

DEVI-
ANTS
& DENIANCE

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
DISVALUED PEOPLE AND BEHAVIOR

EDWARD SAGARIN



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2016

FOUR COUNTY LIBRARY SYSTEM



A 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 3 6 2 0 6

301.62 Saga c.1
Sagarin
Deviants and deviance

D. SCARD

301.62 Saga c.1
Sagarin
Deviants and deviance

MAY 12 1975

Four County Library System

Club House Road

Binghamton, New York 13903

607-723-8236

Serving Broome, Chenango, Delaware and Otsego Counties.

Borrower is responsible for all library materials charged to his card.

Books except new fiction and those on reserve may be renewed.

A fine will be charged for each item overdue.

Please notify the library promptly of any change of address.

✓
99

✓

Deviants and Deviance

EDWARD SAGARIN

*Deviants and
Deviance*

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
DISVALUED PEOPLE AND BEHAVIOR



PRAEGER PUBLISHERS • NEW YORK

Published in the United States of America in 1975
by Praeger Publishers, Inc.
111 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003

© 1975 by Praeger Publishers, Inc.

All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Sagarin, Edward, 1913-

Deviants and deviance.

Bibliography: p.

Includes index.

1. Deviant behavior. I. Title. [DNLM: 1. Social
behavior disorders. 2. Social values. WM600 S129c]

HM291.S22 301.6'2 72-79542

ISBN 0-275-50330-5

Printed in the United States of America

To Stanley J. Wittenberg
if not for whom . . .
as an old saying goes

Contents

<i>To the Reader</i>	xi
I THE IDEA OF DEVIANCE	1
<i>Toward a Definition of Deviance</i>	2
<i>Keeping People in Line</i>	10
<i>Deviance and Value Judgments</i>	15
<i>Deviance and Rarity</i>	18
<i>Crime and Criminality</i>	24
<i>Marginality: A Different Kind of Differentness</i>	34
<i>Abnormality, Pathology, and Eccentricity</i>	40
<i>Social Problems and Social Disorganization</i>	43
<i>The Act, the Actor, and the Status</i>	46
<i>The Dimensions of Deviance</i>	53
<i>Summing Up</i>	62
II THEORIES, EXPLANATIONS, AND PERSPECTIVES	67
<i>The Aim of Theory</i>	68
<i>Biological and Constitutional Approaches</i>	78
<i>Psychological Theories: Personality, Temperament, and Mentality</i>	89
<i>Psychoanalytic Theory</i>	95

	<i>Anomie Theory and the Conflict Between Means and Ends</i>	102
	<i>Theories of Cultural Transmission</i>	112
	<i>Labeling: More a Perspective than a Theory</i>	121
	<i>The Tyranny of Isness</i>	144
	<i>Conflict: From Class Conflict to Culture Conflict</i>	155
	<i>Summing Up: Problems of Living in a Heterogeneous Society</i>	165
III	DEVIANCE AND SICKNESS	179
	<i>Is the Deviant Sick?</i>	180
	<i>Mental Illness as a Social Reality</i>	190
	<i>The Disabled as Involuntary Deviants</i>	201
	<i>The Problem of the Medical Model</i>	214
IV	SOME SOCIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS	219
	<i>Determining the Norms and Counting the Deviants</i>	220
	<i>Learning About Deviants</i>	225
	<i>Conceptualization and the Problem of Minorities</i>	239
	<i>Some Sociological Dilemmas</i>	246
	<i>The First Case History: A Conflict Between Ethics and Research Goals</i>	250
	<i>The Second Case History: Proposal for a Study of Certain Deviant Couples</i>	260
V	SURVIVAL PATTERNS AND SOCIAL CONTROL	267
	<i>Strategies of the Deviants</i>	268
	<i>Dissembling and Dissimulation</i>	279
	<i>Subcultures</i>	294
	<i>Organizations</i>	302
	<i>Normals Against Deviants</i>	315
	<i>Strategies, Types, and Typologies</i>	329
	<i>Stereotypes</i>	343
	<i>Strategy in Reverse: The Burdens of the Normals</i>	354

VI PROSPECTS AND POLICIES	361
<i>Deviance and Social Policy</i>	362
<i>The Functions, Uses, and Value of Deviance</i>	368
<i>Decriminalization</i>	375
<i>Too Much Deviance—or Not Enough?</i>	391
<i>Dissensus and Diversity</i>	398
<i>Who Are the Deviants, Anyway?</i>	405
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	414
GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE	417
INDEX OF NAMES	447
GENERAL INDEX	451

To the Reader

A BOOK should require no foreword, preface, introduction, or prolegomenon, particularly from its own author, explaining, excusing, or apologizing for what will follow. As befits the writer of a book on deviance, I shall depart from that self-imposed rule.

In this work, there are no sections devoted to descriptions and analysis of specific types of deviant people or disvalued acts: no sections on drug abusers, alcoholics, the mentally retarded, prostitutes, child molesters, or suicides and their families. It appears to me that sociology is valuable to the extent that it can be a generalizing science of human behavior and that a book of this type should concern itself exclusively with definitional, conceptual, theoretical, and similar problems and with such areas of the field as, for instance, strategies for coping with life and social policy for human fulfillment. In such discussions, examples of a substantive nature are necessary, not only when they show a neat fit, a validation of the theory or concept, but especially when they do not.

The relationship between the abstract and the concrete in sociology is dynamic, interactive, and continuous. It is from an examination of the concrete that one derives general principles, and it is in the study of the latter that one is better able to comprehend the former. This book is intended to contribute to an understanding of the most general principles, so that the reader will be better equipped to proceed, whether by field work, literature study, or in any other manner, to an investigation of white-collar criminals, stutterers, ex-convicts, and others. These studies will then enrich, refine, validate, and in some cases no doubt disconfirm the general conceptual approaches. The process is cyclical and, it is hoped, unending.

E. S.

Deviants and Deviance

I

The Idea of Deviance

WHO ARE the deviants? What do they do? What sort of men and women are sociologists talking about when they use this word? Murderers, automobile thieves, people who assault others on a dark street? Prostitutes who seek their customers by walking up and down the avenues or recruit them through a telephone service and receive them at plush apartments? Communists, atheists, and anarchists, or racists and warmongers—those who inhabit the worlds of the radical left or the radical right? Who are these individuals and groups on whom the label *deviant* is frequently and successfully placed?

Are the deviants those who violate the law? If so, should one include not only individuals commonly acknowledged to be criminals because they prey on others but also such lawbreakers as jaywalkers and litterbugs? Is the fellow who drops orange peel on the sidewalk as he strolls along a deviant? Are you?

Are the deviants those who are most unlike the mass of ordinary folk, those who deviate most from the average? And does this mean the genius as well as the retarded, the saint as well as the sinner, the strongest man in the world as well as the weakest?

The first task in any study is to define the subject matter.

Toward a Definition of Deviance

SOCIOLOGISTS SPEAK of *deviant behavior*, using the phrase as if it were the opposite of *conformity*. In searching for a definition, one immediately encounters some difficulties. For example, what of those whose alleged deviance inheres in what they *are* rather than in what they *do*?

The blind, the crippled, and other disabled, the visibly scarred, and that most stigmatized of all sick people, the lepers—are they to be included under the rubric of deviants and deviance? If so, does this imply that deviance is not necessarily restricted to the voluntary act, for which the person so labeled can be held responsible? Certainly nobody can be called criminal who is not responsible. Can deviance be present when responsibility is not?

Examine for a moment the people who are the recipients of sneers and jeers, of stares and glares, of openly hostile epithets and of remarks whose hostility is ill concealed by jocularity. There are the obese and the undersized (“fatty” and “shrimp”), the interracial couple, the unmarried mother, the two men holding hands on the park bench or at the beach. Deviants all? Are these the people under examination here, are they the ones referred to when people speak of deviants or deviates?

A man walks into an elevator, sneezes without covering his mouth, and remains silent, never uttering or even mumbling under his breath the expected words, “Excuse me.” A few seconds later, another person in the same elevator allows a little noise to come forth, the expulsion of air, associated with an unpleasant odor. Are they deviants, both of them, and what is implied when sociologists, laymen, or you and I place them (if we do) in the same category with murderers and thieves, prostitutes and adulterers, anarchists and paraplegics, and state that this is a category called deviants and deviance?

What are the criteria for placing people in this category? Some have

suggested that sociologists should display their own values, their sense of outrage at crimes against humanity, by examining as deviant the mass murderers of Nazi Germany and those men of the Pentagon and in high political standing who were responsible for the bombing of Vietnam and Cambodia. When the backgrounds of deviants and the etiology of their behavior are studied, this argument goes, one should look into the broken families and the childhood difficulties not only of men who are responsible for the death of one or two persons but also of those responsible for the death of tens or hundreds of thousands. One should look at the aberrations not only of those who occupy the beds in mental institutions, who for the most part are both powerless and harmless within and without these confines, but also of those who occupy the citadels of might on the American corporate, military, and political scene, who are equally deviant and with much more destructive consequences. But is this deviance? What sort of definition of deviance does one require if such persons are to be included?

Finally, what of the people who define themselves as fighters for freedom, who are often denounced in their own land as outlaws if not as mental incompetents, who plant bombs and engage in shoot-outs, convinced that theirs is a righteous cause and that history will vindicate their behavior? The world has seen such people in Palestine prior to 1948, in Northern Ireland, in Quebec, and in many other parts of the world, the United States not excepted. Are they to be included in the study of deviants, and, if so, with what justification, with what theoretical framework, and under what type of definition?

What is a course in deviant behavior all about, asks Alexander Liazos (1972). "Nuts, sluts, and preverts," he quotes college students as answering—and then expresses his indignation that these are the sorts of people being studied and that these epithets accurately express the attitudes taken toward them, arguing that sociologists should, rather, study the evil men who are responsible for poverty and war.

So that the study of deviants properly starts with the questions: Who are we talking about? What kinds of people? Where are they, what do they do, what do they have in common, how are they to be recognized or located?

LOOKING AT SOME LISTS

One of the ways of understanding and defining a concept is to take all the persons, objects, or situations that authorities (in this instance, sociologists) place within the parameters of that concept,

note the individual instances of the phenomenon that are given the label, and then determine what they have in common. Who is called deviant and what is called deviance by students of human behavior? It is through an examination of the individual instances that serve as examples of a concept that a definition can come forth. With such a definition, one can place instances or examples with greater certainty that one knows what they have in common and what the implications of their commonness may be.

Many authorities have compiled their own lists, consisting of examples and not meant to be inclusive. An examination of such lists suggests that each author is focusing on a slightly different group. Fred Davis (1961), for example, states that under the term *deviant* he would include "the Negro, the career woman, the criminal, the Communist, the physically handicapped, the mentally ill, the homosexual, to mention but a few." All are deviants, he claims—"albeit in different ways and with markedly different consequences for their life careers." (Bear in mind, in evaluating Davis's statement, that it was written in 1961; a decade later, after the women's liberation movement had begun to affect American social and economic life, the career woman could no longer be seen as deviant.)

Albert Cohen (1966:1) opens a work on deviance with the statement: "The subject of this book is knavery, skulduggery, cheating, unfairness, crime, sneakiness, malingering, cutting corners, immorality, dishonesty, betrayal, graft, corruption, wickedness, and sin—in short, deviance." At first glance, it is difficult to compare this list with Davis's because Cohen is presenting types of behavior rather than people, but a translation can easily be made: Cohen's deviants are knaves and cheats, criminals and malingerers, wicked folk and sinners. This is still not as specific as Davis's deviants, who are identified and unmistakably located: the Communist, the physically handicapped, the mentally ill. But it is clear that Cohen is emphasizing the deliberate and voluntary wrongdoer while Davis's spectrum is much broader. Many of his people have done no wrong; if anything, they are the victims of wrongs done to them by others. Not so those who engage in immoral behavior.

Alvin Gouldner (1968), in describing the work of some students of deviant behavior, states that their focus of study has been "the world of hip, drug addicts, jazz musicians, cab drivers, prostitutes, night people, drifters, grifters, and skidders: the 'cool world.'" The identifications of sociologists who study such people, Gouldner says, are with deviant rather than respectable society.

Howard Becker (1963), in his major work on deviance, made

detailed analyses of two examples: marijuana users and jazz musicians. But again, allowance should be made for the time when such studies were conducted (starting in the late 1940s and ending in the early 1960s). A British collection entitled *Images of Deviance* (S. Cohen, 1971) deals with drug users, thieves, hooligans (uncontrolled and violent fanatics at a soccer match), suicides, homosexuals and their blackmailers, and industrial saboteurs. Edwin Lemert (1951), in an extremely influential book, included studies of seven types: blind people, stutterers, political radicals, prostitutes, criminals, alcoholics, and the mentally disordered. He later added specific studies of check forgers and paranoiacs (who presumably would have been included under criminals and the mentally ill, respectively, in the previous work). Lemert's is a broad spectrum, reminiscent of the list suggested by Davis. James Henslin (1972) refers to studies of deviance in four settings—"cabbies, suicides, drug users, and abortionees"—and others have found deviance in alcoholics, nudist campers, protest demonstrators, topless barmaids, motorcycle gangs, jockeys, and hippies.

Much as these lists may differ from one to another, a general image begins to emerge out of which definitions can be formed. On the basis of such definitions, one can examine and re-examine the lists and determine whether various people have erred or exaggerated in identifying some groups as deviant while omitting others.

Putting aside Davis's career women and Gouldner's and Henslin's taxi drivers (actually, Gouldner was attributing the list to others), comparison of the groups cited by the various authors produces some clarity. What kind of concept can include Negroes, homosexuals, scoundrels, thieves, prostitutes, and cripples? Obviously, there is much that these people do not have in common: responsibility for their status, a claim to public sympathy, the moral meanings imputed to them, the degree to which they are victims rather than victimizers (or neither or both), the existence, nature, and extent of antisocial characteristics, their relationship to the legal order, and even whether the deviance is associated with their behavior or their status: If they differ in all these respects, what traits, then, do they share? The fact that, *as persons in a given status, whether or not they commit acts associated with their groups and imputed to them, they are devalued and reacted to in a negative manner by large numbers of persons in the society.* Having arrived at this point, one would have to examine each category of persons (as well as a long list of other categories not mentioned by these scholars, such as ex-priests, atheists, and religious cultists) to see whether the placement under the heading of deviance is accurate for a given society.

LOOKING AT SOME DEFINITIONS

The lists of persons who are thought of as deviant or are given this label do not constitute definitions but can lead directly to them. The definitions offered by several scholars have much in common, although they have different emphases, and sometimes the points at which they depart from each other can be reconciled. By and large, one will find four areas in which the definitions are somewhat dissimilar: (1) Some scholars emphasize volitional acts, while others do not; (2) some make it explicit that for an act to be deviant there must be social disapproval in addition to law- or rule-breaking; (3) a few definitions include the concept of deviant status, as well as deviant behavior; and (4) there are some who would broaden the theme of deviance to include being different or unusual, even when the differentness is in a socially approved direction. Aside from those who adhere to this last point, deviance is usually seen as doing or being that which is socially disapproved.

Thus, Ira Reiss (1970) writes: "Deviant behavior, by general agreement, refers to behavior that is viewed by a considerable number of people as reprehensible and beyond the tolerance limit." Fine, but many will object to the vagueness of some of these terms. They will want to know how many people constitute a "considerable number," how far they have to be pushed—that is, how reprehensible they have to perceive an act as being—and how one knows that an act is "beyond the tolerance limit." Even given the definition, there can still be a difference as to whether a given type of behavior or a particular group of people might fall within its limits. For example, Reiss himself concluded as late as 1970 that premarital heterosexual intercourse, even on a consensual, affectional, and nonpromiscuous basis, was deviant, a conclusion with which many would differ; in that case, the example would not be acceptable because it fails to fit an unobjectionable definition.

Along somewhat similar lines, Albert Cohen (1966:1) defines deviance as the violation of rules when that violation "excites some disapproval, anger, or indignation." That would omit cripples and lepers, blacks and other ethnic minorities, retardates and the mentally ill; they excite disapproval, anger, or indignation, but not for rule-violation, just for being what they are.¹ Further, the question that

¹ Some people find a way of reconciling Cohen's definition with some or even all of the groups that I have listed. The mentally ill do violate the rules of social interaction, not deliberately but quite disruptively, and that is what arouses disapproval. The same can be said for the leper; because he is (or is considered to

arose with Reiss's definition continues to haunt the social scientist: How severe must the disapproval or anger be in order that it qualify as "some"?

Marshall Clinard (1968:28), in the best-known textbook devoted specifically to deviance rather than to such related fields as criminality and delinquency, writes: "Only those deviations in which behavior is in a disapproved direction, and of sufficient degree to exceed the tolerance limit of the community, constitute deviant behavior." Finally, Donald Black and Albert Reiss (1970) state that "individual or group behavior is deviant if it falls within a class of behavior for which there is a probability of negative sanctions subsequent to its detection." They then go on to point out that these negative sanctions need only be "above zero when the behavior is detected" to qualify the acts as deviant. "The greater the probability of sanction," they state, "the more appropriate is the classification of deviant." This effort to correlate a deviant label with the probability that sanctions will be forthcoming appears to be valuable, and perhaps a modification of the last quotation would be in order: "The greater the strength of negative sanction, the more appropriate is the classification of deviant." Above zero—that is, just slightly above—might be so mild a sanction that deviance becomes a misleading category.

A slightly different orientation is found in the work of Talcott Parsons (1951:250). He refers to deviance as "a motivated tendency for an actor to behave in contravention of one or more institutionalized normative patterns." It may be inherent in Parsons's view of society that those who contravene "institutionalized normative patterns" are punished, but this is never made explicit. What is interesting here, further, is the "motivated tendency," which would make it necessary to exclude the involuntary actor—the physically handicapped, for example—from the category.

Howard Becker (1963) notes that deviant behavior "is behavior that people so label," a tautology that serves to emphasize that any term must have connotations about which there are implicit or explicit agreements among the members of the language community employing

be) in a contagious condition, hence dangerous, interaction with him is impeded. The cripple quite obviously, according to this type of thinking, does not live by the rules of others; he does not because he cannot. As for the racially stigmatized, what rules have they violated—the rule that one is supposed to be white in the United States, or Protestant in Ulster? I find this line of thought facile and unconvincing. Even if one accepts the formulation that the "rule-violation" consists of an intrusion into another's personal territory, or a disruption of another's careful navigation through life, the black, the Jew, the cripple can hardly be characterized as *behaving* in a deviant manner, for it is what they are, rather than what they do, that "excites some disapproval, anger, or indignation."

it. But in context, Becker refers to the fact that there are some people who take it upon themselves to label *others* deviant. The statement is important, not only in its suggestion that deviance is relative, subject to change, and that it is not an inherent quality of the person who carries the label, but also in its emphasis on the normal, law-abiding, and straight members of society as those who decide who should be labeled deviant.² However, Becker's statement should not be confused with a definition, for it leaves unanswered questions concerning the referents used by the members of the society in the determination of the meaning of the term and the manner in which they will use it; it fails to cite the criteria used for calling something deviant, and how these differ from the criteria that are employed when something is called criminal, stupid, beautiful, or anything else; it does not specify who the labelers are, how many they must be, what positions they occupy in society, whether their agreement on what to call deviant must be unanimous, and whether such agreement is explicit or implicit. Finally, perhaps most important of all, it gives no indication of what characteristics are present, or presumed to be present, in the persons given the deviant designation.³

Nevertheless, although Becker (1963) never explicitly spells out a definition of deviance that he could accept, he finds closest to his own the view that calls this phenomenon "the failure to obey group rules." Continuing: "Once we have described the rules a group enforces on its members, we can say with precision whether or not a person has violated them and is thus, in this view, deviant." Here, let it be noted, disapproval and sanctions are absent, although one might find them implicit in the word "enforces."

One more definition and the concept should then be clear.⁴ Edwin Schur (1971) points out that it would be desirable to create a definition that could include reactions to certain personal conditions and to the disabled, even though the latter have violated no rule, except if one

² This statement is a cornerstone of a major perspective on deviance known as *labeling*, which is discussed at greater length at several points in the book.

³ Becker (1971) and many others who are in substantial agreement with his approach (the so-called labeling school) have answered some—but not all—of these arguments. My point here is that the simple statement that deviant behavior is behavior that people so label creates more problems than it solves.

⁴ At no time do I consider how the word is used (and hence, by implication, defined) in everyday discourse. Ordinarily this would be important, except that deviance is a word not used with great frequency; further, my concern in this opening section has been with how sociologists define the word, for the purpose of arriving at a sociological definition. For the rationale that permits (and sometimes demands) that scientific definitions depart from those of everyday language, I refer the reader to Robert K. Merton's discussion of the meanings of functionalism in his *Social Theory and Social Structure* (1957).

wants to say that there is a rule in society that one should not be disabled. But he then goes on to suggest the following working definition, italicizing what he considers the most crucial phrases: "Human behavior is deviant *to the extent that* it comes to be viewed as involving a *personally discreditable* departure from a group's normative expectations, *and* it *elicits* interpersonal or collective reactions that serve to 'isolate,' 'treat,' 'correct,' or 'punish' *individuals* engaged in such behavior." This is as close as any to the concept that will be used in this book, and for my purpose it is acceptable, although I would make some slight modifications. I would speak not of human behavior as deviant, but of human behavior *or* human beings as deviant, for this usage permits one to understand that deviance is a matter of being *or* doing, and perhaps both, but that under some circumstances it may be one without the other. It is particularly useful to have a definition that sees deviance as a matter of degree rather than an either-or proposition, and this is expressed by Schur in the simple phrase: "to the extent that." Finally, the definition includes the departure from expectations, the fact that this departure must be viewed by others as discreditable, and that it incites punitive and/or rehabilitative reactions, the nature of which is spelled out.⁵

In this book, disvalued people and disvalued behavior that provoke hostile reactions will be considered deviant.

⁵ There is one problem with Schur's definition that seems to require clarification—namely, does it include secret acts, behavior, or states of being? If secret, anonymous, or unknown, how could such acts or states elicit interpersonal or collective reactions that isolate or in some other way punish the offender? If no such reactions are elicited, are not the acts deviant nonetheless? The problem is at least partially handled if one uses Erving Goffman's (1963) differentiation between discreditable and discredited, the former being a secret characteristic that would produce negative reactions if discovered, and the latter unconcealed, perhaps visible. At any rate, this can be spelled out with greater care by suggesting that there is general agreement that the behavior, when it is concealed or unknown, would elicit such negative reactions upon becoming known.

Keeping People in Line

DEVIANCE CAN be equated with the idea that some people are out of line with most others in the society, or at least with the men and women in their own, sometimes small, subgroup, the subgroup with which they identify. But it is only when this failure to be in line or to stay in line is disapproved that sociologists speak of deviance. The word has been defined in terms of rule-breaking, of doing what is considered as just not the right thing to do, or of being what the audience viewing (and managing or manipulating) think of as not the best type of person to be.

From this view, it is the rules that make the deviance; if there were no rules, there would be no rule-breakers. So that one starts with an elementary and self-evident statement: that all societies have rules, formal and informal, explicit and implicit,⁶ for the behavior of members, and all societies enforce these rules by a variety of rewards to the vast numbers who uphold them and punishment or sanctions to those who violate them.

From this, it appears that deviants might be defined as those who break a socially imposed rule. But even as a starting point, this definition offers difficulties for sociological analysis. It might be better if one were to limit the definition of deviance to the violation of rules when such violation incites anger, hostility, resentment, scorn, ridicule, or punitive action by a significant sector of the populace. Jaywalking, then, would not be a deviant act, nor would the failure of a professor to hand in his students' grades on time, although the former might well be considered deviant if there were a campaign by motorists, parents, and civic groups to arouse the public, and the latter might likewise be considered deviant if it were part of a pattern of contempt for the regulations of the institution shown by the particular professor,

⁶ There can be argument over whether primitive and preliterate societies had formal rules. It would appear to me that the above statement is literally correct; such rules were formal and explicit even when not reduced to writing and codified in the manner of modern law.

and if by so acting he elicited sufficient hostility in students and administrators.

Not only must every society have rules governing behavior, but every social organization, whether large or small, formal or informal, must have its guidelines and regulations. Sometimes these are the very obvious rules prohibiting acts that would threaten the ongoing society and seeking to protect people from assault at the hands of others and to prevent what is agreed upon as belonging to one person from being taken by another. The regulations by which men live and which guide human behavior govern what one must do as well as what one must not do; that is, they are prescriptions as well as proscriptions. In most societies, a mother and father must take responsibility for the well-being, care, and upbringing of their child. As soon as one mentions a rule of this sort, exceptions will come to mind: the slave owner who had no social or legal responsibility for the child he had fathered, the avuncular societies in which the mother's brother was as responsible as (or more responsible than) her mate, the shift in responsibility from the biological parents to foster parents. But the existence of these exceptions in no way invalidates the contention that societies make prescribing rules: it merely indicates that these rules differ from one group or period of time to another within the same society.

Then, there are rules governing everyday behavior, particularly folkways and etiquette. When students enter a classroom, even for the first time, they know that they are to take seats that have been set aside specifically for them, not the one behind a desk that is for the teacher. At a funeral, one may smile at seeing a friend or relative whom one has not seen for a long time, but one may not laugh joyfully. One covers his mouth when yawning or coughing, says "excuse me" after sneezing, and ignores an adult's failure to do these things, but is permitted to correct or reprimand a child for the very same transgression.

The rules that govern behavior are the cement that holds a society together. Without such rules, even the smallest interaction in the smallest circle of friends or family would be impossible. One would have no guideposts as to what can be done, what is allowable, and what the outer limits of nonconformist violation of these allowances might be. Behavior would be constantly problematic, for people would never know what others might do. The whole concept of social expectations would be meaningless.

All members of a social group follow or are supposed to follow the rules of the game; people have to be aware of these rules and know what punishments they will suffer for infractions or violations.

Complex rules and prohibitions governed even primitive societies and nomadic groups; clearly, a network of rules is all the more necessary for survival in the urban and technologically complex world of the twentieth century.

People, in short, must be kept in line; this is true both literally and figuratively. Literally, there are lines waiting to make purchases, to enter theaters, or to get on a bus, as well as lines of soldiers or schoolchildren on parade. There is order in these lines and progress toward a goal common to all those cooperating. But in a symbolic sense, these lines can be seen as similar to the cooperative efforts of human beings who are involved with one another, by chance or by design, for a few fleeting moments or continually over a period of years, in other types of situations. The way people act as they drive their cars, sit in subways, walk into stores to do their shopping, sit at a table with members of the family, make or avoid eye contact on a street, or have discussions and ask questions in a classroom—all are part of a scheme in which it can be said that they are “in line,” in the sense that they are cooperating in obeying a set of rules and working toward some common goal.

In sociology, rules of all sorts that are laid down for people to follow are called *norms*. The norms are the guideposts for human behavior, for behavior by a given person in a given situation; they are the *shoulds* and the *oughts* of social action. Behavior that follows these rules is generally called *normative* (not to be confused with normal) and is sometimes referred to as conformity, although the latter has a connotation of slavish and unthinking obedience, lacking in spontaneity and innovation.

The breaking of a rule, the carrying out of a nonnormative act, is generally called deviance or deviant behavior, although it will be seen that some deviance involves no rule-breaking at all (a sort of deviant status or person), and other rule-breaking is difficult to conceptualize as deviant.

The alignment of people takes on a variety of forms, with degrees of rigidity and flexibility, something that is manifested in both the literal lines (or *queues*, as the British call them, borrowing the French word) and the figurative ones. Those waiting to buy tickets at the theater do not have to stand in the same manner as do cheerleaders or soldiers waiting for the signal to start marching, and soldiers in Germany have traditionally been subject to greater discipline in their line formations than those in the United States. At the theater, one may reserve a place in the line while going off on some errand by asking another to hold that place, or one might even decide to abandon the line altogether; but such alternatives are not available

to those awaiting turns in more rigid or less voluntaristic situations.

The same is true of the alignment of people in a figurative sense: that is, when they are made to obey socially demanded prescriptions for behavior. Parents are permitted to correct, discipline, and punish a child, and there is considerable leeway as to whether this should be done in a permissive or nonpermissive manner. But one may not stray outside the areas of these guideposts for behavior without being subject to the hostile reactions of others (should they discover or know of the situation). For example, there are boundaries on the amount and type of corporal punishment, upper and lower age limits at which physical punishment may be inflicted, and innumerable other culturally understood and largely implicit rules about this type of behavior.

Man⁷ can be conceptualized as creator, follower, user, and violator of norms. Most people are not engaged in the creation of norms; they do not innovate, invent, or bring into existence a set of rules that did not previously hold sway. Occasionally, a new situation will require rules that were not previously present, but even these are most frequently adaptations of rules governing other related occasions. A new game requires rules that did not previously exist, and this is true of a new formal organization or a new nation. A vast experience from the past and a view of the surrounding network of rules governing related situations result in some new norms that are not entirely innovative; they have not been created spontaneously, as if out of nothing, so to speak. There are times when norms are formulated for a special situation, as a war or a disaster; or when they are established by the self-conscious effort of crusaders. For the most part, norms are not created at a given moment in time or by single person, group, or body but come into being and grow to their full force by a subtle and gradual process, so that they take hold without anyone's awareness of at what moment they had arisen, or where. It is humanity that is the creator of norms, not—at least usually not—one man or woman, or a few.

Man as violator of norms is the subject of this book: That is the essence of deviance—or at least of that aspect of norm-violation that is reacted to with hostility, and that aspect of deviance that involves rule-violation—not stigmatized status. It is the differentiation between norm-follower and norm-user that clarifies the matter of the alignment of people.

The norms are guideposts for behavior; hence, they are there to be

⁷ "Man" in the context of this sentence means humanity, mankind and woman-kind, men and women. I apologize to those who may take offense at this usage, but I find myself bound by linguistic convention.

followed. However, the ingenuity of man and the precariousness of his life combine to make it necessary to manipulate these rules, short of forthrightly violating them. True, they are violated, but more frequently they are utilized, circumvented, handled, called into force, and then (at an appropriate moment) placed aside. Sometimes it suffices for the offender merely to acknowledge some minor transgression. His acknowledgment is a ritual that repairs a disturbed situation; this is what Erving Goffman (1971) calls "remedial work." One sneezes or yawns, then remedies the situation with the phrase "excuse me," a recognition of the offensive nature of the behavior, an apology for having perpetrated the act. This method of repairing a relationship would not work for thievery, although the annals of criminology are replete with anecdotes of apologies uttered by robbers and even rapists as they took hasty departure from their victims.

It is in the nature of norm-flexibility that one sees man as user more than as follower of rules. The motorist is to stop at the red light; the motorcyclist is under the same constraint, but the bicyclist ignores the rule, although technically it applies to him as well. The ambulance driver, the police patrol car, and the fire engine are excepted from the red-light regulation, but the exception is tempered—which is another way of emphasizing the matter of flexibility—by the existence (or absence) of an emergency, the amount of traffic, the apparent danger of running the light, and other factors. As for the civilian, he utilizes the norm without truly violating it when he cautiously passes a red light while rushing to the hospital, while in a funeral procession, or while chasing a thief.

One of the most effective methods of keeping most people in line is to throw some people out of the line. This leaves the remainder not only in better alignment but at the same time in fear of exclusion. It is in this view of the world that deviance emerges as something that is useful to the continuity of an ongoing society. By reacting in a hostile manner to those who are *not* the good and the proper, a majority of the people or a powerful group may reinforce the idea of goodness and propriety and thus perpetuate a society of individuals who are more conforming, more obedient, and more loyal to their ideology and rules of behavior.

Deviance and Value Judgments

THE TERM *deviance* connotes that the type of behavior under examination (and the type of persons performing such behavior) are negatively judged in a given society. This does not mean that the social scientist is judging such persons negatively, although he may very well be doing so, as he probably would if the behavior were forcible rape, which virtually everyone agrees is evil. It means only that the social scientist is evaluating the manner in which the act or actor is judged in a given society, usually his own. He is taking the pulse of the society and coming to the conclusion—in which he may be wrong—that the act or actor is disvalued, and to such an extent that the word *deviant* can properly be applied to them.

In short, to state that an act or a person is deviant is not to pass a value judgment; it is to state that, in the view of the speaker, such a value judgment has been passed by the society as a whole, or by large and significant numbers of people within it. For a professor or student to say, "I do not consider marijuana smoking to be deviant," for example, means not that he approves of it but, rather, that he believes that in his society, at a given time, it is not disapproved. To say "I do not consider shoplifting deviant, because it is a justifiable answer to high prices and high profits" is a misuse of the concept of deviance; one can say that this behavior ought not to be so labeled (if this is one's belief), but the fact is that it is negatively judged and that it is therefore deviant. That it ought not to be, in the judgment of some persons, is quite another matter, and a very significant one at that.

All this brings up a number of questions, such as: In whose eyes is such behavior disvalued? By how many people? How negative must their judgments be? How does one know that this is the judgment of others? These problems, to be discussed in the course of this work, are not ones for which easy solutions are readily available.

WHO'S CONDEMNING WHOM?

In everyday speech, the term *deviant* is not frequently heard, but when used it has a most pejorative connotation.⁸ It often refers to a child molester or other type of individual who has performed a sexually disvalued act, and sometimes the act itself, rather than the person, is described as deviant. The negative judgment of the speaker is, however, almost invariable and well-nigh unmistakable. Thus there is a sharp dichotomy between the everyday use of the term and the use of the sociologist. This is an unfortunate situation, as John Lofland (1969) points out, but language is hard to change, and it may be sufficient for social science that people within the discipline define their terms and agree on the ground rules for communicating with one another.⁹

Inasmuch as the social scientist is expressing the attitudes and value judgments of people in the society as he understands these to be, one can accept the statement of Howard Becker (1963) that deviance is what people declare it to be. The study of deviance is a study of what people condemn. All deviant people and all deviant acts have nothing in common except the condemnation that they provoke. Deviance, Becker contends, is to be found in the reactions of people. This is not merely because if people did not make rules, they could not be broken; deviance is located in the reactions people have to *some* rules that are broken, the nature and extent of these reactions, and their reactions to some of the people who break rules. This does not mean that deviance does not reside in the quality of the act that

⁸ Even more so the word *deviate* as a noun, but not as a verb. Note in this respect that they are pronounced differently. From the viewpoint of the many linguists who regard spoken language as *the* language, these words might be considered to be different but related. Certainly they have very dissimilar connotations.

⁹ Not all social scientists, by the way, are willing to accept these rules. Erving Goffman (1963:140) expresses his misgivings about what he calls the currently fashionable term that has become a convenient label:

It is remarkable that those who live around the social sciences have so quickly become comfortable in using the term "deviant," as if those to whom the term is applied have enough in common so that significant things can be said about them as a whole. Just as there are iatrogenic disorders caused by the work that physicians do (which then gives them more work to do), so there are categories of persons who are created by students of society, and then studied by them.

But Goffman, of course, has studied the category—he simply uses other terms for the people within it. The key question is whether those within the group *do* have "enough in common." The opinion of social scientists appears to be almost unambiguously affirmative.

may have provoked negative reaction, but it is only such hostile reaction that enables the sociologist to identify the act as deviant and justifies his categorization, description, and analysis of it under that rubric.

One may dispute the validity of the specific list of deviants compiled by Fred Davis (Communists, career women, cripples, criminals) or by anyone else, but it would be absurd to question the propriety of the social scientist's making such a category of the socially condemned, of groups that excite hostile reactions from numerous others. Such people differ from one another in many ways, as Davis points out, and the label of deviant has dissimilar consequences for the different groups so labeled. But what they have in common provides at least two valid topics for investigation: namely, the study of hostility that is directed within a society at some of its own members, and the study of those who are the objects of such hostility.

If it is kept in mind that deviance is not a judgment made by the behavioral scientist of what is wrong but a judgment of what he finds is *considered* wrong in the society under study, many issues become clarified. The sociologist who fails to conceptualize slavery or genocide as deviant is not condoning these acts. If anything, he may be severely condemning the societies in which they took place, because he is saying that these acts were widely condoned, or at least free from condemnation, at the given time and place. To say that lynching was not deviant among the dominant whites in large sections of the United States from the 1860s through the 1930s does not imply that one approves of lynching; more likely—although this has to be spelled out—the social scientist is expressing a commentary, and a most condemnatory one at that, on American life from the end of Reconstruction to the Sunday morning when bombs fell on Pearl Harbor.

The study of deviance as it is here defined casts light on the nature of a society, its institutions, and the social character of its people when one considers the following questions: What are the norms and who are the violators? How are deviants suppressed, tolerated, or otherwise treated? How is evil condoned by the failure to define it as deviant? Who makes the rules, and how can they be changed? How can people bring about change in the definitions of the condemned and the culpable? Those who have called for a change in focus, so that evil is studied even when it is not condemned, are asking for a concentration on one phenomenon rather than another; they may, nonetheless, have an effect on deviance as a subfield of sociology, by

steering scholarship toward the hitherto largely ignored area of how and why some wicked acts come to be widely approved by a society, particularly when they are the acts of these at the helm of the society.¹⁰

Deviance and Rarity

ONE SHOULD distinguish concepts from others to which they are closely related and with which they are often confused. If two concepts were to cover exactly the same territory—an unlikely situation—then it might be said that they are identical, that the terms are synonymous, and that what is studied about one applies equally to the other. More frequently, there are differences, subtle or gross, sometimes clarified only in communication among scholars and students, at other times clarified by the layman in ordinary discourse. Closely related concepts may be overlapping, may cover distinct areas, or may be contained one within the other.

Deviance is often confused with several related and overlapping types of conditions and performances. Perhaps the most frequently confused, and the easiest to dispose of, is the matter of statistical fewness, the tendency to speak of something as deviant because it is not part of a majority in the purely numerical sense.

Not all numerical minorities are negatively judged by themselves and others around them. Nevertheless, deviance and rarity do overlap, albeit in a complex way. Many minorities are considered deviant, and most deviance is numerically in the minority; further, some minorities only appear to be such but are actually defined by others as part of a larger group, a majority.

For example, no single Protestant denomination constitutes a majority of the American people, or even a majority within Protestant-

¹⁰ This phenomenon has not been entirely ignored. See, for example, the work of Everett Hughes (1962) on the condonation of genocide by masses of “good people” in Germany. But the sociology of deviance has paid little attention to such matters, and, interestingly, Hughes’s focus is that of an American on a German situation. White American sociologists generally do not ask similar questions about racism in this country, and certainly this is hardly looked on as part of the sociology of deviance.

ism; from this viewpoint, one could speak of the Methodists, for example, as being a numerical minority both of Americans and of Protestants. However, in this instance (and others, such as Baptists, Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and so forth), the members are seen not so much as part of a unique sect or denomination, differentiated from the other denominationalists, but rather as part of the Protestant (and perhaps Christian and often white Anglo-Saxon) melting pot. So that even if *minority* were being used as synonymous with *deviant* (as it is not), Methodists would not qualify. In the same way, to have an IQ of 116 is to be in a minority, for most people do not have exactly that IQ, and to be 5'5" is to be in a minority, for most people are not 5'5"; but these are illusory statements. Everyone does have an IQ, and the majority do grow to an adult height, for which these figures fall within the "normal" (or average, or majority) range, whether judged by statistical formula or, better, by the way they are viewed by other members of the society. Again, the statistical minority is sometimes an illusion.

Even when it is not an illusion, however, it is more properly identified as deviation, or simply acceptable difference, rather than as deviance. To illustrate the first, an IQ that is "abnormally" high, outside the range of the statistical average (or statistical norm, as the phrase is sometimes used), would usually not be viewed negatively, although there may be circumstances in which children would ridicule a "brain" or fellow students resent the competition he presents. Generally, however, such persons are adulated more than deprecated.

People with IQ's above 160 would hardly be considered deviant, and they are not disvalued, although they make up only a small fraction of the population. However, they may in some circumstances utilize their high IQ's for nefarious purposes—as justification for snobbish or arrogant behavior, or to commit unusual crimes that require extreme intelligence—and then they would be deviant, not because of their intelligence (if, for the purpose of this argument, IQ is equated with intelligence), but because of other characteristics that, in this instance, are made possible or encouraged by that IQ.

Very tall males may be encountered about as infrequently as very short ones, but the latter are disvalued much more than the former, and the tall ones not at all unless their height reaches a point where the word "freak" is invoked pejoratively. Someone with a rare blood type is not a deviant, nor is a chess master, or a concert pianist. There is a value neutrality toward the first individual, and a positive valuation toward the second and third.

At least two scholars prefer to place deviance and differentness in

the same category, and their arguments should be considered.¹¹ The distinguished criminologist and educator Leslie Wilkins (1964) conceptualizes deviance and differentness, not as concentric or overlapping circles, but as dimensions on a bell curve, following a normal (or Gaussian) structure. This perspective would equate normative behavior with the statistical norm, the central area of the bell. As the curve goes out in either direction, toward extreme criminality or saintliness, toward retardation or genius, there are fewer and fewer cases. Deviance, for Wilkins, is behavior that is found at the outer edges of the frequency curve.¹²

The flat ends of the bell curve represent rarity, which is not the same thing as deviance. It is another phenomenon that is worthy of social study. To determine why a few people do things that are not done by many is an interesting and worthwhile endeavor, and in such a study it would be perfectly logical, and scientifically valuable, to bring together as a single group the socially condemned and the socially accepted (even adulated) unusual persons. But this is not the same as making a study of devalued people.

Rarity is sometimes highly functional for a society, and in fact some positions can be filled effectively only if there are very few people to fill them. A society does not need so many brain surgeons as it does social workers or teachers, but this does not make the latter more highly regarded and rewarded than the former. In fact, the reverse is true. Furthermore, to postulate the Gaussian curve for human behavior may be a little naive and oversimplified.

¹¹ Note, however, that the position regarding this issue expressed here is in accord with the concept of deviance used by almost all social scientists except for those mentioned in this section and a very few others.

¹² Saints, Wilkins reminds us, are condemned in their own day, by their own contemporaries, in the land in which they display their saintliness. It is only later that they are retrieved, rehabilitated, and canonized. Hence, they can be conceptualized as deviants.

One could write an entire essay on this theme, but I shall permit myself only a few words, as an aside. In the words of St. Matthew, "A prophet is not without honor, save in his own country, and in his own house." The seventeenth-century British poet, Thomas Heywood, wrote:

Seven cities warred for Homer being dead;
Who living had no roofe to shrowd his head.

James Joyce was an Irish expatriate, an exile by choice, whose works in his lifetime were banned in his native country and elsewhere; today he is an honored son of Ireland, and few in that nation are not proud to claim him as their own. In the United States, the Abolitionists were reviled, not only in the antebellum South, where they were a threat to the social and economic organization of slavery, but in the North as well, where their militancy was equated with advocacy of social equality and intermingling of the races—an unthinkable idea.

Looking at the examples of Homer and Joyce, John Brown of the Harper's Ferry raid, Nat Turner, Denmark Vesey, and others who were once denounced and later

What Wilkins's normal-curve concept does offer is the idea that a society has a tolerance for deviation (before it becomes deviance) from the norm (in the statistical and sociological sense of the word), and that this tolerance reaches its outer limit at a certain point in the curve, a given number of alphas from the central mean. This he expresses by x -alpha. Deviance would be locatable at that point in the curve.

As one travels farther away from tolerable behavior on the curve—that is, toward the extremely intolerable—one would encounter the most strongly condemned conduct, and would expect that it be most infrequent, but this does not mean that all rare behavior is at the points of greatest condemnation. Some forms of strongly condemned conduct have at times been quite common. During certain periods in history, lynch mobs were not rare, either in the frequency with which they were formed or in the number of participants therein, but this does not imply that there was little or no hostility to them. Not all "saintly" people are disvalued in their own society by their contemporaries; certainly men of the cloth, nuns, and monks have not been treated in the same manner as befell those who were looked upon as sinners.

Nor is there a clear and regular correlation between the strength of the condemnation and the rarity of the event. If there were, it would make a neat little proposition for deterrence: all one would have to do would be to increase the condemnation (and the penal sanctions, presumably) and there would be a decrease in the activities. There are more murders than kidnappings, although murder is usually considered the more heinous, and there are more rapes than art forgeries, although the latter are considered less reprehensible. The rarity or frequency of the deviant act depends on many factors in addition to discouragement of the act by condemnation: These include opportunities, psychological predilections, talents and abilities for performance, probability of rewards and certainty or uncertainty of punishment, and degree of reinforcement for the act by peers, families, and oneself, as well as other factors. All these complicate the simple calculus that would proclaim as a sociological truism: The more deviant, the more rare.

embraced makes one recall only that history is fickle. It has no loyalties, not even to facts, much less to people. That some of these erstwhile deviants are now heroes, if they are, does not imply that all of today's heroes or saints were once crucified, hung, imprisoned, or condemned, nor the converse, that all of those once condemned have survived in history to have their memories and reputations rehabilitated. It demonstrates only that such reverses of historical judgment are possible and do occur, but they are not an inevitable event in the onward progression of time.

While one may well agree with Wilkins that “there is deviant behavior which is ‘good’ or functional to society,” his examples depart from deviance in proving his contention: “The genius, the reformer, the religious leader, and many others are ‘deviant’ from the norms of society as much as the criminal.” To find the socially useful or good in deviance, one must look elsewhere than to the genius.

Jonathan L. Freedman and Anthony N. Doob (1968) hold a point of view similar to that of Wilkins. In their monograph entitled *Deviancy: The Psychology of Being Different*,¹³ the scope of their definition is somewhat wider: Just “being different,” or feeling that one is different, is what brings together a group of dissimilar people for the purpose of being objects of investigation and study. “Just as a homosexual may be rejected by a group of heterosexuals, so might a genius be rejected by a group of nongeniuses. The homosexual may be subjected to more abuse, but the genius will also be left out of the group and also abused. At least this fear will be shared by both.” And again: “The person of average intelligence serving as a reporter at a conference of Nobel prizewinners, the person with normal vision at a home for the blind, the man of average height on a professional basketball court must all feel deviant.”

There can be no objection to a psychological or sociological study of differentness—of why people find themselves among those from whom they feel different, how they handle this, with what ease or dis-ease, and the many other facets of behavior that could be investigated. In such an area as education of children, those who are different because of outstanding abilities or skills may require special attention and facilities, even as the latter are supplied to the unfortunate young who are handicapped or retarded.

However, it appears to be most useful, as an area of sociological study (and psychological, too, I believe), to limit the concept of deviance to the disvalued people in a society, and not to include the rare persons who are highly valued. What Freedman and Doob seem to be focusing on in their examples is the feeling of being out of place, with the concomitant embarrassment and awkwardness in social interaction—in short, the feeling, in the presence of others, of being different from them. To be different is not, however, to be deviant. Left-handed people became less deviant, and no doubt also less different, after they ceased

¹³ These authors use the word *deviancy*, which is almost never encountered in sociology. However, they discuss the same phenomenon that I am discussing in this book, and that sociologists have studied for some decades, under the name of deviance. It is not the terminology that I take issue with, but the manner of defining the concept. Perhaps the dispute could be settled by allowing Freedman and Doob both their definition and their orthography. I fear, however, that this would obfuscate, not clarify, the matter.

to be regarded as "sinister." It appears to be more rewarding for the student of human behavior to separate differentness from deviance, and to exclude from the latter those instances of the former in which one is either highly regarded or is momentarily with others unlike oneself in some characteristics, especially if one has a legitimate role, a right to be present (like the reporter with Nobel laureates).

In distinguishing between differentness and deviance, it should, however, be apparent that it would be difficult to find an instance of the latter occurring in a statistical majority of the population. Probably no society could survive if the majority of its populace disobeyed any rule over any length of time, and no rule would survive if it were widely disobeyed by society's members. If the rule for some reason did not become extinct, its violation would no longer be seen as deviant or negative. It is true that slavery or genocide, indulged in by a majority of a population, is seen negatively and is disvalued, but this value judgment is made by people of another society, or by people of the same society at a later time, not by those in the approving society.

An analogous example might be found, however, in a deeply divided society, in which the acts of one group, perhaps constituting a majority of the populace, are defined as deviant in the eyes of another group. Nonmarital sex might be seen as deviant only by a "square" and uptight minority of the population, but this numerical minority is not entirely powerless in having its voice heard and is not itself defined negatively by the permissive because of its unpopular view. Rather, it is tolerated in a bemused matter.¹⁴

There is a very real, positive relationship between deviance and statistical deviation, but it is not the one that has usually been cited by some writers. For the most part, as noted, numerically small groups are not necessarily deviant, but deviant people tend to be numerically few. Only a society of ruthless oppression, such as the white power structure in Rhodesia and South Africa, can survive when a minority defines the majority in a hostile manner. If a society has a majority that is deviant, the members of that majority will exert pressure to change the moral attitudes and values of the entire populace, or will seek to seize power for itself. An exceptional instance would again be genocide: the lynch mob making up a majority of the town and having the support, at least tacit, of the nation as a whole. But this brings one back to the difficult problem of imputing the label of deviant from the vantage point of another culture, in which the act was not committed. It

¹⁴ The example is quite complex, for what may be involved is not merely the conservative minority but the relationship of the "real" to the pretended or façade culture, the clash of age groups, and the nature of the mores at a moment of rapid transition.

might be said that the act should have been considered deviant but was not; and the failure to so regard it was a moral failing on the part of the populace, proof of the people's deviance from universal moral standards.

Neither rarity nor differentness is the most valuable criterion for determining deviance, because neither of them necessarily implies disvaluation.

Crime and Criminality

NOT ALL deviant acts are crimes. In most cases, for an act to be considered criminal, the government must set in motion a process that is political in nature. This process has been called *criminalization* or *legalization*.¹⁵

It is not a crime for a man and woman of widely disparate heights or ages, when she is the taller or older, to go on a date or to marry, but it is deviant, and perhaps it would be even more deviant for people to arrange for such a couple to get together on a blind date. But no one would want to make the act of arranging this date punishable by law, subject to arrest by a policeman and trial to determine guilt. Similarly, it is not against the law to belch or break wind in the presence of others, but these are things that one does not do, or at least tries not to do, and that bring down enough negative reaction to be defined as deviant.¹⁶

To differentiate deviance from crime poses problems somewhat unlike those encountered when deviance is separated from rarity. Usually, crime is defined as a violation of the official governmental penal codes,

¹⁵ Both terms are ambiguous and perhaps should be abandoned in favor of *illegalization*. I object to *criminalization* because it is also used to describe the process of turning people—such as young delinquents in shelters or industrial homes—into criminals or toward criminal behavior. As for *legalization*, it is used here in the sense of “to make into a matter for the law,” not to make legal, and hence is subject to considerable misunderstanding.

¹⁶ Deviance, it should once again be noted, is tied to age, sex, and other roles and statuses. Breaking wind may not be deviant for the adolescent. If he performs well at it, he might be a hero (but not a saint).

punishable by government action. Some people speak of poverty, air pollution, charging high prices, and making high profits as crimes; others speak of unpatriotic utterances as criminal. These are metaphoric uses of the term—save in those societies where such activities are indeed illegal—and while identifying these uses as figurative in no sense diminishes the social disapproval with which one might regard certain of these acts or conditions and those responsible for them, poverty, pollution, and similar conditions are conceptually different from crime, not in their awfulness (if one sees them as awful), but in that they are not violations of laws passed by a *de facto* and *de jure* government and do not meet the other criteria of crime and criminality. Perhaps what is meant is that these phenomena *should* be treated as crimes and the people responsible treated as criminals, but this is a social judgment that is not the same as the study of those who are so treated.

On the other hand, there are some violations of the criminal law that are usually not regarded as crimes, and certainly the perpetrators are not defined as criminals. They are the minor, taken-for-granted acts that meet considerable acceptance by both the perpetrators and the general populace, such as traffic violations (but not those that endanger people's lives, like drunken driving). H. Laurence Ross (1960–61) has called these acts "folk crime." Although I have some reservations about whether the term *crime* should be applied to them no matter what the modifier, if they *are* crimes, then as a group they constitute crimes without deviance. It would be even more difficult to refer to the persons who carry out these illegal acts as criminals, for the word implies having a certain character and a commitment to a serious and immediately threatening crime; one certainly cannot speak of the double-parker, the jaywalker, even the occasional speeder, as deviant.

A more difficult problem is encountered when one looks at certain types of sexual and white-collar crimes, particularly those having considerable social support. One would be hard-pressed to apply the concept of folk crime to either of these categories. In jurisdictions in which nonmarital sex or oral-genital heterosexual relations between consenting adults are against the law, these acts might be considered criminal yet not deviant, for they meet little negative reaction, or would meet little if discovered.¹⁷ The same is true of executive law-breaking, such as price-fixing, collusion, illegal lobbying, and violations of

¹⁷ At one time there was a good deal of hostility toward these activities and those indulging in them. However, I refer above to a time in history—now—when the law remains but the hostility does not. This would be crime without deviance.

regulations of the Federal Communications Commission and other such bodies.¹⁸ It was the position of Edwin Sutherland (1940) that these activities should be handled as crimes and that the people responsible for them should be branded criminal. Gilbert Geis (1974) has used the term "upperworld crime," in contrast to the crime of the "underworld," to characterize such activities as rocked the nation in the Watergate scandal and other political and white-collar actions perpetrated by the rich and the powerful. In fact, it may well be that revulsion over Watergate and the "White House horrors" will lead to a strong negative reaction against people whose white-collar and political delinquencies hitherto provoked nothing more serious in many people than a decision to switch to another party. Nevertheless, until such reaction does set in, it can be said that white-collar and political violations that meet little or no hostility upon discovery, and adult consensual sexual acts, when they are in contravention of the law, might well be considered crimes without deviance.

In a discussion of the relationship of crime and deviance as abstract concepts, the following propositions exhaust the logical possibilities:

1. That these are different terms for exactly the same thing: all crime is deviance and all deviance is crime.
2. That these are two terms for completely different phenomena: crime is never deviance and deviance is never crime.
3. That crime is the more global term; all deviance is crime, but some crime is not deviance.
4. That the reverse is true, deviance is the larger concept: all crime is deviance, but some deviance is not crime.
5. That they overlap in such a manner that there is an area that is both crime and deviance, another that is deviance without crime, and finally one that is crime without deviance.

Now, the same set of logical possibilities could be worked out for deviance in relationship to many other terms, of which the most frequently used in social science, and apparently among the most significant, are nonconformity, marginality, aberrance, deviation, abnormal behavior, rule-breaking, and non-normative action. In this book, I shall consider in detail the logical possibilities of the relationship between the concepts of deviance and crime and then, without going into similar detail, use some definitions to pinpoint the differences between deviance and other areas.

¹⁸ I do not extend this thesis to argue that such white-collar crimes as embezzlement and forgery are not deviant. These are "ordinary crimes" committed by those who have the opportunity to do so, which is usually managerial and other white-collar personnel.

To test the propositions describing the relationship between the concepts of crime and deviance, one must go to the definitions of the two terms and to the types of acts and persons that are contained within each. Emile Durkheim (1893) departed from the usual description of crime as acts that violate the penal code of the nation in which they are committed and instead emphasized that crime is behavior that outrages the members of a society. This is a definition that would permit one to speak of primitive crime in societies that do not have formal laws, much less penal codes; and to speak of war crimes and genocide as delineated in the Nuremberg trials and the Eichmann trial, and as charged by some European and American intellectuals against the United States in the conduct of the Vietnam war.

For some people, this problem of the definition of crime is handled by the differentiation between *mala prohibita* and *mala in se*. The former are acts that are evil because they are prohibited; the latter are evil in themselves, and retain this evil character (that is, continue to be crimes) even when they are not prohibited. *Mala prohibita* are wrong, it may be said, because they are crimes; *mala in se*, on the other hand, are crimes because they are wrong. *Mala prohibita* would cease to be crimes if they were not prohibited, but *mala in se* not only continue to be crimes, even if they are not prohibited, but reflect on the judgment of the lawmakers, to the extent that they may be considered criminal for not outlawing, and in fact for abetting and encouraging, such acts. This differentiation is one to which I shall return when I discuss the movement toward decriminalization in American society and the entire problem of what has been called "the legislation of morality"¹⁹ (Duster, 1970).

Even if this matter is resolved, and it is decided that the term *crime* shall (or shall not) be limited to legally prohibited acts, there is another problem, at the other end of the continuum, so to speak: that


¹⁹ How easy it would be to cite examples, if only there were consensus on whether there is anything inherently wrong in certain prohibited acts. Many writers would include prostitution, drug abuse, homosexual behavior, commerce in pornography, abortion, and other illegal acts (that is, in jurisdictions where they are illegal) as *mala prohibita*. But others protest, insisting that these acts would be harmful and inimical to the individual and society even were there no legal sanctions against them. This would leave the area of *mala prohibita* to administrative matters, such as failure to file an income-tax return or violation of a traffic law that does not endanger public safety. The latter examples bring one right back to the problem of folk crime and to the question: Is folk crime crime? As for *mala in se*, examples are predatory acts, slavery, genocide. But things that most people see as evil in themselves are not always illegal (as infanticide), and some of those acts that most people designate as being evil are acts that few would dream of making illegal (such as inducement to sexual relations under a false claim of affection). The entire matter is complex, but worthy of greater effort to unravel than is usually accorded it.

is, legally prohibited acts that do not arouse any outrage or hostility in the public and that can be committed without the rule-breaking being stigmatized by treatment of the offender as a criminal. If he is declared guilty but is not labeled criminal, can the act that he committed be considered a crime? Take, for example, any traffic offenses that do not endanger life, such as double-parking or jaywalking. These could be relegated to the lowest end of the continuum of crime seriousness,²⁰ but they fail so completely to fulfill the Durkheimian concept of outraging the public that it would appear to be best to exclude them altogether from the concept of crime. Certainly, if one were to define a criminal as one who has committed a crime, has been convicted of so doing, has done so regularly, or has a commitment to following lawbreaking behavior in the future, one would be forced to place the label of criminal on the jaywalker, and this dilutes the notion of the criminal to the point of absurdity.


Thus, one is dependent on the definitions of crime and deviance and on the specific instances of persons found within each category to decide how the two concepts are to be differentiated, if at all. Diagrammatically, this differentiation can be shown, in its logical possibilities, as in Figure 1.

Logical possibility 1—the complete coincidence of deviance and crime—must be rejected. There are many acts that are deviant without being criminal: for example, the able-bodied male bringing up the children in the home while his wife goes out to work (although the deviation of this situation is subject to rapid social change). The two terms are proved, by this example (and countless others that could be added), not to be identical. The second possibility, which excludes any overlap, also does not stand up under examination: surely the fact that armed robbery is both criminal and deviant, as are many other performances, would eliminate this option. In order to accept the third option, in which crime would be a subdivision under deviance, one must reject the concept of folk crime and define crime as all illegal activities that outrage the public and arouse hostile reaction. The fourth diagram is the reverse, in which deviance is seen as a subdivision of crime. This would not only require the restoration of nondeviant criminality (folk crime and other illegal acts that meet little or no social disapprobation and that would have to be considered crimes), but it would also exclude from the realm of deviance anything that did not


²⁰ The best and most extensive discussion of measuring the seriousness of a criminal or delinquent act is found in the work of Thorsten Sellin and Marvin Wolfgang, *The Measurement of Delinquency* (1964). The scope of the book is less limited than the title would indicate; that is, the material applies to adult as well as juvenile crime.




Possibility 1.



Possibility 2.



Possibility 3.




Possibility 4.

Key:

==== crime

||||| deviance


||||| crime and deviance




Possibility 5.

The sizes are not quantitative representations.


Figure 1.




Possibility 1.



Possibility 2.



Possibility 3.



Possibility 4.

Key:

==== crime

||||| deviance

||||| crime and deviance

Figure 2.

violate law. Numerous examples are found, in courtship and marriage as well as in courtesy, etiquette, folkways, and everyday interaction, that exclude this possibility from serious consideration. By elimination, only the fifth remains.

The fifth diagram should not be interpreted to express the proportion (if that could in some way be measured) of criminality that is and is not deviant, or the converse. The diagram could be drawn in several fashions, as shown in Figure 2. These representations are meant to conceptualize the relationship between crime and deviance in a society somewhat as follows:

1. Most crime is deviant, most deviance is crime, but there are areas of each that are not to be found in the other.
2. Most crime is not deviant, most deviance is not crime, but there is a small area of each that coincides with the other.
3. Most deviance is crime, but most crime is not deviant.
4. Most crime is deviant, but most deviance is not crime.

Even these symbolic representations should not be interpreted as having more quantitative information than is explicitly stated. For example, any of these four views of the relationship between the two phenomena in a society could be stated to show that the society in question has a great deal of crime and relatively little deviance, or the reverse. It is probably true—although these are generalities that have to be expressed in terms of rate of crime per population, rise and fall of the rate, and many other variables—that the Soviet Union has a much greater crime than deviance problem,²¹ England a great deal of deviance with a low rate of crime, and the United States rather high rates of both.

Furthermore, the problem involves a complexity not only of place but of time that a diagram cannot easily capture. The relationship between crime and deviance differs not only as one travels from one nation or society to another but also from one subgroup within a society to another. The quantity of crime and the seriousness of types of criminal acts constantly undergo change, as do the extent of deviant behavior and the degree to which people feel a sense of outrage and hostility. To grasp crime and deviance, not as abstract concepts (a necessary and worthwhile but extraordinarily difficult task) but in a world of reality, one must consider the two types of events in space and time, and—

²¹ Partly, perhaps, because the Soviet government has defined so much of what would elsewhere be deviant as criminal and partly because more people are evidently kept in line with less leeway for flexibility and straying, in the Soviet Union than in Western Europe or the U.S.A.

especially for deviance—with regard to both the direction and the speed of social change.

If one were to use the system of categorization developed by Robert Merton (1938) in his famous paradigm, the concepts might be differentiated somewhat as follows:

	<i>Crime Deviance</i>		<i>Examples</i>
1. Predatory acts	+	+	Homicide, rape
2. <i>Mala prohibita</i>	+	—	Folk crime
3. Law-abiding deviants and deviance	—	+	Disability, disapproved marital unions
4. Normative acts	—	—	Earning a living in an approved manner
5. <i>Mala in se</i> , when not illegal	±	±	Genocide, slavery

In this table, (4) is neither crime nor deviance and hence may be thought of as not germane to the issue of deviance at all, except that the idea of deviance has no validity unless one can contrast it with rule-following, conforming, normative, legal, and acceptable behavior. In my view—not shared by many thinkers in the field—(2) is better eliminated from the study of crime as well as that of deviance; it should not be treated as crime at all but as lawbreaking noncriminality. Of the other groups, only (5) requires a little more elucidation. The acts involved are criminal in the sense that they are inherently evil, but noncriminal in that they are not illegal in the jurisdiction in which they are committed. They are deviant in the eyes of those of us who make judgments from the vantage point of a later date or another society, or even from that of a dissenting group within the society, but at the time and place of occurrence, large sectors of the populace approved or condoned, if they did not actually commit, the acts.

Crime and deviance, then, can be seen as overlapping but not synonymous entities. Both exist on a seriousness continuum: An act could be a serious crime in the sense that it is punishable by a long prison sentence, yet not too serious in terms of the indignation it arouses; and the reverse could likewise be true. One might think in terms of the following categories:

Crime with deviance: homicide, burglary, child molestation, rape, robbery, and other acts usually thought of in everyday parlance as criminal

Crime without deviance: white-collar crime, folk crime, blue-law violations, and other acts that contravene the laws but outrage few persons

Deviance without crime: breaches of etiquette and violations of folkways; doing things that are "just not done"

Neither crime nor deviance: socially and legally acceptable behavior

There are many important consequences resulting from any differentiation of concepts. One, in the case of crime and deviance, is that an individual suspected or accused of crime must have his guilt or innocence determined by a governmental body before he can be punished as a criminal. This necessity is entirely absent in the case of noncriminal deviance. Suspicion and belief, rumor and gossip, suffice for the populace to exclude, segregate, or in other ways punish. No trial is necessary, and the proclamation of one's innocence may serve only to accentuate the belief of others in one's guilt.

The story is told of a young woman in a small town who found herself the victim of gossip as to her sexual virtue. To put an end to the victimization, she took an advertisement in the local paper, stating that, idle talk to the contrary notwithstanding, she was not a promiscuous woman. The results, which can be imagined, say a great deal about the fate of a person accused of a deviant pattern, rather than a criminal one.

What would have occurred had she been accused of theft rather than promiscuity? Simply enough, she would have been subject to arrest rather than to gossip and rumor. She might have made denials, as prominent people in the Watergate scandals did following their indictment for perjury and other offenses; but a court of law, not the idle talk and generally held beliefs of neighbors, would have decided her fate. She could have been exonerated in court and still shunned as one who had been arrested although subsequently acquitted, but the social exclusion would have been for the deviance of being one who had been subject to the degradation of arrest, not for the crime that a court had decided she had not committed.

In the matter of how the accused is treated, the distinction between crime and deviance can be profound, even when it is not clear-cut.

Marginality: A Different Kind of Differentness

IT WOULD be simple to draw a circle to represent the area of rule-abidingness or conformity, with circumference representing extreme deviance (usually criminal behavior, but more properly defined as behavior that outrages almost everyone), and within it to show a gradation from the most nonconforming to the most conforming. Perhaps some people would not place conformity in the center of such a circle, for this would suggest inflexible and highly ritualized overconformity, which would meet some social support, not without suspicion and scorn.

In such a geometrical presentation, there might be an area to represent behavior that is mildly deviant—that is, somewhat disvalued by considerable numbers of people, but not considered a serious departure from social acceptability. However, there is still another type of behavior that is not deviant but *marginal*—that is, outside the pale of the culture but not condemned by others. Ethnically, perhaps the Amish constitute such a group; occupationally, certainly jazz musicians are better described in terms of marginality than of deviance. If they are outsiders (to use the terminology of Howard Becker), they are outsiders who are more self-segregated than pushed out of society, and who are seen by others as different rather than evil.²² Prostitutes, on the other hand, are different from others, but their difference is indubitably disvalued—even, in fact, by their customers.

Marginals or outsiders, as I am using these labels here, would include but not be limited to what Harold Finestone (1957) called “the cats, the beat, and the hip,” so long as they confine their hip activities to expressive language and body postures and do not mainline heroin

²² In his influential book *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance* (1963), Becker used the words *outsiders* and *deviants* interchangeably. In his early work on jazz musicians (1951), he spoke of these people as outsiders, invoking neither the word *deviance* nor the idea of social hostility against them by others. I think the two concepts are better separated than fused, but better fused than confused.

and snatch purses. The marginals are those whom Alvin Gouldner (1968) called denizens of the "cool world" and "night people." Yet I would hesitate to include some of Gouldner's characters in either the marginal or the deviant world, and others fall into both or between the two. There is no reason to see taxi drivers, for example, as either marginal or deviant, except that they are frequently co-opted into activities that bring them into contact or even collaboration with both worlds. Skid Row inhabitants are deviants, but the poolroom buffs in the world of Ned Polsky (1967), even when they do a little hustling (so long as large sums are not taken, and the victim of larceny is given some fun by competition with a first-rate player), are closer to being marginal. Actors and actresses, and many other celebrities, in fact, live in self-segregated marginality.

One cannot speak of the marginals as being tolerated by society (because that implies disapproval without sanctions), but they are certainly not condemned, not exactly excluded, yet hardly approved. Rather, there are groups of people who are on the fringes of society for a number of reasons: The nature of their pursuits (or of their statuses) requires relatively little interaction with those truly in and part of society; they are not seen as a threat to others and are not labeled antisocial; their activities are not devalued by others but are seen as their bag, not yours or mine—their thing, and let them do it. Immigrants have been called marginal people, but this ignores the generally low esteem in which those coming to alien shores are often held, not only in the United States. That immigrants were deviant, not marginal, was expressed in the term "greaseball." But "eggheads," a term of disapprobation, not an expression of scorn or ridicule, does not imply that the intellectuals to whom it is applied are evil people, but just that they are unlike others, and hence that their views are not to be taken in the same way as those of people with their feet on the ground and their heads neither in the clouds nor in dusty tomes. The intellectuals are marginals, but the immigrants were deviants (and perhaps marginals, too).

The concept of the marginal man as the initiator of social change—the man in whose mind "the moral turmoil which new cultural contacts occasion manifests itself in the most obvious form"—was developed by Robert E. Park (1928), distinguished sociologist and one of the founders of the profession's Chicago school. For Park, this marginality arose primarily from human migration. Later, marginality was given prominence among social scientists by the work of Everett Stonequist (1937). For this scholar, whose book on the subject is called *The Marginal Man* (a title goes a long way toward popularizing a phrase or an idea), marginality consisted of the area between other-

wise well-defined and well-separated groups. Applying this to the racial and ethnic scene, Stonequist saw the offspring of Oriental and white Americans, or blacks and whites, for example, as marginal, because they were people who were in neither group fully, and who had serious problems of identification as a result. For Stonequist, these in-between people had greater personality difficulties than those who were clearly in one racial group or another. Whatever the merits of Stonequist's thesis (which was disputed quite vigorously by Gunnar Myrdal [1944], at least as it applied to black people), it is a long way from deviance, or even from people who live "on the margins" of society.²³

Marginals are those seen as more "quaint" than "queer" (or perhaps queer before that word came to be pejoratively applied almost exclusively to homosexuals). They are not ignored or held in indifference, for others are aware of and responsive to them. Rather than indifference, one can speak of value neutrality and frequently of some admiration from afar. Their ways are not those of ordinary folk and are seen as neither better nor worse, neither good nor bad. Their existence on the fringe rather than in the midst of society is a matter of not fitting in rather than of being excluded, and often originates in their withdrawal from society. It has been said of the marginals that they are in society but not of it, that they are a part of society yet apart from it. They have in common with some forms of deviants such aspects of social life as segregation, high degree of interaction among themselves and a low degree of interaction with others, and the ability to view society from the critical perspective of one who is not within it; they differ from most deviants in the frequency with which the marginals believe in the propriety of their behavior and the superiority of their own group. They are seldom stigmatized, as are deviants (but immigrants would be an exception); they do not internalize, as do many deviants, a sense of shame, guilt, and wrongdoing; they do not arouse hostile societal reaction, official and unofficial, including but not limited to the strong force of law.

Marginality in this sense is almost invariably a group characteristic, whereas deviance can be highly individual. Gypsies were marginal in many societies (and negatively viewed, too), and Jews as well; but both retained their marginality even when they were not so viewed. If one thinks of marginal people as the reverse of assimilated, and deviant as the reverse of socially approved, the similarities and differences between

²³ Myrdal does, however, note that the theory of the marginal man was originally developed for Jews and other white immigrants in America, and states that for these people "it probably has validity and a strong empirical basis." To this I would add that, when used in the manner suggested by Park and Myrdal, it is not so far removed from the concept of deviance as it is when employed by Stonequist.

the two concepts come into sharper focus. Yet marginality can be highly individual, taking on the form of rebellious nonconformity by one person who resists being fitted into the expectations set forth for those in his group. Such a marginal, as described by David Riesman (1954), might even be a minority within a minority, or a minority of one.

There is still another and sociologically significant usage of the concept of marginality; it is more akin to that of Stonequist and Park than to those who would fuse marginality with deviance. It derives from the seminal work, on the one hand, of Georg Simmel and, on the other, of Alfred Schutz, and it suggests again the person who feels himself an outsider, sometimes as an individual and at others as part of an outsider group. It leans, in this respect, toward studies of alienation.

The outlook of Simmel (1950 ed.:402–8) on this subject is suggested by the simple title, “The Stranger.” His stranger was a wanderer, but

not in the sense often touched upon in the past, as the wanderer who comes today and goes tomorrow, but rather as the person who comes today and stays tomorrow. He is, so to speak, the *potential* wanderer: although he has not moved on, he has not quite overcome the freedom of coming and going. [Italics in original.]

There is an ambivalence in the connection between Simmel’s stranger and the group that he comes to as an alien but never leaves. As a group member,

he is near and far *at the same time*, as is characteristic of relations founded only on general human commonness. But between nearness and distance, there arises a specific tension. . . . Strangers are not really conceived as individuals, but as strangers of a particular type: the element of distance is no less general in regard to them than the element of nearness. [Italics in original.]

Is this deviance? No, although such a stranger can easily be rejected, scapegoated, or despised, in a manner that will transform him into the deviant. But Simmel appears to be describing what can almost be considered typical of the marginal man.

Alfred Schutz, a powerful influence in twentieth-century thought and one of the prime figures in laying the philosophical foundations for a phenomenological sociology and for what has come to be known as ethnomethodology, addressed himself to marginality in two related essays, “The Stranger” and “The Homecomer” (Schutz, 1964:91–119). His stranger is, like the immigrant, a newcomer, but he also may be the latest recruit or the most recent joiner; like Simmel’s stranger, he is not a transient, but the world that he has come to is nonetheless

strange to him. He takes a view of this world around him and sees it as less coherent, less taken for granted, less consistent than it no doubt appears to those who have been in it for a long period:

The discovery that things in his new surroundings look quite different from what he expected them to be at home is frequently the first shock to the stranger's confidence in the validity of his habitual "thinking as usual." Not only the picture which the stranger has brought along of the cultural pattern of the approached group but the whole hitherto unquestioned scheme of interpretation current within the home group becomes invalidated. It cannot be used as a scheme of orientation within the new social surroundings. For the members of the approached group, *their* cultural pattern fulfills the function of such a scheme. But the approaching stranger can neither use it simply as it is nor establish a general formula of transformation between both cultural patterns permitting him, so to speak, to convert all the coordinates within one scheme of orientation into those valid within the other. [Italics in original.]

In "The Homecomer," Schutz is examining a particular and special instance of the stranger:

To the homecomer home shows—at least in the beginning—an unaccustomed face. He believes himself to be in a strange country, a stranger among strangers, until the goddess dissipates the veiling mist. But the homecomer's attitude differs from that of the stranger. The latter is about to join a group which is not and never has been his own. He knows that he will find himself in an unfamiliar world, differently organized than that from which he comes, full of pitfalls and hard to master. The homecomer, however, expects to return to an environment of which he always had and—so he thinks—still has intimate knowledge and which he has just to take for granted in order to find his bearings within it. The approaching stranger has to anticipate in a more or less empty way what he will find; the homecomer has just to recur to the memories of his past.

For Schutz, the frame of reference is how these aliens, wanderers, strangers, and returning ex-members see the new world rather than how they are seen (and hence treated) by the hosts to whom they have come. While these are interrelated matters, they are not the same, and deviance would reside in the rejection of these strangers by others, not in the strangers' own ways of looking at the new reality that confronts them.

The question of marginality comes closer to that of deviance in the work of Frank Zimring and Gordon Hawkins (1968). They use the category of marginality to refer

to the entire class of persons who are objectively on the margin of a particular form of criminal behavior or, in other words, the class of persons "next most likely" to engage in the criminal behavior in question.

Whatever merits or dangers there may be in delineating any individual or group of people as "next most likely" to commit an antisocial act, and therefore seeing them on the margin (or, one might say, on the brink) of such activity, this is not the sense in which marginality is generally used.

There may well come a time when sociologists will efface the difference between marginality and deviance, and in that case perhaps the concept that was used by Stonequist will have to be relinquished or find a home under some other rubric in works on ethnicity, migration, and related areas. This is indicated by several titles—and titles can have a significant effect in bringing about changes in the usage of words. Thus, James McIntosh (1974) entitles his work *Perspectives on Marginality: Understanding Deviance*; Jerry Jacobs (1972), in a work devoted for the most part to prostitution, drug use, white-collar crime, suicide, and other types of behavior that are generally disvalued and disapproved, uses the title *Getting By: Illustrations of Marginal Living*; and Charles H. McCaghy and his colleagues (1968, 1974) handle similar people and situations, including the physically handicapped, under the title *In Their Own Behalf: Voices from the Margin*. If Stonequist's influential work established a meaning for marginality, it is possible that these and other studies and collections will disestablish it, so that being on the margin, like being an outsider, will begin to take on the meaning of being deviant.

Nonetheless, the distinction between marginals and deviants is significant, particularly if a researcher studying an individual or group belonging in one category is tempted to make generalizations that apply to the other. Yet, it is not a distinction that is always easy to make, for some groups may be marginal in one sense and deviant in another, marginal for some people and deviant for others, or marginal at one time and deviant later (or, more likely, the reverse). Human behavior cannot always be pigeonholed and classified, although classification is extremely valuable, because it is only through classification that studies made of some facet of behavior can be applied to other facets that are not studied. It is more difficult, yet more congruent with social reality, to place people (and groups of people) into categories to a certain extent, see them in a group in one sense and not in another, see them as existing simultaneously in one group and in others (yet each to different degrees), and see all of this in a state of flux, constantly undergoing change, so that by the time one's results become

public, studies are no longer so valid as when they were made. It is with these many variables in mind that one can look at such people as embalmers and funeral-home employees; marijuana smokers; college students who give away, sell, or lend term papers, and others who refuse to do so; girls who swing promiscuously but with some discrimination and without prostituting themselves; interracial couples; people who speak up for the victory of an "enemy" in an undeclared war; and numerous others. Marginals, deviants, neither, or both? To what extent? When? In whose eyes? Is the categorization undergoing change? In what direction? With what speed?

Abnormality, Pathology, and Eccentricity

THERE IS a wide variety of terms that approach the area of deviance yet are not quite identical with it, and that may diverge considerably or may simply identify a perspective other than that peculiar to deviance. Many of these are more psychological than sociological in orientation, some perhaps medical and physiological.

Is deviance abnormality, and is abnormality deviance? Both terms are poorly defined, and hence to contrast them is difficult. If abnormality were to be confined to psychological and physiological usage and deviance to social relations, the distinction would be clear. Yet, this is not to say that they are otherwise the same thing. Abnormality suggests a malfunctioning or malformation of the organism—body or mind; deviance perhaps can be visualized as a malfunctioning of social relations.²⁴ Deviance is a diminution of one's social competence (or what might be termed interpersonal competence), as judged by others, abnormality is a diminution of one's mental and bodily functioning, as judged

²⁴ Some sociologists will encounter a problem when a phrase of this sort is used, particularly those who, taking a leaf from Durkheim, see deviance as functional, at least sometimes, for society. Paradoxical as it may appear to be, a malfunctioning set of social relations may very well contribute to the better functioning of a society. I shall return to this problem in the last section of this book (pp. 368–75).

by others (usually experts) and by oneself as well. Both are cultural constructs, but what is regarded as abnormal is more likely to meet cross-cultural agreement than what is regarded as deviant. But no, there is the case of predatory crime and unauthorized violence, on which the cross-cultural agreement would be as great as anything in the realm of the body or mind. In abnormality, there is an imputation of objective factors; in deviance, it is entirely subjective: that is, how the act is seen by others.

Abnormality and pathology are more properly judgments made by experts, although the former is a term in greater everyday usage than is deviance. But deviance is a reaction by people, expert and inexperienced, ordinary and extraordinary. The trained individual, the sociologist, is expert only as an observer to record the reactions of people and interpret them, but not to make a judgment himself.

Perhaps this could be clarified with illustrations. Some situations would qualify as both deviance and abnormality, some only as the former, some exclusively as the latter (again recalling that there are dimensions and degrees). True kleptomania would be both deviant and abnormal, as would psychologically induced cases of pyromania. But "ordinary" shoplifting, in which a person is not overcome by a compulsion and an irresistible "need" to take but rationally plans the act for monetary gain, would be a manifestation of deviance, not of abnormality.²⁵ The same could be said of an owner of a building or store who sets fire to his property, not for the gratification of some unconscious demand, but for the insurance that he expects to collect.

A further example of this differentiation can be found in the area of sexuality. A young man meets a young woman at a very proper party, introduced under proper conditions, and immediately propositions her. "There's a room upstairs that no one is occupying," he tells her. "Let's go up there and make out." Now, to make that sort of a pass under these conditions violates the rules of etiquette and of good and proper behavior, and one can say that his actions are non-normative, but one can hardly speak of him as being abnormal. On the other hand, some abnormal behavior may not be violative of a norm: An example might be an obsessive and compulsive fear of heights that makes it impossible for a person to look out of a window above the third floor, something that violates psychological standards of normality but no social standards of propriety or normativeness. The abnormality can of course lead to deviance, as a claustrophobic person

²⁵ The complexities of the example are many. Kleptomania is an overwhelming and uncontrollable desire to steal, which might be contrasted with stealing because of need or greed. Moreover, kleptomania is a psychological condition that, when translated into action, includes theft as the act; however, not all theft is a manifestation of kleptomania.

who refuses to visit his dying mother on the thirtieth floor because he is afraid of elevators (but note that the abnormality here serves to diminish responsibility and mitigate the force and effect of the sanctions against the norm-violator).

It would be digressing to seek to differentiate abnormality and pathology, particularly as they pertain to medical and often psychological states, except to note that abnormality is usually seen as a more static condition and pathology as condition in process of change (a distinction analogous to that between anatomy and physiology). The distinctions that I have sought to make between the abnormal and the deviant would seem to apply, with pathology being a stronger word, connoting a deteriorating problem for the organism and one that will continue to worsen unless corrected.²⁶ Just as abnormality is sometimes without deviance, so with pathology. The very rational, financially motivated embezzler is hardly pathological, but he is indeed deviant.²⁷ But deviance, like pathology, implies action, motion, process, although not deterioration.

I shall not belabor the point by dwelling on the difference between eccentricity and deviance. The former describes unusual and unpredictable behavior, an expression of the manner in which one person is peculiar unto himself. This peculiarity may or may not be of a nature to make him socially disvalued. In fact, his eccentricities may make him likable. The eccentric artist or professor (or for that matter, bricklayer or student) may incite amusement or admiration rather than anger or disgust. On the other hand, one would be hard-pressed to speak of the armed robber as eccentric, any more than the manner in which he pursues his livelihood would qualify him to be called abnormal.²⁸

It is easier to find concepts synonymous with deviance in the world of everyday language and experience, especially since the word *deviant*

²⁶ Edwin Lemert (1951) uses the phrase "social pathology" to describe deviance, but I note several exceptions to this usage. It is a metaphor and suggests that, like cancer or a bone disease, deviance is inherently bad—although Lemert dissociates himself from that conclusion. By definition, pathologies cannot be good or useful for the affected system, but deviance can be and under some conditions is.

²⁷ Referring again to Lemert and the concept of social pathology, some might contend that the existence of such behavior, or its increase in frequency, constitutes a symptom of social pathology—but that is another matter, and the term seems hardly useful or necessary.

²⁸ Sociologist Jack Katz (1973) interprets eccentricity in a different manner: "There is also a 'positive' deviance," Katz writes, "as when we affectionately say 'He's so crazy!' of a friend who is a 'a real character.'" I would suggest that this is not deviance, positive (which is a contradiction) or negative (which is a redundancy), but merely an interesting instance of how man borrows from the language of the pejorative to express closeness, acceptability, and affection. When one says of a friend "He's so crazy," one means to express the thought that he is *not* crazy, but that his notions are wrong, funny, wild, or whatever the context may imply.

itself is not frequently used outside of sociology, and when used is often limited to certain sexual acts, particularly those involving homosexuality, "unnatural" congress, or child-adult sexuality. Deviance is behavior that is outlandish or outrageous, oddball or eccentric, but only when the peculiarities are sufficient to incite a negative reaction.

Similar to the distinction between deviance and eccentricity is the distinction between deviance and unconventionality. In a literal sense, the deviant is not following the conventions—that is, he is violating the folkways and norms, the rules and regulations. But unconventionality suggests a deliberate disregard for and rejection of social conventions because one judges them to be irrational and undeserving of slavish followers. The unconventional person is innovative, skeptical, less concerned about the views and opinions of others than the ordinary run of social members; the deviant does not bring to his norm-breaking such a view of his fellow-citizens and their opinions, except perhaps by coincidence. Street muggers are not unconventional, and women who wear big hats and wide brims when these are not in style are hardly deviant. Even those who follow rules and fashions in the most careful way, and who never venture an opinion or hold an idea in conflict with those of their circle of friends and colleagues, do not utter the word "unconventional" with the disdain that characterizes and in fact locates the attitude toward deviants.

Social Problems and Social Disorganization

YES, DEVIANCE is a social problem, although some deviant people and circumstances are more of a problem than others. And people who create or perpetuate social problems are usually thought of in the negative fashion characterizing what is called deviant. But that the two are not the same thing has been emphasized by Marshall Clinard (1974:28), among others. Deviant behavior, he points out, and crime as well, constitute social problems, but not all social problems constitute deviance. Air pollution, traffic congestion, housing shortages, all are

social problems; they are not examples of deviance. Someone may have been deviant in the handling of these matters so that they became social problems, but this is not necessarily the case. More likely, some administrators, social thinkers, and planners were inadequate or inefficient, or they bureaucratically misjudged a situation, but all of these are some distance from deviance.

Perhaps the closest concept to deviance, and one most difficult to separate, is personal and social disorganization.²⁹ For Robert Faris (1948), social disorganization constitutes a disunion or a disruption of the constituent parts of an order or system. These constituent parts are persons or groups of persons, and the union that comes apart is a kind of functioning interdependence, consisting of the patterns of complementary relationships among the people who constitute a society. Faris sees social problems as involving value connotations: Something is a social problem when it is deemed to be bad or undesirable. Social disorganization, on the contrary, may not be undesirable at all; for it is possible that the organization that is disrupted was undesirable itself. One could not deny, for example, that social disorganization existed in the South after Emancipation, but for many people this would be considered an improvement over what went before, namely, slavery.

Hobo areas, Skid Row sections of town, rootlessness, the decline of church and family without other institutions arising to carry on their functions—these would be manifestations of social disorganization. Yet, in light of the types of people he describes, Faris might well have been writing a book about deviants (except for the failure to include the physically handicapped); his subjects are ordinary criminals, delinquents, gangsters, white-collar criminals, alcoholics, drug addicts, gamblers, prostitutes, suicides, the mentally abnormal, the politically corrupt, members of lynch groups and others involved in mob violence. All that distinguishes his outlook from later ones on deviance (a word that had not yet entered the language of sociology) is an emphasis on the breakdown of neighborhood, family, church, and other stabilizing institutions. Thus his work comes closer to being a theory of deviance than a description of a different phenomenon. Moreover, his disclaimer to the contrary notwithstanding, his work and that of others in the social-disorganization tradition can hardly be considered free

²⁹ Complicating the problem for sociologists is the fact that "social disorganization" is a term used not only to describe a state of society but also as an explanation or theory of deviance. As a theory, it had its heyday in America in the early part of the twentieth century, particularly through World War II and even into the 1950s. I am here attempting only to describe what is meant by the phrase as it has been used by scholars and, in doing so, to distinguish it from the subject matter of this book. For a discussion of social disorganization as an explanation or theory of deviance, see particularly Peter Manning, 1969.

of value judgments and value connotations. Some of the activities are described, for example, under the heading of "The Vices," and others of lesser importance are "Marginal and Minor Vices," terms hardly indicative of value neutrality.

Many writers on social disorganization use a concept similar to their view of social problems; this is the case with Herbert Bloch (1956) and Reece McGee (1962). A social problem that develops to the point where the system cannot continue would have brought the society to the point of social disorganization. The latter may be equated with breakdown, a term that is often used for an individual who just "cannot go on." The complete breakdown of a system—social or personal—is very rare. However, there are degrees; one may be functioning poorly, the component parts may be at cross-purposes to one another, or the personality may be lacking in what can be termed integration. An individual may be distraught, unable to take care of his elementary needs and meet his responsibilities, incapable of planning a day, having lapses of memory—these are examples of a high degree of personal disorganization.

Short of civil war and the near-anarchic conditions typical during a revolutionary crisis, when there is a question as to where power resides, complete social disorganization is unusual. There are manifestations of it to a partial extent: a malfunctioning bureaucracy and civil service in which people do not know what their jobs are or cannot perform them; a failure to provide the schools and hospitals that a populace deems essential; the maldistribution of training so that there are simultaneous shortages and surpluses of people to fill necessary jobs; and, of course, food riots, starvation amid plenty, contempt for authority, and the like.³⁰

Another view of social disorganization is offered by Arnold Rose (1954:10), who sees it as a condition that exists when individuals in the same society do not share a sufficient number of common values and meanings:

We may consider two logical types of social disorganization. The first type is one in which a number of individuals in physical contact with one another form discrete subgroups, each of which has a large proportion of meanings and values common to its members, but between which there are relatively few meanings and values in common. . . . This situation can be described as one of *symbiosis* or one of *conflict*. . . .

The second type of social disorganization is one in which a number

³⁰ Like deviance, social breakdown is not necessarily bad. I believe that food riots would be better than the lack of such riots while people are starving, and contempt for authority is preferable to obsequious acceptance of an authority that has contempt for ethics, responsibility, and the public it is supposed to serve.

of individuals in physical contact with one another do not share a large number of meanings and values; that is, it is like the first type except that there are no subgroups, or each individual can be considered as his own subgroup. This is a situation which Durkheim defined as *anomie*. [Italics in original.]

A succinct description of these terms is offered by Walter Reckless (1967:397):

Social disorganization was conceived as the declining influence of existing rules of behavior upon individuals, resulting from change, disruption, immigration, conflict, confusion, including a breakdown of public opinion and a solid moral and ethical front. Personal disorganization represented the demoralization and individualization of individuals—the inability of persons to conform to and live within the dominant expectations of society. Both social and personal disorganization were conceived in terms of a breakdown of social and personal controls over behavior.

In contrast to disorganization, there may be well-organized deviance that fits into the social system extraordinarily well. This is particularly true of crime, which is sometimes organized; further, there is an anti-crime organization that is highly integrated into the political and social structure of society, and even more into the economic structure, employing thousands of persons and offering a sizable market for many commodities.

Yet, all these definitions and alternate terms fall somewhat short when one looks at deviant people and deviant statuses apart from deviant acts—at people who are assigned the stigma of deviance although they perform no act that is described in the society as deviant.

The Act, the Actor, and the Status

IN THE past, deviant acts and deviant actors, deviance and deviants, have been insufficiently differentiated. Some improper or disapproved acts are situational, impermanent, perhaps ephemeral, sometimes anonymous. They do not leave the mark of Cain upon

the performer of the act. They do not involve his basic character, and although the act is condemned, it is not inextricably associated with the person. One might say, in the language of sociology, that it does not confer upon the actor the status of one who does such an act, even though it may be known that he did it once or even repeatedly. Is this deviance? Yes, it is deviance without deviants. For the act is disvalued, it is reacted to in a negative manner that is the touchstone of the definition of deviance, but the actor escapes essentially unmarked.

Deviance that does not confer the label of deviant on the performer may occur for many reasons: The act may be carried out under conditions of anonymity so that the person does not acquire the label. It may be performed rarely or irregularly rather than steadily, so that one cannot speak of him as a secret deviant. Then, further, the act may be so trivial as not to make the individual responsible for it into a deviant, or the public may see it as essentially out of character for that individual. Social-class and ethnic considerations may serve to disidentify the person with the action, although it is known that he did indeed perform it.³¹

In contrast, some acts do leave a mark upon the performer, identifying him as a person who commits the particular act, impressing upon the world the personality of just such an individual—even if the act is a one-time event. If the act is a repetitive and permanent type of deviance, the status of deviant may be inescapable. Whether one-time or frequent, an act with high visibility can confer the deviant label on the performer.

Finally, there is a third category of socially disvalued person—namely, the one who has not committed any improper act or become deviant by omission instead of commission, and no deviant act has been falsely imputed to him. Rather, he is stigmatized for a status (usually but not always physiological) over which he has no control. One can speak here of involuntary deviance.

Although these categories are not always distinguishable and do at times strongly overlap, deviants and deviance can be divided into three groups: (1) deviant acts that do not confer deviant status upon the actor, (2) deviance that includes both the person and the

³¹ *Role distance* is a phrase used by Erving Goffman (1961) to describe the disidentification of an individual with the activity he is performing. In Goffman's world, this is negotiated by the actor. For example, an older child on a merry-go-round assumes an air of boredom in order that he may not be confused with a baby who likes to ride on carousels. In the case of middle- and upper-class people who are separated from the deviant status because of their favored position in society, the role distance is conferred by others, whose hostile reactions to the deviant act is muted, or at least modified, by deliberate inattention or even favorable reaction to the actor.

act that he performs, and (3) the deviant person who does not commit and has not committed any deviant act.

THE ACT WITHOUT THE STATUS

Everyone commits socially disapproved acts at one time or another, and most people probably do so with some degree of frequency. An act may be trivial: In the presence of others, a man yawns without covering his mouth or without excusing himself with a brief apology. On the subway, and out of sight of anyone he knows, he is protected by anonymity, so that the act cannot follow him. He is further protected by the diminished rules of good behavior that apply to subway riding; the etiquette covering yawning behavior may just not apply in such an impersonal setting. If he is among friends, however, he is not cloaked with anonymity. Furthermore, the yawning has a discrediting implication on himself or on his view of others: that he has come without properly preparing himself with rest, or that he is overcome by boredom. The gesture of the hand to the mouth is an acknowledgment of recognition of his own culpability, and the begging for forgiveness ("Excuse me," stated quietly and quickly and without permitting any lingering discussion around it) serves to exculpate him. The act is over; it is one-time, transitory, trivial, all combining to save the individual from being labeled as a "deviant" despite his having committed a deviant act.

He can be transformed from one who does the thing to one who is a person who does such a thing if he commits the same or similar acts repeatedly. He then acquires a reputation emanating from such behavior. He is unlikely to be known as a yawner, partly because yawning, in and of itself, even when not accompanied by appropriate etiquette for coverups and excuses, is just not important enough to confer such an identity. But if this is combined with other breaches of etiquette, he can be known as a boor or an impolite guy, and the act can result in the status.

The deviant act without the deviant status, or the deviance without the deviant, plays an important role in everyday living. It tends to sort out people according to social class, education, and other characteristics, and to call forth unofficial societal reactions that serve to maintain group boundaries. It is significant in determining circles of friendship and informal cliques.

Where a disapproved act does not confer disapproved identity upon an individual, one can usually expect to find the following characteristics: It is either not a crime at all or, if a crime, it is one in which the law has little social support; it is an act that can usually

be lived with by others—although it may be uncomfortable, disgusting, or unaesthetic—because it is not catastrophic or threatening to a victim (if any), to the public, or to society; it is most often reacted to with scorn, sneer, ridicule, the mild disapproval of jocularity, and sometimes ostracism, but the last is more often invoked when the act is repeated or combined with other disapproved acts. Examples of such activities, in addition to those already mentioned, include “bad” eating habits or lack of “table manners” (that is, inappropriate to the setting or to the others present); wrong speech (malaprops, pretentious vocabulary, obscenities under conditions when taboos apply, pronunciation that is inconsistent with the occasion); improper physiological actions and reactions (as flatulence and nose-picking).

THE ACTIONS AND THE STATUS

Some deviant acts immediately confer upon the actor the status of one who commits just such an act. The action is deviant, and the individual who performs it is a deviant, whereas in the first group it was only the action, and not the individual, that was so labeled.

Sometimes, in fact, the person is so labeled without committing the act, but this does not exactly fall into the third category, because the condemnation of the individual is due to a belief (rumor, gossip, accusation) in his culpability; or he is seen as one who would be likely to commit or harbors an interest in committing the act (here one might say that the members of the society who so label him do not equate the desires with the actions but see the desires as actions, of a slightly different, albeit related and almost equally condemnable, nature).

The major conditions under which the combination of acts and status is likely to arise are: that the action is regarded as serious, threatening to other persons or to the society; that there is an official governmental reaction in the form of penal sanctions for the act's commission; that it is repeated with some consistency or frequency, or that it is seen as a threat if repeated; that it involves the entire “moral character” of the person, not just a phase of his being; that it is sometimes biographical and hence ineffaceable; that it is unlikely to be committed under conditions of anonymity or, if it is so committed, is so serious that, if discovered, the person would be fully and not merely slightly discredited; that the act is not impermanent and ephemeral; and finally, that the language accommodates the identification of the individual as one who commits or has committed certain acts or classes of acts.

Most crimes, particularly felonies, are sufficiently serious, and the societal reaction likewise so, that the label of deviance and deviant is placed on the act as well as on the individual perpetrator. There is theft and the thief, rape and the rapist, murder and the murderer, even drunken driving and the drunken driver. Biographical information involving a deviant past that is of sufficient importance to follow a person, although it gives a slightly different character to the deviance, even an air of respectability because it is a shortcoming or failing that has been overcome, would be found in such examples as the ex-convict and the ex-addict. In these instances, there is ambiguity covering the social attitude: The individual is both admired for having "straightened himself out" and scorned for having done wrong things in the past. This ambiguity is even stronger in the case of the ex-alcoholic, confusion being added by Alcoholics Anonymous's propaganda "Once an alcoholic, always an alcoholic," so that one is still feared and identified as a wrongdoer, yet even the more adulated because, although a wrongdoer, one does not succumb to one's "weakness."

Identification of the individual as a deviant for having performed and sometimes for continuing to perform deviant acts may not be inescapable, although there is a suggestion of inescapability in the conferring of the status and the placing of a specific linguistic symbol on him. He has several options: He can conceal the identity; change his actions and obtain a new identity (with or without concealment of the past one); accept the identity and the concept of evil that goes with it (that is, accept the negative judgments about his acts that are made by others); accept the identity, but reject the judgment of others or work toward changing these judgments of others.

Having an abortion and obtaining a divorce are good illustrations of the complexity of the question. An abortion is a one-time act for the pregnant woman but a repetitive series, indeed an occupation, for the person performing the medical work. When it was both illegal and widely condemned in the United States, the culpability fell more strongly upon performer than upon the patient. For the former, the language supplied a word: He was an abortionist and was sometimes called a butcher—the kind of pejorative term typically applied to deviants. For the client, the word *abortionee* was a technical term, infrequently used. The entire process took place under conditions of anonymity and secrecy, so that there were few people to place the label of condemnation upon the woman, even if they wanted to. A degree of outrage against her was present, but I suspect that people were often expressing greater outrage than they felt, an example of the discordance between the real and the pretended culture. These

factors (the one-time act, the anonymity, and the diluted hostility) served to make the act of obtaining an abortion a deviant one, without conferring the status of deviant upon the woman who was the abortioneer. Further, she was an abortioneer for a moment, not permanently or continually, as would be true of an alcoholic, drug addict, or prostitute. The abortionist, however, was condemned; although his identity was secret, he was subject to extreme penalties if discovered. He performed his acts in stealth and repetitively; both the acts and the individual were deviant. Even if his motives were above reproach (charging little money, being ideologically concerned with the right of the woman to control her body), this only slightly mitigated the deviance. In fact, these explanations were usually suspect.

The person who was divorced in a society in which divorce was possible but highly stigmatized (middle-class America until the 1930s or early 1940s) carried a biographical stigma. The stigma seems easily concealed, but only from the viewpoint of visibility. Constant interaction among friends and relatives, particularly in the dating and marriage market, will result in the necessity to expose this past episode. To the extent that it is deviant to have been divorced, deviant status is conferred equally upon the act and the person. No repetitive pattern is required but repetition would intensify the deviant reputation of the person, because he or she would be known, not as one who was divorced, but as one who gets divorces.³²

Most of the literature on deviance deals with acts that confer a deviant identity upon people. The acts that do not confer such an identity are usually considered too trivial to be studied in this literature.³³ With regard to the types of acts challenging to the ongoing society, and with regard to the identities that have the strongest repercussions on those affected, activities that confer a deviant status constitute major social and personality problems.

THE STATUS WITHOUT THE ACT

A third group of deviants has likewise attracted considerable study and research in social psychology and sociology: These are people who

³² Stigmatized people sometimes rationalize a condition by placing the blame on others. In the case of divorced persons, one can always say that it was the fault of the partner. Blaming others is a device that is not effective for some forms of biographical blemish, even where there could be no rational argument about the responsibility of these others and the freedom from culpability of the stigmatized person. Consider, for example, the case of the illegitimate child: blaming his parents hardly serves to diminish the stigma of being illegitimate.

³³ Erving Goffman (1963, 1971) has handled such matters with remarkable insight, drawing from these small transgressions generalizations about the human condition and the precarious world that all people inhabit. One might say that Goffman searches for the significance of trivia.

carry the status of deviant, although they have broken no rules and are labeled deviant for what they are, not for what they do. They fall into three major categories: (1) the family and close associates of deviant people, (2) the afflicted, disabled, and handicapped, and (3) persons with disvalued interests, desires, or motivations that they do not translate into action.³⁴

When a negative appraisal is made of someone because of what has befallen or been done by a member of his family, or even a friend, this has been called by Goffman (1963) "courtesy stigma," although I prefer the term "stigma fallout." The classic example of stigma fallout, although not a pure example, is the bastard—an innocent person on whom the pejorative term and the most extreme punishment are inflicted for the "sin" or "error" of the parents.

Stigma fallout extends to the families of the mentally retarded, convicts, criminals, homosexuals, and others. It extends not only to families but to friends: for the latter, it involves a degree of social pressure, as if the stigma is a mechanism to compel the friend to abandon the offender. In some instances it appears that failure to abandon may be regarded as evidence of the probable culpability or involvement of the friend himself. The family sometimes abandons the stigmatized person by institutionalization, concealment, banishment, or a combination of these and other mechanisms.

The cripple, the mentally retarded, the spastic, and the badly scarred are examples of deviant persons who have committed no deviant acts. To a much greater extent than any of these, there is the leper, and to a much slighter extent, but nevertheless present, examples are found among the blind, the deaf, and the mute.

All these are deviants without responsibility for their status. In some instances, however, the responsibility for deviant status is not apparent, such as the drunken driver who gets into an accident that

³⁴ Some people would conceptualize all ethnically and racially disvalued persons and groups as deviants. (Note that Davis, 1961, includes them in his list, putting the Negro with the career woman—why not simply the woman?—the Communist, and others.) While there is tremendous similarity in the reactions of people to homosexuals, ex-convicts, and blacks, and there is even some similarity in the ways in which the objects of hostility handle the negative reactions of the larger society, it would seem preferable to me to analyze these categories as minority groups of an ethnic and nonethnic character, respectively, and not as deviants. Women can be seen as a minority group but hardly as deviants, and in that sense I find it difficult to use the deviant model for Negroes, Jews, and other ethnic and racial minorities. Goffman (1963), however, does find it conceptually valuable to handle this as a type of stigmatization—"tribal stigma," he calls it. I have found it more valuable to see some deviant people as minority groups than to see the traditional ethnic minorities as deviants (see Sagarin, 1971). Edwin Schur (1971) makes the same point, preferring to separate the ethnics from the deviants if only for analytic and pedagogic reasons.

causes him to be permanently crippled. The condition that resulted (i.e., being crippled) was nonvolitional, although the act that led to that condition was not. Obese individuals, who in most instances (except for severe endocrinological disorders) could reduce their obesity, do have some responsibility for the physiological condition in that they overeat—or at least there is popular belief to this effect. But most of these represent deviant people who have committed no deviant acts, whether of omission or commission.

The Dimensions of Deviance

DEVIANCE IS not an all-or-nothing proposition; it is a matter of degree. One recalls the oft repeated story of the girl who found that she was a little bit pregnant, and the sharp satire of George Orwell (1946), in whose animal utopia all pigs were equal, but some pigs were more equal than others. Most character traits in the real world, however, can be present in one person to a slight degree, and to a greater degree in others.

One of the problems in the study of deviance is that people have tended to categorize behavior as deviant or as normative rather than seeing these as the extreme points on a continuum. Then, having failed to differentiate between the slightly deviant and the very deviant, writers have applied to the former conclusions based on analysis of the latter. Generalizations, theoretical considerations, and proposals for social policy for the mildly deviant may be quite inapplicable to the extremely deviant (although this is not necessarily and in all instances true).

Unlike the equal pigs, some people can be and are more deviant than others, and, unlike being pregnant, some acts are a little deviant while others are very much so. This may be just another way of quantifying the public reaction to the person or to the act. In the case of crimes, it has been expressed by the division into felonies, misdemeanors, and offenses, or into various groups of felonies that are categorized according

to the severity of the punishment that can be inflicted, or (what might be quite a different matter) the nature of the punishment that actually *is* inflicted when one is found guilty. Both murder and robbery are crimes, but the anger and indignation elicited by homicide is greater than that elicited by a crime where no killing is involved; the reaction of the public and of governmental authorities is stronger; and although both types of acts are criminal, one is considered more criminal than the other.

DEVIANT IN WHOSE EYES

If a deviant act or person is defined as one that is disvalued in the society at a given time, it would seem to suggest that there is a consensus among the members of that society about what is good or bad, right or wrong, desirable or undesirable. Howard Becker (1963) emphasizes that it is a question of power—that some people have the ability to cause others to be labeled as deviant, and that this is a political matter in the broad sense of that term. Ira Reiss (1970) suggests that it is a question of numbers—that to speak of deviance is to talk about acts that are negatively judged by a considerable number of people in the population. Talcott Parsons (1951) believes that to a great extent there is a value consensus in societies, whereas Jack Douglas (1972) has stressed the lack of such a consensus, or the degree of “dissensus,” one might say.

One can well bring together these seemingly disparate orientations. Deviance is a matter of how many people have negative opinions of another person or group of people; who the opinion-makers are in terms of social class, ethnic identification, sex, age, education, prestige, power, and numerous other factors; and the nature of their relations to the transgressor. There are some modes of conduct that meet almost universal condemnation, not only in a given society at a given time, but even across cultures of greatly dissimilar customs and values. These acts would include most manifestations of behavior in which one person preys upon another, such as assaults, murder, rape, robbery, and burglary. The person committing the act does not feel self-righteous about his action; he believes it to be wrong, does not defend it, would not wish to be victimized in a similar manner by another, and demands protection for himself and family against others who would commit the very type of act that he has performed.

True, sweeping statements of this sort seem not to hold up under careful scrutiny by historians, sociologists, and others. A single exception can often be found, even for such almost universally condemned practices as brother-sister incest. Rape, for example, often meets little

condemnation, at least among the rapists and their countrymen, when it is committed by soldiers against the women of the conquered enemy.³⁵ The mass rape of women in Bangladesh is only one of many such instances in the history of warfare. Anthropologists have managed to locate one society, the Gusii, where something close to forcible rape is socially acceptable, but only under very special conditions (LeVine, 1959).³⁶

Plunder does not meet the same condemnation when it is committed by the employer and the rich as when the transgressor is poor. Murder has many partial and complete justifications, some of which offer legal impunity: the killing by a soldier of someone who has been labeled an enemy, the slaying by a policeman of someone who he believes (or claims) was seeking to commit an armed holdup, assault committed in self-defense and resulting in death, the fatal injury inflicted by a negligent autoist. Then there are those legally condemned acts that receive only slight moral condemnation: murder for vengeance when one's kin has been slain, mercy deaths, the killing by the cuckold who discovers his mate's sexual infidelity.

When there are so many exceptions, can one speak of a value consensus that condemns and places the label of deviance on rape, robbery, or murder? The answer appears to be in the affirmative: One can say that these are strongly condemned acts but that, like all condemned acts, they are judged by such criteria as the status of the perpetrator, his role vis-à-vis the victim, and any mitigating circumstances that might serve to diminish the degree of condemnation of the act and its perpetrator; moreover, they are defined in slightly differing ways depending on the nature of the society, its traditions, religion, norms, and other factors. But still they are criminal or deviant

³⁵ This is part of the general suspension of normative restraints during war. Geneva conventions and such niceties aside, civilians are murdered, their homes plundered, and their belongings "liberated," and prisoners are killed by all sides in all wars. "We don't take prisoners" is a common remark among soldiers in battle. Simply stated, war brutalizes. No less a scholar than Cesare Lombroso, often called the father of modern criminology, suggested that societies could put to good use their born criminals and their incorrigibly violent men by sending them off to war against the barbaric and uncivilized peoples (Lombroso-Ferrero, 1911:214-15). That could be the starting point for another book, but I shall content myself by saying that the suspension of the rules of societies during a war and the occupation that follows hardly signifies that rape, plunder, and other such acts are not universally condemned.

³⁶ The case of the Gusii is important, because a single exception disproves a rule—in this case, the rule of universality. Yet, careful reading of the anthropological report on this society reveals to me that a complex game of "hard to get," in which the woman highly values the man who can capture her and "compel" her consent, is involved. I find this quite far removed from force and violence being used by a male to sexually subdue an unwilling woman. The Gusii did not institutionalize rape but, rather, teasing, subjugation, protest, and acceptance.

acts, and that view of them is inherent in human society, transcending time and place.

Some acts and people meet with universal or near-universal hostility or disvaluation; others, with a much more selective type of hostility. If one polled a cross-section of society, took its pulse, so to speak, one might find that certain acts are condemned by, let us say, 40 percent of the people: Having nonmarital sexual relations, undergoing an abortion, practicing contraception, refusing to stand when the national anthem is played, or making known one's atheism in a small town—these are examples of behavior that is likely to elicit negative responses from some people but not from others. There is here a quantitative dimension of deviance.

This quantitative dimension does not necessarily coincide with the degree of hostility and the strength of the societal reaction. For example, a short man who marries a tall girl (let us say that there is an eight-inch difference in their heights) is committing a deviant act. This pair will be subject to widespread ridicule, as would a young man who marries a woman much older than he. But in both of these instances, although the number of people who would show their disapproval is large (this is the quantitative dimension, and it would be almost unanimous), their display of disapproval would be extremely mild. The transgressor or rule-breaker would not be arrested, run out of town, discriminated against in employment, or in other ways made to suffer enormously for his deviant act. But he would be made to suffer through mild but nonetheless significant informal channels.

The question of consensus goes beyond the matter of the universal condemnation of crimes that are abhorrent to all and the condemnation of some acts by certain groups while the acts are approved or looked upon with indifference and apathy by others. The members of a society are generally in wide agreement on what constitutes the behavior proper for a given situation. There are innumerable norms, writes Thomas Scheff (1966:32),

over which consensus is so complete that the members of a group appear to take them for granted. A host of such norms surround even the simplest conversation: a person engaged in conversation is expected to face . . . his partner rather than [look] away from him; if his gaze is [directed] toward the partner he is expected to look toward the other's eyes rather than, say, toward his forehead; [he is also expected] to stand at a proper conversational distance, neither one inch away nor across the room; and so on. A person who regularly violated these expectations probably would not be thought to be merely ill-bred, but as strange, bizarre, and frightening, because his behavior violates the assumptive

world of the group, the world that is construed to be the only one that is natural, decent, and possible.

In the sense in which Scheff discusses this matter, agreement within a society as to what constitutes the right thing to do comes close to unanimity, and violation of these norms is not only a manifestation of deviance but of a very special type of deviance; that is, it is usually considered, by laymen, symptomatic of mental illness.

When the hostile group is less than the whole population, there are still further dimensions that must be investigated. Does it consist of a special sector of the populace or a representative cross-section? Smoking marijuana in the 1960s was certainly condemned by far fewer college students, working youths of college age, and older persons with higher education than by the rest of the population. In studying a deviant act, and in determining how deviant it is and in whose eyes, one should ask whether and how strongly it is condemned by different ethnic, racial, sex, and age groups, and other portions of the population. More than that, it should be determined whether an act meets social approval or merely indifference among those not condemning it. The quality that has come to be known as salience involves the question "How strongly does one feel on an issue?" Black people are likely to be less condemnatory of ghetto violence, even when it takes the form of rioting, than whites, but they are seldom indifferent to the act, for, by virtue of their own racial identification, the act itself and its consequences concern them. But, on the other hand, college students who do not smoke pot are likely to take the attitude that they couldn't care less what others do and would probably be hostile to those who are condemnatory about such activities.

CONDEMNATION AND POWER

Does the hostile group constitute the center of power in a society? On the surface, this involves the rather simple question of whether they can have legislation passed and in other ways make their viewpoint strongly felt in the areas of employment, promotion, and other societal rewards. Certainly, in the 1960s, abortion and marijuana smoking represented types of actions that were condemned by only a portion of the population in most parts of the United States, but this was the portion that controlled the laws and had the power to enforce its will on the rest of society.

However, in many societies the question is not only a matter of police, judicial, legislative, and other governmental power; it is even more a question of whether the type of behavior conforms to the "official culture." One does not eat during the minister's sermon in

church, certainly not a sandwich, although perhaps a piece of candy can be surreptitiously sucked; this is the "just not done" type of behavior that is informally frowned upon. No laws are passed about these things; it is common knowledge that they are not to be done, and if done, they are not to be boasted of. Power here seems to consist of the tacit agreement among most people who belong to a society, or to a group within it, about what is right and what is wrong, and a widely shared feeling that some things are not done and that people who do them are not highly valued.

A further complication arises when a deviant act is committed by one who is from elite society and who is therefore likely to be exempt from strong informal and formal social sanctions. Speeding, drunken driving, smoking marijuana, use of other prohibited drugs, the importation and selling of these drugs, having illegitimate children, being "known" (informally, by gossip) as a homosexual—all these result in only mild reproof or none at all, and sometimes the transgression is ignored, particularly when the transgressor is a member of the upper social class of society, in power or part of a family in power, wealthy, or a celebrity. The social stigma of being a narcotics addict is far less for a physician than for an unemployed man on welfare (Winick, 1961). Thus, the societal reaction to the deviant involves both who he is, in terms of social power, and what he has done (Schwartz and Skolnick, 1962). This does not mean that the powerful and the wealthy can get away with anything, although sometimes they do. Note that the examples cited here are cases of marginal deviance, where the act does not meet quite universal condemnation and even receives a little bit of social support.³⁷

The power of a person's social status to lessen the hostility of society ought not to be confused with the effect that special circumstances can have in transforming an otherwise prohibited act into behavior that is right or proper. Speeding is illegal, but not if the car is on an automobile speeding course; if it is a police car, an ambulance, or a fire engine; or if it has received special dispensation by virtue of its being part of a motorcade racing to an airport. Most prescriptions

³⁷ High social status (determined by power, ethnicity, wealth, and other factors) undoubtedly tends to mitigate the hostility of society toward a transgressor. However, things do not always work out that way. The rich can often get away with anything, including murder; but sometimes the riches of a suspect or an accused will alert a hostile public and make it less likely, not more so, that a deal can be worked out with a prosecutor or judge. In most instances, the upper class escapes condemnation for the same transgressions for which the lower classes are severely punished, but sometimes prominence, wealth, and social position thrust a deviant into the public limelight and make him all the more vulnerable to the indignation of the more lowly, an indignation fanned by envy and the pretensions of morality often found among those who think of themselves as socially upward mobile

and proscriptions governing behavior refer to the status of an actor, but it is not only the status that is considered but the context in which the event occurs.³⁸ The onus of stigma and deviance is relieved if the status or context calls for the behavior, or tolerates it but does not prohibit it. This is not the same as, although it is related to, the effect of mitigating circumstances. For example, one is held less accountable for speeding if it is shown that a woman was being rushed to the hospital to give birth.³⁹

A MATTER OF TIME AND PLACE

Deviance has a temporal quality to it. Some acts that are condemned at one period are viewed less harshly and are even accepted, at another, and the reverse is also true. Such sexual and familial matters as cohabitation before marriage, divorce, and swearing in the presence of both sexes are much less deviant in the United States than formerly, if they can properly be labeled deviant at all. Not only can a woman have an abortion today, but she can acknowledge it publicly—something that would have been impossible in America before 1950. At one time, it was reprehensible for an unmarried son, no matter what his age, to live outside the home of his parents—and for a daughter it was unthinkable. Later, not only did this behavior become normative, but the son or daughter who was still living “at home” at age 30 came to be ridiculed and considered deviant.

In the 1920s, a man was not permitted on public bathing beaches in and around New York without carefully covering the entire upper part of his body up to the neck and shoulders. A shoulder strap on the upper part of the bathing suit (which resembled an undershirt) could be slipped down to the biceps only at the risk of receiving a summons from a policeman and a fine in court. By the 1970s, there were few areas of the human anatomy still left unexposed on these same beaches.

³⁸ One of the problems here is that the word *status* is used by sociologists to describe two quite different but related phenomena. One concerns social class or stratification (as lower- or middle-class status), and the other concerns a position held in society that carries with it rules for behavior that do not necessarily apply to others (as the status of husband or teacher).

³⁹ Clearly, there is nothing deviant about a male gynecologist who asks a female patient to undress. But if the same man makes a similar request to the same woman during a social visit to her home, while her husband steps out to buy a six-pack, the act is quite different. The point is too obvious to belabor, and examples can be found for every status and role that a person occupies. Some sociologists have interpreted these events as demonstrating the lack of universality of norms, but they merely show that norms (and hence deviance arising from their violation) are related to status.

Another example of rapid change in attitudes is found in the significant area of race relations. Hardly a city or town in the United States was not strictly Jim Crow in its restaurants, hotels, and other public accommodations until the 1940s. For people of different races to eat together, or even to want to do so, was then deviant, and for a "proper" or "decent" restaurant to serve them was unknown. A decade or two later, it became deviant to react with hostility toward such interracial mingling.

These are but a few examples that illustrate the larger point: that deviance is not immutable and timeless but grows and diminishes, rises and disappears. Its temporal nature can be exaggerated, however. While public attitudes toward certain forms of disfavored and disvalued behavior may change with regard to the nature of the sanction or the evaluation of the perpetrator, the hostility may remain rigid. Furthermore, changes with time should be seen as only one aspect of a larger and much studied issue: namely, that deviance is culturally relativistic. What is disvalued in one society may not be scorned in another, and certainly the extent to which negative sanctions are imposed differs considerably. This very simple statement has given rise to two misunderstandings and difficulties for analysis. On the one hand, cultural relativism has been exaggerated: Some scholars have even denied that certain acts are universally condemned. On the other, there is the undeniable historic fact that various societies have permitted, institutionalized and encouraged what most human beings have grown up to condemn. From today's vantage point, should sociologists look back to American slavery, genocide in Nazi Germany, and the acts committed in the name of colonialism and imperialism and say that these forms of behavior were not deviant because they were not condemned by significant portions of the populace in which they were committed?

To answer this question, one should return to the concept of deviance as an area of study. If deviance consists, not of bad, harmful, and antisocial acts and persons but of those *that are so defined* by the members of the society in which they take place, it is easy to see that the American slave trade and slaveholding were not deviant. They were, in fact, quite strongly approved by the nation's most powerful forces. This is not to condone them; in fact, one might readily condemn the country in which they took place as normative acts.

SALIENCE AND SERIOUSNESS

Crimes, as distinct from socially condemned noncriminal acts, have been rated according to the degree to which they were seen as evil.

The simplest system of rating uses three categories: felonies, which are the most serious crimes; misdemeanors; and violations or offenses, which are lesser infractions of the law that are often not counted as crimes at all. The distinction between a felony and a misdemeanor involves the degree of punishment that may be meted out to one who is found guilty. At least in the eyes of the lawmakers and those segments of society that give social and political support to the legislative bodies, the category and the seriousness of a crime are measurable, the yardstick being the severity of the punishment. The range of crimes includes those for which death can be imposed,⁴⁰ those that can be punished by prison terms, and, lowest on the scale, those punishable only by fines. This is not, however, a continuous system of classifying the degree of "evil" imputed to an act. Corporal punishment, for example, may also be invoked; how, then, can one decide the relative seriousness with which two acts have been conceptualized if the first is punishable by forty lashes and the second by four months in prison?

The major effort to measure the seriousness of criminal acts (particularly delinquent ones committed by young people) and rank them in order of the degree of evil with which they are generally regarded, was undertaken by Thorsten Sellin and Marvin Wolfgang (1964). Obviously, a similar study might be made of all deviant acts, criminal and noncriminal. Some are more deviant than others. This is a matter of salience and can be quantified only by noting how strongly the acts are condemned by large segments of the population. Evidently, being the father of an illegitimate child is not looked upon with as much disfavor as being the mother; being an effeminate male is seen with more disfavor than being a mannish woman; smoking marijuana is not condemned so strongly as mainlining heroin; overcharging by the storekeeper is not condemned so much as stealing from the storekeeper; and so on. It is the differences in intensity of condemnation that compel the social scientist to see deviance as a matter of degree. In no instance does grading some acts as less deviant imply that they are morally justifiable or show better judgment than other acts—that overcharging by the storekeeper, for example, is less heinous than stealing from him. What the sociologist is saying here is that, in his opinion, it is not so regarded by the general public.

THE MANY DIMENSIONS

In sum, the dimensions of deviance would appear to involve the following factors:

⁴⁰ These seem to be diminishing, both in the number of violations of law punishable by death and in the frequency with which that penalty is inflicted.

How many people see the act negatively?

Is it seen negatively by distinct and discrete segments of the population?

Do others see it positively, or are they indifferent?

Do those who see it negatively exercise considerable political and police power?

Is the negative judgment the official one of society?

Are there official governmental sanctions for the act?

Does the performer himself see his action as self-righteous?

Is there social support for the act from others?

How certain is it that the actor, if apprehended, will meet social condemnation?

How strong will this condemnation be?

Deviance, in short, is not a simple matter. Within limits, one can say that an act is criminal or not, although the gray area is a large one, and many court cases have been involved in deciding, not whether a given individual committed the act, but whether, under the circumstances, it constituted a crime. For noncriminal deviance and criminal nondeviance, there is no all-or-nothing proposition, no pigeonhole in which to put the act or actor. One cannot merely ask whether or not they are deviant, but rather, how deviant, in whose eyes, and with what consequences.

Summing Up

ALL THESE pages, all these examples, just to pinpoint the subject and define the terms! Has it been worth it?

If the concept has been clarified, then the answer is yes. For it is not merely a semantic question of finding a proper label. It is an effort to separate unlike things and bring together similar ones; to draw conclusions in one province that can be applied to other, related provinces; to gain an overview of the subject that will indicate how smaller elements fit into the larger picture.

Along this line, Robert Merton (1957:114-15) has written:

A good part of the work called "theorizing" is taken up with the clarification of concepts—and rightly so. It is in this matter of clearly defined concepts that social science research is not infrequently defective. Research activated by a major interest in methodology may be centered on the *design* of establishing causal relations without due regard for analyzing the variables involved in the inquiry. . . .

But in general, the clarification of concepts, commonly considered a province peculiar to the theorist, is a frequent result of empirical research. Research sensitive to its own needs cannot easily escape this pressure for conceptual clarification. *For a basic requirement of research is that the concepts, the variables, be defined with sufficient clarity to enable the research to proceed*, a requirement easily and unwittingly not met in the kind of discursive exposition which is often miscalled sociological theory. [Italics in original.]

Social science, like science itself, cannot study all the examples of a given phenomenon. It studies a few, verifies its findings by looking at others, and then draws conclusions which it applies to the other instances of the given phenomenon that have not been examined. But this can be a successful process only if the phenomenon itself has been carefully defined, so that one knows what instances fall within its perimeters and which do not. That the process is complicated by an enormous range of variation within any one category makes the task difficult.

Deviance? Yes, but not necessarily deviants. Deviance? Yes, but how much, to what extent? Deviant people? Are they criminals, eccentrics, abnormal, personally disorganized, pathological, unconventional, marginal? Are they any of these, all of these, a few of these? Sometimes? Always? These are the sorts of questions that I have sought to answer. Now, on to the matter of how people arrive at doing the things that are disvalued, or how society arrives at disvaluing some people and some activities.

REFERENCES

- Becker, Howard S. (1951). "The professional dance musician and his audience," *American Journal of Sociology* 57:136-44.
- (1963). *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*. New York: Free Press.
- (1971). "Labeling theory reconsidered," paper presented to British Sociological Association.
- Black, Donald J., and Albert J. Reiss, Jr. (1970). "Police control of juveniles," *American Sociological Review* 35:63-77.
- Bloch, Herbert A. (1956). *Disorganization: Personal and Social*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

- Clinard, Marshall B. (1968). *Sociology of Deviant Behavior*. 3d ed., New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- (1974). *Sociology of Deviant Behavior*. 4th ed., New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Cohen, Albert K. (1966). *Deviance and Control*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Cohen, Stanley, ed. (1971). *Images of Deviance*. Middlesex, England, and Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books.
- Davis, Fred (1961). "Deviance disavowal: The management of strained interaction by the visibly handicapped," *Social Problems* 9:120–32.
- Douglas, Jack D. (1972). "The experience of the absurd and the problem of social order," pp. 189–214 in Robert A. Scott and Jack D. Douglas, eds., *Theoretical Perspectives on Deviance*. New York: Basic Books.
- Durkheim, Emile (1893). *De la division du travail social*; translated by George Simpson, *The Division of Labor in Society*. New York: Macmillan, 1933; New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.
- Duster, Troy (1970). *The Legislation of Morality: Law, Drugs, and Moral Judgment*. New York: Free Press.
- Faris, Robert E. L. (1948). *Social Disorganization*. New York: Ronald Press.
- Finestone, Harold (1957). "Cats, kicks, and color," *Social Problems* 5:3–13.
- Freedman, Jonathan L., and Anthony N. Doob (1968). *Deviancy: The Psychology of Being Different*. New York: Academic Press.
- Geis, Gilbert (1974). "Upperworld crime," pp. 114–37 in Abraham Blumberg, ed., *Current Perspectives on Criminal Behavior: Original Essays on Criminology*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Goffman, Erving (1961). *Encounters: Two Studies in the Sociology of Interaction*. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill.
- (1963). *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- (1971). *Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order*. New York: Basic Books.
- Gouldner, Alvin W. (1968). "The sociologist as partisan: Sociology and the welfare state," *American Sociologist* 3:103–16.
- Henslin, James M. (1972). "Studying deviance in four settings: Research experiences with cabbies, suicides, drug users, and abortionees," pp. 35–70 in Jack D. Douglas, ed., *Research on Deviance*. New York: Random House.
- Hughes, Everett C. (1962). "Good people and dirty work," *Social Problems* 10:3–11.
- Jacobs, Jerry, ed. (1972). *Getting By: Illustrations of Marginal Living*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Katz, Jack (1973). "Essences as moral identities: Verifiability and responsibility in imputations of deviance and charisma," paper presented to Society for the Study of Social Problems, New York.

- Lemert, Edwin M. (1951). *Social Pathology: A Systematic Approach to the Theory of Sociopathic Behavior*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- LeVine, Robert A. (1959). "Gusii sex offenses: A study in social control," *American Anthropologist* 61:965-90.
- Liazos, Alexander (1972). "The poverty of the sociology of deviance: Nuts, sluts, and preverts," *Social Problems* 20:103-20.
- Lofland, John (1969). *Deviance and Identity*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Lombroso-Ferrero, Gina (1911). *Criminal Man According to the Classification of Cesare Lombroso*. New York: G.P. Putnam's; reprinted, with introduction by Leonard D. Savitz, Montclair, N.J.: Patterson Smith, 1972.
- Manning, Peter K. (1969). "A critical assessment of the disorganization, value conflict, anomie and deviance and societal reaction approaches to social deviance." Unpublished.
- McCaghy, Charles H., James K. Skipper, Jr., and Mark Lefton, eds. (1968). *In Their Own Behalf: Voices from the Margin*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- (1974). *In Their Own Behalf: Voices from the Margin*. 2d ed., New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- McGee, Reece (1962). *Social Disorganization in America*. San Francisco: Chandler.
- McIntosh, James (1974). *Perspectives on Marginality: Understanding Deviance*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
- Merton, Robert K. (1938). "Social structure and anomie," *American Sociological Review* 3:672-82.
- (1957). *Social Theory and Social Structure*. Rev. ed., New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Myrdal, Gunnar (1944). *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Orwell, George (1946). *Animal Farm*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Park, Robert E. (1928). "Human migration and the marginal man," *American Journal of Sociology* 33:881-93.
- Parsons, Talcott (1951). *The Social System*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Polsky, Ned (1967). *Hustlers, Beats, and Others*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Reckless, Walter (1967). *The Crime Problem*. 4th ed., New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Reiss, Ira L. (1970). "Premarital sex as deviant behavior: An application of current approaches to deviance," *American Sociological Review* 35: 78-87.
- Riesman, David (1954). *Individualism Reconsidered and Other Essays*. New York: Free Press.
- Rose, Arnold M. (1954). *Theory and Methods in the Social Sciences*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Ross, H. Laurence (1960-61). "Traffic law violation: A folk crime," *Social Problems* 8:231-41.

- Sagarin, Edward, ed. (1971). *The Other Minorities: Nonethnic Collectivities Conceptualized as Minority Groups*. Waltham, Mass: Xerox College Publishing.
- Scheff, Thomas J. (1966). *Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Schur, Edwin M. (1971). *Labeling Deviant Behavior: Its Sociological Implications*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Schutz, Alfred (1964). *Collected Papers*. Vol. II: *Studies in Social Theory*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Schwartz, Richard D., and Jerome H. Skolnick (1962). "Two studies of legal stigma," *Social Problems* 10:133-42.
- Sellin, Thorsten, and Marvin E. Wolfgang (1964). *The Measurement of Delinquency*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Simmel, Georg (1950). *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*; translated by Kurt Wolff. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
- Stonequist, Everett V. (1937). *The Marginal Man: A Study in Personality and Culture Conflict*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Sutherland, Edwin H. (1940). "White-collar criminality," *American Sociological Review* 5:1-12.
- Wilkins, Leslie T. (1964). *Social Deviance: Social Policy, Action, and Research*. London: Tavistock; American ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965.
- Winick, Charles (1961). "Physician narcotic addicts," *Social Problems* 9:174-86.
- Zimring, Frank, and Gordon Hawkins (1968). "Deterrence and marginal groups," *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 5:100-114.

II

Theories, Explanations and Perspectives

A MAJOR aim of any scientific pursuit—perhaps *the* major aim—is to answer the question “Why?” The social scientist studies, categorizes and classifies, examines, sometimes experiments, in order to explain why a phenomenon has occurred. Man is a complex animal, in many respects individually unpredictable, but much less so when large groups are under consideration. His complexities are increased by the multitude of factors that impinge upon him, making it difficult to isolate those responsible for bringing about an observed result; and furthermore, each of many forces, factors, and influences can lead to a variety of behavioral patterns, even in a small and relatively homogeneous community.

The Aim of Theory

A THEORY must seek to explain a phenomenon under consideration: how it got there; what it is doing there; how it manifests itself; why it takes on the form that it does; what its relationships are to the society as a whole, to other people, to cultural objects, and to social institutions. The usefulness of any theory depends on:

- how much it can explain—that is, how many people, how many groups of people, types of acts, types of reactions to people and to acts
- how profoundly it can explain the activities under study—that is, with what insights, so that further probing adds little that is not already known
- how successfully it can be employed for predictive purposes—which means not only to explain things before they have occurred but also to anticipate the findings in areas of behavior not already studied
- with what simplicity the theories can manage these explanations—that is, the minimum of other, extraneous and tortuous thinking that must be brought into play
- the elegance of the theory—or, as set forth in Occam's razor, its economy or parsimony in covering the widest number of cases by the simplest path
- the extent and degree to which a theory is compatible with a variety of theories that explain other areas of human behavior or, for that matter, of science—for two mutually exclusive approaches cannot be held, even though they explain different phenomena
- the light it sheds upon the science of human behavior other than in the area of deviance—that is, the applicability to an understanding, let us say, of the socialization of the child, or of intergroup tensions
- the minimal number of "exceptions" that require a constant sharpening, refinement, and refocusing of the theory itself

Is it possible to explain deviance? It is said that Gertrude Stein, on her deathbed, asked, "What is the answer?" and, getting no reply, said, "In that case, what is the question?"

What is the question? What is one trying to do in formulating a theory of deviance? Just what is social science seeking to explain?

At first glance, there appear to be several possible questions that are being posed, and, although they are interrelated, they must be dealt with separately. To wit:

Why is there deviance at all? Why is a given type of behavior or a certain category of person disvalued? Why do some people but not others get involved in various forms of disapproved activities?

Shifting the focus only slightly, one can ask: Why are certain forms of disapproved behavior found with greater frequency among some sections of the populace than among others?

Perhaps the most thorough probing would seek to understand whether deviance itself—in the broadest sense—increases or decreases with changes in the economic, political, religious, familial, and other institutional aspects of a society. That this is a formidable problem to confront is evident if only because of the inherent difficulties in quantifying deviance; that is, in knowing whether it is greater or lesser at one time or in one place than in another.

Theories of deviance take several possible orientations. One can, at least for analytic purposes, distinguish among them according to whether they involve a study of the nature of society, the nature of the deviants, or the nature of the reaction against the behavior and the people.

The nature of society. A theory of deviance that focuses upon the society itself would seek to explain what there is about the culture, social structure, institutions, or values that generates deviance. This approach has two broad divisions: (1) a study of the nature of the society that leads some people to choose behavioral patterns that conflict with the values of others and provoke their anger, indignation, and hostility, and (2) a study of the nature of the social institutions and culture that generates hostility in some people toward others unlike themselves in status or behavior. The first problem addresses itself to the social setting that cultivates and nurtures the deviance; and the second, to the social pressures against deviance.

A “nature of society” theory, then, would seek primarily to account not for what motivates people to pursue deviant activities but for why they are so motivated under certain social conditions. It would not ignore the factors that lead some people into deviance, but it would look for the root cause in society that generates these factors. It would be concerned with the etiology of deviance not in individuals but in larger groups of people and would seek to know not why certain people are “chosen” (that is, become motivated or vulnerable) for specific types of disapproved behavior but why the social institutions lead these people into such activities rather than into martyrdom, innovative

artistry, religion that is not hostility-generating, creative isolation, or other offbeat but not disvalued alternatives.

The nature of the deviants. A rather different and classically popular approach has been to study the nature of the people who are engaged in deviant activities, or who are labeled deviant by others, to see what distinguishes them—in character, intelligence, familial background, genetic structure, or physical attributes—and thus explain deviance by explaining the people involved in it.

The “nature of deviants” approach does not entirely exclude a “nature of society” theory. Both can be at work at the same time. That is, people of a certain character, constitution, or set of attributes may be drawn toward deviant activities in certain social structures but not in others. Induction into deviance may very well require both of these conditions: an individual with the given attributes, temperament, and personality for the disapproved behavior, and a society in which these potentialities take root, are cultivated, and flourish.

Further, the deviant may have certain characteristics that are the *effects* of having been propelled into deviance because of the nature of society (or a part of it to which he has been exposed) rather than the *causes* of his pursuit of that disvalued activity. In fact, it is difficult to believe that psychological and other features of individuals who have been severely stigmatized and discriminated against—that is, people against whom the societal reaction has been strongly negative—would not be different from the characteristics of others not subject to such treatment.

Finally, there may be attributes of a person that make such an individual better equipped for criminal or other socially rejected conduct than others who lack these attributes. The strong, wiry, athletic, and energetic may be better suited for burglary, particularly “second-story” jobs, which requires an agility and fleetness less likely to be found in the stout, the weak, or the lethargic. A beautiful young woman is more likely to succeed as a call girl than a plain-looking woman would be, just as she would have advantages in such normative pursuits as modeling. It is easy under such circumstances to slip into the error of believing that physical attributes (or personality and temperament) can account for the deviance, and hence that there is a “deviant type” having a variety of physical or personality traits; when actually, these personality and physical characteristics are widely distributed in the general population. If call girls have to be beautiful, then beauty will be a characteristic of call girls; and if art forgers have to be talented in painting, then such talent will be found among art forgers. But this

does not mean that such attributes are indicators that permit the identification of these or other types of deviants.

The nature of the societal reaction. A third way of seeking to explain deviance is to look at the social reaction of powerful groups or individuals toward those whom they find unsuitable. This view focuses on the nature, frequency, probability or certainty, and degree of hostility of the reaction to an individual, or an act, and on why some acts or persons are reacted to negatively.

This method of approaching a theory of deviance does not deny the efficacy or meaningfulness of the other two, but it has a different emphasis. It is an approach to deviance that could very well lead to a study of the nature of a society (again, its social structure, its institutions) that encourages and permits some people, particularly those who are in power, to react strongly against certain others. This is not to deny that the latter have violated rules, but here the emphasis is on the rule-makers themselves. One seeks to understand why these rules were made, who makes them, why people react so strongly against those who break them, why (if this is true) there is a selective reaction against some rule-breakers but not others, and, finally, what happens to the deviant as a result of the reaction against him. It is the significance attributed to this last element that distinguishes the social-reaction perspective from the others.

To elaborate, the social-reaction approach suggests a deep interest in the characteristics of the deviant, but the focus is primarily on these characteristics *as the result* of the individual's being negatively labeled, and usually as a result of his being discovered, apprehended, and prosecuted or persecuted as deviant. The characteristics that differentiate the deviant from the normal were seldom there before, or, if they were, they may have been trivial, but the social-reaction approach sees the most significant attributes (and those that are most harmful personally and socially) as having been aggravated, if not actually brought into being, as a result of the deviant's rejection by society.¹

The social-reaction orientation can very well lead to an examination of the social structures and major institutions of a society that create the hostility. From a study of the social reaction it is logical to demand answers to the questions: "Why is there hostility toward people committing certain acts in some societies and not in others? What is the nature of the social structure that brings forth so much hostility?"

¹ In the instance of the physical deviant, the characteristic was there before it was stigmatized, but how it is reacted to, in the view of those using this perspective, is often unnecessarily cruel and frequently results in the new difficulties that were not present before.

Thus, there are three major but interrelated approaches to a theory of deviance: One examines the nature of the society that cultivates deviant behavior among a certain number of its members. It seeks to understand why there is more inappropriate activity at some times than at others, and more among some cohorts than others. A second looks at the deviant actors to see what is "wrong"—or at least different—about them and to explain rule-breaking in terms of the characteristics of these persons. A third looks at the normals, or rule-makers, and the society in which they function to see how and why they react to others as they do, and with what consequences for the rule-violators. It is possible that these three approaches can be combined in one way or another or used separately to discuss and explain different forms of deviance.

The particular theoretical view one takes is likely to be influenced by the type of deviance one is examining; but this becomes more complicated, for the nature of the theory that is being used is likely to influence the type of research one will conduct and the type of deviant individuals or groups one will use as examples to validate or modify the theory. For example, behavioral scientists who study activities that are not inherently hurtful to those who do not participate in them, such as prostitution and smoking marijuana, are likely to develop an attachment to the social-reaction perspective. As a corollary, those who have been viewing the world from that orientation are more likely to study prostitution or homosexuality rather than violent rape. On the other hand, people who examine acts that are committed primarily in a lower-social-class milieu are tempted to base their theories of deviance on the class structure, and hence the social structure; and those having a social-structural outlook are likely to examine traditional forms of antisocial crime. Behavioral scientists who examine acts of extreme passion, senseless violence, crimes of lone madmen,² will seek to locate the motivation in the characteristics of the criminal; they will focus on the attributes of the deviant person rather than on the institutions of society. And forensic psychiatrists or psychoanalytically oriented sociologists will go to precisely such instances of deviance for study. Research, then, would tend to be self-validating.³

² The terminology here (extreme passion, senseless violence, lone madmen) is not meant to imply any scientific validity for such categorizations. These are journalistic terms that apply to acts seen in a society as violent, senseless, mad, or in similar ways.

³ This is dangerous for the researcher and for theory as well, but elaboration of the point belongs elsewhere. Suffice it to say that, rather than search out experiences and experiments that validate a theory, the researcher should constantly seek those that are most likely to disconfirm it.

POSING QUESTIONS AND SEEKING ANSWERS

To return to Gertrude Stein's "What is the question?" suppose that one were trying to develop a theory of prostitution. Just what would one be looking for? To go back to the three major approaches, one might seek to answer several questions:

- Why does this type of activity exist, thrive, grow, or decline under certain social systems and various conditions?
- Why do some people become prostitutes in a society in which prostitution is strongly condemned and discouraged?
- Why is there differential stigmatization of the streetwalker and the courtesan? Of the prostitute and her client?
- What are the traits and background features that characterize the prostitute?
- Why do people take so strong a negative attitude toward this type of person and behavior (or do they)?

Each of these questions would lead to further ones, so that they tend to become intertwined. Are the personal attributes the result of the stigmatization, or did they result in a selective process by which some persons were brought into this disvalued profession? Did these personal characteristics arise because of economic or other social conditions, or were they of a constitutional (inherent) nature?

If these questions are answered satisfactorily then one might have the beginnings of a theory. From the data, conclusions are drawn and generalizations made, but they apply to prostitution, not deviance. Do they hold true for homosexuality, voyeurism, rape, white-collar crime, lynching, committing blasphemy in a religious household, agitating for Communism in an anti-Communist society, and laughing at one's mother's funeral? If so, one can say that there is a general theory of deviant behavior (although not yet of deviance, for nothing has been said of the status of the crippled or the blind). At this point, the sociologist has a way of looking at and understanding the entire phenomenon of negatively viewed activity.

But what if the attempt to theorize doesn't work out? What if one's views throw light on prostitution but not on some or all of the other manifestations of deviance? Then one is left with a theory of prostitution, perhaps with a middle-range theory that explains nonnormative sexual behavior, or a theory of lower-class crime, or of deviance that is money- and goal-oriented, or of female deviance. All the behavior and activities that fit the theory developed in the study of prostitution must be brought together; all those that do not fit must be excluded.

It is possible to have both inclusive and more restricted theories of deviance; that is, one may be able to make general theoretical propositions that will explain all such behavior and people on one level, but may have to make more specific and particular theories, or subtheories, to explain these instances in greater detail. Furthermore, the particular and specific can be differentiated in two ways:

1. It may be necessary to have divergent theoretical approaches to the various forms of deviance; that is, an explanation for the widely condemned violence of the deliberate and self-righteous radical (right or left) or the militant nationalist may be inadequate to account for a deviant act of shoplifting or white-collar crime, much less for the status of the physically disabled.

2. It may be necessary to have dissimilar approaches to explain different individuals or groups within a single form of behavior. Some people may indeed be brought to drug addiction or alcoholism by early childhood family experiences and deprivation, and others may arrive at the same form of behavior by seduction, initiation, youthful rebellion, or habituation. What explains adolescent deviance may not explain analogous activities among adults; similar statements may be made about social class, race, and other distinctions.

Essentially, there are three overlapping and intersecting problems here: to describe the people, to describe the type of behavior, and then, finally, to describe the society in which such people and such behavior are condemned.⁴

The complexities of attempting to find explanatory theories for different types of behavior and different people can well lead to a multicausal approach, in which literally everything is found to be the cause of anything, or to an eclectic approach, in which different causes are applied to different cases, not predictively, but after the fact. Both the eclectic and the multicausal approaches to behavior are largely out of fashion in sociology, not because they are "wrong," but because they are seen as of relatively limited usefulness.

Eclectic here means that numerous explanations are available and are all valid and have been found applicable, but one theory might apply to some instances, a second to others, a third to still others. Although this sounds reasonable at first, as a theory (if it can be called such) or, rather, as a congeries of theories often only loosely related to one another, eclecticism tends to lose its usefulness for prediction, prevention, or even understanding. If, as many criminologists have claimed,

⁴ This last point leads to greater complexities. The society of normals includes at least three different types of persons: those who are indifferent, those who are hostile to the transgressors, and those who have done more than follow the rules—they created them.

crime covers a great many behaviors that are unconnected with one another in all respects except that they are illegal and hence would not lend themselves to a single causal explanation, how much more true would this be of deviance. Such a perspective (which is not here being adopted) would lead to numerous theories, each applicable to a given form of deviance or type of deviant.

Nevertheless, eclecticism has had its defenders, none more prestigious than Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck (1950:4-5, 7):

The problems of human motivation and behavior involve the study of man as well as society, of nature as well as nurture, of segments or mechanisms of human nature as well as the total personality, of patterns of intimate social activity as well as larger areas of social process or masses of culture. . . .

At the present stage of knowledge an eclectic approach to the study of the causal process in human motivation and behavior is obviously necessary. It is clear that such an inquiry should be designed to reveal meaningful integrations of diverse data from several levels of inquiry. There is need for a systematic approach that will not ignore any promising leads to crime causation, covering as many fields and utilizing as many of the most reliable and relevant techniques of investigation and measurement as are necessary for a fair sampling of the various aspects of a complex biosocial problem.

Many excellent thinkers in the field of criminology and noncriminal deviance have spoken out strongly against eclecticism, and I take a summary of several of their statements from Dale Hardman (1964), a convenient source (and an opponent of those he paraphrases and quotes):

Vold, for instance, states that "the end of eclecticism can only be the complete negation of the whole purpose of attempting to develop scientifically valid and useful generalizations. . . . Eclectic theories carried to the logical extreme . . . can only mean the impossibility of formulating any consistent scientific theory in the field." Hartung refers to it as a "scissors-and-paste-pot eclectic psychology." Datta states: "One cannot take the best of many disciplines, mix them, and emerge with 'theory, eclectic.' The eclectic view is not theory, but hodge-podge." Carl Rogers: "Attempts to reconcile [divergent theories] result in a superficial eclecticism which does not increase objectivity and leads nowhere."

Hardman finds shortcomings in all extant theories, yet he finds some possibilities for explaining individual cases in all of them (except Freudianism): "It has been demonstrated that new and better theories can and do grow out of combinations of old ones." He quotes many authorities who warn against trying to explain too much by a single

cause, or who would not exclude some causes although they do not entirely embrace them. An eclectic approach is not only possible, he urges, but advantageous. Some theories are useful for understanding certain forms of deviance or certain individuals, but one must look elsewhere to explain others, and perhaps a way will be found of synthesizing the two. What he suggests by his eclecticism is what could be better termed a low-level-of-abstraction theory. For theoretical purposes, it would probably result in discarding deviance, or even crime, as a single conceptual entity and restricting a given theory to one form of deviant activity. Eclecticism, on the contrary, offers so many theories *for the same behavior* that it gives none, resulting in a system that is essentially atheoretical.

The multicausal approach poses somewhat the same problem but with greater complications. Here, it is postulated that there are many explanations at work simultaneously, not only in an individual instance, but on each other. They are cumulative, additive, synergistic.

David Matza (1964:23–24) expresses a strong case against multicausation:

When factors become too numerous, there is a tendency for them to be not factors at all but rather contingencies. The term *factor*, after all, means something. A factor is a condition that is applicable to a given universe. It has an effect on everyone, not equally, to be sure, but according to degree. It is not something that may or may not matter. Factors may matter to varying extents, but every factor must by definition matter to some extent. Is the way in which a policeman responded to a child on their first meeting a factor? Does it matter or not? Is American foreign policy a factor? Does it matter or not? Is the demeanor of a child's sixth-grade teacher a factor? Does it matter or not? And so on, endlessly. Common sense tells us that these occurrences may matter or not, depending on many other things that may more legitimately be considered factors. Some occurrences may or may not matter. Thus, they are contingencies and not factors. If we insist on considering them factors, we are in the hopeless position of arguing that everything matters.

Some of the controversy over multiple-factor approaches (and eclectic as well) may derive from the failure to differentiate causal factors from variables. As Albert Cohen (1951) has pointed out:

A multiplicity of factors is not to be confused with a multiplicity of variables. Almost all scientific theories contain a multiplicity of variables. . . . Each event may well be accompanied by a unique configuration of circumstances which is in each case causally relevant since many different combinations of concrete circumstances may fit the conditions called for by the generalized theory. Explanation calls not for a *single*

factor but for a *single theory* or system of theory applicable to all cases. . . .

A multiple-factor approach is not a theory; it is an abdication of the quest for a theory. It simply asserts that this particular event is "caused" by this particular combination of concrete circumstances and that particular event by another combination of circumstances. [Italics in original.]

Like eclecticism, multicausality seems on its face to be convincing: There is indeed a multitude of causes for a single event; there are many forces that impinge upon each person to bring him to the point of committing a given action. But again, like the eclectic, the multicausal theory is of limited usefulness. It fails to single out the forces without which the results would have been markedly different, and thus it is of little predictive utility. In its effort to encompass so much, it fails to provide social-policy recommendations for the prevention of antisocial behavior or for the diminishing of hostilities between people who have dissimilar patterns or statuses. It is extremely difficult to account for such differences in the amount of or type of deviance, whether one looks at these matters over a period of time or from one sector of the populace to another. Furthermore, multicausality would be of little use in accounting for the rise and fall in popular acceptance or rejection of various forms of activity.

Theories of deviance, like most other theoretical approaches to types of human behavior, should not be seen as right or wrong. They are more useful or less, and that is why the eclectic and multicausal are generally discarded: because they are less, not more, useful.

Theories of deviance tend to recapitulate theories of crime, although many aspects of deviance are generally not subsumed under crime. At the same time, deviance has attracted to it certain unique theories, either because they are more encompassing than those developed to explain crime, or because they were formulated to explain rule-breaking behavior in general and not lawbreaking behavior more specifically.

Theories have been described as focusing on the social structure, the individual deviant, those who label people deviant and condemn them for their activities, or combinations of these. Now, in a more generalized sense, theories of deviance and crime can be described as biological, sociological, psychological, combinations of two or all three of these, eclectic (with different theories applying to different individuals or types of behavior), or multicausal.

Biological and Constitutional Approaches

THE MAJOR interest in biological theories of deviance, and particularly of crime, arose in the second half of the nineteenth century and continued during the first decades of the twentieth century. Following the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859, there was an effort to apply the biologically and specifically the evolutionary model to many forms of human behavior. Several of the biologically oriented social scientists contended that some people had an inborn predilection for the deviant path which under certain conditions made them more likely to develop in such a direction; other scientists saw in the "born criminal" an inevitable and predictable "bad seed."

It has been argued that biological theory is contradicted by the fact that different types of behavior are regarded as criminal (or antisocial) at various times, and that no type of behavior is invariably criminal in all societies. Hence, it is contended, no person can be born with a predilection for "crime." Thus, Austin Turk (1969:10-11) suggests that validation of the biological-predisposition theory requires one to believe that there are persons born to commit certain acts that will invariably be criminal, anywhere and everywhere:

There is apparently no pattern of human behavior which has not been at least tolerated in some normative structure. While there do seem to be universal categories of norms (e.g., norms limiting the use of violence) no specific explicit or implicit rule has ever been shown to be present in all human societies. . . . From the absence of universal norms it follows that research on the etiology of any specific form of "criminal" behavior must inevitably be culture-specific and time-bound, because the phenomenon under study will change from culture to culture and from time to time within essentially the same culture, which implies that findings cannot be tested by comparative research, and therefore that the concepts used to define the subject of investigation are scientifically inadequate. [Italics in original.]

Aside from Turk's extreme cultural relativism, which concedes and

subsequently downplays the high degree of cross-cultural similarity in attitudes toward predatory crimes, the argument is not necessarily true. For there can be (although this is not to say that there are) persons born with a tendency to have little self-control, to be violent, compulsive, severely phobic, enormously suspicious of others, or to have a variety of other traits, characteristics, and attributes that increase the likelihood of their committing crimes. Some individuals might be self-destructive and thus tend to ignore warnings of punishment that succeed in deterring others; some might be individualistic, rebellious, and anti-authoritarian, with the result that they tend to violate rules for the sake of violating them. In short, a biological basis for an understanding of deviance is not at all incompatible with a relativist view of crime and deviance.

Although some of the earliest and most influential criminologists leaned strongly toward biological explanations of crime, in general the biological has fared poorly at the hands of scholars and has often been dismissed with little serious consideration. However, in the late 1960s and the early 1970s it seems to have had a resurgence of attention. Nevertheless, the predisposition against biological explanation among scholars and students is strong, as strong as the predisposition in favor of such explanations among laymen. Before looking at biology, let us look briefly at the prejudices themselves.

Scholars tend to be wary of biological explanations of human behavior because such explanations often have racist, chauvinistic, jingoistic, and nationalistic overtones, and sociologists and other behavioral scientists have feared the uses to which biological views might be put and the implications of findings along such lines. Furthermore, biological explanations by and large leave the leaders of a society seemingly helpless; they make any effort at either prevention or rehabilitation appear to be useless. On the other hand, these may be the very reasons that biology appeals to laymen: because in the first instance it is an appeal to the racism and nationalism that so many people harbor, and because it solves the problem of rehabilitation, by justifying abandoning the attempt.

Any effort to focus on the biological factors in the causation of crime and deviance is bound to be an evasion of the obligation to search for the causes of social difficulties in the nature of the society and its social structure and institutions; hence it would not appeal to the sociologist (who is generally a social reformer and likely to be radically oriented) and would have a strong appeal to the uneducated masses in a country in which they make up a conservative bloc.

It is useful, in this respect, to recall that in the early days of the American republic, many arguments in support of the contention that

blacks were inherently inferior were based on their apparent passivity and their lack of aggression under slavery and extreme oppressive conditions, while at the same time the arguments adduced to "prove" the inferiority of the Indians claimed that they were wild and prone to violence. By the third quarter of the twentieth century, this had been turned around: Now the Indians were shown to be inferior because of their passivity (as they accepted the life on the reservation) and the blacks because of their violence.

Biological theories need not be racist or nationalistic, although they often have been. They need not be based on the presupposition that a predilection for violence or for other types of antisocial action is more prevalent in one group than in another. It is doubtful that any group of human beings is inherently or genetically more violence-prone or less so (i.e., "peace-loving") than others; rather, political, economic, geographic, historical, and other factors have produced some peoples who have lived at peace for centuries, while most of the world's population has not been so fortunate.

If it is true that some criminogenic factors (such as predilection to violence or lack of self-control) are inborn in some individuals, this does not suggest that they are found in disproportionate numbers in a particular racial, religious, or national group. It is just as feasible to imagine hereditary factors distributed randomly in all racial and ethnic groups, even as feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, the tendency to have twins and, so far as I can determine, genius are found in approximately equal proportions no matter what gene pool is examined.⁵

Nor is it true that a biological theory of crime would necessarily make man helpless, for it does not mean that one is foredoomed and predestined to a criminal career but merely that one is more likely to follow such a career than are others.

The first serious efforts to look at crime from a biological viewpoint stemmed primarily from the Italian school of criminology and from the work of Cesare Lombroso (1835–1909), although Lombroso had his predecessors, and he himself did not entirely exclude nonbiological factors. In the era of Darwin, biological orientations were significant in philosophy, political science, social philosophy, and the new and burgeoning field of sociology. Man began to see his world in terms of evolution and other biological metaphors. In this atmosphere, Lombroso sought and found physical and physiological differences between

⁵ There can be some argument over each point itemized, but my contention here is that random distribution of the alleged criminogenic factors, if the latter are indeed hereditary, can logically be postulated. In short, biological approaches to deviance need not be racist, although they often have been.

prisoners and civilians. Since he himself was a physician, the biological influence was particularly strong. He postulated that primitive man was criminal (in the sense of being wild, hence asocial and violent) and that modern criminals were throwbacks to an earlier form on the evolutionary scale. With crude measurements, and often confusing the immutable anatomy with the socially induced physiology, Lombroso (1911) found a number of attributes of the criminal population that he contended occurred more frequently than among civilians. His criminals were darker in skin (possibly because of the greater amount of crime in southern than in northern Italy, or possibly because darker people were apprehended more frequently), they had "shifty eyes," strong and jutting jaws, receding hairlines, sparse beards but full heads of hair, and other characteristics that differentiated them from the law-abiding population.

Lombroso believed that a person having a given number of these features, which he called stigmata, was born with a strong tendency to become criminal and was, therefore, in his phrase, a "born criminal." Born criminals did not account for all crime, but a substantial number of convicts (about a third) were in the born-criminal category. Lombroso's work attracted many followers (among others, the prominent British writer Havelock Ellis, 1890), but it was scoffed at in France. A good scientific study in England (Goring, 1913), in which prisoners were compared with nonprisoners, did reveal some statistically significant differences, but in general the English study tended to invalidate the work of the Italians.

The biological influence was fused with environmental ones as the debate over nature versus nurture raged. A student and disciple of Lombroso, Enrico Ferri (1913), saw crime as the inevitable and uncontrollable act of a man devoid of free will, a culmination of what he was born with and of all the influences around him in his environment throughout life, up to the moment of that act. There were no miracles, Ferri contended, no acts that man committed without previous cause.

Despite his emphasis on early childhood and repressed sexual drives, Freud (1896) believed that heredity and what he termed (but did not define clearly) constitutional factors played a major role in the development of neurotic behavior:

Experience shows, as might have been anticipated, that among the problems of etiology that of the quantitative relationship of the etiological factors to one another should not be neglected. But one would not have guessed the fact which seems to follow from my observations, that heredity and the specific causes may replace one another quantitatively, that the same pathological effect will be produced by the coexistence of

a very grave specific etiology and a moderate degree of predisposition as by that of a severe neuropathic heredity with a slight specific factor.

While European sociology and criminology were turning toward economic determinism and, in the throes of wars and revolutions, were concerned with large social factors, some American social scientists were turning toward self-image and social-psychological considerations. In the 1930s, Earnest Hooton, a prominent anthropologist, undertook a study of the anthropometric factors in the American convict, using a prison population, which he contrasted with civilian controls. Hooton (1939:376) found that when ethnic and racial origins were held constant, the convicts were physiologically different from civilians who had never been convicted of crime. Furthermore, specific types of physiques were strongly correlated with given types of crime:

It is a remarkable fact that tall thin men tend to murder and rob, tall heavy men to kill and to commit forgery and fraud, undersized thin men to steal and to burglarize, short heavy men to assault, to rape, and to commit other sex crimes, whereas men of mediocre body build tend to break the law without obvious discrimination of preference.

Note, however, that it is not the same as saying—as it seems to say, out of context—that all or most tall thin men will have a tendency to rob, or most short heavy men to commit sex crimes. Hooton claimed to have found *within the category of criminals*, utilizing only the imprisoned as a sample, body differences that distinguished the forgers from the assaulters, and both from the burglars. In addition to this, and no doubt even more significantly, Hooton contended that there were physiological differences between the convicts and the law-abiding, norm-following controls.

Although it is true that Hooton's work can be interpreted as demonstrating nothing more than predisposition to crime, he himself did not always draw this conclusion. From his studies, he concluded that there were born criminals, and even suggested that it might be necessary to exile them to permanent convict colonies, if not annihilate them altogether. But his work was strongly attacked, not only for its concept of the inevitability of criminality (the bad seed idea) but also on methodological grounds, for the extremely inadequate sampling of controls. Although it attracted considerable attention, it found few followers. It was published in an era when America had just come out of its greatest economic depression, when Marxist and neo-Marxist interpretations of crime were more fashionable; at a time of America's fascination with Freud, when one looked more at the Oedipus complex than at the genes; and at a moment of rising racism in Germany and the disenchantment of American social scientists with the racist heritage of their own

country. For all these reasons, there was little rush to embrace Hooton's genetic theory of crime and deviance.⁶

Nevertheless, physiological studies were continuing. William Sheldon, a prominent physician and psychologist, was making an effort to categorize people according to physical or body type and to correlate the typing with temperament and with delinquency. Borrowing from the work of Kretschmer (1926) in Germany, and revising a system of typing that Kretschmer had suggested, Sheldon (1940) identified three types—ectomorph, endomorph, and mesomorph—each representing a given range of such physical characteristics as muscularity, boniness, flabbiness, fleshiness, wiriness, and the like. Sheldon, with S. S. Stevens (1942:7–8), outlines his system as follows:

When *endomorph* predominates, the digestive viscera are highly developed, while the somatic structures are relatively weak and undeveloped. Endomorphs are of low specific gravity. They float high in the water. . . . [They] are usually fat but they are sometimes seen emaciated. In the latter event they do not change into mesomorphs or ectomorphs any more than a starved mastiff will change into a spaniel or a collie. They become simply emaciated endomorphs.

When *mesomorph* predominates, the somatic structures (bone, muscle, and connective tissue) are in the ascendancy. The mesomorphic physique is high in specific gravity and is hard, firm, upright, and relatively strong and tough. The skin is relatively thick, with large pores, and it is heavily reinforced with underlying connective tissues. The hallmark of mesomorphy is uprightness and sturdiness of structure, as the hallmark of endomorphy is softness and sphericity.

Ectomorphy means fragility, linearity, flatness of the chest, and delicacy throughout the body. There is relatively slight development of both the visceral and somatic structures. The ectomorph has long, slender, poorly muscled extremities with delicate, pipestem bones, and he has, relative to his mass, the greatest surface area and hence the greatest sensory exposure to the outside world. [Italics in original.]

In a rather homey reduction of Sheldon's somatotypes to the phraseology of everyday life, Dale Hardman (1964) spoke of the mesomorph as being the muscle-and-blood boy, the ectomorph as the string-bean type, and the endomorph as roly-poly.

Sheldon (with Stevens, 1942:7), contrary to popular misconceptions of his work, did not place any person in one of the three categories but, rather, found that each individual had ectomorphic, mesomorphic, and endomorphic components, each to a given extent, as measured on a scale:

⁶ Hooton was one biologically oriented thinker who avoided the traps of racism. He compared convicts and civilians of the same racial and ethnic background, to locate any differences between the two groups within one homogeneous gene pool.

The somatotype is a series of three numerals, each expressing the approximate strength of one of the primary components in a physique. The first numeral always refers to endomorphy, the second to mesomorphy, and the third to ectomorphy. Thus, when a 7-point scale is used, a 7-1-1 is the most extreme endomorph, a 1-7-1 is the most extreme mesomorph, and a 1-1-7 the most extreme ectomorph. The 4-4-4 falls at the midpoint (of the scale, not of the frequency distribution) with respect to all three components.

However, the Sheldon system usually did not turn up such extreme types. "The bugaboo of types disappears," he writes, "in a continuous distribution in which every physique has a place." Thus, one young man might be 2-5-1, indicating that he has less than average surface fleshiness, is somewhat muscular and bony, and has minimal wiriness and fragility. The typing of individuals was done by a team of physiologists, all trained in the Sheldon system, and showed a remarkable degree of replication. Sheldon's findings were significant for social science, particularly for the study of crime and deviance, when he declared that there was correlation between temperament and body type: The endomorph, for example, tended to be slow, ponderous, warm, and affectionate; the mesomorph to be loud, vigorous, and energetic; the ectomorph to be more of a loner than a competitor, visceral rather than physical in his release of energy (Sheldon and Stevens, 1942). In a study of delinquents, Sheldon and his colleagues (1949) found a preponderance of mesomorphs among the young law-violators, or, more precisely, he found that mesomorphs were overrepresented in the delinquent sample as compared with controls or with the youthful populace generally.

At the time that William Sheldon was working on body typing, his system attracted the attention of Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck at Harvard. Starting in the early 1930s, they studied large numbers of factors (including heredity and body type) in the lives of delinquents, later to be followed by similar studies of female convicts and of the same juveniles ten, twenty, and thirty years after they were first examined. In one of their most remarkable and controversial works, the Gluecks (1950) did a matched-sample study of 500 white male delinquents as against 500 white male nondelinquents. Each delinquent had been apprehended on at least two occasions for a serious violation; each nondelinquent not only was without an arrest record but had been declared by teachers not to be a "troublemaker." The matched-sampling was an ambitious methodological effort: For each delinquent of a given IQ, age, and ethnic background, a "regular kid" almost equally matched in all three respects was found. Thus, to take eight consecutive

pairs in the study, chosen as examples because of the wide ethnic spectrum covered:

EIGHT DELINQUENTS AND EIGHT NONDELINQUENTS FROM THE
GLUECKS' MATCHED-SAMPLE STUDY

Case Number		National Origin		Age	Total IQ *		
Del.	Non-Del.	Del.	Non-Del.	Del.	Non-Del.	Del.	Non-Del.
11	542	Rumanian	Syrian	15-6	14-10	97	99
12	503	Fr. Can.	Fr. Can.	15-5	16-5	89	98
13	842	Italian	Italian	15-5	14-10	102	105
14	692	Irish	Irish	14-7	14-10	75	82
15	925	American**	American	14-3	13-7	94	97
16	528	Jewish	Jewish	14-9	15-1	80	76
17	704	Greek	Syrian	13-2	12-10	97	79
18	715	American	American	14-8	14-2	114	105

* Note the generally low IQs of the delinquents, and hence of the matched sample. This may suggest poor methods of determining IQ, with "American" (or WASP) social-class bias, or it may indicate that the lower-IQ youths are either more delinquent or more frequently apprehended; finally, this may be a flaw in the sample, which did not include many middle-class or brighter boys. Such a flaw would nonetheless not be fatal for the major findings of the Gluecks; it would simply mean that these findings were applicable to youths of below-average intelligence, and that their relevance to above average youths is speculative.

** By "American," the Gluecks evidently meant that no foreign ethnic identification could be made.

It is an indication of the remarkable care with which the delinquents and nondelinquents were matched that in the entire sample of 500 pairs, IQ variations of more than 10 points were found in only 21 instances and age variations of more than 12 months in only 14. Ethnic variations were negligible. There were only about 25 or 30 instances that were not identical or nearly so, and these showed variations no greater than the matching of a German with a Swedish youth, or Polish with Czech.

Using "blind studies"—that is, studies in which the physiologists, social workers, and others who did the ratings did not know whether the youths came from the delinquent or the nondelinquent sample—the Gluecks looked into 165 factors in the lives of the youths: childhood diseases, alcoholism of parents, body types, age when bedwetting ceased, and many others. They found some of these factors to be negligible in influence, others to be strong. Of body type, they found a definite and statistically significant preponderance of mesomorphs in the delinquent group. They concluded that physique could not be excluded as a factor in producing delinquency but that it had to be com-

bined with other attributes and experiences in life to produce the delinquent youth.⁷ While the Gluecks did not regard crime, deviance, and delinquency as either inevitable or inborn, the appearance of this behavior pattern, they believed, was influenced by biological features.

One of the problems with the work of the Gluecks (as they readily admitted) is that body type may predispose one not to crime but, rather, to energetic, agile activities that require and choose certain types of persons. Such activities will include athletics, on the one hand, and stealing, on the other. To be able to run fast is an asset for a thief (although this depends on, and will in fact often determine, the type of thievery indulged in) as well as for one who seeks to excel in football, baseball, or tennis. Further, one gets chosen by peers for certain activities to the extent that one is physically equipped (or seems to be, in the judgment of those peers) for the activity. This goes for a football team, a hiking club, or deviant acts that require stealth, strength, speed, or all three.

A new interest in biological predisposition to crime arose with reports appearing in the late 1960s of violent criminals having an XYY chromosomal disorder. The normal female has what is known as XX chromosomes, the normal male XY; an extra Y chromosome seems to appear in about one out of 500 to 1000 males (National Institute, 1970). This is one of numerous chromosomal abnormalities (others are associated with such disorders as pseudohermaphroditism, dwarfism, and mongolism). The XYY type may be the closest thing to the "born criminal" that has been found, for it seems to be correlated with a proneness for violence and an impaired ability for self-control over that violence (and with certain physiological traits as well, such as being tall, lean, lanky, and having a poor complexion). It appears, from the meager evidence available, that most XYY persons do not commit violent (or other types) of criminal acts and that most people who do perpetrate such acts are not of the XYY type, but that XYY persons are significantly *over*represented in the population of violent criminals in proportion to their number in the populace at large. There is no reason to believe that the XYY person is doomed or destined to violence, but he is probably more vulnerable to it, may be more readily seduced into it, and may be more likely to be compulsively driven toward it. This is something of a modification of the biological concept proposed by the Gluecks. If it seems to be multicausal, that may mean merely that the cause (or causes) of the deviance is (are) rooted in the social

⁷ Although mesomorphs were preponderant among the delinquents, for some types of deviant behavior no differences in physique were found, while for others the acts were associated only with those mesomorphs from homes with alcoholic fathers, for example.

structure, but that one must go to biological, personality, and institutional factors to explain why some individuals and not others come to commit deviant acts.

It might be argued that persons having XYY-linked traits tend to be suspected by peers and authority figures of certain types of violence, given little opportunity for participating in normative activities, and hence pushed toward the type of behavior expected of a person with this anomaly. This viewpoint is expressed by the British writer Ian Taylor and his colleagues (1973:46–47):

The bizarre appearance and behavior of XYY males may be inextricably involved, in dialectical fashion, with the social labeling and stigmatization they experience; and their exclusion from “normal” social interaction may (along with material deprivation associated with such handicaps) make it more likely that they will be attracted to illegitimate or illegal alternatives. That is, stigmatization of XYY individuals (the formal causes of *deviancy*) eventually engenders crime (the efficient cause of *deviancy*)—which, because of their unusual appearance, makes them more likely than other lawbreakers to be arrested (the formal cause of *crime*). In short, biological abnormality is interpreted in such a fashion that it is likely to result in the stigmatized person reacting to those who are responsible for interpreting his abnormality in a deviant fashion. Biological factors enter into crime only in an indirect respect: The crucial mediation which goes unexamined in positivistic accounts is the interpretation placed on biological characteristics. [Italics in original.]

Whatever the merits of this argument, which will be encountered again shortly, it is inapplicable, I believe, to XYY persons, whose chromosomal type is not apparent to the onlooker but becomes known only after laboratory studies. Furthermore, the associated physical traits are widespread among the populace and are not at all disdained.

In the 1960s and the first years of the 1970s, there was a resurgence of interest in the biological givens with which man starts life, a new interest that was probably brought about by advances in genetics and other biological research. It was postulated by Konrad Lorenz and other students of animal behavior, or the ethologists, as they came to be called, that the extent to which man is a culturally molded being has been exaggerated, that man is motivated by drives and instincts modified but still recognizably related to those of primates and other animals, that the human (like most other forms of animal life) is extremely aggressive by nature, and that his aggressions lead in particular to the violent struggle over and defense of territory. These perspectives (widely disputed, let it be added) would suggest that some forms of crime, especially the predatory, and many other antisocial but not criminal

activities (such as war) might be derived from basic human nature. Advocates of this thinking would be more pressed to explain the low than the high amount of deviance.

In the 1970s, many psychotherapists, including B. F. Skinner, Joseph Wolpe, Albert Ellis, and Carl Rogers, among others, have suggested that man is born with tendencies to irrationality (Ellis calls it "crooked" thinking), self-destructiveness, and self-blaming predilections; that he is perfectionistic in aims without the abilities to attain perfection, is easily deflected from his goals, and is prone to avoid risks and to fear the humiliation of failure and defeat. These traits are not only in-born (or what Freud called constitutional), the therapists maintain, but exist as inborn factors to a greater extent in some people than in others. Like the concepts of the ethologists, and even more like those of the Gluecks, this position does not suggest the existence of the born criminal but of inborn tendencies that are quantitatively different from one person to another and that are more likely to lead to deviance in the individual in whom such predilections are strong than in those in whom they are weak or virtually absent.

All this is far from Lombroso and the neo-Lombrosians of various orientations. Stripped of a crude social Darwinism and freed of the stigma of racism, biological contributions to an understanding of deviance are gaining respectability in scientific circles (but they have met a new and formidable opponent in Women's Liberation, and a new stigma, sexism). For a time, various forms of sex deviance, particularly homosexuality, were thought of as inborn, as were problems of gender disorientation. The so-called true homosexual was contrasted with the perverse, the former a constitutionally conditioned and the latter a learned behavior. The language remains, but the concept is now almost dead: It survives only in the form of predilections and tendencies, not for homosexuality (or for murder, rape, check forgery, alcoholism, or drug use), but for greater or lesser self-control, ego strength, proneness to violence, and the like.

The fear that biological explanations would doom social science as an ameliorative field is thus answered. But the fear itself was from the first irrelevant to the larger question of whether and to what extent inborn nature contributes to deviance.

The most serious argument against biological theory in this area of human behavior may be its inability to account for fluctuations in deviance in a single gene pool from one period to the next. In this sense, biology is seen as perhaps (or sometimes) necessary but never sufficient, and, as a theory, of very limited usefulness, no matter that it might be validated.

The concept of predilections toward deviance that arises from a

variety of characteristics is not so far removed from earlier biological theory as one might suppose. Consider this statement by Sheldon Glueck (1956):

Does anybody nowadays believe that criminal behavior "as such" is inherited? . . . Those criminologists who call attention to variations in the strength of different hereditary drives and controlling mechanisms do not claim that criminalism *per se* is inherited, but merely point to the too often sociologically underemphasized if not ignored biological fact that, in the eyes of nature, all men are not created equal and that some, because of certain traits useful to the kind of activities involved in criminal behavior, probably have a higher delinquency *potential* than others. [Italics in original.]

Psychological Theories: Personality, Temperament, and Mentality

BIOLOGICAL AND personality theorists have in common the fact that both see something peculiar, wrong, or different about the deviant and trace to this differentness the source of conflict between the individual and society. The biogenic theories are postulated, however, on the belief that the diversion of the individual from normative behavior is brought about by inborn factors (sometimes although not necessarily hereditary); the personality theorists may or may not see inborn (or constitutional) factors as contributing to the development of the behavior or trait in conflict with social norms. Like the biologically oriented theorists, however, the personality school looks at the deviator, and only secondarily at the society, as a source of difficulty. Because personality and temperament, even when inborn or rooted in early childhood, are usually seen as modifiable, correctable, and controllable, the emphasis is on prevention and on individual rehabilitation, largely through psychotherapy.

Very early in the study of deviance and crime, scholars wrote of "moral insanity" and "moral imbecility." Although the terms were

later abandoned, the concept remained in such themes as "decadents" and "degenerates," and still later, in less moralistic terminology, as "psychopaths." These terms all referred to persons who had apparently normal (and sometimes superior) mental abilities but who were "morally subnormal," so to speak; that is, they had little or no conscience or any sense of moral right and wrong.

Several difficulties present themselves in the study of the relationship of personality to deviance. The first is that it is not an "original cause," except in those instances where the factor can be traced to hereditary or congenital conditions. Thus, to say that fear, bitterness, low self-esteem, and a feeling of being unloved are correlated with prostitution, for example (if indeed this is the case), is to say nothing of the social and familial (or even individual) conditions under which they arise. Low ego strength may be a result of an unhappy or a broken home, or of a feeling of being overwhelmed by an older sibling, so that the causes and explanations which theory seeks would still be lacking. This does not make personality and temperament theories entirely useless; they can still be helpful for therapeutic and predictive purposes, although of little aid for prevention.

A second and ubiquitous difficulty is the danger that cause and effect are being confused. The low self-esteem of the prostitute (assuming that it exists) may be the result of her (or his) occupation, the way it is seen (or is believed to be seen) by others, the secrecy in which it is shrouded when one is in contact with the respectable world, the language used to describe it. In this instance, basic causes may be overlooked. Although a feeling of self-contempt may have resulted from rather than preceded prostitution, it remains an important personality factor that must be dealt with if the individual's problems are to be satisfactorily resolved. Some scholars contend, however, that ego debility and poor self-image are facets of the personality that develop in childhood and are congealed by adolescence, and that hence an occupation like prostitution or life-style like homosexuality, in which one is the recipient of contempt, is unlikely to be the cause of the psychological disorder. This demurrer having been noted, the difficulty described here—the confusion of cause and effect—seems nonetheless to be a real and pervasive one that cannot be handled by attributing personality formation to an early period in life.

A third problem is that samples of the deviants may be biased in a manner that produces results indicating personality difficulties. If a sample of alcoholics comes from people who have been arrested, it may be the arrest that produced the very real psychological problems that one is seeking to identify; or it may be that the people who get arrested are not of the same mental or temperamental capacities as

those whose alcoholism can be handled without coming into sharp conflict with the law. If one studies the personality features of call girls or drug users, and if the subjects of such studies are drawn from the clients of psychotherapy, one may find higher levels of disturbance than in a cross-section of participants in the particular type of deviance. It has even been suggested that therapists find disorder in all their clients, no matter what their mental and emotional states might be; that therapists create personality disorders that were not there before; and that therapists convince patients that they are "ill" even though the patients and other observers believe them to be well.

Finally, personality factors are difficult to measure and to quantify. There is considerable question as to whether any projective tests give results more reliable than would be obtained by chance alone. Reports that offenders are neurotic or well-integrated, as the case may be, are not easily tested and replicated; there would be a lack of consensus among experts studying the same people. Some agreement can be found, however, among experts and laymen as well, when there is extreme emotional disturbance or very low mental capacity. This is quite different from the problem of deciding that a man or woman is well-adjusted to life.

Personality difficulties, mental deficiencies, and emotional disorders are abundant in the deviant, an apparently self-evident statement that may be misleading. The fact is that some people with mental disorders are disvalued, ridiculed, and scorned for that reason, even if they do not commit erratic, eccentric acts that indicate to the layman that the perpetrator is "teched." People speak of the mentally aberrant as being nuts, crazy, lunatics, looney—all words that are strongly pejorative. Since it appears to a lay public that most mentally deranged persons do commit peculiar and seemingly "senseless" acts, this leads one to the unjustified conclusion that people committing such acts are mentally incompetent.

Early theorists of crime and deviance believed that there was a strong correlation, and in fact a causal relationship, between feeble-mindedness and socially disapproved activities. Some acts were so outlandish that only someone not mentally normal, it seemed, could have committed them. Mental deficiency did appear in a sufficient number of criminals and deviants to project a believable impression of its relationship to the act. Furthermore, if the highly educated—a group that appeared to be devoid of feeble-minded persons—perpetrated disapproved acts, they did so usually with secrecy and circumspection. If such acts were not entirely overlooked or excused, they were regarded as willfully decadent and degenerate, whereas similar behavior in the uneducated was traced to mental inferiority.

White-collar and executive crime, and political crime by government leaders or their opponents, have served to dispel any notion that much deviance can be explained by mental incompetence. It appears that many crimes require considerable agility, alertness, and cunning and could not be carried out by the feeble or the insane. There is, of course, always the danger that people doing some outlandish things will be regarded as "stark crazy," "out of their minds," or "dumb as hell," but this is circular reasoning. To determine that the feeble commit deviant acts in numbers greater than the mentally normal, average, or gifted, one must have some criteria for measuring feebleness and intelligence other than the judgment of the behavior as "crazy."

Most deviant acts are not committed by feeble-minded persons, although, as one would expect, some of the feeble-minded do commit such acts. Likewise, most deviant acts are not committed by neurotic and psychotic persons, driven by deeply repressed unconscious desires, although many such people do behave in a manner that violates the norms of society. At best, one could look to psychological theory to shed light on certain forms of deviance—particularly sexual—but even this must be done in the cultural contexts of family configurations, socially expected roles of males and females, opportunities for and encouragement of normative sexual expression, puritanism, antisexual hostility, and other factors.

The view of the deviant as disturbed was studied by the Gluecks, who dispelled many popularly held images and stereotypes. The Gluecks (1950) found that whereas their 500 "good boys" were "more banal" than the delinquents, were conformist, neurotic, anxiety-ridden, and felt unloved, the 500 "bad boys," on the other hand, while hedonistic, distrustful, aggressive, and hostile, were also socially assertive and felt that they could manage their own lives. It would appear from this brief summary that the delinquents did not have more serious personality problems than the youths with whom they were matched for comparison.

For a brief time after the science of criminology was established, there was a serious effort to study phrenology in relationship to crime. Long since abandoned and fallen into disrepute, probably even more so than palmistry and astrology, phrenology was an effort to understand character (presumably affected by brain formation) as it manifested itself in the shape, form, and topography of the head. Reduced to its ultimate absurdity, it was ridiculed as a study of the "bumps on the head." It is hardly worth mentioning, as it is but a footnote in the development of criminology, except that it illustrates two divergent themes. On the one hand, phrenology as a serious endeavor was patently absurd, even for the time and state of knowledge when it thrived.

It had no scientific basis, no theoretical foundation, could offer at best a few cases and coincidences (poorly measured at that), and developed into a mass fad, given to the people by a few "experts" who should have known better, and enthusiastically devoured by the ignorant, who were eager to have answers for pressing problems. It is an historic warning against the rapid dissemination and uncritical acceptance of poorly developed ideas. Yet, in being cited as an example of the ease with which absurdity can be embraced, the phrenology episode is misused as a basis for dismissing without careful consideration almost any new theoretical development, particularly if it has psychological or biological components.

Under the onslaught of time, early psychological theories of deviance fare even more poorly than their contemporary socioeconomic, political, and cultural theories. This might mean only that personality and psychological approaches have made great progress whereas sociological approaches have stagnated; but it might also be an indication of the poverty of psychological assessments of deviant behavior, particularly of deviance deeply rooted in social conditions.⁸

There is a grave danger that personality theories can be misused by those who would divert attention away from the sociopolitical, cultural, and economic factors that produce social evils. Much of the discussion of the personality development of people like Hitler and Stalin is a caricature that conceals the political forces that brought these people to power. In the same way, an effort to explain a wave of violence, a politically motivated assassination, or the apparently senseless acts of middle- or upper-class deviants by placing the blame on personality factors may deflect attention away from the social factors behind such acts. The assassin of Martin Luther King, Jr., may indeed have had personality problems, but focusing on them (if they exist) is

⁸ The foremost American thinker in the field, applying psychological diagnoses and theory in an attempt to understand juvenile delinquents, was William Healy (1915). Working in the early decades of this century, Healy was an M.D., a professor of mental and nervous diseases, and director of a group associated with the youth court, called the Juvenile Psychopathic Institute. The name of this group and Healy's medical training supplied a predetermined bias to his studies. Healy found mental aberrations abounding in his delinquents: Most of them masturbated, and many smoked! He also found an excessive amount of melancholia, schizophrenia, epileptic psychoses, paranoia, and other "unclassified major mental aberrations." His delinquents were obstinate, resentful, restless, and mentally subnormal. He concluded that people were not born criminals but that they were often born with mental defects, which somehow cropped up very frequently in some ethnic groups. By today's standards his work is shockingly racist; it is apparent in his statements about blacks, American Indians, and southern Italians, particularly Sicilians. But a careful reading reveals that even Healy emphasized environment and that he saw some situations as aggravated by people's concern about the hostility they encountered.

a mechanism for avoiding societal responsibility for an act that was nurtured, encouraged, and finally performed in a cultural milieu that can be called a national breeding ground, if not a national conspiracy, for racially inspired violence.

Advocates of personality-causation theory (including the Gluecks, who made this a part of their eclecticism) argue that even if one accepts a social theory of one sort or another, this would account only for the frequency of the deviance in an area at a given time, or in a particular group as against another. But even if a theory explains a high deviance rate, it would not indicate why most persons in the given group do not go in the direction of the forbidden path, but a few do. There must be *psychological* traits, it is contended, that differentiate these few from the many others, even if one concedes that these traits flourish only under very specific conditions. This, of course, does not necessarily suggest, or at least does not demand, a theory in which the deviants have traits in common; it requires merely that they be individually susceptible and impressionable, able to be molded in a special direction. Furthermore, it does not present personality factors as a cause of deviance. If the Gluecks' delinquents felt more loved than the nondelinquents in their sample, can greater feelings of being loved therefore be interpreted as a cause of delinquency?

In sum, psychological theories may be more applicable to a few special cases of criminal and noncriminal deviants than to broad and general groups of persons engaging in such behavior. Furthermore, this statement is strikingly similar to what can be said with some assurance about biological theories as well. From the viewpoint of social policy, the recognition that certain biological and psychological characteristics make some people more susceptible to deviance than those who do not have such traits (without implying that these are causes that compel persons to become violators of the norms) would lead to an emphasis on giving such people alternatives more socially useful and more fulfilling to themselves.

Psychoanalytic Theory

To put together in a single approach the many facets of personality theory, the concepts and constructs that have been developed, modified, revised, abandoned, and defended for half a century, would be beyond the task of this work. Instead, I will content myself with a few words on the best-known, most influential, and most frequently debated psychological theory, which is that established by Sigmund Freud.

Whatever may be scholars' final judgment on psychoanalysis as a view of humanity and as a mechanism for alleviating man's ills, it cannot be disputed that Freud was one of the greatest innovative minds and intellectual influences of the twentieth century. He challenged many of the widely accepted and deeply cherished images of man and developed a system of thought that had repercussions and applications in such diverse fields as biology, political science, and anthropology. Yet many of his strongly held contentions have been modified or abandoned in the years since they were promulgated, even by his faithful coterie of Freudians and neo-Freudians.

Freud was the intellectual child of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. He saw man as motivated (or driven) in his behavior by forces over which he had no control because he was unaware of their existence. Within each of us, in the Freudian image of man, there are subterranean layers that command or demand action to satisfy needs, but work on a subconscious or unconscious level. An outburst of anger, an act of forgetfulness, a slip of the tongue, a sudden impulse to steal, a craving for food: These acts are not devoid of importance, in the Freudian system, nor are they to be explained on their own level for what they appear to be. Rather, they are expressions that gratify needs of which the actor is not (and often will not allow himself to be) aware.

The Freudian system is thus based upon an image of the human being as an individual who frequently commits acts because of unconscious motivations, desires, and impulses. The unconscious (which of course does not exist as an entity but is an abstraction

that expresses these unknown forces within the person) is deeply rooted in experiences of early childhood and even infancy. The infant is a highly sexual being, Freud concluded (but his definition of "sexuality" was one in which undifferentiated and diffused pleasurable sensations, derived from tactile and other stimuli, gradually matured into general libido). The infant develops a strong sexual, and hence incestuous, attachment to the mother (called, after Sophocles, the Oedipus complex) and the child—fearing retaliation from a father angered by his son's attempt to keep the mother for himself—learns to look outside the family for satisfaction of the needs originally provided by the mother. The child's sexuality goes into a latent stage, and the strong drive toward the mother is resolved (through the process of sublimation). The tie to the maternal figure is gradually severed as sexuality reawakens during puberty and adolescence.

Freud conceptualized the newborn human being as a bundle of animalistic drives, seeking constant and immediate gratification. People learn very early in life—particularly during the Oedipal stage—that these drives must be held in check, controlled, coordinated with the needs of others. The child becomes in this way a social animal. His instinctual needs, constantly seeking expression, were termed by Freud the *id* (again an abstraction, not to be thought of as having a concrete existence). In the words of Freud (1949:14), the *id* "contains everything that is inherited, that is present at birth, that is fixed in the constitution—above all, therefore, the instincts." The moral strictures and social demands of others, the rules by which people learn to live, are internalized by the human; this is the *superego*. Between the *superego*, man's conscience and the morality within each being, and the *id*, man's search for unbridled gratification and pleasure, there is a constant battle. The *ego* is the resolution of these two forces; it is man's conciliation, the conscious presentation of oneself to oneself and to others. As stated by Freud (1949:15), the *ego* "acts as an intermediary between the *id* and the external world."

What has this to do with deviant behavior? It implies that deviance is a personality disturbance, that deviant people are by nature neurotic, psychotic, or in other ways emotionally ill. Their acts are to be interpreted in terms of their unconscious motivations, often having a sexually symbolic significance the source of which is unknown to the perpetrator. Sometimes the action is the very opposite of the unconscious desire, this being a "reaction formation" necessary in order the better to conceal deep-seated needs from one who cannot face them.

Like most scientists, Freud classified and categorized. Thus, he saw people in terms of both types and stages, the two interrelated. That is, individuals go through stages of an almost inevitable and

seldom varying nature during infancy and childhood. In early infancy, the oral zone serves the purposes of self-preservation by means of nourishment. "The baby's obstinate persistence in sucking," writes Freud (1949:28), "gives evidence at an early stage of a need for satisfaction which, although it originates from and is stimulated by the taking of nourishment, nevertheless seeks to obtain pleasure independently of nourishment and for that reason may and should be described as 'sexual.'" Then the teeth appear, and with them sadistic impulses; the child thus enters a second stage, described as "the sadistic-anal phase, because satisfaction is then sought in aggression and in the excretory function." The inclusion of aggressive impulses in the libido is justified "by supposing that sadism is an instinctual fusion of purely libidinal and purely destructive impulses, a fusion which thenceforward persists without interruption" (1949:28-29). The anal is followed by a third stage, the phallic; what comes into question here, Freud postulated (making him subject, some years later, to the attacks of the feminist movement, which considered his entire view of humanity as male- and not human-oriented), "is not the genitals of both sexes but only those of the male (the phallus). The female genitals long remain unknown: in the child's attempt at understanding sexual processes, he pays homage to the venerable cloacal theory—a theory which has a genetic justification" (1949:29).

Some people, because of troubled relations, or trauma, at this time of their lives, or because of later disappointments that cause them to regress to these earlier periods, pass their adult years in a manner that can be explained by the direction given to their life patterns by one or more of these various childhood phases. That is, they become, for example, "oral" or "anal" types. An "oral" type may be a compulsive talker, eater, or drinker. Alcoholism is explained as a regression to an oral period in life. The alcoholic is of course unaware of his orality; hence he can only satisfy his impulses (for reasons that he does not understand and cannot control) or deny and suppress them, with other unforeseen but negative consequences. The "anal" person may become cruel or miserly (wanting to hold back what the mother wished him to give forth in order to win her approval), or he may seek to suppress this anal drive and overcome it by overcompensating and becoming a philanthropist.

David Abrahamsen (1952:148), a psychoanalyst who had worked with prisoners, states:

Of all the offenders I have seen, every one has been fixated at one or more stages of his development. Some are orally oriented, in that they strive for immediate satisfaction through the mouth, and frequently for omnipotence. Others are anal-sadistic, cruel and suspicious. Others do

not show any signs of conscience, while still others have some kind of mother fixation, be it strong attachment to or deep dislike of the mother, which may have turned them to homosexual practices.⁹

To understand purse-snatching, some orthodox Freudians have stated, one should focus on the unresolved Oedipal complex that motivates a youth deprived of maternal love to seize from a woman the symbol of her sexuality. In contrast, there are those who place their emphasis on the economic conditions, racial and ethnic conflicts, and other social factors in which the act occurs. This is not to suggest that the two approaches are irreconcilable, but only that they have different emphases and, hence, different consequences.

The youthful rebel, the pleasure-seeking, fire-watching arsonist, the compulsive stealer of women's shoes, the violent asserter of masculinity and manhood, the voyeur, exhibitionist, and other sexually deviating people—all are explained by psychoanalysis in terms of unresolved infancy or early-childhood problems, particularly in relation to repressed sexuality and relations with maternal (and sometimes paternal) figures. Causes of deviant behavior, according to Freudians, are rooted in the individual, although cultural considerations may bring about familial relationships in which the neurotic behavior is more likely (or less likely) to be nurtured. They believe, moreover, that the social response to deviance should be individual and group psychotherapy, to reorient the afflicted person so that he is capable of living and enjoying a normative pattern. Nevertheless, some Freudian concepts have been used as deviance-preventive measures, by incorporating psychoanalytic outlooks into preschool and other children's centers, family-modification counseling, and other techniques that would provide a milieu in which disturbance would be minimal.

Psychoanalysts' major efforts to understand deviance have focused on children and adolescent youths, on some politically deviant individuals, and on people involved in bizarre sexual behavior. Thus, while ordinary adult crime—bank robbery and armed holdup, for example—has been subjected to psychoanalytic investigation only peripherally, the same is not true of criminal acts committed by youths. Whereas adults who take a gun and enter a gas station for the purpose of obtaining money are often assumed to be rationally motivated by the desire for the money and what they can do with it, youths who

⁹ There are two problems with such an approach: (1) It is necessary to determine the extent of similar fixations in the nondeviant population. It is likely that psychoanalysts might find one of these neurotic stages or manifestations to be universal, and this would make their approach meaningless as an explanation of crime, delinquency, or other types of deviance. (2) The denials of the socially conscious and politically radical Freudians to the contrary, formulations of this type serve to deflect attention away from the social roots of deviance.

perform such acts are usually thought of as coming from homes where they were hated by or themselves hated one or both parents, and as having resentment, anger, and rebellious feelings that led them to commit their antisocial act. Albert Cohen (1955), in a *tour de force* that incorporates some Freudian concepts without being psychoanalytic as a whole, contends that youthful crime tends to differ from its adult counterpart in that the former is malicious, negativistic, and not rationally goal-oriented (a contention that may be less true in the 1970s than it was in the 1950s). A child might express his anger and contempt for the middle-class teacher by defecating on the desk, thus leaving the teacher a "gift" to behold when he (or she) enters the room. Adults would not be likely to commit such a mischievous, malicious, and negativistic act; they would more probably steal from the teacher because they want the money.

One of the first to apply the psychoanalytic approach to deviant children (whom he termed "dissocial") was August Aichhorn (1935), a Viennese student of Freud. "Truancy, vagrancy, stealing, and the like," he wrote, were only symptoms of a greater but less obvious disease, "just as fever, inflammation, and pain are symptoms of disease. . . . Our task is to remove the cause rather than to eliminate the overt behavior." By the "cause," however, Aichhorn did not mean the social conditions but the unresolved conflicts within the child's unconscious. He saw some children as having a predisposition to delinquency; although it may be inherited, it is not a "finished product at birth but is determined by the emotional relationships, that is, by the first experiences which the environment forces upon the child."

The child so disposed does not necessarily develop "dissocial" habits. A particular kind of environment is needed to bring this out: "Bad company, street influences, and the like, factors which are not the underlying causes of delinquency but the direct or indirect provocation, also play a part." While Aichhorn here appears to be merging the individual and social factors, the logic of his position leads him to the concept that youth can be delinquent without any deviant or "dissocial" behavior at all: "We can now speak of the overt bad behavior as 'manifest' delinquency. When the same state [the state of mind, the reality of the neurotic] exists but has not yet expressed itself, we speak of 'latent' delinquency." In still another passage, Aichhorn states that he is not interested in why the youth persists in behavior that elicits punishment but only in the fact that his behavior is contrary to the demands of reality.

Yet one must question whether alcoholics are oral types, or even whether there is such an entity as orality. Alcoholics have many serious

problems, but it has not been demonstrated that these are more traceable to early infancy than are the problems of other persons who may be frightened, easily angered, or withdrawn, or who show various personality disorders. The early Freudian postulation (later modified by Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, Erik Erikson, and many others) seems to have overemphasized, without empirical validation, infancy and early childhood in character formation at the expense of the school years, puberty, and adolescence. This view appears to be concerned only with the original causes of a disorder, whereas many later psychotherapeutic approaches to deviance distinguish between what may have started an individual toward, let us say, drinking or compulsive eating, and what continues to support what might be termed "the habit." In their search for the unconscious and the symbolic, the Freudians have downplayed the conscious and the obvious. Thus, a man with a gun may indeed be handling something that resembles a penis, and he may be reverting to his own phallic stage or be deflecting some repressed and unacceptable homosexual urges, but he is also motivated by a violent subculture that surrounds him, one in which guns are easily obtained and are good weapons for carrying out holdups for which there are expected economic gains and in his mind relatively few risks of apprehension. In the same way, even if one were to admit that purse-snatchers are grabbing unconsciously for a denied maternal symbol (difficult to prove and not very convincing), the fact is that these youths like money and can do much with it, that they have internalized few moral restraints on such antisocial behavior, or that they live in a subculture where this behavior does not clash strongly with peer-group norms.

Despite the development, particularly in America, of a Freudian left, with such figures as Herbert Marcuse, Philip Rieff, and Norman O. Brown, it remains true that psychoanalytic explanations of deviance often contribute to minimization of the social factors responsible for the emergence of reprehensible behavior. This is particularly striking in the case of acts of a political nature that outrage the public, including those acts of people in power and those of the officially powerless. It may be true that Hitler and Stalin had deep-seated psychological problems that they acted out symbolically in their life-styles and major political decisions, and this may likewise be true for every lone assassin, but these statements are irrelevant.¹⁰ The task

¹⁰ The game is called psychohistory, and it is played with political devils as well as gods, tyrants as well as popular idols, and those who fall in neither category. Thus, in addition to Hitler and Stalin, subjects of analysis by psychohistorians have been, among others, Richard Nixon, Martin Luther, Mahatma Gandhi, Woodrow Wilson, and the Abolitionist martyr John Brown. Sometimes psychohistory is written with a sophisticated interweaving of the cultural and psychological factors,

of social scientists is to determine the consequences of the actions of these people and the sociocultural milieu that made their actions possible, successful, popular, or otherwise.

As a mechanism for therapy, psychoanalysis has been modified by most of its followers and abandoned by many therapists in favor of short-term, client-centered approaches—reality, transactional, rational-emotive, behavioral, existential, or other types of aid. In most of these approaches, the therapist takes a very active role in the relationship and directs the patient (now often called the client) toward a restructuring of thought processes, maximized self-actualization, increased ego strength, and changed behavior by a teaching-and-learning process. The psychoanalytic emphasis on free association and on delving into forgotten areas of the past, dreams, and hidden meanings is abandoned not only because it is costly and time-consuming but also because the concentration on childhood experiences and night-and daytime fantasies can serve as an evasion for the patient-client who does not want to face the reality of his current self-destructive and irrational thinking and behavior. Even in areas that appear to lend themselves to Freudian explanations of their origin, such as bizarre sexual activities, the exploration of these origins may be not only unnecessary but an impediment to a therapeutic process. This is seen in the suggestion of such admirers of Freud as, for example, Bruno Bettelheim (1960:22) that psychoanalysis is more useful for an understanding of man's behavior than for effecting a change in it.

There is rather widespread agreement that psychoanalytic and other psychological orientations explain a few, but nevertheless only a few, *cases* and *types* of deviance. They are valuable for an understanding of compulsives and psychotics, but not of ordinary crime and the usual types of rule-breakers and norm-violators. They succeed in clarifying the position of the "senseless" criminal more often than that of the obviously goal-oriented one (particularly when that goal is supported by the norms of society). They are more effective in explaining why a particular person was self-destructive than why suicide rates differ from one year to another or from one social group to another within a society, although studies dealing with the latter are not unknown.

Nevertheless, like other personality and psychological theories, Freudianism, stripped of its excess, may be most helpful when integrated into a sociological approach to the world. One could accept the fact that only social explanations can be useful in discovering why the distribution of deviance differs from one category of people

as in the work of Erik Erikson (1969) on Gandhi. This could lead to an understanding, not so much of why social movements or deviant forms of behavior arise, but of what qualities are found among their most dedicated leaders.

to another and yet require some psychological explanation to account for the fact that, within such a category, only a few will commit these antisocial acts. This "few" will be larger in number than the "few" in another group that differs from the first in income, ethnic status in the community, housing opportunities, amount of schooling, and the like. Childhood factors, unresolved Oedipal complexes, and regression to an infancy stage would not be the cause of the deviance, in this view, but would enable us to understand why some people within a category become alcoholics or drug addicts or commit suicide and others do not without disputing the social factors that focus on the differential vulnerability of individuals for reasons that have nothing to do with the psychoanalytic approach.

Furthermore, Freudian psychoanalysts tend to see most human actions as being "overdetermined," by which they mean that an action does not represent the fulfillment of only one need but is the concrete manifestation of a number of needs. If a Freudian is willing to admit that an action is overdetermined even in terms restricted to emotions, then he is certainly willing to admit that social roles likewise play a causal role. The youth who becomes a purse-snatcher, in this view of the world, may indeed have unconscious needs to reach for his mother's womb but he may also be responding to peer-group pressure, the wish to rebel against authority, monetary needs, anger because he had just been cheated by a storekeeper, and numerous other converging forces.¹¹

Anomie Theory and the Conflict Between Means and Ends

FOR THE most part, theories of deviance started as theories of criminality, efforts to explain or account for criminal behavior and for the gyrations in the incidence and frequency of crime. Only two

¹¹ The points raised in the last two paragraphs were suggested to me by Steven Goldberg.

major theoretical efforts were developed specifically to explain deviant behavior and later extended, with varying degrees of success, to crime and delinquency. Of these, the first, at least chronologically, was the theory of anomie.

Anomie is as difficult to define as it is to measure. The word is used to describe both a social situation and the attitude or mental state of an individual in that situation. By extension, one might say that a social situation is anomic if many individuals feel internal strains, tensions, and anxieties associated with it. For some, anomie is used in the sense of alienation.

The first major effort to introduce anomie as a sociological concept and as a mechanism for the understanding of disapproved behavior was made by Emile Durkheim, in his classic work *Suicide* (1897).¹² On the basis of his study of statistics and of social structure, Durkheim concluded that there were three types of suicide. By this he meant that suicides could be accounted for by dividing those who carried out the act into three groups, according to motivation. He called these types egoistic, altruistic, and anomic. The first took place when the individual was highly integrated into a cohesive social unit but was suddenly displaced from it; the second when the person, again integrated into the unit, had an opportunity to sacrifice his life for it; and the third, when the person was malintegrated into the social unit, when the social bond that tied him to community, folk, people, or nation was weak. Self-destruction, in this third or anomic condition, took place because an individual was set adrift, because there were no strong ties to others that prevented this from occurring.

The Durkheimian concept of suicide has come in for severe scrutiny in recent years. It has been criticized (when it was not ignored) by the Freudians, and it has not fared well at the hands of others. Perhaps the most significant criticism has come from Jack Douglas (1967), who questioned the validity of the statistics themselves, pointing out not only that the definition of suicide changes, but also that social attitudes determine whether a death is recognized, defined, and recorded as a suicide. But the idea that suicide is the effect of weak bonds to society, which Durkheim postulated under the name of anomic, has persisted. Marshall Clinard (1964:7) refers to anomie, as interpreted by Durkheim, as arising "when disruption of the collective order allows man's aspirations to rise beyond all possibility of their fulfillment. Discipline is not imposed by society; there are no social

¹² As a matter of historical record, note that Durkheim had briefly discussed anomie a few years before the publication of *Suicide*, in *The Division of Labor in Society*. *Division* appeared in French in 1893 and in English in 1933; *Suicide* in French in 1897, in English in 1941.

norms to define the ends of action. Persons aspire to goals which either they cannot attain or find difficult to reach." This succinct summary of the formulation of Durkheim should be borne in mind, for, as I will show, it fits neatly into modern American theories of anomie and deviance.

In a landmark essay on deviant behavior and anomie, Robert K. Merton (1938) made developments and departures from Durkheim but utilized the latter's basic concept of social cohesion and alienation. This essay, which was later used as the foundation for a major theory of juvenile delinquency (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960), has been examined and criticized at great length, and perhaps its influence and importance can be seen by the frequency with which it is cited and quoted from. This, of course, illustrates its provocative nature rather than its acceptance in understanding deviant behavior.

The significance of Merton's work lies in the fact that it is the only major theory of deviance (orthodox Marxist theories of society, applied to deviance, may be the sole exception) that is sociological rather than a combination of the biological and psychological with some social overtones. That is, it is sociological in the sense that it locates in the nature of social structure itself, in the nature of the norms, mores, laws, values and institutions of society, the source and explanation for acts that violate these same rules. It is a sociological theory in that it seeks to explain "why it is that the frequency of deviant behavior varies within different social structures and how it happens that the deviations have different shapes and patterns in different social structures" (Merton, 1957:131).

In his theory of anomie, Merton suggests that in some societies there is a strong schism between the goals with which the people are inculcated, goals that they must attain if they are to be successful and fulfilled members of that group, and the acceptable or institutionalized means for attaining these goals. In small, primitive, traditionalist, or highly religious societies, this dichotomy is less likely to exist; it thrives in modern, industrialized, impersonal, and secular societies, having reached its strongest point in America, as a result of the development of the Protestant work ethic and the striving for money and other signs of financial success. In the United States, one has to "make it" in the world—this is emphasized and doubly emphasized—and he who fails to make it is a general failure. On the other hand, probably because of the decline of supernatural religion and the rise of secularism, American society teaches the norms for achieving these ends, but fails to emphasize or inculcate in its citizens the significance of abiding by normative means and does not offer large numbers of people the institutional methods of reaching

success goals. Anomie is the state of conflict of norms that develops between the goals that one has internalized and the means that one improvises or employs when the accepted methods of reaching such goals are largely blocked. Anomie, for Merton (1957:162), is “a breakdown in the cultural structure, occurring particularly when there is an acute disjunction between the cultural norms and goals and the socially structured capacities of members of the group to act in accord with them.”

In Merton’s view of the world, social control has not failed; deviance, one might say, is not so much an indicator of the failure of social control as a sign of its success. Man is not a bundle of impulses seeking immediate gratification but controlled by or imprisoned in society. “The image of man as an untamed bundle of impulses” he writes, “begins to look more like a caricature than a portrait” (Merton, 1957:131).

Literally, and etymologically, anomie is a state of normlessness. A truly normless society is a contradiction in terms—a social, not merely a political, condition of anarchy, thus probably precluding the existence of human society. Anomie can be used to describe what has been termed “relative normlessness,” which itself is ambiguous: It can mean, on the one hand, that there are many areas of life not governed by norms, or that the norms are relatively weak in the hold that they have on many people. It is in this last sense that Merton is using the term. Finally, anomie may be used as indicating “too many norms,” which lose their hold because people do not know where to turn in conflicting loyalties.

Most thinkers have emphasized how social structures, through socialization, rewards and punishments, and other mechanisms, place pressure upon people to keep them in line. There is something “wrong” or different about those who do not remain in line, or there is failure in the socialization and education process. Merton (1957:132) turned this vision topsy-turvy, making it his primary aim “to discover how some *social structures exert a definite pressure upon certain persons in the society to engage in nonconforming rather than conforming conduct.*” [Italics in original.]

The pressure against conformity derives from a conflict between the ends that are set forth as goals that all should seek to attain, and the means that are available so that these goals can be reached. When people are unable to arrive at the goals by the socially accepted means, they have a number of possible logical choices open to them. These Merton arranged in what has come to be the most famous paradigm in sociology:

ANOMIE AND THE ENDS-MEANS
CONFLICT (MERTON'S PARADIGM)

	<i>Ends</i>	<i>Means</i>
Conformity	+	+
Innovation	+	-
Ritualism	-	+
Retreatism	-	-
Rebellion	±	±

Note that this paradigm is a typology of modes of individual adaptation. The references here are to role behavior, not personality types, and people may shift from one mode of behavior to another.

In this view, the central hypothesis is "that aberrant behavior may be regarded sociologically as a symptom of disassociation between culturally prescribed aspirations and socially structured avenues for realizing these aspirations" (Merton, 1957:134). Conformity exists when people accept both the ends and the approved means for attaining these ends. It is the bedrock of a stable society, without which the stability and continuity of the society could not be maintained. However, there are many variations and problems with conformity that Merton does not handle. Are his conformists people who attain the ends by the approved means, or are they people who pursue these means even if and when they do not succeed in reaching the inculcated goals? Probably both, but if so, at what cost to the failures?

After conformity, all other types of adaptation are relevant to deviance, although each in its own way, and at different costs to the individual and to society. Innovation refers to the "use of institutionally proscribed but often effective means of attaining at least the simulacrum of success—wealth and power." It is a response that occurs "when the individual has assimilated the cultural emphasis upon the goal without equally internalizing the institutional norms governing ways and means for its attainment."

Innovation is an unfortunate term for the second group (which encompasses the majority of deviants), for two reasons: first, because it is a positively value-laden word and, second, because most deviants do not innovate but, rather, copy methods that are known to them, have been taught to them, but that they have been warned (or should have been warned) to avoid. In fact, there may be nothing innovative about deviant behavior; utilizing disapproved means is not the same as inventing or creating new means; it simply means using the methods

at hand even though one has been inculcated (unsuccessfully, to be sure) with the need to avoid them.

The ritualist group consists of those who accept the means for their own sake, not caring about the ends. The ends here are not really rejected; they are ignored and become irrelevant. Or, in other words, the means become ends in themselves. This is seen in religious ritual, on the one hand, and also in large institutions (the armed forces, major industrial organizations, government agencies), where it plays a role in the ongoing bureaucratic setup. One may object that ritualism is far from being deviant, that it is not true deviance, because the ritualist is not reacted to negatively and in fact may be a highly respected member of society.

Retreatism, like Merton's innovation, is more genuinely a deviant adaptation to anomie. It consists of a rejection of both the ends and the means to reach those ends. The retreatists are the alcoholics, particularly on Skid Row who are just not in society at all, so to speak. This group may also include many of the hard-core drug addicts. They are not alienated in any intellectual sense, or in the sense that intellectuals are alienated; rather, they are aliens to and in society, having no bonds with it, just trying to keep themselves alive in the struggle for survival. They are "double failures": They failed first in an effort to make it toward the socially prescribed goals by normative means, and then failed again to get to these same goals by "innovative," illegal, or deviant means.

Finally, there are those who have not merely rejected the ends and the means but have substituted new and more acceptable ones. The ritualists and retreatists have, one might say, no ends at all toward which they are moving—their lives are without goals; while the innovators have no set of acceptable norms for the means, and the retreatists (perhaps society's true rejects) have rejected both the ends and the means but have offered no substitutes. But are the rebels deviant? That would depend on the form of rebellion, its visibility, the threat it offers to others, and numerous related factors.

Why should there be a conflict between ends and means in many modern societies, and particularly in America? The open class system not only motivates people to struggle for monetary success goals but entices them into that struggle with promises that they can achieve the ends: "In this setting," according to Merton, "a cardinal American virtue, 'ambition,' promotes a cardinal American vice, 'deviant behavior.'"

Merton (1957:146) sees considerable value consensus even in the conflict-ridden and pluralistic society:

It is only when a system of cultural values extols, virtually above all else, certain *common* success-goals *for the population at large*, while the social structure rigorously restricts or completely closes access to approved modes of reaching these goals *for a considerable part of the same population*, that deviant behavior ensues on a large scale. [Italics in original.]

In defense of the concept that Americans are overwhelmingly involved in the success rat-race, Merton writes:

To say that the goal of monetary success is entrenched in American culture is only to say that Americans are bombarded on every side by precepts which affirm the right or, often, the duty of retaining the goal even in the face of repeated frustration. Prestigious representatives of the society reinforce the cultural emphasis. The family, the school, and the workplace—the major agencies shaping the personality structure and goal formation of Americans—join to provide the intensive disciplining required if an individual is to retain intact a goal that remains elusively beyond reach, if he is to be motivated by the promise of a gratification which is not redeemed.

It can be argued that Merton seems to be overlooking the peer group as a major force “shaping the personality structure and goal formation of Americans.” However, if this force is taken into account, it would make his case stronger, not weaker.

The goal of winning the game, rather than “winning under the rules of the game,” is perhaps nowhere so apparent as in the sports arena. In using athletics as an example, Merton might indeed have carried this further, and made his case stronger, had he contrasted the goal of winning with the use of acceptable means (or one might say, the alternative goal) of playing for fun, sport, camaraderie, and entertainment of oneself and others, without regard to the goal of winning at all. As a matter of fact, winning in sports contests seems to have become for many athletes and coaches a means, not an end: the means to financial rewards and glory. In any case, the gratification is in the outcome, not the participation.¹³

As a concept of deviance, a theory explaining the forms it takes,

¹³ Again, some complications; the growth of participatory sports (such as tennis) in contrast to spectator sports (almost all professional activities) appears to provide evidence contrary to Merton's thesis. Exceptions are also provided in circumstances in which persons are trained in a noncompetitive spirit. A. S. Neill (1960), in *Summerhill*, reports that when the school played other schools, the athletes were in the game for the joy of it. If the other team's star was unable to play, Summerhill's team would not use its star. This example appears to indicate that human nature is malleable, that the drive for winning is culturally induced, and that a group of young people can be trained to resist such a drive despite the pressures of their surrounding culture.

anomie is not entirely successful and, in fact, leaves a great deal to be subjected to further study, elucidation, and validation. As Merton points out, it may be too ambitious to attempt to bring forth a single theory of deviance to explain all instances, all people, all types of behavior; it may be necessary, at least at this stage of human knowledge, to have middle-range theories that will explain a smaller portion of the deviant behavior. And as such, Merton's major thesis would be that lack of access to strongly inculcated goals produces deviance in a society in which there is little emphasis on the need to adhere to ethical and proper activities in life patterns. The major instance of deviance would be as regards monetary success goals, which are certainly blocked off to many persons; the reason people forge checks, swindle, commit acts of bribery, rob, embezzle, blow up safes, steal, burglarize, is not that they need money (this they do, and have since money was first used) but that American culture teaches them that they have to live high, to have and always accumulate more, but it does not offer masses of people opportunities to obtain the unlimited amounts they desire except through these immoral and illegal methods. People find different (Merton would say "new") ways of getting what they have been taught to want, envy, and admire in others; the result is crime for monetary gain. Crime may also, of course, be motivated by success goals other than financial gain. Thus we have Watergate, for which anomie theory offers almost a perfect key to an understanding of the motivation of the principal participants.

Anomie sometimes appears to be a "money-is-the-root-of-all-evil" approach to deviance. For purposes of simplifying the problems of pressures for deviant behavior, Merton writes, "Monetary success was taken as the major cultural goal, although there are, of course, alternative goals in the repository of common values" (Merton, 1957: 157). The rebellion area describes those who have rejected ends and means and substituted their own, but it does not show why this takes place, and certainly it is a great supposition to suggest that this rebellion is caused when certain people are caught up in the conflict between ends and means. The retreatists are explained somewhat more logically, as a group of people who have been not only unable to reach the goals by acceptable means but unable to reach them by unacceptable means as well.

Anomie theory has been subjected to support, modification, elaboration, debate, defense, refutation, and rejection.¹⁴ Many have objected

¹⁴ I shall not detail the support it has had, except to note that Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin have applied the thesis to juvenile delinquency in their work *Delinquency and Opportunity* (1960). Several criticisms of the anomie-deviance theory appear in a collection edited by Marshall Clinard, *Anomie and Deviant Behavior* (1964).

to the differentiation between ends and means: What are ends to some people, it is contended, may be means to others. Is not money, conceptualized by Merton as an outstanding example of a goal in American society, for many merely a means toward other goals? Likewise disputed is the dichotomy between culture and society. But most strongly rejected is the image of a society in which there is a consensus of values and goals that is inculcated into almost everyone. Rather, the critics say, the world is pluralistic, with culture conflict and with many diverse reference groups from which different people obtain a variety of conflicting guideposts and values. Not only cross-culturally and across a span of time but within a single nation at a given moment, what is good and proper, or wrong and deviant, finds little consensus. Edwin Lemert (1964:65), for example, notes:

The important conclusion from examination of such pluralistic value situations is that criminal deviation in the ethnic minorities can be explained in the same way as conformity among members of the dominant population segment, i.e., by reference to traditionally patterned values and norms where there is no socially structured restriction of means. Numerous examples of such deviant behavior in our society, without disjunctive ends-means concomitants, can be cited: violations of fish and game laws among Indians; common law marriage, statutory rape, marijuana use, and carrying concealed weapons by Mexican migrants; common-law marriage, "totin'" (petty theft) and assault by rural Negro migrants; gambling and opium use by Chinese; informal sororal polygyny, gambling and statutory rape ("sex sixteen" cases) among Hawaiians; drunkenness among older Japanese in Hawaii; and cockfighting among Filipinos.

Lemert here makes an interesting but vulnerable argument, for he chooses examples that fit into his thesis of a lack of value consensus, but this does not mean, or even suggest, that there would not be near-unanimity in the condemnation of forcible sexual assaults or in the embracing of success goals. If American society does rally most of its people around the success goal, then the exceptions cited by Lemert are not particularly relevant, however interesting they may be in other respects.

What can anomie tell us about, or predict, with regard to sex deviance? Certainly exhibitionism does not take place because the normative road to sex fulfillment is unavailable, nor even rape or prostitution, although it is possible that some cases of homosexuality (in prison or other all-male settings, or among young people unable to find an outlet with the other sex) may be explained in this way. But even here, the end (sexual gratification) has not been glorified. It does not explain violence and tells us nothing about the acts that are

defined as deviant by the society, how people react to others, under what conditions, and why. It overlooks or at least underplays the important concept of norm conflict, lack of consensus, and culture clash in favor of a single set of overriding values in society that some people do not subscribe to and others cannot find the means to follow.

Yet, returning to monetary crimes, it tells us a great deal. It sheds light on why there are crimes of profit and greed, white-collar and corporate crime, crimes of warmakers, profiteers, people in power and those searching for power. Power, money, conspicuous consumption, and conspicuous hoarding are all highly touted. Everyone admires the guy who's made it and who flaunts it, who's the head of the corporation or some branch of the government. How he got there, over what dead bodies, with what utter lack of ethics, with what larceny: well, as long as it does not become a matter of public scandal, these questions are not asked. Ethics are for the birds in a world of mud-slinging and dog-eat-dog.

Anomie theory, more than any other, has pinpointed the nature of a society in which scandals going right up to the President's office can be virtually ignored, as was the case during the 1972 elections. It is a society in which doing the right thing is regarded as "being a Boy Scout"—and this is said pejoratively, because it's okay to be a Boy Scout if you're twelve years old and naive, but grow up, man! Let's get to the top, where everyone will admire you—your old man and your old lady, your neighbors and kids, everyone except a couple of griping radicals and carping sociologists, and that's probably because they couldn't make it there themselves!

In this light, anomie is a powerful but limited theory, and to the extent that one agrees with it, one will become increasingly pessimistic about America (and to a lesser extent about most of the rest of the world as well). If anomie-produced deviance is going to diminish, some very profound changes in society will have to be made, and many people doubt that this is likely to happen. It is a gloomy picture, but that has nothing to do with the explanatory value of the theory.

Theories of Cultural Transmission

FOR DECADES, if not centuries, students of human behavior have argued the question of whether nature or nurture is the greater influence. Among those thinkers who have favored environment as an explanation of how people act, Edwin Sutherland, for many years the towering personality in American criminology, focused on how people learn to act in the manner that they eventually do act, and how their modes of activities are transmitted through various cultural agencies, particularly to youth.¹⁵ Theories of this type flowered under the influence of Sutherland, who developed what came to be known as differential association, but in various ways they can be traced back to nineteenth-century sociology and criminology. Although the earlier adherents of such views have often been criticized and their major theses well-nigh discarded, it is possible that some of their ideas can be synthesized with those of the later cultural transmissionists and that the result can explain much in modern-day deviant behavior.

Essentially, the cultural transmissionists took sides in the great debate regarding heredity and environment and, furthermore, in answering the question of whether one must look to deviant people to determine what was different or "wrong" about them, or to the society to see what it contributed to making antisocial behavior "necessary" or possible, they synthesized the two. The deviant was indeed different from others, not only in how he behaved, but in his mental-psychological attitudes; and this difference was nurtured in a social milieu that might be called criminogenic.

Late in the nineteenth century, Gabriel Tarde (1843–1904) de-

¹⁵ Sutherland's influence is difficult to exaggerate, and it is possible that his theory of differential association would not have attracted so much attention had it not been for his authorship of it. He was a dominant figure in American sociology, at one time president of the American Sociological Association, and his trenchant criticism of American business and political practices almost single-handedly created the interest in white-collar crime, an interest that has never flagged.

veloped what he termed a theory of imitation. He saw criminal behavior as very much like normative behavior, in the sense that there was little innovative about it and seldom a new form that was other than a slight adaptation of the old. Criminals, like everyone else, Tarde contended, imitated the ways of people they had met, heard about, or known of in one way or another. But they imitated other criminals, not law-abiding or "good" people.

According to Tarde (1912:278), if one studies the memoirs of prefects of police or local magistrates, one perceives

. . . by means of the similarity of the process employed by malefactors of the same region and of the same period, by means of the local color and the historical color which distinguish the criminal fauna adapted to each locality and to each time, the preponderance of the "social factors" in the production of the offense and the delinquent. The criminal always imitates somebody, even when he originates; that is to say, when he uses in combination imitations obtained from various sources. He always needs to be encouraged by the example and approval of a group of men, whether it be a group of ancestors or a group of comrades, whence arises the duality of the crime because of custom and the crime because of fashion. It is precisely in this respect that the criminal is a social being, and that as such he is responsible.

When Edwin Sutherland developed a learning theory of criminal and deviant behavior, he appeared on the surface to depart from any theory of imitation. Fundamentally, Sutherland did not reject Tarde's outlook so much as modify it, primarily in his contention that behavior was learned not by imitation, but rather by association with those who had already learned and developed it. In other words, Sutherland claimed, it was not only learned, it was taught, whereas the teaching element is essentially absent from the imitation theories.

Sutherland set forth his learning theory in the form of seven propositions; later these were expanded into nine propositions by Donald Cressey. The later version is given below. The italicized material comes from Sutherland and Cressey (1966:81-82); the remainder in each paragraph is my own explanation, discussion, and elaboration:

1. *Criminal behavior is learned.* Sutherland, in the great "nature versus nurture" debate of his time, broke firmly with the neo-Lombrosians, social Darwinists, and biologically oriented psychologists by denying that there is anything genetically inheritable about crime or deviance. Writing in an era when family trees of generations of alcoholics and other so-called degenerates were being widely disseminated (and were in fact not unpopular among some prominent early American sociologists), he was taking a strong stand against such

ideas. But the learning theory went further: It denied the inventiveness, innovativeness, or creativity of the criminal. One has to be trained in mechanics to be able to invent in the field of machinery; so one must be trained in crime in order to pursue a line of behavior that is against the law. It is not quite clear whether this means that one must receive training in order to learn that one wants to commit the act, that the act exists, or how to do it.

2. *Criminal behavior is learned in interaction with other persons in a process of communication.* The major emphasis here is on interpersonal interaction, a denial of the role of mass media and of the imitation of persons whom one does not know. Language is the basis of this process of communication, but gestural communication is not excluded.

3. *The principal part of the learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate personal groups.* Sutherland here continues the previous point; it is not only in interaction but in interaction within families, among peers, and in cliques that the learning process takes place.

4. Learning includes both techniques for committing the acts and what might be termed the frame of mind, *the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes.* Both are gained in the intimate association with people who are already familiar with the former and bring to the interaction the motivation, drives, and attitudes.

5. *The specific direction of motives and drives is learned from definitions of the legal codes as favorable or unfavorable.* In other words, one learns not only what the legal or right thing to do might be but also whether to take a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward the various codes. It was Sutherland's view that there are societies in which an individual invariably associates with those having reverence for law and others in which he associates with those having only contempt for law. But in America, this situation is almost always mixed, resulting in what he termed "culture conflict in relation to the legal codes." It is not clear whether this is conflict with regard to the idea of obeying law and having deference for authority or conflict in the sense that some rules are good and to be obeyed whereas others are bad and to be scorned.

6. *A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of law over definitions unfavorable to violation of law.* This is the essence of what Sutherland called differential association. The more one associates with people who are contemptuous of norms and urge that they be violated and who teach the desirability of such violation to the neophyte, the greater is the probability that one will become delinquent or criminal. People who eventually become

criminals do so because of their great amount of contact with those already committed to lawbreaking and their relative isolation from those whose commitments are in the opposite direction. However, much of the activity that people learn is neutral, having nothing to do with crime or deviance, whether favorable or unfavorable to such pursuits, such as how to pronounce a word or how to brush one's teeth. The significant factor here seems to be that people assimilate the surrounding culture, unless aspects of it are counteracted by other patterns. Becoming deviant is a learning process no different from becoming anything else; it merely depends on who the associates are and what they have taught.

7. *Differential associations may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and intensity.* Everyone has some associates whose influence would lead one to conform; but whether the good companions, so to speak, or the evil ones have the greater impact on development depends on how often one is with some companions rather than others, for how long a time the relationships endure, how early in life they take place, and, finally, the prestige of the associations, the commitment one has to them, the amount of emotional input or investment involved and the emotional reactions related to them.

8. *The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and anticriminal patterns involves all the mechanisms that are involved in other learning.* Whether the act is acceptable or unacceptable it is learned in the same way, and whatever learning theory is developed to explain normative behavior should be able to explain the deviant.

9. *While criminal behavior is an expression of general needs and values, it is not explained by those general needs and values since noncriminal behavior is an expression of the same needs and values.* Although thieves steal because they need money (in fact many people steal who do not need money) laborers put in a week of hard work to gain the same ends, so that the goal of having money would not explain why some people become thieves and others laborers. It is similar to respiration, which is necessary for all behavior but could not be used to explain why some people choose one pattern over another.

Let us look at these nine propositions, which have been discussed and debated in American sociology for several decades. Starting from the premise that all behavior is learned behavior, Sutherland continues that it is learned in association and interaction with those who behave in a given manner, who serve as what later came to be called role models, and who teach (by their actions or more didactically, almost

as if in a classroom) the type of behavior that they themselves indulge in and agree with. People not only have to learn what behavior to follow, or to internalize the desire to want to follow that behavior and to believe in it themselves, but also must learn how to carry out the type of actions involved when they decide to behave in a given manner.

If all behavior is learned, and if this is as true of normative as of deviant behavior, then the reason some people grow up to pursue the nonnormative path is that they have had more meaningful associations with those already engaged in the deviant way than with people who conform. The criminal is not inventive, and he imitates (in Sutherland's view) not because he has been exposed to mass media and propaganda, but because he has learned the "wrong way" from others already enmeshed in the criminal life.

The important point in this approach is not that certain social or economic conditions found in a given area give rise to a large amount of antisocial behavior, but that the large amount of antisocial behavior in a given area turns out to be self-perpetuating. People pass this down through role models, peer-group pressure, parental and fraternal influence, and sometimes actual instruction.

The theory does not deny that slums breed delinquency, but Sutherland claimed that they do so because the delinquents were already there. For the same reason, the so-called correctional homes for youth, reform schools, juvenile prisons, under whatever name they existed, were breeding grounds for crime, because there the youth was given the opportunity to associate almost exclusively with those already involved, and moreover, with those who could teach him the techniques for the commission of the act.

Although it is true that some forms of deviant behavior require a good deal of skill in order to pull off the act and not be apprehended, or even in order to enjoy the experience, the same is not true of other forms. But even those acts requiring skill are often learned alone by trial and error. Pickpocketing, lockpicking, safe-blowing, and writing bad checks are among those deviant behaviors that require lessons, and, in rare instances, things akin to classes and schools have been known to exist for this purpose. Certainly, spies are sent to school and trained in a systematic manner to commit kidnapping, murder, and arson. But the techniques of many criminal acts are never learned. (Perhaps those who never learn are the people who get caught most easily; they botch their jobs, one might say.) This is true of assaults, rapes, murders of passion, and probably purse-snatching and other street robberies. Furthermore, and this seems to be a major criticism of differential-association theory, some deviant

acts are committed because one has learned the techniques *in association with* the most upright and conforming teachers. This can be said of embezzlement, tax fraud, and other white-collar crimes: One can pick up several of the techniques and a good deal of the necessary information while taking a course in accountancy, or even bookkeeping. Techniques for committing crimes are learned by policemen and detectives, by students of criminology and deviant behavior, from the most well-meaning teachers and writers. Some of these police and students utilize the information for criminal purposes.

Although the simple assumption with which this theory starts—namely, that criminal behavior is learned—would seem to many to be self-evident, it is denied by Sheldon Glueck (1956) in a powerful critique of differential association. Glueck writes:

What is there to be learned about simple lying, taking things that belong to another, fighting and sex play? Do children have to be taught such natural acts? If one takes account of the psychiatric and criminological evidence that involves research into the early childhood manifestations of antisocial behavior, one must conclude that it is not delinquent behavior that is learned; that comes naturally. It is rather *nondelinquent* behavior that is learned. Unsocialized, untamed, and uninstructed, the child resorts to lying, slyness, subterfuge, anger, hatred, theft, aggression, attack, and other forms of asocial behavior in its early attempts of self-expression and ego formation.¹⁶ [Italics in original.]

As many critics have pointed out, one must determine why it is that criminal lawyers, who have a majority of their associations with criminals, do not themselves become criminals. (At least, it is comforting to assume that this is true of the majority of them.) Or, how can one account for the “one bad kid of the family” syndrome—the situation in which several brothers and sisters are brought up in one home, subjected to the same (or essentially the same) parental associations and values, mingle in the same neighborhood with a similar group of friends, go to the same schools—yet one brother drifts into a life of crime and the others become schoolteachers, doctors, lawyers, men of the cloth, and mechanics, or whatever their normative pursuits might have been? How does one account for the large number of people who associate with gangs during their adolescence and yet mature into law-abiding and not deviant citizens? Did they start with different biological-temperamental makeups, or were they subject to other unconscious differential influences? Did small matters in their

¹⁶ Robert Merton rejects the image of the newborn child as a bundle of untamed impulses. Sheldon Glueck in this quotation is close to Freudian theory. But Sutherland would insist that *all* behavior is learned, by the delinquent and the non-delinquent alike.

life patterns, beyond grasp and analysis, possibly even beyond human knowledge because they were seemingly so insignificant at the time of their occurrence, influence some in one way and others in another? If so, is differential association a useful and meaningful theory?

Social scientists are generally wary of the reduction of complex theories to homey aphorisms and clichés, but there is nevertheless a good deal in the theory of differential association that is summarized by the mother's plaintive cry: "My Johnny was a good boy, but he got into the wrong company." In this wrong company, Sutherland insisted that deviant behavior is learned in association with those already committed to it. David Matza (1964), however, suggests that the learning process may be more subtle, that the role models may not really be committed to the deviance, but that many people, particularly youth on the margins of delinquency, are putting each other on.

Like all behavior, deviance is learned from books, mass media, suggestion, imitation, and in numerous other ways. Some forms of deviance do seem to require teaching and apprenticeship, but this is not in order to become deviant but to learn how to function in the subculture, navigate through life while having a secret identity, enjoy the activities, avoid apprehension, and the like.

A major contribution was made by the theory of differential association in its emphasis on two aspects of the learning process: learning to want to commit the act, and learning how to do it. I would suggest that there are three aspects (and this largely combines Sutherland with Tarde): The first, not at all self-evident, is to learn that the act exists—what it is, what it is called, the form that it takes. For some acts, if one had never heard of them, the frequency would be diminished considerably. (I suspect that this is true of such widely divergent forms of deviance as skyjacking and declaring oneself a transsexual.) The language plays an extremely important part in making the act known—that is, in making impressionable people aware that such a thing is in existence.¹⁷

From this, one passes to the second stage, which Sutherland made central to his theme yet somehow did not entirely explain—that is, to want to commit the act, to be sucked into the area, and to feel that one is the sort of person who would do what peers and others are doing, even though parents, clergymen, teachers, and police, among many others, have taught the person that this is not to be done. At this point, many behavioral scientists explain the techniques that are used

¹⁷ This is not to deny the point made by Sheldon Glueck: that people would probably lie, steal, and be violently aggressive without being taught that there are such modes of behavior.

to rationalize the deviant and supposedly evil, sinful, or immoral behavior, to cut the bonds of normative guides and permit the deviant behavior to be committed.

Sutherland explained this entire phase in terms of the quantity of associations that one has with some people, the "bad ones," rather than others, the good guys. But this leaves many matters unexplained, among them, why some people drift into a certain type of association, develop it, stay with it and nurture it, while others do not. Simply to state that the "bad people" are there, in the neighborhood or around the block, is insufficient, for good ones are there also, and some are chosen, others are shunned. Sutherland failed entirely to face the question of the choices that the protodeviants make in the associations that are developed.

The second missing factor is the values that people bring to these associations. Do they come in with firm values that oppose those of the "bad guys" (this would account for the social worker or criminal lawyer, who is apparently seldom "corrupted" by what he encounters, for example)? One can have numerous associations with people having criminal or deviant ways without becoming part of their crowd, without learning to want to be like them, if one approaches them with contrary values. Sutherland's precriminals are, for the most part, youth who are able to learn criminal values because they are impressionable and largely untutored in the ways of the world.

Finally, Sutherland saw the teaching of criminality entirely in terms of face-to-face association. Actually, the evidence would indicate that one learns to want to be criminal, to know about criminals and to have criminal interests and desires, from contact with ideas as much as with people, and sometimes from contact with people who are not at all criminally inclined themselves. As for the process of learning how to commit an act, it is not always learned from others who already have the skill.¹⁸

Coming on the scene before the television era, Sutherland underestimated the effect of mass media upon the learning process. In a period when there is almost universal literacy in the Western world, and when television is reaching millions with a single message at all times,

¹⁸ As a matter of fact, Sheldon Glueck (1956) definitely scores a point over Donald Cressey by citing Cressey's own study of prisoners who had been convicted of criminal-trust violation. Cressey (1952) writes (and Glueck cites): "On the basis of evidence found in interview materials gathered from these men, the first hypothesis, that the techniques are learned in association with identifiable criminal behavior patterns, was rejected." As for where the prisoners had obtained their rationalization and ideologies to steal and to embezzle, the men referred to "general cultural ideologies," rather than face-to-face associations with those already "in the life."

one can no longer discount the media as a major criminogenic force. Television never tells anyone to do anything "wrong," but it depicts wrong, suggests it, makes known that it is taking place, shows how it is done, and offers it as an alternative to anyone watching and listening. Then it gives the arguments against that alternative, but the arguments may be far from persuasive to people who are vulnerable to suggestion.

The language of Sutherland's original theory, and of the controversy that has been waged over it, centers upon crime and delinquency, not upon deviance in a more general sense. Yet the theory may be more tenable if it is extended. It is weakened, not strengthened, by the inclusion of references to lawbreaking and attitudes toward the law. People do not learn respect or disrespect for the law so much as internalize certain behaviors as being the appropriate ones for themselves, and others as being inappropriate. To the extent that there is conformity, normative behavior, and law-abidingness, it is more a matter of the relative enticements of "right" and "wrong," the fear of punishment, and the strength of the teaching-and-learning process. "In our American society," the original statement of Sutherland reads, "these definitions [of the legal codes as favorable or unfavorable] are almost always mixed." If this is so, and it appears to be, then it is not an attitude toward law but toward propriety, tradition, authority, the official culture, that is here being learned.

In the end, the theory of differential association leaves much unanswered. It does not tell us why there is widespread deviance, delinquency, or criminality in a given area or ethnic group, but it does suggest why this type of behavior persists. It persists because there are seeds already planted, and newcomers entering a neighborhood, children growing into adolescence, become exposed to those who are already there and already committed to crime. This will tell us why cops entering the police force with high ideals become easily corrupted, as Arthur Niederhoffer (1967) so forcefully demonstrated, and why sometimes immigrants from abroad have a higher delinquency rate than they had in the area from which they came. But such a theory cannot cope with the basic cause of high or low crime and deviance rates, which will fluctuate from place to place and from time to time. It does not tell us, for example, why suburban, middle-class, or upper-class deviance comes about at certain times, then flowers or declines.

Compared with other approaches, differential association is better equipped to explain the extent to which a person is vulnerable to deviance, but not whether he will in fact become deviant. Its foremost contribution, however, is the proposition that deviance is learned,

that it does not just drop upon us, as if from nowhere. People sometimes tend to forget this, and particularly like to avoid asking whether it is learned from the major role models of the society, from scandals, celebrities, top politicians, and other important figures who are teaching corruption, cynicism, and racism to a population, some of whose members interpret and act on this in the only terms open and favorable to them: by committing white-collar crime, predatory crime, fraud, and the like.

Labeling: More a Perspective than a Theory

DEVIANCE THEORY in America has gone through its fashions and fads, from the era when most scholars spoke of social disorganization to the focus on biological predestination (or at least predilection), Freudian orientation, Marxist and other social- and culture-conflict approaches, differential association, anomie, and, particularly in the 1960s, a thrust of sociological thinking that came to be known as labeling. These theoretical emphases and concentrations overlapped, both in time and in conceptual formation; they borrowed from one another, sometimes without acknowledgment, and seldom returned the debt; and each infused the study of deviance with new life and vitality. Of these diverse trends, none instigated so much controversy, stimulated so much excitement, and was responsible for so much significant new thinking in the field as labeling. This controversy has hardly waned today.

Labeling has been known by several names (or labels). Once it was called tagging, and later the word was used synonymously and interchangeably with the "societal reaction to deviance" approach. Some of the adherents of the orientation prefer that it be called interaction theory (sometimes symbolic interaction), thus highlighting the thought that deviance arises and develops as an interactive process between

the actor (the perpetrator or deviant) and those who react to him (presumably in a negative fashion). Interaction, however, is more of a modification of labeling; proponents such as Colin Williams and Martin Weinberg (1970) have called it a corrective.

If by theory one means an explanation of what the causes of deviance are, one might say that labeling is itself not a theory of deviance, although some of this is certainly present. It is, rather, a perspective, an approach, an emphasis, one that is not entirely absent in other theoretical orientations but that is central to the outlook of the labelists. At times, it has been called a "school" of sociology. That there are a number of leading thinkers who have this orientation, to a lesser or greater degree, seems to be the case, but they have serious disagreements and different orientations among themselves. There is no "party line" of labeling—merely a large number of influential people who support many of its major postulates.

Although the labeling perspective had its first important public pronouncement when Edwin Lemert (1951) published *Social Pathology*, and became extremely popular in American sociology when, a little more than a decade later, Howard Becker (1963) published *Outsiders*, as an approach it has a very long history and some outstanding antecedents, not only in the fields of deviance and crime but in other areas of sociology, particularly in the study of intergroup relations. Ned Polsky (1967:195) traces labeling back to the Inquisition, when in 1611 the Grand Inquisitor Salazar Frias wrote, "There were neither witches nor bewitched until they were written and talked about." Even Cesare Lombroso (1911:374), famed for his phrase "born criminals," also coined the term "criminaloids," those pushed into continued and worsened antisocial behavior by the manner in which they were treated following apprehension. Many early commentators on the racial scene, particularly W. E. B. Du Bois (1903), attributed socially condemned behavior of American blacks, as well as of immigrants and other groups, to the way in which they were treated and the nature of the behavior expected of them. Later, in a frequently quoted statement, W. I. Thomas hinted at the labeling approach, writing: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences." These consequences can be self-fulfilling prophecies, the person becoming what he was originally defined as being; or the result of a definition may be the creation of a new situation that would not have existed had the first situation not been defined as real. What is particularly significant about the Thomas statement is that he suggests that the consequences of a definition of the situation may have little relationship to any objective truth or reality.

While Robert Merton's theory of anomie seems to be rather far removed from labeling, Merton (1948) used a "labeling" approach in his work on race relations, maintaining that when people are defined as uneducable, inferior, or in other negative ways, and are treated as if they were such, they frequently take on the traits attributed to them although they did not have these traits at the outset. Ruth Benedict (1934:245), before the advent of modern labeling theory, wrote: "The adjustments that [our] society demands of [homosexuals] would strain any man's vitality, and the consequences of this conflict we identify with their homosexuality." A few years later, Frank Tannenbaum (1938) published *Crime and the Community*, which differed from the numerous other texts on criminology in many respects, but particularly in an emphasis on the treatment of the offender that makes a hardened criminal out of the accidental or occasional one. The greater evil thus lies in the treatment, not in the original act. Thus Tannenbaum wrote:

There is a gradual shift from the definition of the specific acts as evil to a definition of the individual as evil, so that *all his acts* come to be looked upon with suspicion. In the process of identification his companions, hangouts, play, speech, income, all his conduct, the personality itself, become subject to scrutiny and question. From the community's point of view, the individual who used to do bad and mischievous things has now become a bad and unredeemable human being. . . . The young delinquent becomes bad because he is defined as bad and because he is not believed if he is good. . . . [pp. 17-18]

The process of making the criminal, therefore, is a process of tagging, defining, segregating, describing, emphasizing, making conscious and self-conscious; it becomes a way of stimulating, suggesting, emphasizing, and evoking the very traits that are complained of. . . .

The person becomes the thing he is described as being. [pp. 19-20. Italics added.]

Reading this passage decades after it first appeared, one sees clearly why labeling is traced to Tannenbaum. He did everything but use the word: he called it tagging. But a reading of *Crime and the Community* in full shows that the author's approach was essentially one of a world of social conflict, and of learning theory in that conflict-ridden world. The publication of *Social Pathology* by Edwin Lemert (1951) might be said to mark the birth of the modern labeling school. An examination of Lemert's first work in this area reveals his main contentions.

Social Pathology opens with an epigraph, and while Lemert never takes quite so extreme a position as the author he is quoting, never-

theless the quote sets the tone for what is to follow. It reads: "Nothing is good or evil by itself; it is only the attributes that man imputes to it and the public reaction to it that make it good or evil."¹⁹ In this statement, it is suggested that evil is not an attribute of the acts or actors but is something imposed on them by others, the normals or rule-abiders. Deviance, like beauty, exists only in the eyes of the beholder.

People deviate, in Lemert's concept, from the rules of society. This, however, is deviation, not deviance. When their deviation is reacted to in a hostile manner, two things occur, one official and one unofficial, that aggravate an already difficult situation. First, they are labeled by others as deviators, evil or abnormal people, not to be trusted and not to be admitted into the world of humanity with ordinary, law-abiding, good folk. Second, as a result of how they are labeled and reacted to, they develop defenses, fears, paranoia, mental anguish, low self-image, or self-hate, all of which result in a new and secondary form of deviation. This secondary deviation is infinitely more harmful than the relatively mild original deviance for which they had been labeled.

In his first formulation of his theory, Lemert on the one hand stressed that sociologists should break abruptly with the tenacious notion "that human beings can be divided into normal and pathological," or that, if such a division must be made, at least the term "pathological" should be divested of its "moralistic unscientific overtones."²⁰

In the infinite number of ways in which people are differentiated from others, some distinctions result in social penalties, rejection, and segregation. "These penalties and segregative reactions of society or the community," Lemert emphasized, "are dynamic forces which increase, decrease, and condition the form which the initial differentiation or deviation takes." He saw deviance as an interactive process, with the societal reaction as a necessary ingredient, but he was not suggesting except in a few instances that it was the reaction that

¹⁹ I trust that my translation is faithful. Lemert presents the quotation only in French. In the original, it reads:

*Nulle chose n'est bonne ni mauvaise; seule la conception
que l'on a d'elle et la réaction publique la rend telle.*

From *Monologues Sociales* by
Jacques Lorot, Paris, 1982.

²⁰ Between the first and second parts of this statement, there is a great difference. For many who see a need for categorizing some individuals as pathological are nonetheless in agreement that not only the term but all associated ones be used in a scientific manner, devoid of moral judgments.

created the deviance.²¹ Among the determinants of deviance, the degree of social visibility was strongly emphasized.

After Lemert, the major proponent of the labeling perspective was Howard S. Becker, whose work is traced to a thesis on professional dance musicians (Becker, 1949) and a paper on the same theme published soon thereafter (Becker, 1951). He saw jazz musicians as people dedicated to a specific type of music, who looked upon their patrons, employers, audience, and others as square. From a vantage point of their self-segregated sense of superiority, they withdrew from the world of ordinary folk and established themselves as outsiders, while seeing others as outsiders to themselves. Nowhere, at this time, did Becker use the word "deviant" or any synonym; nowhere did he suggest that these people were treated negatively or saw themselves so treated. The label of "outsider" was not meant to be pejorative; the outsider was perhaps marginal, in the manner that certain intellectuals have been so considered. This marginality and this "outsider" status, however, led to certain other types of ingroup behavior, particularly marijuana smoking. In Becker's early writing, there is a strong identification with the plight of these marginal people. Note the language:

Musicians feel that the only music worth playing is what they call "jazz," a term which can be defined only as that music which is produced without reference to the demands of outsiders. Yet they must endure unceasing interference with their playing by employer and audience.

It was only later that Becker (1963) saw outsiders as deviants rather than as people excluded from the ingroup of an occupational or professional collectivity or other clique. His major work, *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance* (the title itself effaces the distinction between outsiders and deviants), infused the study of the socially disapproved and rejected with an intellectual excitement that it had not had before, by placing the major emphasis on the hostile social reaction as the deviance-creating force. In Becker's view, deviance is created by society, by those who make the rules whose infraction con-

²¹ There were some instances in which Lemert viewed the societal reaction as the creator of the deviance: "There is nothing intrinsic in a disfiguring scar or in extreme hairiness on the body of a woman which interferes in any way with physiological activity or with the potential fulfillment of social roles. Nevertheless, a culture may *impute* a set of mythical physiological limits to such differentiae and thus cause them to become criteria for social exclusion and penalty." But the crucial factor in the Lemert contribution was that some deviation "sets off a chain of social reactions" and further that deviation is "one of the factors, but not a direct determiner, of the societal reaction."

stitutes the disapproved behavior, and then selectively apply these rules to some persons but not to others.

Outsiders was not merely a major theoretical contribution to the study of devalued people; it was indeed a manifesto, and around its formulations there arose what came close to becoming, within sociology, a social movement.

The literature of labeling, and its list of adherents, has been impressive, and its influence is found not only in sociology but in psychiatry, both in America and in England. Of the sociologists, a strong statement appeared from John Kitsuse (1962), who interested himself in how the man with a secret (in this instance the homosexual) was suspected, how his mask began to wear thin, how he was turned into a deviant by identification at the hands of unsympathetic others. Edwin Schur (1965) focused on the harm that illegalization of victimless acts brings to a society; later, Schur (1971) provided labeling with a general defense of its major contentions.

In the field of mental health and psychiatry, leading figures have been R. D. Laing (1964), Thomas Szasz (1961, 1970), and Thomas Scheff (1966). Laing has emphasized that behavior labeled disordered or neurotic may have rationality for the actor and can be understandable in terms of a defense against the onslaughts of family or of society. Szasz, on the other hand, denies the existence of mental illness as a category, says it is something created by institutionalized psychiatry, and maintains that handling people as if they were mentally ill when they are behaving in a harmless manner that is not to the liking of psychiatrists and the public becomes the cause of social evil. Scheff does not seem to deny the reality of mental illness but objects that it is a "residual category" into which all behavior not otherwise neatly classifiable but nevertheless objectionable is thrown. Moreover, Scheff insists that the matter of who gets institutionalized is not based on the type, degree, or potential harm of the mental illness but on other extraneous or irrelevant factors.

In the area of physical disability, some of the most interesting work in the labeling field has come from Robert Scott (1969), who studied philanthropic and social agencies for the blind. These agencies had a vested interest, Scott found, in having many clients and large numbers of services and hence in transforming people with impaired sight into "blind" men and women—blind not in a physiological sense but in a social sense—through handling and hence through a labeling process.

Several of the labeling theorists have combined their approach with a conflict and in some instances a Marxist orientation. Among them, one can cite Richard Quinney (1970), John Lofland (1969), and some

of the writers in a collection edited by Denisoff and McCaghy (1973). For these people, the labeling process can be understood in terms of an inherent conflict between various groups in society and the power of some such groups to apply a negative label to others.

For a period of about ten years, labeling found a fertile ground in the upheavals and social movements of the 1960s. By the early 1970s, criticisms of the approach had begun to appear in greater number, expressing increasing skepticism as to the utility of labeling, and at least one critic (Peter Manning, 1973) could speak of the exhaustion of labeling as a theory, and even Lemert (1974) appeared to be somewhat disenchanted.

THE ACT OF PLACING A LABEL

Man is a language-using animal. In the nature of language, he divides things (inanimate objects, people, thoughts, acts, or any other type of things) into groups, categories, or classes, including some objects with others because they have a characteristic in common, although they are dissimilar in an infinite variety of ways. In order to speak and write about these groups of things that are alike in some respect, he places a label (a tag, name, or counter) on them.²²

There are several meanings that can be imputed to the process of labeling, and sometimes it is not entirely clear from the literature which one is meant by scholars using this perspective in the study of deviance; at other times the diverse processes are confused. Labeling may thus refer to any of the following (and possibly many more) acts:

1. The placement of a person within a category: male or female, student or professor, athlete or diabetic, whatever the case may be. This is a necessary and inevitable process and, in and of itself, may have no consequences pertinent to antisocial or rejected behavior.

2. The attribution of negative status to the category, as is the case when the label is prostitute, alcoholic, cripple, dope fiend, and numerous others.

3. The identification of someone as belonging in a negative group, as by retrospective definition; the processes by which this takes place, the cues that are picked up and the clues that are pursued, important in the case of secret deviance (a problem to which John Kitsuse [1962] turned his attention in investigating how identification takes place in an atmosphere of concealment and innuendo).

4. The differential application of the label and the consequences

²² For an elaboration of the relationship between the object and the linguistic label, see Roger Brown's lucid book *Words and Things* (1958).

of that application to persons of different social class, education, race, and influence. The literature on juvenile delinquency is particularly rich in material of this nature, as is the literature on race and crime.²³

5. The employment of the specific word *deviant*, or its many synonyms and near-synonyms, to describe either an individual or a group of persons.

6. The arbitrary choice of a label for an individual or category, to express and evoke diverse quantities and qualities of hostility; as, for example, a whore, slut, prostitute, courtesan, call girl, harlot, pushover, or loose woman; all without regard to the subtle and gross differences that could be drawn between these categories.

7. The pejorative use of a label as epithet, often without regard to the content of the ideas or the character of the acts. This is the manner in which such terms as, for instance, sexist, racist, Red or Communist, middle class, and whore are at times used.

THE ESSENTIALS OF LABELING

No one speaks for labeling; each writer speaks for himself. One can find quotes among the works of various authorities showing that labeling does (or does not) take into account the idiosyncracies of the individual actor, does (or does not) accept the concept of the unapprehended as being deviant. It appears that some adherents of labeling see no acts as inherently evil; yet elsewhere this is contradicted.

Nevertheless, it may be said that there is general agreement that the following themes are central to the labeling perspective:

1. Actions derive their characteristic of "badness," not from their intrinsic content, but from the way in which they are defined by others, particularly by the rule-makers and rule-abiders in a society.

2. It is not especially useful to look at the nature of the act or the characteristics of the individual in order to understand the phenomenon of deviance; rather, one must examine the nature of the condemning society and the process by which some people gain the power and ascendancy to successfully place the label of deviant on others.

3. The process of placing the label of deviant, and of reacting to the individual as a transgressor, differs not only with the nature of the act but with who the transgressor is. Official and unofficial reaction

²³ This appears to be the meaning of labeling found in the study by Richard Schwartz and Jerome Skolnick (1962) of legal stigma, and in a work by Charles Winick (1961) on physician drug addicts and how they are treated by society, in contrast to the treatment of the uneducated, lower-class addict.

to deviance is not predictable from the act itself but varies according to social class and power relationships.

4. As a result of the official societal reaction to a person as a deviant, he is processed and handled as such a being. A label of deviant (more frequently a label embodying the negative character of deviance without that word) is placed on him, and this results (usually, although not invariably) in new, secondary deviance that is more severe and more hurtful to society than was originally the case. Further, the placing of this label and the public identification of the individual as deviant, in this perspective, act to reinforce or "fix" the individual in that status.

5. There are careers in deviance, as in other roles and in occupations. These careers are facilitated by the official reaction to persons as deviant, particularly by their exclusion from the society of normals, and by incarceration with others who have been cast out by society.

In short, deviance is manufactured by the hostile reaction of rule-makers. Not all rule-breakers are reacted to in a hostile manner. It depends on who you are, what you do, and to some extent on the visibility of the act; for the labelists, this proves that breaking a rule is not enough to establish a deviant role or deviant identity. If society did not manufacture deviance, it would not exist. Furthermore, the label perpetuates and aggravates the deviance.

PROBLEMS WITH THE LABELING APPROACH

The labeling perspective has been staunchly defended and frequently opposed. There are several major criticisms that have been offered:

The problem of limited applicability. General statements are often made on the applicability of labeling to all forms of deviance, but it is interesting that few efforts have been made to study and understand ordinary crime (particularly violent crime and property crime) through this orientation. Richard Quinney (1970) does seek to extend labeling to "ordinary crime," as does Clayton Hartjen (1974), but the bulk of labeling work is much more limited.

Consider, for a moment, the scope of the literature. In *Social Pathology*, Lemert (1951) deals only to a slight extent with criminals, but much more with prostitutes, Communists, stutterers, and paranoiacs; clearly these are people who could easily qualify for the concept that evil inheres not in the act but in the way people look at the actor. Before Lemert, Frank Tannenbaum (1938) emphasized how surly, unruly, and ungovernable boys were judged and handled, and

how the social reaction contributes to their maturation into criminals. Howard Becker (1963) concentrated on marijuana users and dance musicians, and David Matza (1964, 1969) on juvenile delinquents and marijuana smokers. The major contribution of John Kitsuse (1962) to the field deals with homosexuals. Edwin Schur (1965) examines homosexuality, abortion, and drug use, and the logic of his position, it appears, would make it possible to extend his view to cover prostitution as well. In all these instances, one can make a reasonable case for there being nothing inherently "wrong" or "antisocial" about the act, but it is the way in which man sees and defines the act that brings about the social harm.

Further, Robert Scott (1969) deals with those who are declared to be blind although they may be partially sighted and how this definition and the consequent treatment "make" blind men out of them; Fred Davis (1961) is concerned with victims of polio; Thomas Scheff (1966) with the manner in which people are processed and labeled as mentally ill. Kai Erikson (1966) studied heretics and witch-hunters, and Thomas Szasz (1961, 1970) homosexuals, drug users, and those declared to be mentally ill (but note that Szasz is very careful to choose examples of the putatively mentally ill from those who fit into the labeling theme).

Nonetheless, this is not primarily an argument against labeling but merely a statement that it might have to be confined to certain types of deviance. It is possible that the perspective may explain a great deal about homosexuality or juvenile delinquency but little about rape; that it may tell us a good deal about marijuana use but little about armed robbery (except when it is performed to get money to support a drug habit); or that it may illuminate the behavior of marijuana smokers but not of alcoholics.

This argument has been summarized succinctly by Milton Mankoff (1971:205):

The failure of those whose work falls within the boundaries of the labeling tradition to develop typologies that indicate which particular kinds of social deviance can be most fruitfully understood by using the concepts of labeling theory is a serious shortcoming which prevents evaluating the significance of their research. While labeling theorists may think they are only applying the principles of the labeling perspective to one form of deviation, their incidental endorsements of generalizability to other forms of deviant behavior make the critic wary of "straw men" arguments when he attempts to project the implications of specific research for general theory. Those who write about deviance from the labeling perspective, whether they feel they are being general

theorists or not, should welcome an attempt to consider the limits of their model for explaining career deviance.

Processing as a turning point. Adherents of labeling suggest that when persons are apprehended and processed and a negative tag is consequently placed upon them, this becomes a point in their career that catapults them into further and greater deviance. They are picked on, suspected, falsely arrested, arrested for actions that would be ignored in others, and generally regarded as antisocial. True as this may be in some instances, it is contradicted by a body of literature in which the label and the identification of the transgressor may constitute what Harold Garfinkel (1956) termed a "degradation ceremony," or a moment of "hitting bottom" for someone who has been living a furtive and precarious life in deviant ways. It can "bring him to his senses," frighten him into seeing the bleakness of his future, and cause him to seek assistance. The label, it is argued by Milton Mankoff (1971) and others, does not necessarily lead to career deviance. Deviant people, it is maintained, can be induced to relinquish their rule-violating behavior by the labeling process. Bernard Thorsell and Lloyd Klemke (1972) cite the famed Bank Wiring Room study:

In that study, labels applied by members of one's own work group were more effective in controlling deviation from group norms than was labeling carried out by management representatives with respect to formal orders contradicting the group norms concerning daily output.

Among other conclusions, they note:

When the deviant person has some commitment to and is, therefore, sensitive to the evaluation of the labeler, the effect of the labeling process appears more likely to be positive than negative.

They cite the work of Mary Cameron (1964), who found that once the label of "shoplifter" was placed on the novice pilferer, this ended the designated activity. Thorsell and Klemke, however, would not reject the concept of a label as reinforcer or as a stimulus toward greater deviance; rather, they would refine it by introducing such elements as the stages of the individual's development or immersion in the activity at the time that he is apprehended; the secrecy and confidentiality of the label; the relationship of the deviant to the labeler; and the ease with which the designation can be removed. These and other modifications and exceptions might well make labeling theory more useful, not less so, in the evaluation of the anticipated effects of a given social reaction. As such, several diverse modifications could make labeling an effective though limited guide to policy, both for society as a whole and its social agencies and for the individual

(a stigmatized or a normal) seeking to reduce tension and manage a difficult situation.

No doubt, one can make out a good case both for the original labeling perspective, in which the placing of the tag pushed someone into greater or secondary deviance, and the modified view, in which the label aided others in removing themselves from deviant pathways. Social scientists have yet to work out the conditions and the types of persons for whom the deviant label brings forth these diverse reactions.

Labeling generates underdog ideology. The adherents of labeling look upon the world from the vantage point of the deviant. They see the deviant as having been victimized, not so much by social institutions and lack of opportunities that have brought him to his present plight, nor primarily by psychological forces at work within family and early childhood, but overwhelmingly by a society that has cruelly condemned him. The sociologists "take the side" of the deviant and seek to show how he is misunderstood, wronged, and stereotyped. Their vision of the world of normals and deviants is narrowed by this approach, as they bend every effort to show the deviant in a light in which condemnation will be alleviated. Their research is ideologically motivated, designed to establish that evil does not inhere in the deviant nor in his acts but is generated in the treatment by the hostile society.

Ideological distortion as an impediment to research and to the search for truth is not absent from other approaches either. Sociologists take sides and tend to structure their studies to confirm their sympathies. Usually their sentiments are on the side of authorities, fund grantors, normals, and supporters of the status quo. Howard Becker (1967) maintains that researchers cannot avoid taking sides, but it is a matter of whose side one is on:

As sociologists, we provoke the charge of bias, in ourselves and others, by refusing to give credence and deference to an established status order, in which knowledge of truth and the right to be heard are not equally distributed. "Everyone knows" that responsible professionals know more about things than laymen, that police are more respectable and their words ought to be taken more seriously than those of the deviants and criminals with whom they deal. By refusing to accept the hierarchy of credibility, we express disrespect for the entire established order.

The problem for Becker is not whether one takes sides but whether this introduces so much distortion that the work becomes useless; or, perhaps, merely distortion that must be taken into account, discounted, watched, and rectified, before the results of such work can be used.

Part of the answer, he recommends, is to make a clear statement of position:

We can, I think, satisfy the demands of our science by always making clear the limits of what we have studied, marking the boundaries beyond which our findings cannot be safely applied . . . [making] a sociological disclaimer in which we say, for instance, that we have studied the prison through the eyes of the inmates and not through the eyes of the guards or other involved people. We warn people, thus, that our study tells us only how things look from that vantage point—what kinds of objects guards are in the prisoners' world—and does not attempt to explain why guards do what they do or to absolve the guards of what may seem, from the prisoners' side, morally unacceptable behavior.

This position has been subjected to considerable criticism. David Bordua (1967) suggests that it leads to underdog ideology:

Sociologists have traditionally served the overdog by providing a sympathetic link to various underdogs, but the details change from period to period. The deviant as underdog seems to be coming into his own, and, correlatively, "due process" seems to be replacing earlier welfare-oriented shibboleths. In any event, it seems easy for this perspective to turn into a kind of witch-hunt in reverse—the witches now being the decision-makers rather than the deviants.

Still another criticism of side-taking, and from a perspective opposite to Bordua's, has come from Alvin Gouldner (1968). The labeling approach, he maintains, takes the side of the deviant in opposition to welfare agencies, police, and other decision-makers and rule-enforcers, and in so doing deflects the struggle to alleviate suffering away from the truly responsible causes: the oppressive social institutions.

Problems with underdog ideology are many, and although Becker's warning that one's perspectives and sympathies should be made explicit can be helpful, Bordua's fears have not proven unfounded. It would appear to me that truth cannot be attained by taking the perspective of either a victim or a victimizer, even though one openly avows his viewpoint and puts everyone on notice, but rather requires a synthesis of the perspectives of all those involved in an activity. It is not a matter of choosing underdog or overdog but of making certain that no significant side is summarily dismissed or overlooked.

Further, and it is at this point that underdog ideology may become most disastrous, it is not easy to divide the world into victims and oppressors. The hunted fugitive is a victim, but so are people upon whom he preys; and, potentially, the hunters—the decision-making, overdog, and putatively oppressive police—may be victims as well. A racist murderer stands before the bar of justice; he is a victim, but

much less so than the black man in his grave or that man's widow and children. Are sociologists certain of their position when they take the side of the molester, not only against the child or his surrogates, but against prison officials and institutionalized psychiatry? If taking his side merely means that one has to see the world from his vantage point in order the better to deal with it, this could be most helpful; but to see only that view and not others may be disastrous for all concerned, especially for the molester for whom one professes such sympathy.

Labeling contentions have not been validated. Perhaps the most serious argument against labeling is that one of its most important contentions—namely, that apprehension and tagging result in secondary deviation and aggravated conditions—is simply not true. Efforts to test and validate this empirically, particularly with juvenile delinquents, have by and large resulted in negative findings. Follow-up studies have been made of youths apprehended for similar delinquent acts, some of whom were processed by official agencies and others released to their homes. It was found that the processing did not result in greater amounts of recidivism, serious delinquency, or adult criminality than were found among those who had not been subject to this process.²⁴

Labeling as a revival of extreme cultural relativism. In the effort to focus on moral entrepreneurs who arouse the community against some rule-breakers and to show that it is the reaction of the hostile and usually the establishment society that creates deviance, labeling tends to deny the intrinsic evil in some human acts. Even retrospectively, a perspective that “evil is in the eyes of the beholder” would not support the view of slavery or genocide as inherently bad. If they were not seen as bad by the society in which they took place, to condemn these actions would be, to the labelists, an improper imposition of one's own value judgments and morality, a sort of judgment as from God or some Olympian heights. This is in contrast to a modified ethical-relativist stand that is generally held, in which one attempts

²⁴ In an extraordinarily thorough study of juvenile delinquents in Philadelphia, Terence Thornberry (1971) found that the handling of the youths in a severe manner generally did not result in greater criminality, as labeling theory might suggest. He discovered no association between the severity of the disposition and the gravity of future or post-punitive offenses. For white youths and those from higher socioeconomic strata, the severity of punishment was directly related to the *volume* of subsequent criminality, but this did not hold for either the black subjects or those from the lower socioeconomic strata, where the bulk of the criminal behavior was concentrated. Thornberry maintained that labeling theory could not account for his results.

to see what is ethnocentric about one's values and to distinguish the modes of behavior that are peculiar to the customs of an individual society from those that are inherently evil.

This argument has been expressed by, among others, Richard L. Means (1969:16) who finds in Becker's definition of the deviant ("that which society defines as deviant") an assumption that "there could be no undefined deviancy." Referring to the genocide in Nazi Germany, Means asks:

Isn't the real problem for the value point of view those who conform, not the nonconformists in the Nazi context? Some might say this sounds too moralistic; but I reserve the right to say categorically that the killing of millions of Jews was an evil act; and in the value sense, becomes a social problem that must be explained and analyzed. I do not think the deviant-behavior definition as expressed by Becker gives us the intellectual grounds to delineate the true nature of problems of this kind.

This is a very complex argument, and it should be contrasted with the "underdog ideology" charge. It would appear that labeling adherents are being accused of two apparently incompatible sins: of upholding the status quo, and of taking the side of its opponents. Much of the polemical statement of Richard Means may derive from a failure to distinguish between that which is evil (a moral and in the last analysis a personal judgment) and that which the members of a society see as evil (a matter for sociological analysis).²⁵

Labeling as a denial of the independence and responsibility of the actor. In one of the most significant statements of this approach, Becker (1963:8-9) wrote:

Such an assumption [that those who have broken a rule constitute a homogeneous category] seems to me to ignore the central fact about deviance: it is created by society. I do not mean this in the way it is ordinarily understood, in which the causes of deviance are located in the social situation of the deviant or in "social factors" which prompt his action. I mean, rather, that *social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance*, and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is *not* a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an "offender." The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label. [Italics in original.]

²⁵ Nevertheless, some labeling adherents do take a position close to that attacked by Means. I return, as example, to the already cited epigraph with which Lemert opens *Social Pathology*.

Ronald Akers (1968) concedes that labeling may promote deviance, increase it, push people forward to greater acts than might have occurred without the label—but “the label does not create the behavior in the *first place*.” [Italics in original.] The problem is whether the label created the deviance, not the behavior that was so tagged. Here, labeling fails in all but a few instances, for it does not recognize that it was the behavior that brought forth the original societal denigration and reaction. In fact, labeling theorists emphasize various types of behavior in which the act itself caused no difficulty until crusaders took it upon themselves to arouse an apathetic or even an acquiescent public. Turning Durkheim upside down, they downplay the acts that brought forth the outrage and they emphasize the outrage that created the deviant character of the behavior (although not, of course, the behavior itself).

Sometimes it appears that labeling theorists are ignoring the behavior that produces the negative societal reaction, as if to indicate that the reaction is either prior to the behavior or haphazard, problematic, and unpredictable. “Deviants are produced by the differential treatment of persons by others,” writes John Kitsuse (1972). “The production of deviants *need not* have anything at all to do with their acts or behavior.” The *need not* (italicized in the original) saves the day, for there are some who are falsely accused and falsely suspected, but for the most part the acts do precede the reaction, provoke it, and create it, and in that sense the behavior is a proper avenue for study. However, deviance as an area of investigation for the student of human behavior must include both the act and the hostile reaction (or the latter as anticipated if the act were known). Hence, the societal reaction is an integral part of the two-sided relationship, but it may be (and usually is) a response to the unacceptable behavior, not a production of “the differential treatment of persons by others.”

R. D. Laing and A. Esterson (1964) and even, on occasion, Thomas Szasz maintain somewhat similar positions, but they mean something else entirely: namely, that the deviant act (as a display of anger, violence, withdrawal, or retreat into a world of fantasy) is produced in interaction with and as a defense against others. In this regard, Szasz (1974:265) writes: “When, for example, an uneducated, overburdened housewife escapes from her life of insignificance into the dramatic pretense that she is the Virgin Mary, the psychiatrist calls the woman sick.” I would suggest that if this becomes firm belief, not just dramatic pretense, it could be conceptualized as a form of deviance embraced as a protection against and escape from the burdens of society. In that respect, it can be said that society (with its

sex roles and other mandates) created deviance. This is not quite the same as stating, as do Kitsuse (1962) and others, including Szasz (1970) in his work on homosexuality and drug addiction, that the identification of some people as wrongdoers and the negative treatment subsequently accorded to them is a process "in the manufacture of deviance and deviants."

Labeling generates narrow theorems and seeks to apply them broadly. Science can be said to be the process whereby individual instances of a phenomenon are studied, generalizations from these instances are drawn, and these generalizations are then applied to other instances of the same phenomenon, because of the area of similarity, although they must in some respects be dissimilar.

Labeling has generated a number of concepts about deviance that are of limited value, but that some people have attempted to generalize to all classes of deviant behavior. Two of these can here be mentioned, and both are taken from Becker (1963): the propositions of deviant careers and of moral entrepreneurs.

The career concept suggests that deviant people go through certain regular stages on the road to becoming full-fledged parts of a deviant subculture: learning to act according to the norms of the deviant, learning to reject the "square" society, and so on, all of which Becker traces very carefully for the marijuana user.²⁶

The career concept fails, however, for no one has successfully applied it to other areas and aspects of deviance; and hence it remains a theory of marijuana use, or perhaps of drug use at most. Even in Becker's work in which marijuana users and jazz musicians are the sole examples of deviance examined at some length, no effort is made to show how the concept of careers can be applied to both of these groups. Do prostitutes, homosexuals, armed robbers, stutterers, and Communists all go through stages of a career development? Is the career the same for all these groups, or do they have in common only the fact of career? Within each such group, can common threads of development be found, which many or most individuals will follow? Or, on the other hand, are there many pathways once one has taken the first step, and in fact are there many different first steps? And do some of these paths lead "backward," away from the ultimate identity

²⁶ Note that Becker's studies were made in the 1950s and even earlier. During the decade of the 60s, marijuana use went through significant change, and if the careers Becker marked out were generally capable of validation at one time, it is doubtful if they were some years later. This in no way refutes the correctness of the original analysis.

with the deviant way? ²⁷ In all, career would appear to be a significant contribution to an understanding of deviance, but with limitations to its applicability that its adherents have not recognized.

The labeling perspective did not originally develop but made generalizations with regard to what were termed *moral entrepreneurs*. These were the busybodies of society, people who cloaked themselves in a mantle of pristine purity and went on crusades to impose their moral values on others. According to the labelers, they created deviance by terming otherwise acceptable behavior evil, sinful, or criminal. It is true that sometimes a hitherto accepted or mildly condemned type of activity does become stigmatized through a moral crusade, and this pattern seems to have been traced by, among others, Alfred Lindesmith (1965) for drugs, Joseph Gusfield (1967) for alcohol, and Becker (1963) for marijuana. Legions of Decency, Mothers for a Clean America, and similar organizations have been active in anti-pornography crusades, and many organizations of the past (e.g., the Society for the Suppression of Vice and the American Social Hygiene Association, whose name was later changed to the American Social Health Association) campaigned against prostitution. But these campaigns, particularly those against prostitution, were more significant in causing red-light districts to be broken up, arrests to be made, laws to be passed; they did not result in the negative attitudes and social hostility toward the prostitute. In fact, the campaigners found fertile ground only because of the pejorative content of such words as whore.

While moral crusaders and moral entrepreneurs are extremely important in understanding how some types of activities came to be extremely deviant and the manner in which many people were driven into deviance by the redefinition of their acts by others, this is a limited area that fits nicely into labeling theory. Even Becker fails to apply it to his jazz musicians.

Although this is more relevant to the theme of the moral entrepreneur than to that of labeling itself, it should not be overlooked that crusades to identify certain people as evil and to arouse the community against them have been undertaken by sociologists, criminologists, journalists, liberals, radicals, and others, and their activities are not cited by critics who see such people as busybodies. A classic example might be the campaign undertaken by Edwin Sutherland (1940), at first almost single-handedly, to stigmatize respectable lawbreakers in the seats of power as criminals. The entire profession of sociology—save for the few who opposed Sutherland, like Paul Tappan (1947)—became the equivalent of an Anti-Saloon League or a Legion of De-

²⁷ Lemert (1967) points out the shortcomings of the idea of a deviant career and indicates that it appears to be incompatible with the concept of drifting into deviance, as developed by Matza (1964).

gency, with the target being white-collar crime rather than alcohol or pornography. Dipping into American history, the Abolitionists were moral crusaders and entrepreneurs, as were those who struggled against lynching and those, a few decades later, marching against segregation. And then there was Watergate, exposed by a relentless press that took for itself the role of watchdog of national morality. Moral entrepreneurs are not to be summarily dismissed because they arouse indignation where it would not otherwise exist, any more than they can be invoked to explain all examples of indignation that do exist.

Labeling ignores the problem of etiology. Labeling theorists often state that too much attention has been paid to etiology. For them, etiology is irrelevant. This is consistent with the orientation of these theorists, which is that the main concern should be with how people are designated deviant by others, not with how people come to do certain things that earn them the label of deviant. If one starts from the concept that deviance is not inherent in the act or in the actor, as John Kitsuse (1962, 1972) has emphasized, it follows that it is wasteful to concern oneself with the factors that led to a person's becoming deviant. From the viewpoint of the critics of labeling, this is not only a valuable and frequently ignored area of social-scientific work but one that might prevent many people from maturing into a life of difficulty and suffering. From the labeling perspective, they would not suffer if only they were not persecuted.

Labeling turns away from rehabilitation. If labeling generates little interest in etiology and prevention, the same is true of rehabilitation. The problem is not to correct people who are disobeying rules but to stop stigmatizing, condemning, and casting them out. The problem is not what activities on the part of the inmate led to institutionalization, nor how he can be changed, but what the institution does to dehumanize him. There is here an inherent assumption that if only one were to cease oppressive stigmatization, people would be relatively happy in their formerly deviant (but now only deviating, offbeat, unusual, or nonconforming) roles.

This is, of course, totally inapplicable to violent and predatory crime. Thomas Szasz (1970) would make it applicable to hard-core narcotics users, Erich Goode (1970) and many others to marijuana users, Edwin Schur (1965), Szasz (1970), and Martin Hoffman (1968), among numerous others, to homosexuality. All these perspectives ignore two important facets: (1) Do these types of behavior selectively attract people who already have difficulties and disturbances? (2) Can these behaviors gratify people, if only the social stigma were lifted? Instead, two other very important problems are

posed: (1) Should society be changed, rather than the individual who resists and rejects what Nicholas Kittrie (1971) terms "enforced therapy"? (2) Are there better ways of dealing with some, many, or all of these people than by criminalization, exclusion from normal social activities, confinement, and other punitive measures?

For some, rehabilitation suggests illness, and they see the label of illness (particularly mental illness) as having pejorative connotations. They ask: Is there not a better way of looking upon the behavior than as illness? To which critics reply that posing the question in this manner, with the implication that the answer is in the affirmative, makes rehabilitation and therapy (voluntary therapy, let it be added) more difficult.

Labeling leaves little room for secret deviance. In some formulations written by adherents of the labeling orientation, it is specifically stated that one is not deviant unless one has been apprehended. Hence apprehension or discovery becomes the act by which the deviant is created or manufactured. In the extreme view taken by Paul Tappan (1947) in his effort to answer the question, "Who is the criminal?" only one who has been convicted by a recognized court of law is a criminal; the undetected criminal is a self-contradictory expression, although the undetected murderer presumably exists, a paradox that cannot easily be unravelled. Others would say that a person is not a "social deviant" without apprehension; that is, that he has not become deviant in social relations and social processes.

Yet, it would appear that this is not a necessary part of labeling theory, for one can return to its bedrock: namely, that the social condemnation creates greater difficulties than the original deviation. If this is true, as it might well be for some types of deviants, then the secret deviant lives in fear of exposure, knowing that at any moment he can suffer reprisals at the hands of a condemning society and further feeling that he is an inauthentic person both because he is doing things that are "wrong" and because he is unable to acknowledge his secret. Labeling thus seems to have made a gross overstatement of the importance of the visibility of the behavior and attitudes of the deviant. Sometimes this merely becomes a matter of definition: the secret will not be included within the scope of those who are being studied when the category is that of the deviants. Thus, Scheff (1966:33) writes:

For the purpose of this discussion, we will conform to Becker's separation of rule-breaking and deviance. Rule-breaking will refer to a class of acts, violations of social norms, and deviance to particular acts which have been publicly and officially labeled as norm violations.

The implication in this statement is that "deviants" would refer to the particular actors who have been publicly and officially labeled norm violators, but it is possible, although the matter was not stated in clear terms, that it could refer to people who performed acts labeled as norm violations even if the performers (or actors) had not been publicly and officially recognized and identified.

It is true that there is no official court to determine whether one is guilty of a deviant act, unless the act is also criminal or the person is declared mentally incompetent; but the labelists to a large extent incorporate the concepts of apprehension and public identification as a major theme, for they fit in with the idea that social reaction is crucial in the development of permanent and aggravated deviance. Thus, in Lemert's (1951:51) initial statement of his position:

In order for deviation to provoke a community reaction, it must have a minimum degree of visibility; that is, it must be apparent to others and be identified as deviation. A vast amount of sexual deviation in our society is clandestine and consequently escapes the public eye, which is to say that it has low visibility, a fact probably related to the puritanical background in our culture. This is not to say that no social influence is present, since the deviant in such cases may still, through the action of covert symbolic processes, imagine the reaction of "others" to his behavior and acquire feelings of guilt or anxiety. However, he or she does avoid the traumatic impact of public identification as an immoral person and also evades the sequence of differential reactions and penalty which follow such an identification.

In the subsequent literature, there has been considerable confusion between identification of a type of behavior as negative and identification of an individual as one who indulges in such behavior. Thus, in Kitsuse's study of societal reaction to homosexuality, he describes how people came to suspect that others were interested in homosexual activities, but this is confounded with placing a negative label of deviant on all those so indulging or so motivated. Becker writes of the deviant as one to whom the label has been successfully applied. If this means only the apprehended individual, it omits a large number of important persons, and sometimes Becker and his colleagues seem to so indicate. But if it is meant to include classes of persons to whom the label has been applied, it is true, but it becomes almost tautological.

Labeling focuses on official reaction, whereas a great deal of social stigma is unofficial. By "societal reaction to deviance," most labeling adherents have referred primarily to official processing by agencies with power: if they are not governmental bodies, they are quasi-governmental. They appear to have downplayed informal control, or what

might be identified as social reaction in contrast to societal. But ridicule can be a tremendous force in the handling of the deviant, making him feel ashamed, aggravating his feeling of unworthiness. While this is in no way incompatible with labeling, the latter approach has led to a one-sided view because of the significance given to the placing of the label.

THE LABEL AS A CLARIFIER

Sometimes the "societal reaction" sociologists seem to be arguing that it is the tag itself, and the hostile reaction that accompanies it, that can bring forth disastrous results. It is possible, however, that the label can identify a person's behavior to himself, clarifying it in a manner that permits greater freedom of choice and consequently freedom to decide whether to change.

As an example, there is a phrase coined by the late psychotherapist Edmund Bergler (1956). He spoke of those who constantly griped, took note of the bad luck always befalling them, held on to unfortunate events and cited and recited them as examples of how life and people were constantly doing them in, and in fact arranged their lives in such a way that they would continually get the short end of the stick. These people were, in Bergler's phrase, injustice collectors. The use of such a label to identify a person with a predilection for such behavior can serve to enlighten him about his self, render him cognizant of the meanings of his own comings and goings, and thus lead him away from what he was labeled as being.²⁸

LABELING AND INTERACTION

In an extension of labeling to apparently psychiatric cases, Edwin Lemert (1962) notes that paranoia can develop through an interactional process. Originally, there may be a loss in status, leading to a mild suspicion by an individual that others (as in an office) are plotting against him. The suspicion leads to avoidance, withdrawal,

²⁸ This is a special instance of the more general statement that labeling can act to deter as well as to reinforce, to bring back to the normative as well as to push into greater (or secondary) deviance. It is a special instance because unlike those cited by Mankoff (1971), Thornberry (1971), Thorsell and Klemke (1972), Cameron (1964), and many others, the mechanism in this case is cognitive-therapeutic, rather than working through fear, punishment, exposure, peer-group pressure, or the like. In the instance that I have cited, the labeling could probably be most corrective in a therapeutic relationship, but the label as a self-clarifier leading to behavioral change need not have a professional therapist as guide; the guide can be spouse, friend, teacher, or oneself.

surreptition, and other peculiar ways of acting, and this is noted by the others, who thereupon become suspicious, watchful, conceal from the potential paranoid what is open to others, and in various and numerous ways exclude him from their circle. A vicious interaction is set in motion and results eventually in full-fledged paranoia, based not entirely on fantasy.

In this work, and in the studies and examples of R. D. Laing and A. Esterson (1964) on mental illness in the family, deviance is seen as an emergent property that develops in interaction between the offender and those who react to him. As contrasted with many other sociological approaches (anomie excepted), labeling appears to have rescued deviance from the view that only the culprit requires examination and correction, not the world around him.

This is not a new perspective in the study of socially condemned people and acts, but it remained for labeling to place the entire field of disapproved behavior in an interactionist perspective. In minority-group theory (and many sociologists have drawn analogies between ethnic or racial minorities and deviants), there is a rich literature on the effect on the individual of being stigmatized, as shown in the studies of Abraham Kardiner and Lionel Ovesey (1951), among others. Without abandoning the search for causes that lead certain people into various paths of deviance, one can at the same time demonstrate how the manner in which they are handled sometimes reinforces or increases their alienation from society and sets them on a path even more destructive to themselves than before. Without accepting the formulation that "deviance is *not* a quality of the act the person commits" (certainly an untenable proposition), one can investigate why and with what consequences some acts that do not have an inherently antisocial character, as marijuana smoking, are labeled deviant; and why and with what consequences the transgressor and rule-violator is reacted to in a manner that creates greater problems for himself and society than were created by the original act for which he is being punished.

Sometimes the labeling adherents go even further, as when Becker (1963) states that "social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders." If one looks only at the first part of the quotation (which admittedly is taking Becker out of context, but some of his colleagues have done just that), one is left with the notion that without rules there would be no rule-breaking, hence no deviance, and therefore that rules cause deviance. It is an idea that gives rise to considerable confusion. Without schools, there would be no truancy; without marriage, there would be no divorce;

without art, there would be no art forgeries; without death, there would be neither body-snatching nor necrophilia. Those are not causes, they are necessary conditions, just as the fact that you are alive is a condition for your reading this book but is not a cause of it.

From the viewpoint of the sociology of knowledge, it is interesting to consider why labeling arose and took hold at the time that it did. It was an expression of rejection of the small-town middle-America view, tenaciously held by early American sociologists, that assumed the propriety of the existing rules of behavior and hence the evil of those who violated them. It went further than Freudianism, cultural transmission, and anomie in turning the world of respectability upside down and demonstrating sympathy for the rule-breakers by questioning the norms and their upholders. It was a period of intense social change, the 1960s, when labeling had its heyday, and during this decade it proved useful to see the deviants more as victims than as victimizers.

The Tyranny of Isness

LABELING THEORY shifted the focus from the origins of disvalued behavior in the individual to the sequential stages that occur after he has been identified and tagged. The labelists further directed attention to the consequences of public identification. Reading their material, however, one gathers the impression that once the deviant label has been attached, no one can remove it; it is almost as if Society, in the form of The Great Floorlady, has placed a sign on each piece of deviant merchandise: "Please do not remove this label."

As an individual went from the first hesitant steps toward deviance, learned the roles and social expectations, learned how to accept and manipulate and navigate within that role, until he became firmly entrenched in it, he often went through a series of stages outlined with clarity by many theorists. Thomas Scheff (1966), for example, showed how people who were mentally ill only in a marginal sense decided that they would play the game of the doctor, behave in the manner expected of them, because otherwise they would be subjected to greater mistreatment. One had to be a "good" deviant (in the

terrible sense in which racists once spoke of "good niggers"), or a conforming deviant—conforming, that is, to the expectations permitted and encouraged for one who had taken on a deviant identity.

This deviant identity emerges in social interaction with others; one begins to be treated and looked on as if one were what one is supposed to be, and, as Frank Tannenbaum put it, this is what the individual eventually becomes. There is a special aspect of this process, particularly applicable to certain forms of deviance but less so to others, that appears to have been insufficiently understood; it is the process of self-definition based upon mistaken identity. Not mistaken identity in the usual sense in which that term is used, which is the error made when a given person is improperly recognized or identified as being someone he is not. Mistaken identity in the career sequence of deviance is the error that such an identity exists at all.

Freud and some of the Freudians conceptualized some neuroses in terms of arrested development or fixation, but they did not specify the conditions under which an arrest takes place, and their theory of fixation was largely based on the now generally discarded concept of the natural and inevitable stages (particularly the sexual stages) in the development of human beings. Yet, people are "arrested" at different points in their growth, and they become more or less permanently encapsulated in a deviant role. This encapsulation or imprisonment in a role is somewhat similar to what Edwin Schur (1971) calls "role engulfment."²⁹ Role encapsulation, fixation, or imprisonment is a very limited theory of deviance, for three reasons: (1) It is strongly applicable, so far as I can judge, to only a few forms of deviance, mainly of a sexual nature (e.g., homosexual, transvestite, transsexual, nymphomaniacal), although it may find application in understanding narcotic addiction, alcoholism, and even suicide, among other aspects of deviance. (2) It does not account for the process by which some people begin to assume deviant identities or behave in

²⁹ Engulfment is slightly different, yet related, to imprisonment. The former refers to being overwhelmed in a status, so that it dominates an entire life process and style; imprisonment is being unable to escape from the status, sometimes because one of the features of being in it is to learn to like it and not to want to escape; another feature, and it is central to this part of the discussion, is to relinquish the struggle for escape because one accepts without question the belief that escape is impossible. As for encapsulation, I am using the term in the sense of becoming permanently enclosed in a box or capsule. Lofland (1969:50) employs the word to describe how a person, without premeditation, intent, or foresight, gets involved in an episodic deviant act: "Modes of dealing with the threat which are long-term, multisteped and indirect become more difficult to contemplate and view as viable in the face of the pressing character of the threat itself. The actor appears to become, rather, relatively open and responsive to threat-reducing management efforts which have the character of being short-term, simple and close at hand or proximate."

socially unacceptable ways while most others do not, but it seeks to explain only what happens to them when they reach that point in their development. (3) At best, it would be applicable to some but not all persons even in the areas specifically mentioned; that is, not all transsexuals become imprisoned in that role, nor do others who are assigned another sexually deviant label.

LABELING ACTS, NOT PEOPLE

Suppose that one were to say, as some have indeed said from time to time, that there is no such thing (or person) as a homosexual, a transvestite, a transsexual, a nymphomaniac, a pedophile, and perhaps one can add an alcoholic and an addict, as these terms are now used and in the light of the meanings usually imputed to them. These are mental constructs, artificial reifications, in which a type of behavior, feeling, or inclination is translated into a type of person.

If one were to start with the proposition that a homosexual (this will serve as my major example for the group or class of phenomena under discussion) is one who does certain things, or has desires to do these things, or both—are we not then admitting the existence of the person as an identity? No, not at all, as a simple analogy will indicate.

Let us take any other form of behavior, be it deviant, law-abiding, normative, or mild rule-breaking that incites only the slightest negative reaction. We say of a person that he is a thief because he steals, that he is an adulterer because he has extramarital sexual relations, that he is a cheat because he commits some act or acts that fall within the purview of what is called cheating, and that he is a doubleparker because he places his automobile at a certain position in the street, next to another car already parked. In all these examples, to say that a man *is* such-and-such is merely a linguistic method of expressing that he *does* certain things; in some instances, he would have to do them on many occasions, more or less regularly, to justify the use of the verb “to be” and the suggestion of identity that goes with it.

No one would think of himself or another individual as a thief, adulterer, doubleparker, or any other such word, if the person did not act, or behave, in a certain manner. This is not to suggest that apprehension is necessary for the imputation of an identity to another or to oneself. A person may be a thief or a cheat without anyone but himself knowing. The consequences of the *being* together with the *not-knowing* (by others) are very great, and entirely different from those of the *being* and *knowing* (by the public). In the case of certain forms of mental illness (as schizophrenia, paranoia, and hallucinatory delusions), the person may *be* without this being known to self or others,

for the nature of the ailment may be such as to preclude its recognition by oneself (the hallucinated individual cannot know that what he experiences in his fantasies are hallucinations, for then his mental game would be up). Although in such instances, it is likely that others would discover it (as witness the three inmates of mental institutions in Michigan described by Milton Rokeach [1964], each of whom believed that he was Jesus Christ), one can say that the state of *being* existed at a time when no one was aware of it. The person was a schizophrenic or a paranoid, just as one can be a diabetic at a time when it is not yet known to laboratory technician, physician, family, or patient. The diabetic existed before, and his existence as a diabetic had consequences, the results of which were apparent but the causes unknown. Thus, when Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1964) studied contexts of awareness of dying patients and their doctors, there was an inherent implication that to be a dying person is itself a reality, not a mental construct describing what one is doing and then transplanting the doing into the soil of being. What I am maintaining here is that to be a dying person is both an objective fact and a social status, it can be either one without the other, the former does not require recognition or discovery, and the latter may be based on false recognition.

In certain instances of deviance, both experts and laymen cover themselves by conceptualizing the identity as existing if one *either* commits the act *or* has a desire to do so; that is, the identity is imputed if the person is perceived as being motivated or aroused in a given direction, even though he may not commit the acts. While there would seem to be some usefulness in differentiating between an individual who has homosexual, transvestite, transsexual, nymphomaniacal, pedophilic, suicidal, or other desires and fantasies and the many persons who do not, it is easy to imagine the complications of such a concept if one were to call a thief a man who had desires to commit thievery, an addict if he had fantasies of being an addict, or an adulterer if he looked longingly at a girl who walked down the street or whose image he stared at on his television screen. Here, too, it might be valuable to differentiate between one who has "thievery in his heart" and others for whom thievery is repugnant, but this would hardly justify putting the former (the would-be, repressed, or "latent" thief) in the same category with the habitual doer of the act, in which category all persons are called thieves. Even in such areas of sex deviance as child molestation, one would not say of a man that he is a "child molester" because he has dreams of sexual liaisons with little girls: the term, the identification, belongs exclusively to the actor, meaning one who acts.

Yet, in the area of juvenile delinquency, this is precisely what at least one highly respected authority, August Aichhorn (1935), writing and working under early Freudian influence, has done. For Aichhorn, there were two types of delinquents, those who committed the "dis-social" acts, and those who did not. Are not the latter the remainder of the youthful population of the world? No, because Aichhorn identified these "good boy" delinquents as youth with unresolved internal psychological problems of which they are themselves unaware; they are, in short, potential delinquents. For this scholar, delinquent was an identity, it existed in the person regardless of behavior or even of desire.

The mischief perpetrated by this belief that one can be something, or that the identity has a reality apart from the behavior, is illustrated by the report of a school girl who was having two simultaneous sexual liaisons, both with boys she was very fond of. Deeply troubled by her own nonnormative behavior and by the image of herself that she was developing, she said to a psychotherapist: "I'm wondering if I am a nymphomaniac. I'm just afraid that I might be one. If I am, what will happen to me—I'll end up a common prostitute!"

For this girl, the problem is largely linguistic and is one of identity-confusion. She cannot *be* a nymphomaniac because of fear or suspicion, as if it were a matter of a blood type that exists and is there to find if one seeks it. She might develop a type of unbridled promiscuity that is labeled nymphomania, but the best chance of her so developing, and particularly of being imprisoned in that form of behavior for life (or until retirement age), would be the suspicion or belief that she is what she fears she is.

The problem becomes even more serious when one looks into the question of latency. As pointed out by Leon Salzman (1957), the word "latent" seems to have been used by Freud and the Freudians in two rather different, although not always differentiated, manners. In one sense, it referred to certain formerly active desires and interests that had become temporarily dormant and, during this period of dormancy, were inactive until changes in the person would bring them to life again; in other words, they were present in latent form. Here, latency was applied to the post-Oedipal and prepubertal period; in fact, this was called the latency stage (often the period between the ages of seven and eleven). But latent came to have another and somewhat related meaning: namely, having a potential for developing and coming into the consciousness. It was in this sense that people were conceptualized, both by psychoanalysts and by laymen, as latent homosexuals, and some of their acts as indicative of latent homosexuality.

Later, and to a lesser degree, the term was applied to some transsexual situations, and, very infrequently, to transvestitic ones as well.

In this second form, the concept of latency is scientifically unsound, conceptually useless, and socially pernicious. It is unsound because a potential for development in a homosexual or heterosexual direction is coterminous with being human; in that sense, everyone is a latent homosexual or heterosexual. It's useless because it fails to differentiate those who might more easily and others who might less easily develop in a given direction. However, its pernicious feature is deserving of greater attention.

So long as the concept of latency exists, it is an underpinning for the belief that one can "be" a homosexual (or transvestite, transsexual, or some other type of person), even though one does not have the desires, the fantasies, or the behavior. The "being" is a sort of presumed identity, like a little gremlin or a reified id that exists within the individual. It is both an egg that will develop in a given way and only in that way and a personality that is already there, although there is no way in which it manifests itself.

Because of this linguistic reification of a behavioral concept, and this creation of a nonexistent identity, social scientists and laymen alike think, speak, and write as if homosexuals really existed. A few examples taken from books, newspapers, or conversations will suffice:

"He began to suspect that that is what he was. . . ."

"I wondered if I might be one myself. . . ."

"How do you know you're not gay?"

"He discovered that that is what he was. . . ."

"When he was in the Army, he found out about himself. . . ."

"The true homosexual. . . ."

"When did you first suspect that you were a transsexual?"

"These queens, they're probably a bunch of latent transsexuals."

"She is a woman in a man's body. . . ."

To illustrate how the concept of being is misunderstood, I shall cite two pieces of literature on homosexuality.

In an article entitled "Coming Out in the Gay World," Barry Dank (1971) starts by stating, "There is almost no sociological literature on 'becoming' homosexual," but then completely misunderstands his own statement when, in the very next sentence, he writes, "Little is known concerning how the actor *learns that he is* a homosexual, how he *decides that he is* a homosexual" [italics added]. The very words chosen by Dank and the concepts that undergird them are fallacious, for they presume the existence of an identity before the consciousness

of being. The actor cannot learn that he is a homosexual the way he might learn that he is a Canadian or an American, a white or a black, an illegitimate son or daughter, or a hemophiliac.

In a book on the militant homosexual movement, Laud Humphreys (1972) discusses the number of homosexual males in St. Louis, and he arrives at a figure by estimating that 10 per cent of the adult male population are "more or less exclusively homosexual . . . for at least three years between the ages and 16 and 55" (the quote is from Kinsey). The error in Humphreys's logic is that he takes Kinsey's statistics³⁰ and then applies the term "homosexual" not only to people who are *more* in that category but to those who are *less* so, and to the very large numbers who, according to Kinsey, remained in that category for three or more years, but not for their entire lives, having drifted into it following periods of heterosexuality, or drifted out of it following periods of homosexuality (this amounts to at least half of the Kinsey "homosexual" sample).³¹

Now, starting from a completely different assumption, there is another and far more useful manner of defining reality. There are no homosexuals, transvestites, transsexuals, chemical addicts, suicidogenics, delinquents, criminals, or other such entities, in the sense of people having such identities. There are those who have desires for these types of activities, some of whom translate the desires into forms of behavior. Before they had the desires, it would be improper to have spoken of them as homosexuals (or by some other label in the list under discussion), just as it would be improper to speak of a person as a thief who does not commit acts of thievery. But in the sense that all forms of behavior are preceded by personality and character development that led to what came next, then one can speak of a pre-homosexual or a protohomosexual. However, this would be no more correct, nor less so, and would have all the advantages and dangers,

³⁰ The statistics themselves are suspect, as Paul Gebhard (1972:3), who became head of the Institute for Sex Research that Kinsey founded, has pointed out. The inaccuracies in these statistics have been discussed by John Gagnon and William Simon (1973) and by myself (Sagarin, 1973).

³¹ There are some other problems with the figures of Humphreys that warrant attention. The total St. Louis metropolitan-area population in 1970 was about 2,400,000. About 49 per cent of this was male, and about 70 per cent of the males were over the age of 14, leaving 800,000 people from whom Humphreys deduces "a population of approximately 80,000 male homosexuals in the St. Louis metropolitan area." To accept Kinsey's work and to draw this conclusion, one would have to postulate that, at a given moment, the entire 10 per cent who were "more or less exclusively homosexual . . . for at least three years between the ages of 16 and 55" were all in such a three-year period at the same time and at the moment of Humphreys's study.

of speaking of pre- (or proto-) delinquents, thieves, cheats, and child molesters. If latency is to be reserved for those in whom a later form of development is most easily brought to the fore, then this term should not be applied selectively to certain forms of activity, and it should be used with full knowledge that the potential does not already exist as an all-but-born reality; rather, it is as something that *can* come to the fore but that can also be handled so that it is channeled in another direction. No behavioral, characterological, or personality form that is not yet in existence within the individual is inevitable; it does not exist in some preformed stage or state, awaiting the moment to be born (as in a post-Oedipal latency stage postulated by Freud).

Consider the following colloquy:

Student (on first visit to college counselor): I want to tell you, Dr. Smith, I'm gay.

Dr. Smith: What does that mean?

Student: You know, I'm a homosexual.

Dr. Smith: No, you're not.

Student: But I am. I admit it. How can you say I'm not?

Dr. Smith: Because there's no such thing. There are some people who, at some stages of their lives, want sex with their own sex. But the minute they call themselves homosexuals they become trapped. Instead of thinking that is what they do, they think that is what they are.

Student: What's the difference? Whatever I do, that is what I am. When I play tennis, I am a tennis player. And when I finish school, I'll be doing chemical work, and I'll be a chemist.

Dr. Smith: Yes, that is precisely the fact. You were not a tennis player until you started to play tennis, and nothing forced you to choose that path. And at any time, you can stop playing tennis, and you will not be a tennis player, you will be an ex-player. You can give it up because you have other interests, you're bored, disappointed in your game, not in good health, or for a million other reasons. You have decided that you want to do chemical work, and you are taking a voluntary step to become a chemist. And you can do that as long as it is worthwhile, if it pays okay, if you like the work, or you can give it up because it's boring or because you inherit a million dollars and want to spend your life traveling. Now, you put your finger right on it: You should start thinking of people as homosexuals the way people are tennis players and chemists. It is something they do, not something they are, and as soon as they realize this they will not feel that they *have* to be this.

Student: I thought it was something that I was all along, that I just made the discovery, when I had this first affair, and knew that that's what I was all along.

Dr. Smith: You weren't that all along, and you don't have to be that if you decide that it's not for you.

DISIDENTIFICATION AND CHANGE

Some people have suggested that the greatest facilitation of therapy in cases of sex deviance is a belief that therapy is possible, and that this belief should be held by both therapist and patient. Perhaps this belief can be created, particularly in the patient, by development of the theme that this is not what he "is" at all.

The belief that one is a certain thing, particularly when the concept of isness carries with it a sense of destiny, a part of oneself or one's very identity, creates a feeling of immutability in that role. The language reinforces both the identity and the immutability, and the role occupant at that point finds it impossible to believe that he can be or is other than what he has defined himself as being. Labeling theory has been teaching that once an individual has been tagged by others, there is a greater difficulty in escaping from that identification. He begins to behave as the role demands, because this is the behavior expected and responded to, and he is given less opportunity for behaving otherwise. A major modification in the manner in which this process occurs may be in order. Once labeled in a given manner, the deviant is imprisoned in the role to the extent that he accepts the definition of self by others and by himself, and to the extent that he confuses the behavioral role with identity and immutability.

Part of the problem of being is in the meaning, particularly the positive meaning, in the word "identity." People are urged to know who they are and then to accept themselves with pride of being. Erik Erikson (1956), who has perhaps written more on this theme than anyone else but who has in many works avoided a definition, uses the expression "ego identity" to describe "a persistent sameness within oneself and a persistent sharing of some kind of essential character with others." Starting from Erikson's statement, it would be useful to stress that no matter how persistent, no characteristic of personality, temperament, or behavior need be permanent unless it has biological, chemical, and physiological referents, and even this would not always assure permanence. The "sharing of some kind of essential sameness with others" tends to be self-perpetuating in its persistence, particularly when there has been an internalization of the notion of identity—i.e., when one says to oneself and to others, "That is what I am," although the speaker would be freer if he said, "That is what I do." The greater freedom would be derived from the choices that one can make in doing, as opposed to the relative lack of choices in being. Or, to paraphrase Paul Tillich (1952), while one has courage to be, one must also have courage to become.

Doing and being are closely intertwined. "Action," writes Kenneth Burke (1945:24), "is not merely a means of doing but a way of being." Being, however, can suggest lifetime permanency, until one no longer is, or transitory and ephemeral stages, until one no longer *does*. Anselm Strauss (1959:31) states this succinctly: "The human experience of time is one of process: the present is always a 'becoming'; it is always coming up."

The concept of being implies, although it does not necessarily demand, that there is something inborn or at least fated about these statuses and roles. If one is destined to be whatever one has become, then change is closed and repudiation is a matter of denial of identity. However, there are other negative roles about which the language is explicit in expressing that the characteristic is inborn, but people do not see themselves or others as being fixed in a particular box. For example, a person develops a strong reputation for prevarication; such an individual is sometimes called "a congenital liar." Now, if indeed there were such a thing as "a congenital liar"—if people were born with propensities for telling untruths, with predilections for mendacity for its own sake, with some sort of capacity for fantasy combined with an inability to separate such fantasy from reality—then the expression "congenital liar" might be literally descriptive. In that case, as in the case of many inborn traits of temperament, one could hope at best to control and modify but not to change seriously, and it might even be necessary to advise such a person who arrives at the office of a therapist somewhat along the following lines:

Patient: My problem, doctor, is that I just cannot tell the truth. I've suspected for a long time that I might be—well—I don't like to say it . . .

Doctor: Don't be afraid, say it—you mean, a congenital . . .

Patient: Yes.

Doctor: So what? People are different, not everyone is the same. Some people tell the truth, and they may have no capacity for imagining.

Patient: But doctor, maybe I can get this out of my system; it's really not a good life.

Doctor: The problem is not to try to uproot it, but to utilize it. Was Shakespeare telling the truth when he wrote *Macbeth*? Was Lewis Carroll telling the truth when he told his stories to little Alice?

The example illustrates that words and phrases carry connotations quite different from those that the grammar of the language would seem to indicate. One does not mean, when speaking of a person as a congenital liar, that that status is inborn and immutable, but only that the propensity for untruths is strong. A figure of speech is being utilized to express this.

Adherents of labeling have emphasized that rule-makers, and particularly moral entrepreneurs, create deviance by defining certain acts as evil. Yet the manufacture of certain types of deviance may be rooted more in language and belief than in moral crusading. A young man develops in a manner in which he displays discomfort and difficulty in fulfilling the male role, as it has been defined for him by others and as he has come to understand it. There is a male image or stereotype in his mind, as there is, in fact, of all roles in the minds of everyone. But various forces may have brought this individual to the point where he believes that he cannot perform in the traditional male role. He is unsure of his ability to be aggressive and dominant (masculine traits, in his mind), thinks of himself as being weak, fears that he cannot succeed with women, and sees himself as having characteristics, imputed to him by others, that he identifies with effeminacy. People snicker, point to him, and suspect that he is "one of *them*." He learns that there are people who are "queer," and he himself wonders if that is indeed what he is.

At this point, the self-wonderment is cognitively absurd, for he cannot "be" one of them until he becomes one, but asking himself if he "is" and believing that there are people who "are" facilitate his becoming, after which he "is."

Entrapment, permanency, role imprisonment, "mistaken identity": These can result from the belief in being.

This theoretical approach does not account for the development toward deviance, but for fixation and perpetuation within the individual. Some people become entrapped or imprisoned in roles from which they could escape, or out of which they could develop. Their entrapment is due to a confusion of *doing* with *being* and is facilitated by linguistic structures, particularly reifications. These reifications result in the people believing they have an identity that is inescapable, and they then develop a set of rationalizations to support the identity and explanations for failure to develop out of it.

If people develop new identities, it means that they are not bound to old ones. "Human careers . . . have always an unfinished character, a certain indeterminacy of outcome," writes Anselm Strauss (1959:43). It is this indeterminacy that is lost in language suggesting the very reverse. As C. Wright Mills (1940:906) stated, "Men discern situations with particular vocabularies." And these vocabularies have particular consequences.

Conflict: From Class Conflict to Culture Conflict

THE IDEA of conflict as an explanation for deviance has been popular for more than a century but, treated by various schools of thought, it has taken on many different forms. It can be traced to Marxism, particularly to the philosophy of Hegel, from which Marx derived the concept of the dialectic—the clash of antithetical forces—as a mechanism for social change. Marx applied this concept primarily to class conflict within a society; the Marxists used it to explain why some groups in power could commit predatory acts, could steal and plunder, but avoid being labeled criminals, while others, victimized by exploitation, were driven to commit acts in the struggle for survival although these acts were subject to punishment in their society.

MARXISM, CONFLICT, AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR

In the half-century preceding the Bolshevik Revolution, numerous European scholars specializing in crime and deviance turned to Marxism for an all-encompassing explanation. The Marxist perspective not only explained the presence of crime but offered a clear, though yet untested, prescription for its diminution and eventual disappearance. Rejecting a Freudian outlook on man as basically an impulse-driven animal seeking immediate gratification and held in check only by external forces that imposed a moral order or threatened punitive retaliation, the Marxists offered an image of humanity corrupted by a socioeconomic system of class conflict and exploitation.

Foremost among the European thinkers (particularly in the period between World Wars I and II) was William A. Bonger (1932), a Dutch criminologist and sociologist, who focused attention on the economic nature of many crimes. Numerous deviant acts grew out of economic need, and they were conceptualized as crime only by a ruling class that was itself engaged in plunder. These lower-class or pro-

letarian transgressions were obviously the result of capitalist exploitation. But capitalism could also be used to account for the acts of the greedy (what was later to be called white-collar, respectable, and upper-world crime) as arising from the competitive spirit and the drive for profit. As for other forms of deviance—alcoholism, acts of senseless and uncontrolled passion, sexual immorality, and the like—they were seen by socialists as signs of the degeneration of moral values in a capitalist society that thrived on institutionalized inequality, racism, and sexism.

With the success of the Russian Revolution, many enthusiasts entertained utopian dreams: They expected a gradual renunciation of deviance as the society appeared to be moving toward socialist goals. The continued existence of deviance was for a time explained by the socialization and education of many citizens under the old Tsarist regime in Russia. As a new generation, born after the Revolution, grew to maturity, it was expected by some that they would be nurtured on the ideals of the days of October and would not be motivated to perform antisocial acts. By the mid-1970s, the majority of Soviet residents were those born and reared after the Revolution, so that the argument about the residual effects of Tsarist teachings was seldom heard.

There is no consensus on the characterization of the Soviet state. Does it embody Marxist principles, or is it a betrayal of them? Should one look to China for an indication of how the problem of deviance is resolved in a Communist country rather than to the U.S.S.R.? Furthermore, how successful has the Soviet Union been in reducing deviance, and at what costs, as well as what benefits, to the people of that country? An answer to such questions is hard to come by. Statistics on deviance, whatever they may be worth in other places, are for the most part unavailable in the Soviet Union and China. Nonetheless, it appears that alcoholism is a major problem in Russia, perhaps as much so as ever; that sexual deviance (including prostitution and homosexuality) is less common than in the Western world; and that robbery (including even crime rings, less organized and not so powerful as their counterparts in America) is not at all rare.

This would appear to throw doubt on the validity of Marxist explanations of deviance, but not entirely so, for few people consider either the Soviet Union or China to be, at this stage of their development, exemplars of Marxist-organized societies.

The central thesis in the Marxist analysis of all aspects of social relations revolves around the themes of exploitation, alienation, class consciousness, class conflict, and oppression. Acts that are considered wrong, and that are punished in various ways, are thus defined by a small group of persons who own the means of production, are wealthy, have politi-

cal and military power, and control educational and other institutions. The state serves as the executive committee of the bourgeoisie, not mediating class and other conflicts but generating them and utilizing them in the interests of the ruling group. The preservation of the state and broad acceptance of loyalty to it are predicated on maintenance of the illusion that it represents all the people and protects everyone's interests equally. Its role as a force for stability in the constant struggle between hostile classes and its contribution to the institutionalization and channeling of conflict into legally prescribed means must be constantly obscured in order to hide its true nature as a political combatant allied with the owners and managers of capital.

For adherents of this view, widespread deviance is an expression of conflict between mutually hostile groups and as such is an expression of a form of social protest. In the low level of consciousness of class interests, the deviant is often deflected in his struggle for survival and turns his weapons against members of his own class.

Karl Marx (1963 edition) further emphasized the place of crime in capitalist society and its integration into the economy:

A philosopher produces ideas, a poet poems, a clergyman sermons, a professor compendia, and so on. A criminal produces crime. . . . The criminal produces not only crimes but also criminal law. . . . The whole of the police and of criminal justice, constables, judges, hangmen, juries, etc. While crime takes a part of the superfluous population off the labor market and thus reduces competition among the laborers—up to a certain point preventing wages from falling below the minimum—the struggle against crime absorbs another part of this population. Thus, the criminal comes in as one of those natural “counterweights” which bring about a correct balance and open up a whole perspective of “useful” occupations.

Although very rigid Marxist interpretations of deviance are no longer frequently encountered in American and Western European sociology, a strong Marxist influence is found in almost all variations of conflict theories and is combined by many with labeling and other theoretical approaches.

FORMAL SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL CONFLICT

In the development of sociology in Germany, particular attention was paid to conflict as a social form, a mode of relationship between individuals and among people. It was studied by the school that was called formal sociology, of which the foremost thinker was Georg Simmel (1858–1918). Simmel (1955) noted the similarities that con-

conflict assumes whether one is viewing a marital bond, an employer-employee relationship, class struggles, or international confrontations. While Simmel was not delving into conflict as a *cause* of behavior but rather into the forms it takes and its characteristics in a variety of applications, his influential work elevated interest in this theme, and it has never abated.

CONFLICTS OF PEOPLES AND NORMS

In America, several schools of thought have placed the concept of conflict at the center of their theoretical focus. Anomie is not simply a theory of the conflict between means and ends, but between those who are able to utilize legitimate means to gain access to socially approved goals, and those who resort to other mechanisms because opportunities to reach these goals by normative paths are blocked. Anomie thus explains the emergence of the conflict envisaged by the Marxists as essentially one between the haves and the have-nots. For adherents of labeling, particularly Tannenbaum (1938), rejected behavior arises out of a clash of forces in the society. The child and adolescent are counterposed to authority figures in school, at home, and on the street; such children are sometimes driven to defend themselves against these others, and then the hostile, authoritarian, and punitive reaction, an entirely unnecessary overreaction in many instances, compels many such youths to shift toward more antisocial forms of behavior. They become what they were accused (or suspected) of being.

The conflict theme is apparent in Lemert (1964), who, in his critique of anomie theory, questioned the assumption of a value consensus in America and pointed out the variety of acts that are considered proper in some ethnic groups but objectionable, even illegal, in others. Later, Lemert (1974) appeared to be leaning toward conflict theory as a replacement for the labeling perspective. John Lofland (1969) suggested that deviance could best be understood as an identity that emerges in conflict between groups or between an individual and the groups around him; and Laing sees many forms of schizophrenia as defenses in a conflict situation, particularly within a family. The idea of neuroses or other types of mental and emotional difficulties as defensive adjustments can be found in Freud and other early psychoanalytic writers.

Several decades before the advent of the labeling version of conflict, Louis Wirth (1931), who was later to become a leading figure in American sociology and in fact the first president of the International Sociological Association, drew attention to the effect of migration on misconduct:

Most human beings, living in a civilization akin to our own, are exposed to experiences that carry back to varied cultural settings. To understand their problems of adjustment, therefore, it is necessary to view the personalities from the perspective of their cultural matrix and to note the contradictions, the inconsistencies, and the incongruities of the cultural influences that impinge upon them. The hypothesis may be set forth that the physical and psychic tensions which express themselves in attitudes and in overt conduct may be correlated with culture conflicts. This hypothesis may, to be sure, not always prove fitting.

Wirth found that culture conflicts were not confined to immigrant families but occurred in other families and communities as well, "especially where, as is the case in city life, contacts are extended, heterogeneous groups mingle, neighborhoods disappear, and people, deprived of local and family ties, are forced to live under the loose, transient, and impersonal relations that are characteristic of cities." He warned that culture conflict was but one factor in the understanding of misconduct and that by stressing it he was not disputing but merely neglecting all others. In a culture-conflict situation, Wirth believed, the person accused of misconduct often behaves in a manner that appears proper to himself:

Our conduct, whatever it may consist of, or however it might be judged by the world at large, appears genuinely moral to us when we can get the people whom we regard as significant in our social world to accept and approve it. One of the most convincing bits of evidence for the importance of the role played by culture conflict in the cases that have come to my attention is the frequency with which delinquents, far from exhibiting a sense of guilt, made the charge of hypocrisy toward official representatives of the social order such as teachers, judges, newspapers, and social workers with whom they came in contact.

Expanding on Wirth's study of some human migration, Thorsten Sellin (1938) proposed that culture conflict, particularly the conflict of norms between various ethnic groups, could be understood as a major explanation of crime. Modern societies (and this is especially true of the United States) no longer have any semblance of homogeneity. It is not class conflict that is the foremost theme in understanding the behavior of transgressors but the fact that people who do not accept each other's styles of living today reside, if not side by side, then in the same cities and certainly the same countries. Wars, colonial exploitation, slavery, enforced and voluntary migrations, national disasters (such as famine), escape from dictatorship and tyranny—all have caused people of different ancestries, having dissimilar physical characteristics, sometimes speaking different languages, and with unlike religious beliefs and practices to become neighbors and

citizens of the same country. Geographic mobility has been accelerated and facilitated by ease and rapidity of travel (and, in addition, migration has become reversible). Industrialization and urbanization, those two great forces that (perhaps with secularism and bureaucratization) have been dominant social factors in determining life patterns in the second half of the twentieth century, have resulted in these people seeing one another in factories, in stores, at union meetings, on streets, and in schools; whereas, in an earlier period, with a larger rural and agricultural populace and much more difficulty in traveling, people of diverse origins commingled only infrequently.

For Sellin (1938), these groups—mainly racial, religious, or of different national origins—brought to each other and to their new land a variety of beliefs about what constituted appropriate behavior. What was right within their own group was abhorrent, even criminal, in the eyes of others, or to the dominant Anglo-American culture of the United States.

It appears (although these figures are difficult to validate and are open to different explanations) that the crime rate was greater among immigrants than among comparable people in the native country from which they had departed. Of course, there may have been selectivity here. The rate in a European country, or in a given class in that country, might be low, but those who were least adjusted to the normative life or most likely to get into trouble with the law might be the most likely to leave. This is conjectural and does not suggest that they were “shipped out” and exiled to become pioneers as punishment for their crimes, although that is indeed what occurred in the colonization of Australia by the British.

Further, it may have been that disappointments arising from the struggle for existence in a land whose streets one expected to be paved with gold or where one believed many people to be opulent led some immigrants into criminal paths. Nor would labeling perspectives here be devoid of value, for the newcomers were ridiculed and despised, given few opportunities, treated as inferiors, and some of them no doubt became what they were defined as being and thus were expected to be.

This is not to suggest that crime was extraordinarily high among immigrants; perhaps it was higher than among the native-born, but this is not clear in historical perspective. But Sellin sought to account for such criminality as was encountered in terms of a conflict of norms. A conduct norm, Sellin suggests, may be regarded “as a rule supported by sanctions which reflect the value attached to the norm by the normative group. . . . The severest sanctions everywhere are those which deprive the nonconformist of rights, privileges or benefits which are

most treasured by the group and which the conformist may enjoy." While Sellin's greatest interest is in the violation of legal norms or the commission of crimes, it is clear from this formulation that there are strong informal sanctions that would penalize the nonconformist by depriving him of rights, privileges, or benefits most treasured by the group.

Culture conflicts can also arise within a single society. There are endogenous conflicts that may be brought forth by technology, for example. Kingsley Davis (1940) has suggested, in fact, that intergenerational conflict is directly related to the rate of social and technological change; that is, parents are in conflict with their children because they are still guided by the norms of twenty years earlier and hence see their children's behavior as incomprehensible or immoral, although the children are acting normatively from their generation's viewpoint—a thesis that has been extended considerably by Alvin Toffler (1970) in *Future Shock*. But for the United States and most of the rest of the twentieth-century world, culture conflicts were of exogenous origin. They were conflicts of cultural codes. While the rural migrants to the city may still behave in the fashion of the countryside, Sellin felt that this was a relatively minor source of abrasion, as he assumed that they had absorbed the basic norms of the entire culture, comprising as it does both town and country.³²

Culture conflict takes place when two groups having clashing codes live in contiguous areas, when there is migration, or when the law of one group is extended to cover the other. Anthropologists have noted that murder for revenge has not only been permitted but encouraged in some groups; these acts became major crimes, however, when the law of a European country was imposed on a formerly independent tribe. Polygyny, various forms of sexual conduct, exhibition of the unveiled face by women, and the murder by parents of their daughter's seducer—these are examples of behaviors that are crimes among some people and normative expectations among others.

But it is not only when people relocate in another society that conflict arises; as Sellin (1938:63) points out, the norms themselves may move:

Conflicts of cultures are inevitable when the norms of one cultural or subcultural area migrate to or come in contact with those of another, and it is interesting to note that most of the specific researches on

³² This supposition proved overoptimistic when World War II broke out and the so-called mountain people of Kentucky and Tennessee migrated to Detroit and other Northern urban centers in search of jobs. The subsequent stigmatization of these "hillbillies" was poignantly described in Harriette Arnow's novel *The Dollmaker* (1954).

culture conflict and delinquency have been concerned with this aspect of conflict.

Thus, the conflict is one of different cultural codes, not necessarily of peoples who have internalized these clashing and irreconcilable codes.

One might expect the culture-conflict to lend itself to empirical confirmation, particularly as it applies to crime if not to other forms of deviance, or at least as it is applied to specific aspects of disvalued behavior that are found in many societies, such as alcoholism or prostitution. The problem of such confirmation is formidable in the extreme, but most studies seem to point in the direction of lesser crime, not greater, for migrant groups than for the natives in the same area. Franco Ferracuti (1968) made a study of all reports and researches of this phenomenon in Europe, noted the relatively greater or lesser reliability of the work, and showed that whereas Irish immigrants in England had more brushes with the law than did the English, the reverse was true of Italian migrant workers in Switzerland and many other groups. Israel would seem to be an ideal testing spot for the Sellin theory, as it is largely a nation of immigrants and children of immigrants, and there are diverse groups in close contact with one another, as the European Jewish population, the North African Jews, Oriental Jews, and Arabs, among others. Shlomo Shoham (1966) studied juvenile delinquency and crime rates for these various groups, and at first glance that data would appear to validate the conflict thesis. However, the North African immigrants, he points out, had been in relatively better status positions before migration, and many were faced with poor housing and other disappointments on arrival in Israel.

There are complexities in studying this problem that could lead to unwarranted exaggeration in either of two directions. One might underestimate the amount of deviance among migrants because some groups, in "taking care of their own," handle transgressions as internal matters and conceal them from the authorities. This practice arises from the desire to project a more favorable image to those whose acceptance they seek and from the ease with which it can be accomplished. This has taken place with Orientals in almost all lands in which they settled, and with Eastern European and Mediterranean Jews in Western Europe and North America. In other instances, authorities tended to overlook the transgressions in which members of the migrant group were themselves victims, a phenomenon not infrequent in the Spanish-speaking ghettos of the United States.

These would diminish the amount of recorded deviance, but other factors outweigh those already described. Members of a socially outcast group are afforded fewer opportunities for jobs and housing and

are usually of a lower social class. They are more frequently suspected and more often found guilty, and their acts are remembered by the public that "knows" that these people are no good.

The greatest difficulty with the culture-conflict theory, as one looks closely at it and challenges its precepts, is that it is validated by exceptional circumstances, not by ordinary criminal and deviant behavior. One hears of the Sicilian father acquitted of murdering the youth who seduced his daughter. But culture-conflict theorists seldom discuss theft, that most pervasive of delicts, which is not sanctioned anywhere (except when it is perpetrated by the power group against a victimized population, as in colonial lands). Most murders and assaults, it would appear, cannot be explained by a narrow theory of conflict of conduct norms arising out of migration, whether of peoples or their values. Sexual practices differ from place to place, but few manifestations of sexual deviance are explicable in terms of Sellin's framework. Certainly the drinking of alcoholic beverages is a different practice in various parts of the world, in some places religiously proscribed and in others religiously prescribed, but this does not account for what has been estimated as five million alcoholics in the United States. One can cite the American Indian groups that use peyote regularly in their religious rites and some Orientals for whom opium smoking was acceptable, but this is irrelevant to the American drug scene, just as primitive ritual infanticide or adult-child sexual intercourse has nothing to do with child slaying or the statutory rape of a five-year-old as these occur in the Western world.

Far from believing that the acts that they perform and for which they are apprehended and punished are proper, many delinquents, in the view of David Matza (1964), accept the values of the culture whose norms have been violated. They are not self-righteous; one might say that they are "self-wrongeous."

The casting of deviance into a framework of social conflict is a central theme in the work of Lofland (1969:13-14):

The defining of persons and acts as deviant can be seen as a particular instance of generalized ways in which social organization and social definition can differ. At the level of a single and *total society*, such a basis is found in the dynamics of what proportion of a society, how well organized and how powerful, are *fearful* of, and feel *threatened* by, some other portion of society. Organized social life can be viewed as a game in which actors and collectivities defend themselves against distrusted and suspected others. . . .

Under different levels of fear, size, organization and power between parties in conflict, there are corresponding changes in public definitions of the situation. Persons and acts in a small, powerless minority that

are at one time regarded as merely deviant may, at another time, be felt to constitute a civil uprising, social movement or civil war. Theft, arson, assault, torture and murder perpetrated by individuals is simply deviance; when perpetrated by a loosely organized minority acting in concert such acts might be imputed to have a political meaning, and, when performed in the context of a civil or revolutionary war—that is, by a well-organized minority—they are acts of war or of liberation or legitimate defense. [*Italics in original.*]

The culture-conflict theory is powerful, but it has by and large been imprisoned in the framework in which it was originally presented (not to deny that several critics have suggested that it can be developed far beyond its early form). It is too narrow in its focus on a conflict of conduct norms rather than of people in a heterogeneous society, in its focus on crime rather than on deviance in its noncriminal aspects, and in the attention given to immigrants rather than to diverse peoples in conflict with each other.

Migrant groups, including the internal migrants of lower social class and those separated by race, language, or strong traditions, are seldom accepted by the host society in which they settle. They are often ghettoized, feel (rightly or wrongly) that they are ill treated, are offered smaller opportunities, and have deep resentments against the world around them. The migration may result in a weakening of family bonds without substitution of new forces of control that they can respect. They are catapulted into class conflict, on the one hand, and race and ethnic conflict, on the other. They see the world through the eyes of the oppressed, and their acts of anger and hostility are cries (and crimes) of despair. Out of the mutual antagonisms between the old and the new peoples emerges a subculture in which acts of transgression and depredation, and sometimes degradation, thrive. It is a conflict, in short, of peoples and cultures more than of norms and values.

Further, the conflict may explain why some acts are seen as deviant by outsiders but acceptable by insiders, and this is closer to the conduct-norm approach than when one looks at the vengeful father committing murder. In American society, it would appear that black groups accepted premarital sexual behavior before many white groups did, and the girl who had relinquished her virginity at a relatively early age was not seen as “loose” or “bad,” although white people continued for many decades to make that judgment. Illegitimacy was less highly stigmatized at the time among blacks than whites. Gambling practices differ in various subcultures. For years, people in America ridiculed those who were carrying out certain religious rituals that were visible but not criminal. Even speaking with a foreign accent has been sub-

ject to sarcastic barbs from members of the society who were not on the level of those they called "greenhorns."

Finally, the conflicts in a heterogeneous society are greater than those between ethnic, racial, religious, and immigrant or migrant groups and the norm-giving majority. They are more than the class conflicts that Marxists have elevated to a central position in their image of the world in upheaval. They are age-group struggles, political and other life-style clashes, and strife among numerous subcultural groups. Some of these arise out of a deviation (or what is defined as deviance), such as conflicts between homosexuals, organized or not, and the rest of society, or between parents of the retarded and the medical and helping professions. Teenagers are in sharp conflict with school, family, and other sources of authority, and it is in the course of this struggle that they are likely to be pushed toward greater differentiation of themselves from the controlling and norm-defining people.

Some of this heterogeneity is inevitable in a society that gives differential privileges and opportunities to persons of various age, sex, and other groups, but it is accentuated in a fast-changing world; it is brought to the fore by the developments of urbanization as large numbers of similarly situated persons are in contact with each other and with dissimilar persons. Finally, heterogeneity is made into a central fact of life by the coterminous existence of racial, ethnic, migrant, and other social groups, whose struggles for survival in the urban centers suggest a framework of conflict, protest, and dissension that becomes endemic in the society.

Summing Up: Problems of Living in a Heterogeneous Society

ALL THESE THEORIES, and still more, some glossed over or barely mentioned: broken homes, feelings of inadequacy, rebellious reaction against middle-class respectability—all leading to one or many forms of deviance—do they not imply multiple causation? Or must all

explanations except a single one be discarded? Is it possible to reconcile the many approaches and interweave them into a single pattern, bringing them together into a unified theory, without embracing eclecticism?

On many occasions, it has been remarked that crime cannot be explained by a single theory but that individual forms of crime might be. If this is true of crime, certainly it is more true of deviance, a much broader area taking in even more dissimilar modes of conduct. Thus, Albert Morris (1955) stated:

If we are to get on with the business of learning to deal more effectively with crime, we had better stop talking about crime and begin to identify and study with as much care and thoroughness as is possible the nature and workings of the significant factors essential to each type of criminal behavior.

And, along the same line, Ruth Cavan (1958):

Crime, as legally defined, includes so many different types of behavior that it would be unreasonable to expect all of them to have the same etiology.

WHAT IS THE QUESTION?

One must always bear in mind: What is the question? What is sociology seeking to explain? If the answer is that sociology is groping for the reasons an individual behaves as he does, why one person becomes paranoiac, another depressed, another alcoholic while most people avoid all these states, then a unified theory of deviance is hardly feasible. But that is not the objection of Morris and Cavan. They imply that it might be possible to explain alcoholics in one way, but that the explanation would not hold for arsonists. To this, conflict theorists, Marxists, Freudians, and many other students of human behavior hold that the nature of a society and the nature of man may be sufficient to explain why various phenomena arise, take the form that they do, grow in number of adherents at some time and diminish at others, elicit the negative reaction that is manifested, and appear to be more prevalent in some places and among certain groups than in others. If it is stated in this manner, one might say that social science is forsaking the explanation of the deviant in searching for an explanation of deviance.

Louis Wirth (1931) saw a strong correlation between heterogeneity and deviance. It might be argued that he overstated his case in con-

ceptualizing a small and primitive group as crime-free, but many would agree with the general thrust of his position:

The ethnological evidence . . . seems to indicate that where culture is homogeneous and class differences are negligible, societies without crime are possible. A small compact, isolated, and homogeneous group seems to have no difficulty in maintaining its group life intact, in passing on its institutions, practices, attitudes, and sentiments to successive generations and in controlling the behavior of its members. . . . The community secures the allegiance, participation, and conformity of the members not through edicts of law, through written ordinances, through police, courts and jails, but through the overwhelming force of community opinion, through the immediate, voluntary, and habitual approval of the social code by all.

The conflict model of society, both in the form offered by Sellin and in the dialectic approach of Marx, may provide a clue to the rise and fall of deviance and to its appearance in differential quantities and with varying degrees of salience at various times. Ours is a world of societies each highly differentiated within themselves. Urbanization has brought together people who live in close contact with one another but who are nevertheless strangers to one another; in the words of Vance Packard (1972), not only urbanization but particularly geographic mobility has made America "a nation of strangers." Rapid technological and other changes have made strangers of people separated from one another by only fifteen or twenty years. Immigration, colonialism, wars, conquest, famine, and other catastrophes have brought into one society people of a variety of races, religions, and cultural backgrounds, from all of whom allegiance is demanded by a central authority, the state.

The debate has often raged over whether conformity or deviation is the "natural" state. Is the wonder that confronts us how to explain the fact that so many people follow the norms of society (when, after all, they are a bundle of hedonistic impulses at life's start), or to explain why so many people violate these norms (which they have not only been taught, but which they are rewarded for obeying and punished for transgressing)? It is both, and these questions are not irreconcilable. There are forces that impel man to follow and others that entreat him to fall out of line. In order for him to follow, a number of factors must be present: (1) He should feel a sense of identity with a norm-giving group around him; (2) that group should have the institutional means for communicating the norms to him; (3) he should feel that the rewards of conformity are greater than those of deviation; (4) he should not only know what is "right" in the society but should have a feeling that comes from within himself that he has

a desire to do that which is "right" and not to do that which is "wrong," and that this desire is separate and apart from, and supersedes, the material rewards that await him for obedience.

In a heterogeneous and pluralistic society, there are overwhelming forces that militate against conformity. It is not so much, as Sellin and Lemert have stressed, that various groups come with different norms; rather, it is that they come with competing sets of loyalties and identities and with relatively lesser demands on the individual for his loyalty to the greater society. When these competing groups are living together in a state of open conflict, when even the pretenses and amenities of brotherhood and good neighborliness are dropped, then the pressures against conformity are strong. When the heterogeneous society is at war, when it is faced with an external enemy (real or imagined, but so long as the people believe in it) or an internal enemy (again real or imagined), the people can be rallied in a call for unity, and there will be a diminution of deviance. An unpopular war would have the very opposite effect.

So the first requirement for deviance is strong in the modern world, and particularly in the United States: Many people do not have a sense of identity with the norm-giving groups around them. They may identify with one such group, but not with the culture as an entirety, and when their own group-identifications clash with those of the larger society, their loyalties are to the former, not the latter. In a world in which open hostility has flourished so frequently, not only between nations but within them, one of the sources of deviance is increased.

If there is little or no sense of identity with the broad society, but only with a subgroup, and even that not strong or invariant, it is doubtful that one can expect to have the institutional means for communication of the norms. The role models of the society are rejected by large numbers of people because they are of other groups, not of the society as a whole. Either the schools are seen as agents of outsiders or enemies, or their moral teachings are neutralized by the social conflict. Increasing sophistication and the mass media have communicated an image to the young people of the leaders of their society enmeshed in crime and immorality. "Everybody has his hustle," the saying goes, and right or wrong, youths start to believe it at an early age.

But there still remain the family and the religious institutions of society. Of the latter, little can be expected for the future, except to the extent that some individual religious leaders may utilize the mantle of protection offered by being a man of the cloth, in order to give moral leadership. But this will have to be in rebellion against the rules

of society, not as a rallying cry in support of them. Two forces militate against the emergence of religion as deviance-diminishing factors: (1) the image that organized religion has been coopted by the seats of power, thus diminishing its credibility and hence its hold over the very people whom it must reach, and (2) the rise of secularism, so that religion becomes more a matter of identity with a group than a reservoir for one's moral and ethical beliefs.

As for the family, the problem goes beyond the usual statement that families have lost their hold over children, that the break from the family takes place at an early age and is almost complete by young adulthood, and that families are increasingly broken, have one parent absent, or are beset by economic, social, and moral problems of their own. All of this is at least partially true. But superseding the entire matter is that the family is usually not bound to the general society so much as it is to an ethnic or other subgroup within it. Even where the family is a strong force for communicating the norms and demanding conformity from the children, it is itself still not sufficiently involved, but is often locked into the same conflict-generating relationships that are so conducive to deviance.

So that the second requirement, that one be part of a group that has the institutional means for communicating the norms to its members, particularly the younger ones, would not be met, as a result of the combination of heterogeneity and secularism.

The third requirement is that the rewards of conformity are greater than the punishments of deviation, and that this should be believed in by masses of people. In so strongly an economically and materialistically organized society as exists in most of the Western world, it is difficult to believe in such rewards, unless, as Merton has emphasized, there are means of arriving at these ends. In the absence of such means, deviation is going to be rejected only if people are faced with probabilities, if not certainties, of punishments that far outweigh the enticements. A police state can be more successful in suppressing deviance, but only at the expense of other goals in a society that one would not wish to relinquish. But again, it is the heterogeneity that is a major factor, for within one's smaller social group, what may appear to be deviant to the outside world can sometimes be ignored or even rewarded.

Finally, there is the question of internalization of norms. In a conflict-ridden society where there is competition for one's loyalties, it is difficult to expect clear-cut beliefs to be strongly embedded in the young person, so that his knowledge of the right and only way is in a sense natural to him or seems to come from within his being. If he does not obtain this from identification with others, does not get it from family (and the tradition-steeped family is increasingly rare),

only seldom from school or religious leaders, then there must be what Walter Reckless (1967) has termed inner and outer containment. In American society, outer containment has diminished considerably and today takes on the form primarily of law, for discouraging major crimes, and of social pressure, for promoting minor amenities. But people motivated in deviant directions minimize the social pressure not just by the rationalizations and vocabularies that are made available to them, but by shifting their social lives to milieus in which they are more easily accepted. Thus, the deviant subculture becomes a mechanism for neutralizing the norms by removing oneself from recreational and leisure-time activities, or even work-time activities, in interaction with those who might disapprove. Subcultures begin to substitute for families, become supportive of deviant motivations and ideologies, and as one becomes enmeshed in such a group, the bonds of outer containment are weakened.

Perhaps the strongest force for inner containment was removed when man decided that there was no omniscient deity in the heavens with a ledger opened to a page on which one person's name was writ and where a record would be kept of every misdeed, for which one would eventually pay by an eternity in Purgatory and Hell. Sometimes it is hard to believe that such an image of the world was widely adhered to, and it is debatable how much of a force this ever was in keeping people in line. Brigid Brophy (1962) argues, in fact, that religion under such circumstances was a mechanism for immorality, because the only true morality, to do good and right because it was good and right and not because one would be rewarded or escape punishment, was not taught by organized religion. Nevertheless, the removal of fear of an omnipotent and sometimes vengeful deity and the almost complete secularization of modern societies would leave a gap where once there were bonds of inner containment.

All of this is not to deny that deviant as well as conforming behavior is learned and that there must be a process of cultural transmission, whether by those already enmeshed in the disapproved ways or by education and mass media. But that would account only for perpetuation, or for why there is considerable deviance in the same sections of town or the same professions (i.e., people learning from one another). Nor does one deny that broken homes, alcoholic fathers or mothers, or other such factors, will create the milieu for deviance: but this would only account for why some persons and not others were "chosen," and further, it would not be sufficient, because it fails to go back to the causes of the broken homes of the alcoholism or whatever other factor is under study. Nor would one have to exclude the theory of anomie, but it explains too little, and at the same time it fails to ex-

plain the sources of its own manifestations. It is a powerful argument to note that America impels people toward a success goal and then does not give large numbers of its citizens the opportunities to reach such goals by legitimate or socially approved mechanisms. But this is largely a matter of social differentiation, pluralism, and heterogeneity. There are some groups that cannot reach the goals as easily as others; there are differential opportunities not only to arrive there but also (as Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin [1960] have pointed out) differential opportunities to utilize disapproved means. Not only are these connected to but they are also made possible by the pluralistic society.

It is a society not only of many subgroups but one in which these groups or their members interact, live closely, work in the same offices, and have little or no sense of community with one another. The combination of heterogeneity with secularism produces people without a sense of commitment to each other, and hence with only weak commitment to shared ethics and values. This is the soil in which deviance will grow.

If this is correct, it may appear to be a rather gloomy picture. Neither homogeneity, national cultural commitment, nor religiosity seems to be likely in the United States in the near future. A theory of this sort would lead one to understand the great increase in crime, delinquency, and deviance in the United States in the 1960s as concomitant with an external war that divided the country and reduced loyalties almost to a vanishing point, and with the heightening of racial tensions following the assassination of Dr. King and the decline of the civil rights movement. So that the worst may be behind us. Despite this last statement, this is not a generally optimistic outlook, but that has nothing to do with the truth or validity of the argument.

REFERENCES

- Abrahamsen, David (1952). *Who Are the Guilty? A Study of Education and Crime*. New York: Rinehart.
- Aichhorn, August (1935). *Wayward Youth: A Psychoanalytic Study of Delinquent Children, Illustrated by Actual Case Histories*. Foreword by Sigmund Freud. New York: Viking Press; reprinted, New York: Meridian Books, 1960.
- Akers, Ronald L. (1968). "Problems in the sociology of deviance: Social definitions and behavior," *Social Forces* 46:455-65.
- Arnou, Harriette (1954). *The Dollmaker*. New York: Macmillan.
- Becker, Howard S. (1949). "The Professional Dance Musician in Chicago." Master's thesis, University of Chicago.
- (1951). "The professional dance musician and his audience," *American Journal of Sociology* 57:136-44.

- (1963). *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*. New York: Free Press.
- (1967). "Whose side are we on?" *Social Problems* 14:239-47.
- Benedict, Ruth (1934). *Patterns of Culture*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Bergler, Edmund (1956). *Homosexuality: Disease or Way of Life?* New York: Hill & Wang.
- Bettelheim, Bruno (1960). *The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass Age*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Bonger, William A. (1932). *An Introduction to Criminology*. English edition, London: Methuen, 1936.
- Bordua, David J. (1967). "Recent trends: Deviant behavior and social control," *The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science* 338:119-36.
- Brophy, Brigid (1962). *Black Ship to Hell*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Brown, Roger (1958). *Words and Things*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Burke, Kenneth (1945). *A Grammar of Motives*. New York: Prentice-Hall.
- Cameron, Mary Owen (1964). *The Booster and the Snitch*. New York: Free Press.
- Cavan, Ruth S. (1958). *Criminology*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.
- Clinard, Marshall B., ed. (1964). *Anomie and Deviant Behavior: A Discussion and Critique*. New York: Free Press.
- Cloward, Richard A., and Lloyd E. Ohlin (1960). *Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs*. New York: Free Press.
- Cohen, Albert K. (1951). "Juvenile delinquency and the social structure." Ph.D. diss., Harvard University. Excerpt, "Multiple factor approaches," pp. 123-26 in Marvin E. Wolfgang, Leonard Savitz, and Norman Johnston, eds., *The Sociology of Crime and Delinquency*, 2d ed., New York: John Wiley & Sons. 1970.
- (1955). *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Cressey, Donald R. (1952). "Application and verification of differential association theory," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology & Police Science* 43:43-52.
- Dank, Barry (1971). "Coming out in the gay world," *Psychiatry* 34:180-97.
- Davis, Fred (1961). "Deviance disavowal: The management of strained interaction by the visibly handicapped," *Social Problems* 9:120-32.
- Davis, Kingsley (1940). "The sociology of parent-youth conflict," *American Sociological Review* 5:523-35.
- Denisoff, R. Serge, and Charles H. McCaghy, eds. (1973). *Deviance, Conflict, and Criminality*. Chicago: Rand-McNally.
- Douglas, Jack D. (1967). *The Social Meanings of Suicide*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Du Bois, W. E. B. (1903). *The Souls of Black Folk*. Chicago: A. C. McClurg.

- Durkheim, Emile (1893). *De la division du travail social*; translated by George Simpson, *The Division of Labor in Society*. New York: Macmillan, 1933; New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.
- (1897). *Le suicide*; translated by John A. Spaulding and George Simpson, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1951.
- Ellis, Havelock (1890). *The Criminal*. Reprinted, Montclair, N.J.: Patterson Smith, 1973.
- Erikson, Erik H. (1956). "The problem of identity," *American Journal of Psychoanalysis* 4:56-121.
- (1969). *Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Erikson, Kai T. (1966). *Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Ferracuti, Franco (1968). "European migration and crime," pp. 189-219 in Marvin E. Wolfgang, ed., *Crime and Culture: Essays in Honor of Thorsten Sellin*, New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Ferri, Enrico (1913). *The Positive School of Criminology*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr.
- Freud, Sigmund (1896). "Heredity and the aetiology of the neuroses," in Vol. I, *Collected Papers of Sigmund Freud*, New York: International Psychoanalytical Library, 1924.
- (1949). *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Gagnon, John H., and William Simon (1973). *Sexual Conduct: The Social Sources of Human Sexuality*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Garfinkel, Harold (1956). "Conditions of successful degradation ceremonies," *American Journal of Sociology* 61:420-24.
- Gebhard, Paul (1972). Footnote in Joseph McCaffrey, ed., *The Homosexual Dialectic*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Glaser, Barney G., and Anselm L. Strauss (1964). "Awareness contexts and social interaction," *American Sociological Review* 29:669-79.
- Glueck, Sheldon (1956). "Theory and fact in criminology," *British Journal of Delinquency* 7 (October):92-98.
- Glueck, Sheldon, and Eleanor Glueck (1950). *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (for the Commonwealth Fund).
- Goode, Erich (1970). *The Marijuana Smokers*. New York: Basic Books.
- Goring, Charles (1913). *The English Convict: A Statistical Study*; reprinted, Montclair, N.J.: Patterson Smith, 1972.
- Gouldner, Alvin W. (1968). "The sociologist as partisan: Sociology and the welfare state," *American Sociologist* 3:103-16.
- Gusfield, Joseph R. (1967). "Moral passage: The symbolic process in public designations of deviance," *Social Problems* 15:175-88.
- Hardman, Dale G. (1964). "The case for eclecticism," *Crime and Delinquency* 10:201-16.
- Hartjen, Clayton A. (1974). *Crime and Criminalization*. New York: Praeger Publishers.

- Healy, William (1915). *The Individual Delinquent: A Text-Book of Diagnosis and Prognosis for All Concerned in Understanding Offenders*. Boston: Little, Brown; reprinted, Montclair, N.J.: Patterson Smith, 1969.
- Hoffman, Martin (1968). *The Gay World: Male Homosexuality and the Social Creation of Evil*. New York: Basic Books.
- Hooton, Earnest A. (1939). *Crime and the Man*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Humphreys, Laud (1972). *Out of the Closets: The Sociology of Homosexual Liberation*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Kardiner, Abraham, and Lionel Ovesey (1951). *The Mark of Oppression: A Psychosocial study of the American Negro*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Kitsuse, John I. (1962). "Societal reaction to deviant behavior: Problems of theory and method," *Social Problems* 9:247-56.
- (1972). "Deviance, deviant behavior, and deviants: Some conceptual problems," pp. 233-43 in William J. Filstead, ed., *An Introduction to Deviance: Readings in the Process of Making Deviants*. Chicago: Markham.
- Kittrie, Nicholas N. (1971). *The Right to Be Different: Deviance and Enforced Therapy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Kretschmer, Ernest (1926). *Physique and Character*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Laing, R. D., and A. Esterson (1964). *Sanity, Madness, and the Family: Families of Schizophrenics*. London: Tavistock; reprinted, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970.
- Lemert, Edwin M. (1951). *Social Pathology: A Systematic Approach to the Theory of Sociopathic Behavior*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- (1962). "Paranoia and the dynamics of exclusion," *Sociometry* 25 (March):2-20.
- (1964). "Social structure, social control, and deviation," pp. 57-97 in Marshall B. Clinard, ed., *Anomie and Deviant Behavior: A Discussion and Critique*, New York: Free Press.
- (1967). *Human Deviance, Social Problems, and Social Control*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- (1974). "Beyond Mead: The societal reaction to deviance," *Social Problems* 21:457-68.
- Lindesmith, Alfred R. (1965). *The Addict and the Law*. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press.
- Lofland, John (1969). *Deviance and Identity*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Lombroso, Cesare (1911). *Crime: Its Causes and Remedies*. Boston: Little, Brown; reprinted, Montclair, N.J.: Patterson Smith, 1968.
- Mankoff, Milton (1971). "Societal reaction and career deviance: A critical analysis," *Sociological Quarterly* 12:204:18.
- Manning, Peter K. (1973). "On deviance," *Contemporary Sociology* 2: 123-28.
- Marx, Karl (1963). *Theories of Surplus Value*. Part I. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

- Matza, David (1964). *Delinquency and Drift*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- (1969). *Becoming Deviant*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Means, Richard L. (1969). *The Ethical Imperative: The Crisis in American Values*. New York: Doubleday.
- Merton, Robert K. (1938). "Social structure and anomie," *American Sociological Review* 3:672-82; reprinted in Merton (1957), *q.v.*
- (1948). "The self-fulfilling prophesy," *Antioch Review* 8 (Summer):193-210; reprinted in Merton (1957), *q.v.*
- (1957). *Social Theory and Social Structure*. Rev. ed., New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Mills, C. Wright (1940). "Situated actions and vocabularies of motive," *American Sociological Review* 5:904-13.
- Morris, Albert (1955). *Homicide: An Approach to the Problem of Crime*. Boston: Boston University Press.
- National Institute of Mental Health (1970). *Report of the XYY Chromosomal Abnormality*. Chevy Chase, Md.: Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency.
- Neill, A. S. (1960). *Summerhill: A Radical Approach to Child Rearing*. New York: Hart Publishing.
- Niederhoffer, Arthur (1967). *Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban Society*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
- Paekard, Vance (1972). *A Nation of Strangers*. New York: David McKay.
- Polsky, Ned (1967). *Hustlers, Beats, and Others*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Quinney, Richard (1970). *The Social Reality of Crime*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Reckless, Walter C. (1967). *The Crime Problem*. 4th ed., New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Rokeach, Milton (1964). *The Three Christs of Ypsilanti: A Psychological Study*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Sagarin, Edward (1973). "The good guys, the bad guys, and the gay guys," *Contemporary Sociology* 2:3-13.
- Salzman, Leon (1957). "The concept of latent homosexuality," *American Journal of Psychoanalysis* 17:161-69.
- Seheff, Thomas J. (1966). *Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Schur, Edwin M. (1965). *Crimes Without Victims: Deviant Behavior and Public Policy—Abortion, Homosexuality and Drug Addiction*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- (1971). *Labeling Deviant Behavior: Its Sociological Implications*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Schwartz, Richard D., and Jerome H. Skolnick (1962). "Two studies of legal stigma," *Social Problems* 10:133-42.
- Scott, Robert A. (1969). *The Making of Blind Men*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Sellin, Thorsten (1938). *Culture Conflict and Crime*, Bulletin 41. New York: Social Science Research Council.

- Sheldon, William H. (1940). *The Varieties of Human Physique*. New York: Harper.
- , with S. S. Stevens (1942). *The Varieties of Temperament: A Psychology of Constitutional Differences*. New York: Harper; reprinted, New York: Hafner Publishing, 1970.
- , with Emil M. Hartl and Eugene McDermott (1949). *Varieties of Delinquent Youth*; reprinted, 2 vols., Darien, Conn.: Hafner Publishing, 1970.
- Shoham, Shlomo (1966). *Crime and Social Deviation*. Chicago: Henry Regnery.
- Simmel, Georg (1955). *Conflict and The Web of Group-Affiliations*. New York: Free Press.
- Strauss, Anselm L. (1959). *Mirrors and Masks: The Search for Identity*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
- Sutherland, Edwin H. (1940). "White-collar criminality," *American Sociological Review* 5:1-12.
- , and Donald R. Cressey (1966). *Principles of Criminology*. 7th ed., Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott.
- Szasz, Thomas S. (1961). *The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct*. New York: Harper & Row.
- (1970). *The Manufacture of Madness: A Comparative Study of the Inquisition and the Mental Health Movement*. New York: Harper & Row.
- (1974). "Crime, punishment, and psychiatry," pp. 262-85 in Abraham S. Blumberg, ed., *Current Perspectives on Criminal Behavior: Original Essays on Criminology*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Tannenbaum, Frank (1938). *Crime and the Community*. Boston: Ginn & Co.
- Tappan, Paul W. (1947). "Who is the criminal?" *American Sociological Review* 12:96-102.
- Tarde, Gabriel (1912). *Penal Philosophy* (originally published in French in 1890); reprinted, Montclair, N.J.: Patterson Smith, 1968.
- Taylor, Ian, Paul Walton, and Jock Young (1973). *The New Criminology: For a Social Theory of Deviance*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; New York: Harper & Row, 1974.
- Thornberry, Terence P. (1971). "Punishment and Crime: The Effect of Legal Disposition on Subsequent Criminal Behavior." Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania.
- Thorsell, Bernard A., and Lloyd W. Klemke (1972). "The labeling process: Reinforcement and deterrent?" *Law and Society Review* 6:393-403.
- Tillich, Paul (1952). *The Courage to Be*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Toffler, Alvin (1970). *Future Shock*. New York: Random House.
- Turk, Austin T. (1969). *Criminality and Legal Order*. Chicago: Rand-McNally.

- Williams, Colin J., and Martin S. Weinberg (1970). "Being discovered: A study of homosexuals in the military," paper presented to American Sociological Association, Washington, D.C.
- Winick, Charles (1961). "Physician narcotic addicts," *Social Problems* 9:174-86.
- Wirth, Louis (1931). "Culture conflict and misconduct," *Social Forces* 9:484-92; reprinted, pp. 229-43, in Wirth, *On Cities and Social Life: Selected Papers*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

III

Deviance and Sickness

SHOULD THE deviant be conceptualized as a sick person, having some mental or psychological aberration that accounts for his behavior, and therefore subjected to treatment rather than punishment for having become a transgressor? And the corollary question: Should the sick person, one who is mentally or physically ill, temporarily or permanently, be regarded by sociologists as deviant because of his inability or unwillingness to perform the roles assigned to him in society?

These are interrelated issues that involve theoretical and definitional problems as well as implications for social policy.

Is the Deviant Sick?

MANY COMPLEX problems are involved when the label of sickness, particularly mental or emotional illness, is placed upon a person or group of persons who have violated the rules of society and brought forth expressions of anger and indignation. Mental illness is an especially difficult entity to diagnose: It is often a grab bag, covering a wide variety of symptoms. It does not have clear-cut referents and can usually not be pinned down with biological and chemical tests.

What is called mental illness in one society or in one era is recognized as saintliness or normality in another. This fact has led many people, of whom Thomas Szasz (1960, 1961) is the outstanding spokesman, to deny the existence of mental illness altogether: It is a myth, they contend, created by the powers of a society to suppress behavior that is not to their liking and to inflict upon many persons, those who are innocent as well as those who are guilty of transgressions, a summary justice without trial, something that Szasz has called "psychiatric injustice." In England, R. D. Laing (1967, 1969) has followed a somewhat similar path, not so much denying mental illness as a reality (this, too, he does at times) as stressing that the individual who is regarded as sick is often, in his behavior, logically and rationally defending himself against the onslaughts of family and society. Laing (1967:139) has spoken of the inexactitude and highly subjective nature of the definition of mental illness: "Schizophrenia," he writes, "is a condition that afflicts people diagnosed as schizophrenic. . . . Schizophrenia is the name for a condition that most psychiatrists ascribe to patients they call schizophrenic." Thomas Scheff (1964, 1966), who by no means agrees with Szasz in denying that mental illness exists, stresses the interactional component: It is largely how the person is treated by official agencies that determines whether he will be seen as mentally sick, and from this whether he will develop in the direction of further illness.¹

¹ Scheff's contentions are complex, sophisticated, and highly convincing. People with similar behavioral patterns are handled differently; some are labeled mentally ill and incarcerated, others escape such a fate. This suggests that there must

Szasz's argument that persons treated as mentally incompetent get a raw deal at the hands of society is more convincing than his contention that mental illness is a myth. A youth who stole a chocolate bar is incarcerated in a mental institution for several decades and emerges after the better part of his life has been passed behind locked doors in a place supposedly reserved for the insane, the mentally unbalanced, and the mentally incompetent. Yet he was never less than totally sane and competent; he was merely a man who, in his early youth, had stolen a chocolate bar. There are countless cases of this type, and particularly of people who received sentences for acts that they had committed (or were accused or suspected of having committed) that were much longer, because they were judged mentally incompetent and hence unable to stand trial, than the sentences that would have been permitted under maximum penalty had they been tried by a court of law and found guilty. While it is true that the law in its worst form has been changed in many jurisdictions in the United States (mainly through the unflagging agitation of Szasz), so that a person judged mentally incompetent cannot be incarcerated for a period longer than the maximum prison sentence for those found guilty of the same act, it can hardly be denied that mental illness is and often has been a concept used for extreme oppression.

There are several dangers in applying the label of sickness to people who have committed acts that are illegal or in other respects inimical to the dominant values of the society. First, it is a label that has been frequently applied in the past, as it continues to be invoked today, to handle political opponents who might embarrass a government. Thus, Ezra Pound was incarcerated for some eleven years in a mental hospital because the American Government wished to avoid having to accuse one of its greatest poets of treason. Later, General Edwin A. Walker, who had led mobs of white Southerners in a fight against the integration of the University of Mississippi, was sent to a mental hospital by a government that wanted nothing on the record to show that an officer of its military had incited such a crowd. In the Soviet Union, political dissenters are not infrequently adjudged "insane" and are sequestered so as to remove them from the public scene and at the same time divest their views of rationality.

It is not only official governmental bodies that use the concept of mental illness in this way. When in the late 1960s American youth rebelled against racism, the war in Vietnam, and the powerlessness

be factors other than the behavior or the alleged symptoms that result in the definition of the individual as mentally ill. Moreover, Scheff sees mental illness as a residual category, a sort of wastebasket for all sorts of diverse behavior that cannot easily be classified in other groups (as criminal, for example) or explained without resorting to the mental-illness concept.

of students in decision-making, many scholars and commentators interpreted their efforts not as expressions of legitimate grievances but of Oedipal complexes, identity crises, neurotic needs—regarding them, in short, as borderline cases between the worlds of rationality and irrationality.

Not only are dissenters dismissed with a psychiatric label, but leaders are denounced by oppositionists with the same rhetoric. When massive bombing of North Vietnam was taking place, some people called Nixon “demented.” The imputation of mental aberration to a political leader in this manner is not unlike its use by power groups against opponents. In both cases, there is an avoidance of the issues and responsibility, and a further implication that this is the sort of thing “demented” people do. Finally, the employment of this type of language about both political leaders and their opponents is objectionable to the extent that it serves to intensify mythical stereotypes about the insane, who are for the most part harmless. In short, if it is unfair to a warmonger to call him insane, it is unfair to the insane as well.

As I have suggested earlier, the label of mental illness is used to deprive people of their constitutional rights to a fair trial and to be freed if they have not acted contrary to the law. A person labeled mentally incompetent and hence unable to stand trial is summarily placed in confinement, and although the hospital is not called a prison, in effect it is one in that he enters it involuntarily and does not have the power to leave at will.

The label of mental illness is sometimes placed upon rationally chosen but unconventional and nonnormative behavior when there are no independent referents or diagnostic tests for the condition, and the conventional leaders of the society merely wish to discourage and discredit the behavior in question. Leaders of offbeat religious and social movements, atheists, originators of new cultural life-styles, scientists who have rejected the taken-for-granted concepts of their day, political rebels, women who marched for suffrage, and men and women who raised their fists for the abolition of slavery—all have been declared mentally ill by their contemporary opponents. Many of these people, deviants in their own time, have been adulated by later generations.

STIGMA AND OPPRESSION

A major problem with conceptualizing a person's behavior as a manifestation of mental illness is that the term “mental illness” is a stigmatizing one, and as such will remain a more or less permanent

tag, ever haunting the person, creating self-doubt and conflict, and limiting his rights and opportunities in a manner that most physical ailments do not do. The case of Senator Thomas Eagleton is pertinent; when it was discovered that he had been subjected to shock therapy, he was compelled to resign as the vice-presidential candidate of the Democratic Party in 1972, something that would not have occurred, for example, had he been treated for the removal of a benign tumor.²

The Eagleton affair highlighted the fact that many laymen—millions of voters and ordinary men-in-the-street—have a stereotypical idea of the former mental patient. Included among the features attributed to such persons are a proneness for incipient violence, uncontrollability, unpredictability, and a constant danger of recidivism. Thomas Scheff (1966) contends that this image is fortified by an unceasing barrage of journalistic reports that identify violent people as ex-patients.

Mental illness, unlike many forms of physical illness, carries with it a stigma and makes of the person so labeled an outcast. One does not have the “right,” so to speak, to be mentally ill. Identification of a type of behavior as a symptom of illness often does not bring freedom from responsibility, as had been intended in English and American jurisprudence, but the very reverse: It burdens the person with greater responsibility, not for acting as he does, but for being what he is. The substitution of the concept of sickness for that of sin or crime as the primary motivation for some behavior may result simply in a change in the mechanism of oppression rather than in its discontinuation.

Thus mental illness as a label is used as an oppressive weapon. But it is also used to alleviate oppression, usually in the interests of upper-social-class transgressors. Kleptomania is generally the excuse, or justification, for a rich person caught shoplifting. If a poor kid steals, he is a criminal; if a rich kid steals, he is disturbed. The poor one needs incarceration, the rich one a psychiatrist.

²The Eagleton matter is most complex and illuminates many facets of the attitudes, real and feigned, toward former mental patients. Many Democratic leaders insisted that Eagleton was being dumped not because of his history of shock therapy but because he had concealed this when asked if there was anything in his past that ought to be known before he was nominated. This neat little excuse relieved them from the stigma of having as a candidate a man who, if successful, would be a heartbeat away from the Presidency and whom the public might regard as mentally unstable. At the same time, it relieved them from the stigma of ostracizing such a man because of his history of mental illness. It is one of history's nice little ironies that alone among those involved in this matter, Eagleton came out on top: the hero who had overcome his mental illness and the underdog who had been maltreated by people higher up. And for a second irony, compare how he fared with the fate of the man he was supposed to run against and who, had he remained on the ticket, would have defeated him. It's enough to give faith to the most convinced Agnewstic!

For all these reasons, it appears that the concept of mental illness, while not necessarily a myth, may be more than just useless, actually mischievous; may pose more dangers to the society than it does good; may be operationally difficult to handle and hence lead to unclarity rather than clarity.

Historically, the problem of whether the criminal is sick arose with regard to the matter of responsibility and punishment. It is now clear in retrospect that the movement for differential treatment of the perpetrator of crimes as mentally ill, no matter how humanitarian the motives of its leaders, brought in its wake several abuses: namely, the denial of a fair trial or of any trial at all; the declaration that guilt or innocence is irrelevant because only sanity or insanity is to determine an individual's fate; confinement that is not less an imprisonment (perhaps even more so) because the place of confinement is called a mental hospital (or worse); enhanced and not lessened stigmatization because one has been judged insane rather than criminal; and enforced therapy that is neither desired nor prescribed, and indubitably ineffective. At the same time, "the defense of insanity" has been abused as justification or excuse by murderers and other criminals whose depredations were in this manner minimized and who, if they did not thereby escape punishment altogether, were nevertheless able to manipulate the judicial system so as to mitigate the sanctions.

Abuses notwithstanding, it hardly seems logical to fail to differentiate between the sane and self-controllable lawbreaker and the mentally or emotionally distressed one. This is so not only for humanitarian reasons, but because if any argument justifies punishment, it is the concept of deterrence, and there seems to be no rationale for punishing an individual who is incapable of being deterred from a wrongful act, whether this incapability results from a mental incapacity to understand the nature of the act or a neural-physical incapacity to restrain himself and overcome a compulsion.³ This would in no sense be an argument against confinement of the mentally incompetent, in order to prevent the occurrence or repetition of antisocial acts.

Several problems arise as one seeks to extend the concept of mental illness from the criminal to the noncriminal deviant. With criminals,

³ Some would argue for punishment of the mentally incompetent on the grounds that the greater the certainty of punishment, regardless of the mental competency of the perpetrator, the greater is the deterrence. In this sense, a mental incompetent is not deterred, but action against him deters others (presumably those others are limited to the competent). Many observers who have serious doubts about the alleged sanity of the members of the Manson family (convicted in the notorious Tate homicide case) nevertheless believe that severe sentences were warranted. Against this, it is interesting to weigh the argument that incarceration in a mental hospital is punitive and may in fact be a form of imprisonment.

the determination of mental illness has been for the purpose (ostensibly, at least) of shifting the societal reaction from punitive-correctional to therapeutic-correctional. If the deviant is not a lawbreaker or if there is increasing belief in professional and lay circles that he ought not to be seen as a lawbreaker (as in the case of some but not all instances of sexual deviance), then one might well question the utility or ethics of placing a label as stigmatic as mental illness on groups of individuals.

The major justification of such depiction would be that it is scientifically accurate (if it is) and that it would therefore throw light on the nature of the behavior, its etiology, prevention, handling, and correction. This is complicated by the unwillingness of some people to subject themselves to therapy: They insist on a "right to be different."⁴ Others, however, find themselves in a behavioral pattern from which they wish to escape, and the conceptualization of their activities as manifestations of disturbance or mental illness often provides such a framework.

As I have pointed out, to label some acts and states of mind as mental illness is dangerous, and this has led Thomas Szasz (1960, 1961) and others to dismiss mental illness as a myth. Szasz contends that there is no objective manner in which one can isolate such an entity, analyze it, and decide that it exists except by noting that the behavior of those so labeled is different from that accepted by "institutionalized psychiatry" and differs from the actions of most people in the society. The majority find such behavior and such people unacceptable, and express this prejudice by saying arbitrarily that those who act in such a manner are "sick." The "sick," of course, are those who are out of power, and this means that they are powerless to define themselves as being well and others as being ill. It is an ancient story that the question of who is sane and who is insane depends solely on who has the keys to the asylum. This is an enticing theory, appealing to sociologists who are engaged in debunking the habitual ways of the world

⁴ The phrase itself has been popularized by Nicholas Kittrie (1971), in a book with that title. Kittrie makes an eloquent appeal against enforced therapy, particularly if inflicted on those whose behavior is victimless, is not inherently anti-social, and can do no harm except to the perpetrator (if to anyone at all). Kittrie would not dispute the contention, however, that there is no inherent and unlimited *right* to be different; rather, there are limits on such rights, and severe problems of social policy in determining those limits. Enforced therapy is probably never successful, unless one defines incarceration or corporal punishment as "therapy," but for many forms of behavior that go beyond the limits of tolerance of a community (as uncontrollable sexual assaults on others), there is no choice other than punishment and/or therapy, and if a man should have the right to refuse therapy, he must accept what many would consider an undesirable alternative.

(a useful and important task), who are fond of attempting to show that the most outlandish people are very logical and reasonable indeed and the most ordinary folk truly illogical, which would become clear if people could see the world from the eyes of others.

The matter becomes more complicated when *all* criminal transgressions are considered to be manifestations of mental illness. If all criminality is seen as illness, then the mentally disturbed offender ceases to exist as a separate entity. This would make it impossible to differentiate between the person who logically and rationally, with intelligence, memory, and cunning, plans a burglary or embezzles or forges because of need, greed, or political advantage, and the person who has an uncontrollable compulsion to obtain something that is utterly useless to him. It would make it difficult to separate the man who kills a cousin so that as next of kin he will inherit a fortune from another who murders his children because he hears voices that tell him this is what he must do.

The question is thus twofold: First, does mental illness exist? Second, is it a useful concept? Szasz (1970:14) raises some questions about the presumed mental illness of one who asserts that he is Napoleon:

The patient might assert that he is Napoleon or that he is being persecuted by the Communists. These would be considered mental symptoms only if the observer believed that the patient was *not* Napoleon or that he was *not* being persecuted by the Communists. This makes it apparent that the statement "X is a mental symptom" involves rendering a judgment that entails a covert comparison between the patient's ideas, concepts, or beliefs and those of the observer and the society in which they live. The notion of mental symptom is therefore inextricably tied to the social, and particularly the ethical, context in which it is made, just as the notion of bodily symptom is tied to an anatomical and genetic context. [Italics in original.]

While Szasz begs the question that he has himself raised, as to whether the individual under such conditions might be suffering from mental illness, he does lay down the conditions under which one would be justified (in the eyes of Szasz) to state that such a person is mentally ill. Only if you believe that the individual is not Napoleon (or Jesus Christ, or two different people at the same time, or that his persecution by the Communists is complete fantasy and hallucination) would you be justified in saying that he is mentally ill. Yet, although all judgments of the world must be made with some reservations, admitting the possibility of error and conceding that there is some uncertainty even in those observations and experiences of what appears to our eyes to be absolutely real, an observer is justified

in concluding that a patient is not Napoleon. There is a slim chance that his avowal of that identity is something other than mental illness: He may be under hypnosis, or acting a part in a play which I happen to come across without knowing it is a play, or making believe that he is Napoleon in order to gain entry into a medical institution so that he can do a study for his doctoral dissertation. But if he presents himself as Napoleon and we have reason to believe that he himself gives credence to that avowal, or if he shows himself as believing in a persecution that all methods of verification demonstrate exists only as a fantasy in his mind, then Szasz's very own criteria would establish the existence of mental illness.

In short, the condition for declaring the existence of mental illness is a firm belief that one's own way of looking at the real world is correct and the way of others is wrong. And since there are multiple views of reality, or multiple levels of reality, Szasz would have us reject such an approach as arrogant, absolutist, and essentially impossible to validate.

R. D. Laing (1969:1-2) presents us with the case of a woman whose mother became ill. For three years, the older woman lingered on in agony. The daughter denied that this critically ill woman was indeed her mother, and although she contributed to taking care of her, she said that her mother had died. When the mother actually did die, the daughter refused to recognize that the death had only at this point taken place, insisting that her mother, the woman she had known and loved, had expired three years earlier.

People thought that the daughter was crazy, but Laing argues that she was not, not at all. For the woman she had known and loved had indeed died, and the person occupying the shell, the body, was not the mother; the daughter, a lucid and sensitive person, could not be expected to react to this shell as if that were her mother. It was not a matter of insanity but of differing views of the world, differing meanings of the concept of death; the daughter had simply taken a stance that transcended the ordinary ways of ordinary folk.

Nor was this the only instance in which the younger woman was at odds with the vision of reality of others around her. Her marriage had started to collapse, and she had retained the relationship with the man who was her husband in only a formal sense. But on a more profound level, she could not feel that she was the wife of that man or that he was her mate. So she denied that she was married to him, said that she had no husband. And since her mother was dead, although everyone knew that the woman in her house, still alive by any sane definition, was her mother, and since she had no husband,

although everyone knew that the man who came home to her after work each day was her husband, there was only one explanation: The poor young woman was crazy.

This is an obvious, though unpleasant, conclusion, but Laing does not draw it. Rather, he says, the woman's vision of what constituted living and dying, life and death, being a daughter and being a wife, was simply on a different level, and perhaps a more rational one, than that of less sensitive or perceptive people.

Is this, then, mental illness? Laing, like Szasz, avoids the question, but he leaves a strong suspicion that he would answer in the negative. Yet I would be compelled, using Laing's own case history, to answer in the affirmative.

What Laing may actually be illustrating is not that mental illness is nonexistent but that one can slip into it as a defense against an unpleasant real world. This is, in fact, the thesis of much of his work, particularly *The Politics of the Family* (1969). It is probably true that most mental illness that is not biologically caused has its derivation in just such defenses. Mental illness develops in interaction between the victim and the family or other members of society; Lemert (1962) has illustrated how such development takes place in the instance of paranoia (see pp. 142-43, above). Although this form of deviance would not have existed without interaction by hostile others, the paranoia is not mythical. It did begin as a mechanism for the handling of a difficult social relationship. In the same way one can conceptualize the woman's denial that the sick person was her mother, or the man her husband, as a mechanism for handling the grief over her mother's illness or the profound disappointment in her marriage.

There is another point at issue here, and that is the interpretation of language. The daughter said that her mother had died and that the ailing woman was not her mother. If she was expressing a metaphor, utilizing the language of poetry, to aver that a former relationship between herself and another had ceased to exist with the illness and *in that sense* her mother was dead, then she was a poet. But if she had come to believe literally in the metaphor, then indeed it had ceased to be poetry, although it may have started as such, and had become a manifestation of mental illness because it demonstrated an inability to differentiate fantasy from reality.

An argument against the mental illness concept is that public identification and subsequent stigmatization take place in only a small number of instances. Citing numerous studies showing the extent of mental disturbance, distress, and incapacitation, up to and including insanity, particularly Leo Srole's (1962) study of "Manhattan mad-

ness”⁵ (as Frank Hartung [1963] called it), Thomas Scheff (1964, 1966) points out how miniscule is the proportion of these people who ever get processed and tagged as mentally ill. Thus, if Srole’s work is to be given credence, most mentally ill people (Scheff argues) are in the populace, undifferentiated from others, perhaps seen as difficult or “peculiar,” but not identified as ill. What remains in the category of those processed as mentally ill, therefore, is a small number who are subjected to the labeling that is not but could be imposed on many others like themselves.

A further complication arises from the fact that the symptoms of mental illness (and perhaps of mental health, too) are difficult to recognize, easy to fake, and usually have no testable organic referents. One reads with dismay the essay by D. L. Rosenhan (1973), “On Being Sane in Insane Places.” Eight people (they are called “pseudopatients”), each with a pseudonym and a falsified occupation but otherwise with a true biography, presented themselves to mental institutions where they feigned symptoms. The eight consisted of three psychologists, a psychology graduate student, a psychiatrist, a pediatrician, and two non-professionals (a painter and a housewife). Three of the pseudopatients were women, five were men. They called the various hospitals for appointments and, when they arrived at admissions, complained of hearing unfamiliar voices: The voices were unclear but seemed to be saying such words as “empty,” “hollow,” and “thud.”

The pseudopatients were admitted to the hospitals where, like other patients, they received abysmally little attention (in the better hospitals as well as in the poorer ones). Neither nurses, attendants, nor psychiatrists suspected the game: Only the other patients, the real ones, were suspicious. When the pseudopatients reported after a few days that they no longer heard the voices and were now normal, they were told that a remission is not unusual but is not a sign of being cured.

From this study, one is tempted to conclude that mental illness is a myth—that psychiatrists, since they can’t distinguish the mentally ill from the mentally well, don’t know what they are talking about. Such a conclusion hardly seems warranted, however. The term “mentally ill” is usually (but not always) a label used to describe a person on the sole basis of his or her behavior, without biochemical or physiological tests; as such, it can only be judged by the behavior as observed or reported. In that sense, it is like a headache or a backache for which

⁵ Srole’s studies showed that more than 20 per cent of the populace of Manhattan could be considered sufficiently ill as to be mentally incompetent and that some 80 per cent were in need of therapy for mental and/or emotional malfunctioning. In fact, it was held that only 10 per cent of the population could be called mentally well.

there are no verifications and one must accept or reject the description by the patient. A psychiatrist would seem to be justified in considering a person mentally ill and accepting him for institutionalization if that person complained of hearing voices, and especially if the sufferer asked to be committed. Obviously, there is no mechanism for validating what I hear except my own statement, and if I choose to tell people that I hear things that are not being said, there is no reason to suspect that I am conducting a sociological experiment. If I tell psychiatrists at a mental hospital that I hear voices and I do *not* hear them, then it may well be that I am more disturbed than if I had actually heard voices. If a few days later, I report that I no longer hear the voices, what other logical answer is there except that there has been a remission? Certainly this is no indictment of psychiatry, nor does it indicate that mental illness is a myth. It does show that mental illness is not readily identifiable and that its manifestations and symptoms are rather easily simulated, to the consternation and confusion of professionals.⁶

Mental Illness as a Social Reality

THAT SOME people are mentally ill seems to be apparent, and this judgment can be made independent of the misuses and abuses to which the concept of mental illness lends itself.

The objection to the use of a medical model for deviant behavior is based essentially on two factors: (1) the possible harm done by a misdiagnosis, and (2) the difficulty of arriving at agreement about a diagnosis that can be validated in an objective manner.

The harm of a misdiagnosis is, of course, that it can result in stigmatization. Once a person has been suspected, even incorrectly, of mental illness, he is labeled, in the pejorative sense of that word.

⁶ The problem would be different if a person who complained of hearing voices could be incarcerated without his consent, no matter how well he might function in all his other activities or how well-adjusted he might appear to be.

People will assume that there must have been something wrong for such a conclusion ever to have been reached, an assumption analogous to the suspicion that hangs over a man who has been indicted and subsequently found not guilty on a criminal charge. Correction of the report—retraction—does not efface the harm.

Thomas Scheff (1966:109–10) points out that there are two types of errors that physicians can make:

Do physicians and the general public consider that rejecting the hypothesis of illness when it is true, or accepting it when it is false, is the error that is most important to avoid? It seems fairly clear that the rule in medicine may be stated as: "When in doubt, continue to suspect illness." That is, for a physician to dismiss a patient when he is actually ill is a Type 1 error, and to retain a patient when he is not ill is a Type 2 error.

Most physicians learn early in their training that it is far more culpable to dismiss a sick patient than to retain a well one.

The patient who has been diagnosed as well when he is ill will usually be in trouble. Few illnesses go away, and most get progressively worse if left untreated. If, however, the reverse error has been made, and it is found that an originally suspected malignancy was never there at all, the patient and the family can usually rejoice at the good news; this would be a Type 2 error. However, a doctor does not merely "retain" his patient, he treats him. As a result of the misdiagnosis, there may have been unnecessary surgery, mental anguish, medication with undesirable side effects, interference with the patient's normal hormonal functions, and radical decisions involving his employment and the disposition of his worldly goods. In the meantime, ostensibly there *were* symptoms, and they must have gone untreated, so that a Type 2 error may imply a Type 1 error as well. But from the viewpoint of social interaction, once having been identified as a patient who is thought to have a physical illness does not leave a person branded in the same manner as does identification as one who suffers from mental illness. Psychiatrists, being physicians and having a medical view that behavior can be symptomatic of illness, believe that the probability of impairment from making a Type 2 error is quite low, an assumption that is challenged by Scheff (1966:117–27).

The difficulties of diagnosing mental illness are many but not insurmountable. Certain types of behavior can properly be seen as manifestations or symptoms of mental illness: These would be characterized as traits or indicators of that behavior, but the behavior itself might still be without diagnostic clarity, name, or prognosis. Thus, psychiatrists and therapists might agree that obsessions, uncontrol-

lability, compulsivity, fear not rooted in reality, inability to distinguish fantasy from reality, and a variety of other inner motifs are *signs* of mental illness without agreeing on the nature of the basic condition. These signs are to mental illness what a toothache or a swollen jaw are to decay or infection.

One of the arguments against the idea that certain types of behavior are manifestations of mental illness is that the only examples studied are people who visit a psychiatrist because they are unhappy about their behavior, or who end up in prison because of it, and that these represent an atypical sample. "All of my homosexual patients are sick," the therapist says, in a colloquy that has often been repeated, and his fellow-therapist thereupon states, "Yes, and all of my heterosexual patients are sick, too." Lars Ullerstam (1966) goes so far as to declare—in what may have been a spoof but was taken very seriously indeed—that there is no way of knowing that necrophiliacs are all sick or that necrophilia is a manifestation of mental-emotional illness, because the only persons who have been studied are those who were apprehended in the act and others who came for therapy. And if we are to declare that homosexuals and necrophiliacs are sick merely on the basis of the fact that their behavior is antipathetic to that of society as a whole, why not do the same with adulterers, prostitutes, pimps, racists, integrationists, Communists in a capitalist country, capitalists in a Communist country, atheists, religious fanatics, ordinary criminals, and anyone else who violates the rules of social expectations?

Ullerstam would seem, by his argument, to have perhaps unwittingly reduced the entire matter of agnostic and open-minded attitudes toward socially disapproved behavior to utter absurdity. Most people have a gnawing "feeling" that necrophiliacs are and must be sick, even if such judgment defies proof. One thinks, "A person has to be off his rocker to want to do this," although it is easy to see that such an attitude can be generalized not only toward any rule-violators but toward anyone that the powerful groups in a society want the people to oppose.

It is said that social scientists who view deviants as sick have seen only a limited and atypical sample. It is not at all certain, however, that those who are apprehended in a deviant act are atypical of those who are never caught, at least as regards neuroses and disturbances. It is possible that some of those who are apprehended may have wanted to be caught, may have been driven by self-destructive motives not present in others, and that this could be an indication of greater illness among this sector than in others. But apprehension is a matter of chance, frequency of the action ("he pushed his luck once too often"), agility, money and social class, intelligence and wit (not to be

confused with mental aberration), and numerous other factors. Whether one deals with rapists or pimps, exhibitionists or necrophiliacs, or people involved in other types of crimes, there is little reason to believe that the apprehended are more sick than those who have never been brought before the bar of justice.

Similarly, the argument goes that much of our knowledge of deviants—particularly the sexually unorthodox—is derived from psychotherapy, and that those who visit therapists are, by that fact alone, unhappy and distressed and hence atypical of people with similar behavior who do not seek therapy. This line of reasoning has been presented forcefully by partisans of homosexuality. However, it is predicated on the assumption that the most disturbed are those who seek aid, but it is not at all certain that this is so. Some people are too ill to know that they are in need of help, but not so far gone that they are unable to function, in which case they would probably be taken to a hospital by others, often involuntarily. They do not have sufficient sense of reality to be aware of the extent of their own disturbance. They may be so self-destructive that they do not want their unhappy condition alleviated or, more frequently, have such deep-seated, unresolved difficulties that they have greater fears of the unknown world of normality than of their own world, in which their sufferings are so great. Their basic disturbance may be one of profound guilt, in which they are seeking self-punishment, and this might prevent them from obtaining aid.

Moreover, visits to a therapist involve many factors other than the degree of suffering and/or mental illness (two separate but interrelated phenomena). Money, education, social-class background, religion, family relationships, geographic convenience, and availability of time are among many matters that influence the decision to undertake therapy.

Even if it were true that distress and realization of disturbance were more characteristic of the clients of therapists than of others manifesting the same behavior, there are many other ways of determining the extent of mental disturbance among those not in therapy. In the case of homosexuals, prostitutes, organized-crime figures, and student rebels, for example (unlike exhibitionists, fetishists, and rapists), the patient generally travels in a subgroup having the same values and behavior as he has; members of this subculture have a shared way of life, and in the course of therapy, there are often disclosures about the life-style of friends, acquaintances, lovers, roommates, their problems and their ways of life, their hang-ups and their struggles for existence. This is not to deny that such disclosures may have some elements of a put-on, or that patients may describe the

distress of their subculture in order to please the therapist. Nevertheless, in this way therapists can gain insights into the lives of other members of the subculture and can glean enough information to determine whether or not that group can be characterized as mentally ill.

It has not been established that those who have been apprehended and those who are in therapy are the only sources of information about the deviant worlds. These worlds have also been described in biographies and autobiographies, can be reconstructed from journalistic sources, have been studied and depicted by novelists and poets, many of them apologists. Marcel Proust and Jean-Paul Sartre, Jean Genet and Virginia Woolf, among many other men and women of letters, have offered insights into the world of deviants from which conclusions can be drawn on the controversial questions of disturbance and mental health. Martin Hoffman (1968), a perceptive psychiatrist, went outside his practice and into the social world of homosexuals and there saw distress, promiscuity, personal disorganization, depression, and very little self-fulfillment (although he drew the conclusion from this that such difficulties were caused by stigmatization and were manifestations of secondary deviance).

Peter Sedgwick (1972), in a strong statement affirming the existence of mental illness, responds to the argument that it is nothing more than a label placed on those whose behavior is rejected and devalued in a given society and thus is merely social deviance renamed mental illness. For Sedgwick, all sickness is relative to the manner in which man sees the world and reacts to himself and others. There are forms of ringworm that, in some societies, are so common that those who are not "afflicted" are considered poor prospects for marriage. Ironically, Sedgwick rejects the labeling argument against the reality of mental illness by demanding a labeling stance on all matters of health. Thus he answers the argument that devalued behavior is "handled" by a hostile society by placing it in the mental illness category, but he offers no criteria for the differentiation between heresy, let us say, and psychopathology, especially if those in power are going to utilize their position to discourage the former by calling it the latter. Further, Sedgwick has no solution to the problem of dissensus that plagues the psychiatric field; one can cite similar instances of conflict within the field of physical medicine over diagnosis and treatment, but it is not general to the entire field of medicine as it is to psychiatry.

One of the problems encountered in placing the label "sick" upon various criminal and deviant groups is that it relieves the society as a whole of responsibility for their difficulties and distress. Showing the prostitute as sick, as having gone through faulty socialization or familial difficulties, places the blame for the condition on individuals

and small family units, not on the economic conditions of a society and on institutions that oppress women and make them vulnerable for recruitment into prostitution. Showing rapists as sick is likely to downplay the culture or subculture of violence in which people grow up, the social institutions that produce in some men contempt for women, the racial attitudes that are so deeply ingrained that a few people manifest them in the form of sexual assaults, the culture that so completely separates sex from love, tenderness, and affection that it encourages some men to express their sexuality through rape. Sociologists in particular should be alert to the social and economic sources of human suffering and individual pathology. Otherwise, one becomes co-opted—against one's better judgment, perhaps, but nevertheless co-opted—to become an apologist for and a buttress of an oppressive social system.

There is a conventional wisdom that sees some people as mentally ill although—as the world is endlessly warned—the same criteria they apply would have led, in years gone by, to a view of geniuses and innovators as ill in the same way. One sees a man standing in the street and yelling at imaginary people. A psychiatrist reports the case of a man who insists that he is the “mother” of his children. For all the pitfalls in the use of the concept of mental illness, for all the misuses to which it is put, the psychiatric injustice of which Szasz speaks and the social-class and political biases inherent in it, these people *are* ill; as much so, although with more difficult criteria to judge and quite different consequences, as someone who has diabetes, hepatitis, or some other somatic illness.

I have stated that these people are ill, but the statement needs modification: One cannot be certain without knowing whether there are larger total contexts into which the observed behavior must be placed before a judgment on the actor can be passed. Thus, Alan Blum (1970:33) describes

a small, elderly woman who regularly rants and raves inside telephone booths and whom everyone in the community recognizes as mentally ill. Wearing a threadbare coat and carrying a tattered copy of the *New York Times*, she regularly screams from within the phone booth to no one in particular.

Then, he imagines encountering another woman carrying on in exactly the same way. A child to whom he is trying to teach the meaning of mental illness becomes confused when he says:

“No, that is not mental illness, because do you see that smashed car on the street? She has just been in an accident . . . and those two bodies lying there are her husband and child. So, this is not mental illness

because she is shocked, bereaved, and hysterical. These are all extenuating circumstances.”

What Blum is here demonstrating is not that mental illness is a myth but that the application of this label (and of many others) without an understanding of the context of the behavior and its meaning to the actor can be misleading.

There are several major differences between somatic and mental illnesses. For one thing, in the case of the somatic, there is much greater probability of achieving consensus not only on the diagnosis but even on the question of whether illness exists. Furthermore, there is a virtual lack of objective tests or criteria (other than in the disapproved behavior) that would indicate mental illness. And whereas in physical illnesses there are symptoms other than disapproved behavior (pain, malfunctioning, and in some instances death that can be traced to the ailment), in mental illness one usually has nothing more to go on but the behavior itself, and this could very well lead us back to defining Christians, left-handed people, integrationists, and those who thought the world was round as mentally ill because they went against the ways or beliefs of “sane” and “normal” folk.

Faced with such a dilemma, how is one to say when mental illness is a reality and not a myth? I propose the following very fallible criteria:

1. Mental illness may be inferred when there is strong evidence that behavior is a manifestation of an inner compulsion over which one has no control; when it is largely determined *for* an individual and not *by* him, although the compelling force comes from within; when, in short, a person is subject to what has been called in criminal law “an irresistible impulse,” or when his total behavioral pattern demonstrates that such impulses are chronic and continuing.

2. Mental illness is a scientifically valid and socially useful category when it is used to describe persons whose vision of reality is totally incongruent with the objective reality about which there is general consensus. This is not a matter of values, concepts, or ideas but of the world of people and things. The man who says that his mother hates him when everyone “knows” she loves him is making an alternate and possibly valid interpretation of her actions; this is not to be confused with the contention of a man who claimed to be a mother, or of the woman who declared her mother was dead when everyone “knew” that the woman was alive, in the literal sense of the word.

3. Mental illness is a valuable diagnosis when it is applied to behavior that, within the cultural context, is irrational, self-destructive, and incongruent with conscious goal orientations. In this sense, the arsonist

who burns down a building to collect insurance money is criminal but not ill; the arsonist who commits a similar act because of the excitement and the thrills that the fire gives him, or because inner forces beyond his control compelled him to do so, would be diagnosed as mentally ill.⁷

4. A label of mental illness is sometimes warranted when a deviant act is but one symptom of a total syndrome, so that there are other, and more objective, criteria and manifestations. Withdrawal from human interaction might not be a sufficient basis for a conclusion of mental illness, as it might be motivated by minor quirks (a man who prefers his own company to that of others) or religious and intellectual orientations (a man who wants to spend his life meditating) but it can be characterized as a manifestation of illness when it is accompanied by deep depressions, hallucinations, irrational fears of others, belief in one's own ugliness when one is in fact normally attractive, and other signs of disturbance.

IS THE LABEL USEFUL?

If the concept of mental illness has so many pitfalls and dangers, of what use is it, even if one can show that it exists as an entity? It is useful both prognostically and therapeutically, although at this stage in the development of behavioral science its usefulness is limited in both regards. Prognostically, man should eventually be able to isolate the potentially violent, those who are most likely to be destructive to themselves and to others, those having the least control over antisocial actions. With all the dangers of potential psychiatric injustice, and with the extreme likelihood that persons may be punished before an act rather than as a consequence of it, this is nevertheless one of the ultimate rationales for all socially imposed punishment. One of the ways of preventing antisocial behavior is to isolate the persons most likely to commit it, similar to the way in which quarantine is enacted against those whose social relations may cause suffering through the spread of a disease.

But if mental illness is illness, is it deviance? Or, if mental illness exists, can it properly be conceived of as illness? On the face of it, the answer appears to be simple: It is deviant because, both as a label and as a form of behavior associated with the label and often precipitating it, it is viewed with strongly negative and highly pejorative attitudes in society. It is disvalued, scorned, ridiculed, mimicked, and converted into justification for excluding the individual from roles

⁷ Whether or not he should also be considered criminal is a central issue in an historic argument that has raged for centuries. I refer the reader to the rich and controversial literature in criminal law, forensic psychiatry, and criminology.

that would otherwise be open to him. To say this is not to imply, as some would read into it, that such exclusion is necessarily rational or irrational, although many would propose that, as a matter of humaneness, scorn and ridicule should be removed from the repertoire of informal sanctions. Diminished mental control and competency in social performances may well require, in some instances, some degree of outer control; severe mental retardation would serve as an example that could scarcely be rebutted. The problem here would be to search for mechanisms for the destigmatization of the afflicted without ceasing to disvalue the affliction. On the surface, this might seem not only herculean but even self-contradictory, but there is the remarkable historic case of destigmatization (virtual though not complete) of the blind and the deaf, without acceptance of the physical state or attribute as in any way desirable.

This problem is further complicated by the suggestion of some scholars, particularly Talcott Parsons (1951:249–325) that sickness, in and of itself and *under all conditions* (not merely mental illness), is a deviant status (albeit a legitimate status)—that the sick role is a deviant one, although the reverse may not be true. This is largely a conceptual problem, and as such it would appear to me that Parsons's position is not the most useful. It is based on the debilitating nature of illness; that is, on the inability of the actor to perform in an institutionally legitimated manner. In that sense, the very elderly, even when dying, are not deviant and may not even be sick.

Some types of physical illness, however, do not interfere with normal legitimate functioning in society. The diabetic takes his insulin or other medication and pays some special attention to diet, but is in every sense socially competent. Not confined to home or bed, he can perform in all roles with little or no ill effect: as parent and spouse, wage-earner, chess player, or in any other capacity for which he has been trained and which is deemed legitimate for him. Other types of physical illness are not disabling but nonetheless carry a stigma, either because of fear of contagion, visibility, relationship to excretory and sexual functions, or imputation of moral lapse: Examples would be leprosy (the embodiment of stigmatization, fitting all but the third of the four criteria), being cross-eyed, having a colostomy, or contracting a venereal disease.⁸ For a man to have his testes removed is far more

⁸ There is often no rationality to the imputation of immorality, but once again, the point is not whether there is a moral lapse but whether it is imputed by others. The history of man's attitude toward those afflicted with ailments of various sorts is a story not only of cruelty but of irrationality. Lepers have not only been feared but despised, and in many societies the deaf and the blind were condemned, their disabilities being explained as punishment for transgression of the afflicted, his parents, or other persons in the community.

stigmatizing than if it were his appendix, yet neither operation prevents his functioning in most legitimated roles.

For some persons, such as Peter McHugh (1970), this problem is solved by a conceptual framework that limits deviance to voluntaristic acts for which a person can be assigned responsibility. Such an approach, fruitful as it is but fraught with difficulties in the study of criminality, would appear to efface the striking similarities in the social position of the cripple and the criminal, the leper and the prostitute, and between the alcoholic and addict who are compulsively driven to bottle or needle and those who freely decide (in the sense that anyone ever freely decides anything) to take another drink or another dose. It would appear that between the positions of McHugh (1970) and Parsons, one can take refuge in the conceptual framework of Goffman (1963), seeing societal reaction and stigmatization as the *sine qua non* of deviance, the crucial factors in determining that the deviance exists.⁹ This is close to if not identical with the position of the labelists, but while it accepts the idea of negative reaction as the single necessary factor, this does not mean (as the labeling school sometimes suggests) that the societal reaction is necessarily spontaneous, irrational, unprovoked, or the result of the activities of moral entrepreneurs.

Vilhelm Aubert and Sheldon Messinger (1958), in an important comparison of the criminal and the sick, point out that exclusion is a vital factor in dealing with these categories of people. But note the important qualification in the phrase "some sick persons and some criminals": "One of the simplest sociological statements that can be made about the control measures invoked to deal with crime and illness is that they involve the exclusion of *some* sick persons and *some* criminals from the performance of their everyday social roles." [Italics added.] While it would seem clear that some sick persons are not excluded from performance of everyday social roles (exclusion may be self-imposed or imposed by others), the application of the same theme to criminality is explained by the system of fines. He who pays the sum continues to be permitted to engage in all performances. The question arises whether the individual, when reacted to in such a manner, can effectively be seen as criminal.

Nonetheless, between crime and sickness there is a major difference, and this involves primarily motivation, choice, values, and voluntarism. The criminal enters his role with deliberation. In the words of Aubert and Messinger, he "strives, or has been striving, toward a value." He is engaged in goal-directed behavior, and however one may disagree

⁹ That Goffman objects to the word "deviance" in no way changes the fact that his concept is useful and is identical to that of many sociologists who accept the word.

with the choices and decisions he makes, he does make them. In short, he acts. Illness, on the other hand, is negatively valued by the victim, often even more than by society. The presumption is that a person becomes sick, these authors state, "*in spite of strivings for a value—attempts to stay healthy.*" [Italics in original.]

So that one enters the two roles differently, and one leaves them differently as well. Termination of the sick role is by recovery; a person ceases to be in that state, and there are objective criteria and medical consensus for determining when that moment has arrived. But the criminal does not recover; he spends his time in payment of his debt and then is granted leave to function only in a limited way in most of his everyday roles, stigmatized by his record in a society that is watchful for relapse or recidivism: "The sick person," say Aubert and Messinger (1958), "is constructed as someone with characteristics along a dimension of time, while the criminal is constructed without any time perspective."

While it would appear that known illness sometimes involves no exclusion whereas known criminality always does, Aubert and Messinger see this in the very reverse terms. They deny the first: "In almost all cases where a person is classified as sick, there will be certain relatively well-defined things he is not supposed to do or things he is permitted to abstain from." However, these things may involve not everyday role performances, where failure to perform imposes a negative trait on the ill but, rather, matters of inconvenience and personal choice, such as taking medicine or refraining from using salt in one's food.

The sick person is usually seen as not responsible for his condition; eager though he presumably is to be healthy, for the time being at least he cannot be. Thus he is not held accountable for what befell him; his "irresponsibility" (or, truer to the nuances of the language, nonresponsibility) becomes cloak and protection. But the criminal "is usually perceived as having been able to act differently, had he chosen to do so." Yet the matter is complicated by the responsibility of many individuals for activities that led to the sickness (such as the broken leg and the case of gonorrhea, both contracted—but not necessarily in that order—during a skiing weekend).

The distinctions between criminality and sickness raise several serious questions. One of these is whether the criminal can be sick: What if mental illness, an inability to control himself, led the person to perform the illegal act? A second question concerns the application of this label to other deviants. Should the alcoholic, the addict, the suicide-prone, and many others be seen as sick? It would appear that they entered their state somewhat involuntarily, but it may be a

manifestation of their illness that they do not wish to terminate it and are not motivated toward recovery.

Whatever role impairment is felt by the physically ill, they are usually restored to full social status upon recovery. Not only are mental illness and emotional disturbance stigmatizing labels, but they cling with tenacity. The concept of recovery is just not believed in by large numbers of people. If once, then always, it is said. Thus the problem of the mischief produced by the label of mental illness in such social circumstances cannot be excluded from consideration.

*The Disabled as Involuntary Deviants**

DEVIANCE RUNS the gamut from voluntarism to involuntarism, from responsibility to its total absence ("nonresponsibility"). At the former extreme one might place the political deviant, at the latter the disabled, and somewhere in between people who have any number of obsessions and compulsions that they find difficult to control and that bring them into sharp conflict with society.

Merely to group the involuntary deviant with others raises conceptual and normative problems. The moment the crippled and other physically disabled are categorized in this manner, all etiological theories appear inadequate. Inasmuch as these people did not "decide" to take on the deviant status, the personal and social conditions conducive to becoming deviant are irrelevant. In the capacity of sociologist, therefore, one is no longer concerned with how people got that way, but with how and why they are defined in a disvalued manner and with what consequences for all parties. In that sense, only labeling theory is able to encompass this area of deviance, for it focuses on societal reaction as crucial and notes the similarity of treatment accorded to the actor, and of defenses created by him, whether the person labeled deviant is defined in that manner on the basis of behavior or of being.

The study of disability in relation to deviant behavior is of intrinsic

* This section is based on a study conducted by Arnold Birenbaum.

interest to sociologists because it reveals much about the importance of the unspoken rules that govern our everyday behavior and their use by competent members of society. Moreover, the complex process of developing deviant roles, engaged in by the people who either desire or are condemned to play them as well as by others (the normative or the "normals"), can be examined in the area of disability and in the study of those who seek to provide rehabilitation facilities and programs for people who become handicapped. Anyone who acquires a disability, or is born with one, finds himself facing more than just adjustment to a physical impairment or long-term illness that prevents him from walking as fast as other people, riding horses, or holding a job in competitive employment. He is regarded by others and even by himself as "different," and this difference is considered an undesirable one, creating a sense of awkwardness, embarrassment, and confusion in one's social interaction with others.

The difficulty of maintaining comfortable face-to-face interaction between disabled and conventional members of society results first of all from uncertainty about the kinds of claims the disabled and the conventional person will make upon each other in social situations. If, for example, there is a crippled young man at a party, will he ask one of the young ladies present to dance? In turn, will one of the young ladies present ask that crippled young man to dance, hoping to compensate for his "natural" shyness? This type of encounter has almost no analogue in the world of "ordinary deviants"—ex-convicts, alcoholics, prostitutes, and so on. Secrecy is more easily maintained in "ordinary deviance," only to be dropped when it is unnecessary. The undesirable or "disabling" traits of voluntary deviants are more easily ignored if they are not openly avowed; and the conflict between the deviant and the world around him is not a collision in which there is inability to work through a given scene or a given setting.

A second source of confusion and uncertainty on the part of the disabled, and even more those who must interact with them, stems from the fact that disability is rarely acquired in a conscious way, from intentional misapplication of the designs for living that constitute the culture of the society. Rather, disability is acquired because the culture could not predict a fortuitous or accidental event or the onset of an illness so that it could be avoided; or it came at birth, an unfortunate disaster. Thus, those who are or become disabled cannot be said to have violated the rules deliberately; in fact, in many cases they were let down by those very rules. Acquiring a handicapping condition rarely involves intentional choice. Except for the born handicapped, it can be thought of as the crystallization of involuntary deviance into roles performed by previously voluntary conformists. When a once-compe-

tent person becomes disabled, the very rules that define competency are called into question. Moreover, inasmuch as this disabled person is still psychologically competent, he may start to question these rules because they proved to be unreliable.

Physically handicapped people illustrate how rules operate in a self-correcting and self-fulfilling way. Being a fully competent member of society includes recognition of the meaning of membership and competency. This reflexiveness takes the form of knowing what characteristics a member must possess and who is to be allowed to participate in particular situations. Alternatively, knowledge of what it means to be a nonmember is part of the general role of a member. These rules of identity, or constitutive norms of social life, are acquired relatively early in life. Children will observe out loud that "the man sitting in the next seat has no arm in his sleeve" and their parents will reward them for being so observant, even while admonishing them for being overly vocal in public.

Yet, what makes the entire matter of rules, behavior, presence, and identity as moral beings questionable is the fact that the physically handicapped are the purest of victims. They have committed no "immoral" act in being the way they are. Save for instances in which a disability is relevant to a particular task (for example, a person with impaired sight seeking a license to drive a car), there is no inherent logic in excluding the involuntary deviant from the world of normals, or even in categorizing him as a deviant. That this is the case seems indisputable.

Although at one time simply denounced and reviled, the physically disabled came later to be pitied. Only in the twentieth century has there been a considerable diminution in the contumely heaped upon epileptics, dwarfs, and mental retardates. Even as they ceased to be reviled, however, they continued to be avoided.

Violations of the norms of social identity are events that those who are disabled have to deal with, particularly in the company of conventional people who are strangers to the handicapped person. Every transgression of these norms in the form of a discrediting discrepancy between an actor's virtual (or expected) and actual identity calls into question the validity of these rules, since those who cannot sustain competency may still seek to do so. Then, the everyday grounds for judging others and oneself are made problematic, since actors are uncertain about the kinds of claims that might be made by either the discrepant or the conventional individuals. Thus, such encounters threaten the beliefs of all present in the culture in two ways: (1) The one-to-one correspondence of the social and the natural order—that is, the correspondence between the way things are anticipated and the way they

actually turn out—is called into question. (2) Then, if either or both fail to take the discrepancy from cultural expectations into account in their relationship, they call into question the conventional character of that person or their relationship, suggesting to others a kind of joint or dual madness.

While disability may be unpredictable according to the formulas used in everyday life, every culture provides the members of society with a general idea of what it must be like to possess a handicap and even provides a rank-ordering of various impairments. This uniformity in response to disability provides a third source of uncertainty in relations between those with handicaps and others, since the latter do not want to reveal the negative attitudes they hold toward the disability. Unlike situations involving attitudes toward voluntary deviants, those who share the negativism that identifies a societal reaction feel considerable ambivalence. By condemning a victim, they condemn themselves and often feel guilty about this, if they give it any thought at all. But rather than be forced to face the inner difficulties of their own moral dilemmas, they prefer to avoid the situation altogether, but something not always possible to do.

The pervasiveness of the cultural conceptions of disability is so great that even people who were born with physical disabilities share these negative values. The amount of self-deprecation and self-hatred experienced by such people should not be underestimated as an important source of keeping them in line, particularly when the same people in many respects are voluntary conformists in society. The disabled adapt to the stigma of physical disability in several ways: Some people make a definition of self and seek to work within the framework of that definition; they project themselves as physically different but not socially deviant. This is what Fred Davis (1961) described under the heading of “deviance disavowal,” in which the persons did not deny or try to conceal the handicap but sought to normalize relationships and to deny the awkward, embarrassing, or negative aspects of social interaction. Others who bear a stigma do not attempt to convey an image of normality but embrace their role, seeking to make the impairment the central focus of their lives. Ralph Turner (1972) sees this as the reverse of disavowal and has termed it “deviance avowal.” Others try to conceal all information about their stigma and seek to convey the impression of being physically normal, a strategy that is available only for certain types of impairment.

There are handicapped persons who utilize combinations or modifications of these strategies. Some seek to perform conventional social roles, occasionally manifesting their differentness by their association with others like themselves. They make an effort, one might say, to

“normalize” their deviance so that it does not become obtrusive in all social situations but is taken into account in all ongoing social relations. The handicapped may use one mechanism for handling the social strains with some people and quite easily switch to a different method with others. The same person can be at times secretive and blatant, self-effacing and exploitative.

“Deviance avowal” is less likely to occur in the case of physical disability than in the case of other deviant minorities, because rarely does a counterculture exist that insists that a stigma is a badge of honor rather than a discrediting discrepancy. While many homosexuals claim that “gay is good” and that one ought to be proud of one’s sexual tastes, those with physical handicaps do not make similar assertions about themselves or their handicaps. They may seek to get normals to regard them in a more accepting way by insisting on the use of certain labels for their condition, but the basis of their problem and of their plea for acceptance is still the unintentionally acquired character of the impairment. Thus, there is a strain toward “normalization” among the disabled, since this is one way of diminishing the magnitude, obviousness, and obtrusiveness of their deviance.

Yet, both denial and avowal may be regarded by others as signs of severe psychological disturbance, perhaps brought on or precipitated by the acquisition of physical disability, but something that prevents the person from recognizing either his physical limitations or his other capacities; from becoming aware of the obtrusiveness or lack of it produced by the disability in the course of social interaction; from neglecting or paying an inordinate amount of attention to his other responsibilities. Conventional members of society question the competence of a person who fails to deal with “reality” or who denies what everyone else “knows” are the disadvantages of being disabled. The middle road is regarded as the wisest course because it confirms conventional ideas about disability widely accepted in the culture. As stated by Goffman (1963:122):

The general formula is apparent. The stigmatized individual is asked to act so as to imply neither that his burden is heavy nor that bearing it has made him different from us; at the same time he must keep himself at that remove from us which ensures our painlessly being able to confirm this belief about him. Put differently, he is advised to reciprocate naturally with an acceptance of himself and us, an acceptance of him that we have not quite extended him in the first place.

In following this formula, the disabled person, either consciously or unwittingly, takes part in a process of restoration of belief in those cultural formulas that he followed and that failed him. This process begins

with recognition and acceptance of the stigma by the disabled person, promoting the routinization of deviance into what has been identified as a normal-appearing round of life. In so doing, the disabled person not only removes uncertainty and strain from his life but restores his own and others' belief in the cultural formulas.

There may be less of a difference between the disabled and the non-handicapped person than we imagine, for the self that can perform as a conventional person can often perform when afflicted by some long-term illness or impairment to physical functioning. Nevertheless, this is not always the case, and realization of one's inability to perform, the loss of hope that the performing ability will return, and the resignation to a state of permanence of the impaired self may constitute a severe shock. The bulk of findings would indicate that the objective criteria for performance of most roles in a competent manner are present, but that they are frequently misunderstood by the afflicted (who is demoralized and discouraged), by his family (overanxious yet impatient, and sometimes overindulgent), and by social agencies (especially when they fit the handicapped into preconceived stereotypes of deviance).

This is not to advocate the view that differences in personality and role performance do not arise as a result of possessing a disability. They do, but they are not inevitable, and they arise out of the social interaction more than out of the disabling characteristics. Furthermore, certain kinds of affiliations and agencies devoted to helping persons have great impact on the lives of the handicapped. Just as there is some institutional support for voluntary deviance, as in the case of professionals whose task is to prevent, study, pursue, contain, and rehabilitate in the area of crime, so there are professionals who "need" the disabled. Similarly, courts and prisons have considerable influence over the life chances of the criminal, while hospitals and rehabilitation programs have a similar effect on many of the important career choices made by their clients.

LIFE-STYLES AND LIFE CHANCES

Disability may be acquired in early childhood, even at birth, and the parents' response to a disabled child may be quite different from their response to a normal child. Moreover, it is very rare that a parent will have had any experience at all with disability when the child is born (except in the case of hereditary defects, as, for example, dwarfs), and hence he cannot be a very good model of how to adapt to it for the child. Often the parents feel very guilty, at least during the first few months after becoming aware of the child's condition. The presence of a handicapped child in the family may lead to a redefinition of

the child as one who is constantly "sick," requiring a certain kind of care and attention. This perspective often has a correlate to it: that the child does not require other kinds of social and intellectual stimulation that one would give to a nonhandicapped child. In such cases, fewer demands are placed on children with disabilities, while other children in the family are expected to perform at a very unrealistic level of competency. Frequently, the unaffected developmental capacities of the handicapped child remain overlooked in order that he may be treated as a sick child. Such overcompensating efforts may also involve endless searches for cures or at least a more favorable diagnosis. As a result, the child develops a sense of self that may indeed be based on an appropriate response, but to a set of unusual expectations.

Except perhaps for the severely retarded, children with physical disabilities inevitably learn how the culture evaluates the handicap, no matter how protective parents might be. Self-deprecation or low self-esteem seems to be common in these cases, exacerbated when there are no alternative sources of support or claims of competency that can be made by the child. A child who is treated as sick may never be given the opportunity to prove himself, and his impairment may become the central focus in his life, resulting in an avowal of the role rather than a normalization.

The manner in which one learns that he is seen, not as a whole person, but in terms of the handicap, is illustrated in an autobiographical account by Leonard Kriegel (1969):

What the cripple must face is being pigeonholed by the smug. Once his behavior is assumed from the fact that he is a cripple, it doesn't matter whether he is viewed as holy or damned. Either assumption is made at the expense of his individuality, his ability to say "I." He is expected to behave in such-and-such a way; he is expected to react in the following manner to the following stimulus. And since that which expects such behavior is that which provides the stimulus, his behavior is all too often Pavlovian. He reacts as he is expected to react because he does not really accept the idea that he can react in any other way. Once he accepts, however unconsciously, the images of self that his society presents him, then the guidelines for his behavior are clear-cut and consistent.

While most physical disability does not involve actual disfigurement, it alters the person's body sufficiently to present a discrepancy between what is expected and the image the person presents. Physical appearance seems to be a very important aspect of face-to-face interaction at all times in the life cycle. It is particularly important during adolescence as a way of classifying and rating others and oneself. It is likely, therefore, that toleration of such differences would be lowest among this

age group and that consequently the physically disabled teenager would suffer a substantial reduction in self-esteem.

Physical appearance is a basic source of information about others, especially during first encounters between people. A person with a disability would need to have a wide array of social skills available in order to offset the uncertainty and potential derogation during such an encounter. Even when such a repertoire of social skills exists, the tendency among the nonhandicapped to avoid interaction with the handicapped is very great. Thus, the lack of social skills possessed by a disabled person may result from a lack of opportunity to develop them, rather than an unwillingness or an incapacity to do so. Often, those who seek out contact with the handicapped are social isolates themselves and hardly make good models for disabled children or adolescents.

One of the factors that sets the involuntary deviant apart from all others is the disvaluation that he himself places upon his condition and, frequently though not necessarily, upon himself. This protects the society from people who would "recruit" and "proselytize" others into socially undesired roles. The suggestion is not being made that a disabled or handicapped person could engage in spreading his disability but rather that, if not for his self-denigration, the diminished ability for normal interaction could well be put forth as an equally good or even preferable way of life. The loss of self-esteem, psychologically damaging as it probably is, may well serve society as a protection against cultural transmission, which some people have postulated as a major cause of the perpetuation of delinquency, or of learning to become a certain kind of disvalued individual, as has been described for marijuana users, or "bringing out," a term that apparently has its origins in the subculture of homosexuality. But all of this means, in addition, that for the "hopelessly afflicted," whose injury or condition is such that there are limits to goals of recovery and rehabilitation beyond which one should not fantasize, the development of an ideology that the condition is just as good as that of normals, or even better, is excluded as one of the forms of adaptation.

One adjustment to the presence of disability may be a kind of overconformity to other rules concerning identity, as a way of giving the impression to others that one's handicap has not led to a general neglect of personal appearance. The disabled person may appear less "interesting" to others, dress in less flamboyant colors, avoid long hair, beads, beards, and such accoutrements, as a way of saying that he can uphold some rules if not all rules of conventional identity. Accordingly, less visible aspects of identity may also take on a conforming quality. Political and religious attitudes may be very orthodox, lest they frighten away a potential friend. Overconformity is a frequent though by no

means an inevitable response of those who must work hard to be regarded as acceptable in various social situations. Like the immigrant who becomes a superpatriot, the disabled may become supercritical of individual differences and, in so doing, demonstrate loyalty to a code of demeanor that few pay such strict attention to and hardly any live and die by any more. Formalization of relationships on the part of the physically disabled may be a way not only of dealing with uncertainty but also of receiving support for claims to be treated with respect.

A person with a physical disability lives a life as a deviant to the extent that he belongs both to collectivities made up exclusively of those who are similarly situated and also to others made up predominantly of nonhandicapped persons. This dual membership among one's own kind and among the others enables him to lead a "normal-appearing round of life," receiving support from each collectivity for the particular kinds of claims that he seeks to make in each world. The person who is successful in this adaptation seeks a careful balance between the world of the stigmatized and the world of the normal. Partially, at least, this balance is predicated on the person's participation in the social organizations and culture of the world of disability. The orderliness found in this culture creates a useful parallel of conventionality from which one can convey impressions of managing an intolerable situation, thereby helping to reduce the now often unpredictable nature of the conventional social order. Moreover, when accepting the primacy of socially expected roles, those with stigmas assiduously avoid overinvolvement in the world of the stigmatized, thereby minimizing the extent to which normals will regard them as deviant, even in the presence of other disabled individuals.

Involvement with others in social groups of people like themselves and in organizations devoted to helping the disabled is usually greater when the disability is first acquired than later on. This is due not only to the newness of the deviant role being performed but also to the relief from uncertainty provided by organizations of others who have gone through the same social transformation. Indeed, it is at this point that one is likely to encounter "deviance avowal" as a way of dealing with the problem of uncertainty and also as a way of explaining what has happened to produce an unexpected and undesired condition. New explanations help to reduce the sense of self-blame when the newly disabled recognizes the discrepancy of his condition from that of conventional persons; and social mingling with similarly situated others reduces the despair. Some disabled persons who continue to embrace the deviant role will become formal leaders of these organizations, leading a life devoted to influencing nonhandicapped persons to be more sympathetic to the handicapped, getting greater subsidization from the govern-

ment for retraining and rehabilitation, and improving their situations in numerous other ways. By performing conventional lobbying activities for unusual organizations, they demonstrate a "normal-appearing round of life," not in spite of their handicap, but rather because of it. In a personal sense, those who perform these leadership roles represent a continuous round of impression management, as they move from "deviance avowal" to normalization to denial of the impact of the disability on their competency, all in a single day, all in a single effort to increase the effectiveness of their organizations.

Not all the people who man the major posts of these organizations are themselves handicapped. From about 1960 on, mainly through the innovative programs of the various branches of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, there was a vast expansion of rehabilitation and physical medicine services in the United States. Amid the branches and institutes of this federal agency, and with the advent of the antipoverty program and its incorporation under the Office of Economic Opportunity, there came into being a vast organizational network of "caretaker" agencies to perform the social-control functions associated with disabilities. Voluntary conformists who followed all the conventional social formulas of the culture and were rewarded with suffering, disappointment, and derogation remain a potential threat to that culture and a source of discontent in the society. This has been offset by creating a new set of careers for those in the areas of psychology, social work, prosthetics, and physical medicine, among others, based upon the belief that they can help the adjustment and rehabilitation of those Americans who fall into the general category of involuntary deviants.

The early 1960s saw a rapid increase in funds available for research and for the development of "pilot" programs in many areas of disability, including mental illness and mental retardation. These agencies both supported innovative programs and provided capital grants to establish new diagnostic clinics, rehabilitation centers, sheltered workshops for vocational rehabilitation, and the creation of permanent opportunities for noncompetitive employment in voluntary organizations. Many of these programs were modeled after efforts for the blind, particularly in the area of vocational rehabilitation and workshops, which had been established in the 1930s, with federal subsidization in the form of exclusive contracts with these facilities to supply mops and brooms assembled by the blind. Similar efforts gained acceptance after World War II as a way of aiding returning disabled veterans.

To a large extent, the proliferation of these programs and facilities was significantly retarded, after an enormous growth, by the diversion

of funds to the war in Southeast Asia. At the same time, that war likewise provided a justification for increased support for programs to aid returning disabled and disfigured veterans.

Rehabilitation is a process that does not begin and end when the disabled person has developed some way of managing the problems associated with functioning with a physical handicap or even with its stigma. Organizations and their agents seek to impose their view of the particular handicap upon the person who possesses it, so that, in the words of Robert Scott (1966:138) the person "is socialized to play the kind of deviant role traditionally reserved" for those similarly handicapped. Organizations and agencies possess a perspective on disability that in no small way affects the possible adaptations available to the handicapped and the extent to which they can lead independent lives. These agencies carry on the following activities, as enumerated by Eliot Freidson (1966:71):

First, they specify what personal attributes shall be called handicaps. Second, they seek to identify who conforms to their gratifications. Third, they attempt to gain access to those whom they call handicapped. And fourth, they try to get those to whom they gain access to change their behavior so as to conform more closely to what the institutions believe are their potentialities.

Since many of these agencies provide important services to their clients and thus make available a great deal in the way of resources, they are able to get the disabled person to accept a certain definition of himself (or at least to say so in the presence of rehabilitation workers). Attitudes of the disabled are of central importance to such workers, for continued use of the agency for services by the disabled person requires that he will not question his fate or be socially disruptive. The segregated character of these agencies—the fact that they are specialized by disability even when the help that is sought may have little to do directly with the nature of the physical impairment—promotes the development of a sense of performing a deviant role. In turn, lack of contact with those who are not handicapped, or who have nothing to do with the organized world of rehabilitation, reinforces this sense of differentness since one is judged and judges oneself by the company one keeps.

The handicapped may, as Fred Davis (1961) points out, reject the concept that he is deviant (but he is placing a different meaning on the term than do sociologists) and yet find it difficult to say that he is normal like everyone else. Davis shows how he must constantly cope with difficulties of social interaction. (This of course depends on the nature of the disability.) He was dealing with crippled persons, victims

of polio,¹⁰ whose walking and seeing handicaps made interaction with others difficult. But the stickiness comes from two directions: that normals will aggravate the difficulties, treating the handicapped as if the situation were even worse than it is; or that normals will seek to avoid embarrassment by ignoring the difficulties, creating problems that would otherwise be more easily handled. In the words of Davis:

Achieving ease and naturalness of interaction with normals serves naturally as an important index to the handicapped person of the extent to which the preferred definition of self—i.e., that of someone who is merely different physically but not socially deviant—has been accepted. Symbolically, as long as the interaction remains stiff, strained, or otherwise mired in inhibition, he has good reason to believe that he is in effect being denied the status of social normalcy he aspires to or regards as his due.

The process of transformation from a voluntary conformist to an involuntary deviant reveals a profound underlying concern: the need for continuous restoration of the cultural and social order when threatened by anomalous situations, when things do not go according to the way they are supposed to go.¹¹ Conventional actors reaffirm their belief in the conventional cultural formulas by preferring a stigma that redefines those discrepant individuals' past and future performances as no longer accountable to that set of rules. The stigmatized are "removed" from the conventional social order; in so doing, the conventional members re-establish the primacy of such cultural directives as "competent people avoid accidents."

Disability in itself, so long as it is recognized as being outside the conventional social order, does not threaten the belief systems of normal members of society. In fact, it confirms those systems as valid criteria for judging normality; failure to do so would call into question their own normality. Conventional members of society are not the only ones interested in reaffirming the validity of the cultural order. A stigma not only offers the handicapped a new identification, albeit a deviant one; he accepts it because *his* belief in the cultural formulas has been threatened, too. Thus, both the social and the cultural orders are main-

¹⁰ Note the language, acknowledging that the person was a victim, but nevertheless treating him more as a victimizer.

¹¹ Reference has been made to the involuntary deviant as having formerly been a voluntary conformist. He of course may have been an alcoholic, thief, homosexual, or militant member of an unpopular political group. He was, nevertheless, a voluntary conformist in that aspect of his life and of social interaction in which he became an involuntary deviant. In other words, what is being stressed here are transformation, involuntarism, and the lack of preparation for, expectations about, or socialization into the new role.

tained in spite of unanticipated events. Better as it undoubtedly would be if one were not handicapped, for some people the handicap offers a new label by which they can identify themselves.

Perhaps, in the final analysis, sociologists will find it necessary to accept the judgment of Erving Goffman (1963) that the physically stigmatized must include all those who are visibly stigmatized; this would include in the category of involuntary deviance what Goffman termed "tribal stigma," or race. The analogies between blacks and cripples, drawn in tones of perceptive anguish by Leonard Kriegel (1969), cannot be discounted:

Only by existing does the black man remain black and the cripple remain a cripple. A singular, most unfunny lesson. But the cripple could profit from it. The condition of the Negro is imposed from outside. Obviously, this is not altogether true of the cripple. But while his physical condition is not imposed from outside, the way in which he exists in the world is. His relationship to the community is, by and large, dependent upon the special sufferance the community accords him. And whether he wishes to or not, the cripple must view himself as part of an undefined community within the larger community. But there is no sense of shared relationships or pride. Cripples do not refer to each other as "soul brothers." And regardless of how much he may desire to participate in the larger community, the cripple discovers that he has been offered a particular role that society expects him to play. He is expected to accede to that role's demands. And just as it is considered perfectly legitimate to violate a black man's privacy to bolster assumptions that the nonblack world makes, so it is perfectly legitimate to question the cripple about virtually any aspect of his private life. The normal possesses the right to his voyeurism without any obligation to involve himself with its object. He wants the picture drawn for him at the very moment that he refuses to recognize that the subject of his picture is, like him, a human being. "If you prick us, do we not bleed?" asks Shylock of his persecutors. The cripple's paraphrase might well be, "If you wish to see my wound, can you deny me the right to show you my self?" But voyeurism is the normal's form of noninvolvement. The experience of being the recipient of unasked-for attention is as common to cripples as it is to blacks. Each is asked to show those aspects of his "condition" that will reinforce the normal's assumption about what the cripple (or black) *feels like*, what he wants, and what he is. [Italics in original.]

The physically disabled, however, as outrageous and irrational as the stigmatization may be, are involved in the more difficult problem of self-pride and self-acceptance. The reaction against the black man, for all the deep roots of racism in American society, is lacking in intel-

lectual respectability. Blacks are on the side of law, righteousness, and history; suffer as they do, they can know that their enemies, like anti-Semites, are the ones who contravene the rules of conscience and morality. Whatever one's views as to whether black is beautiful, who can doubt but that anti-black is ugly? Involuntary deviance, other than the racial, lacks such defenses.

The Problem of the Medical Model

IN SOCIOLOGY, the use of the expression "the medical model" for understanding any form of behavior that is allegedly antisocial has fallen into disrepute. There are many good arguments against those who would conceptualize any rejected behavior as sick. Szasz (1970:8-9) demonstrates the absurdity to which the medical model can be carried when he quotes from a review of Karl Menninger's *The Crime of Punishment* in the *New York Times*: "As Dr. Menninger proves so searingly, criminals are surely ill, not evil." Szasz goes on to comment:

"Criminals are surely ill . . . ," say the "behavioral scientists" and their followers. Punishers are criminals, adds Menninger. We are thus asked to believe that the illegal acts of criminals are the symptoms of mental illness, and the legal acts of law enforcers are crimes. If so, the punishers are themselves criminals, and hence they too are "ill, not evil." Here we catch the ideologist of insanity at his favorite activity—the manufacture of madness.

"Criminals are surely ill." Think of it! And remember that anyone convicted of lawbreaking is, by definition, a criminal: not only the hired killer, but also the physician who performs an illegal abortion; not only the armed robber, but also the businessman who cheats on his income tax; not only the arsonist and the thief, but also the gambler and the manufacturer, seller, and often the consumer of prohibited drugs (alcohol during Prohibition, marijuana now). Criminals all! Not evil; and certainly not good; just mentally sick—every one of them without

exception. But remember: it must always be *them*—never *us!*¹² [Italics in original.]

Frank Hartung argues with the utility of a concept of mental illness that attributes this characteristic to a large section of the populace, and sometimes even to all of humanity. He writes (1963:263):

To hold that 10 per cent of the population is mentally well does not completely destroy the wall between the normal and the abnormal. It leaves a stile between them, so to speak. Some people object to the conclusion that as many as 10 per cent of us may be mentally well. They hold that we are all mentally ill. Their position is partly summarized in the title of Lawrence K. Frank's popular book *Society as the Patient* (1948). A few years earlier Ruth Benedict, in the last pages of her *Patterns of Culture* (1934), developed the thesis that "ordinarily the most bizarre of the psychopathic types of the period" are those who most faithfully conform to the norms of their society. Roszak has more recently made the point that "Freud . . . became progressively aware that 'normalcy' may actually be the socially acceptable form of psychic sickness. Man, Freud concluded, is the neurotic animal; the disease is of his nature. . . . What historians may really be studying, not occasionally but at all times, is diseased matter. Human history becomes a case history of the greatest of all neuroses: that of civilized man." [Italics in original.]

Hartung then goes on to quote Edward Glover (1932): "Normality may be a form of madness which goes unrecognized because it happens to be a good adaptation to reality."

It is quite apparent that mental illness is not a very useful concept if it is meant to cover all of humanity or huge portions of it, or every law violator and all those who react punitively against him.

Strong opposition to the medical approach is voiced by Marshall Clinard (1974:12), who notes that it harks back to the older social-pathology model and has been commonly advanced by psychiatrists:

Those who take this view [in favor of the medical or psychiatric model] regard most deviations as some form of "mental illness" or psychological disorder. Consequently, starting with a few behaviors, the concept of mental illness and therefore deviations has been broadened by some people to include "anything and everything in which they could detect

¹² Karl Menninger (1968) never goes quite so far as either the reviewer of his work or Szasz suggests he does. Menninger write of the illness of a woman "who cannot resist her propensity to shoplift, or . . . a man who cannot repress an impulse to assault somebody." One may argue with the entire concept of the irresistible impulse, but this is not the same as attributing mental illness to all those who violate the law.

any sign of malfunctioning, based on no matter what norm. . . . Homosexuality is illness because heterosexuality is the social norm. Divorce is illness because it signals failure of marriage.”¹³ Likewise, delinquency and crime have been regarded as illnesses or pathologies. This approach is invalid, first, because norms are relative and there are few norms whose violation can be universal, and, second, because such behavior is not an illness in the physiological sense but a violation of social norms.

The last point is indubitably true: Behavior that violates norms can only be the *symptom* of illness (if so it is), not the illness itself in the physiological sense. But Clinard is indicating the danger of the medical model, that it can be mechanically and absurdly extended to cover divorce. The problem is to work out methods by which it can cover self-destruction, claustrophobia, or hallucination without extending it to rational and sane behavior that the dominant group in a society may not like.

A further difficulty with the medical model is that it has been applied to deviance as such, not merely to deviants. It suggests a view of society in which obedience to the norms is inherently good, healthy, and mentally well and violation is like a malignant growth. One does not have to look at what is wrong with a social system to see why it generates violation but need only seek ways to correct the evil by suppressing or in some other manner removing the actions that rock the boat and make the ongoing society less viable. So long as the problem is put into the cast of deviance-as-illness rather than deviants-as-ill, a medical view of society will prove inherently conservative and resistant to social change and to the challenge of skeptics and rebels.

For these reasons, the medical model has fallen into disrepute, but what seems to have occurred is that much that is socially useful has been discarded because of the abuses and absurdities to which the theme was carried. It is not necessary to see the law violator during Prohibition as sick in order to find that the compulsive alcoholic is best understood in that light. It is not necessary to see the adulterer as mentally ill in order to conclude that the prostitute is—or the reverse. For some forms of deviant behavior, it appears that a medical model is useful, although it hardly appears useful for deviance as a phenomenon in society.

It would appear to be a task for the sociology of deviance to rescue the medical model from the heap of discarded ideas as well as from the abuses to which it has been reduced by its adherents; to establish objective criteria for the determination of compulsivity, self-destructiveness, and other traits that characterize mental illness; to separate the

¹³ The quote is from Szasz (1961:45).

concept of the illness of deviants from that of the illness of deviance; and to make certain that the concept of mental illness is never permitted to conceal the social ills in which the mental difficulties were nurtured.

REFERENCES

- Aubert, Vilhelm, and Sheldon L. Messinger (1958). "The criminal and the sick," *Inquiry* 1:137-60.
- Benedict, Ruth (1934). *Patterns of Culture*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Blum, Alan F. (1970). "The sociology of mental illness," pp. 31-60 in Jack D. Douglas, ed., *Deviance & Respectability: The Social Construction of Moral Meanings*. New York: Basic Books.
- Clinard, Marshall B. (1974). *Sociology of Deviant Behavior*. 4th ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Davis, Fred (1961). "Deviance disavowal: The management of strained interaction by the visibly handicapped," *Social Problems* 9:120-32.
- Frank, Lawrence K. (1948). *Society as the Patient*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.
- Freidson, Eliot (1966). "Disability as social deviance," pp. 71-99 in Marvin B. Sussman, ed., *Sociology and Rehabilitation*. Washington, D.C.: American Sociological Association.
- Glover, Edward (1932). "Medico-psychological aspects of normality," *British Journal of Psychology* 25:156-65.
- Goffman, Erving (1963). *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Hartung, Frank E. (1963). "Manhattan madness: The social movement of mental illness," *Sociological Quarterly* 4 (April):261-72.
- Hoffman, Martin (1968). *The Gay World: Male Homosexuality and the Social Creation of Evil*. New York: Basic Books.
- Kittrie, Nicholas N. (1971). *The Right to Be Different: Deviance and Enforced Therapy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Kriegel, Leonard (1969). "Uncle Tom and Tiny Tim: Some reflections on the cripple as Negro," *The American Scholar* 38:412-30; reprinted, pp. 165-83, in Edward Sagarin, ed., *The Other Minorities: Nonethnic Collectivities Conceptualized as Minority Groups*. Waltham, Mass.: Xerox College Publishing.
- Laing, R. D. (1967). "The study of the family and social contexts in relation to the origin of schizophrenia," *Excerpta Medica* (International Congress, Series No. 151), *Proceedings of the First International Conference: The Origins of Schizophrenia*, 139-46.
- (1969). *The Politics of the Family*. Toronto, Ont.: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
- Lemert, Edwin M. (1962). "Paranoia and the dynamics of exclusion," *Sociometry* 25 (March):2-20.

- McHugh, Peter (1970). "A common-sense conception of deviance," pp. 61-88 in Jack D. Douglas, ed., *Deviance & Respectability: The Social Construction of Moral Meanings*. New York: Basic Books.
- Menninger, Karl (1968). *The Crime of Punishment*. New York: Viking Press.
- Parsons, Talcott (1951). *The Social System*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Rosenhan, D. L. (1973). "On being sane in insane places," *Science* 179: 250-58.
- Scheff, Thomas J. (1964). "The societal reaction to deviance: Ascriptive elements in the psychiatric screening of mental patients in a Midwestern state," *Social Problems* 11:401-13.
- (1966). *Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Scott, Robert A. (1966). "Comments about interpersonal processes of rehabilitation," pp. 132-38 in Marvin B. Sussman, ed., *Sociology and Rehabilitation*. Washington, D.C.: American Sociological Association.
- Sedgwick, Peter (1972). "Mental illness is illness," *Salmagundi* 20 (Summer-Fall):162-224.
- Srole, Leo, et al. (1962). *Mental Health in the Metropolis: The Midtown Manhattan Study*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Szasz, Thomas S. (1960). "The myth of mental illness," *American Psychologist* 15:113-18.
- (1961). *The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct*. New York: Harper & Row.
- (1970). *Ideology and Insanity: Essays on the Psychiatric Dehumanization of Man*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
- Turner, Ralph H. (1972). "Deviance avowal as neutralization of commitment," *Social Problems* 19:308-21.
- Ullerstam, Lars (1966). *The Erotic Minorities*. New York: Grove Press.

IV

Some Sociological Problems

SOCIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS are not synonymous with social problems. The former involve issues for the profession, the latter for the public. In the area of deviance, to determine, for example, whether or not a form of behavior is disvalued is a sociological matter; to alleviate the sufferings of those so disvalued, or to protect society from them, is a social one. Sometimes the sociological issues are methodological in nature; that is, they concern the mechanisms used for obtaining the answers that sociologists seek, and hence affect the validity, reliability, and reproducibility of the results.

A few sociological and methodological matters are briefly reviewed here.

Determining the Norms and Counting the Deviants

How WIDESPREAD is deviance? How many people are involved in a major or minor disvalued activity or status, whether permanent, temporary, or ephemeral? How great is the suffering that they inflict on others or that is inflicted on them? These are very complex problems. At first glance, it would appear that deviance is, by nature, not quantifiable. Perhaps, with great difficulties, individual types of deviants and deviance can be counted, but some would deny this altogether, and others would prefer to have the number shrouded in doubt.

Almost from the beginning of scientific sociology, there has been an interest in determining the number of people engaged in criminal and other acts considered antisocial. One of the first great statisticians and methodologists of the social sciences, Alphonse Quetelet (1796–1874), devoted his major work to an effort to count crime; and, inspired to a great extent by the contribution of Quetelet, Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) made his greatest substantive contribution to sociology in the study of suicide, a work which was both an amassing of statistical data and an analysis of such data (1897). For Quetelet, Durkheim, and the many who have followed them in the twentieth century, it was not enough to determine how many people committed murder, rape, or suicide; the value of the data would evolve from the knowledge that the figures were increasing or decreasing as one moved from men to women, from one social class or religious group to another, or with the fluctuations of economic conditions. To say that there are thirty homicides in a given city during one year tells only a little; if the figures are translated into a rate, with so many homicides per 100,000 population, their value increases; and if there can be some certainty that the figure is exact, or nearly so, the significance is enhanced immeasurably. When the perpetrators and victims are studied for demographic and social variables, the prospects of using the data in understanding crime causation and prevention increase considerably.

Some crimes, including certain ones of unchallenged social importance, are almost beyond one's ability to count. Who can say how many acts of bribery take place, even when it is possible to define bribery with greater exactness than anyone has done in the past? Blackmail, too, is not reported to the police except on rare occasions, and social scientists can make educated guesses, using a variety of aids (such as interviewing vulnerable people and interpreting newspaper accounts) to arrive at some notion of how often it occurs.

Other crimes, however, seem to be easily countable, and generally with greater accuracy than noncriminal deviant acts, because there is an official agency to whom the crimes are reported. In the United States, crime statistics are gathered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, utilizing data supplied by local police forces, and are published annually as *Uniform Crime Reports*.¹

Statistics on deviant behavior, particularly on matters involving crime, are looked upon by many with skepticism. It is generally felt that they suffer from underreporting. It is true that occasionally a crime that did not occur will be reported, although such instances are probably both rare and easily spotted, so that they do not find their way into statistical tables. More frequently, however, a victim does not learn of the crime until long after its occurrence, or fears vengeance if he reports it, or feels that no good can come to compensate for the time that will be lost in police stations and possibly in court.

With no official agency to count the number of offensive acts that are not illegal, or, if illegal, are generally ignored by the police, and with the greater problem of what acts to consider deviant, can one say whether deviance is on the increase and, if so, in what forms and among what portions of the populace?

Murders can be counted, albeit with great inaccuracy, and rapes and automobile thefts, and there are ways of estimating the number of people engaged in narcotics usage, nonnormative sex behavior, political and religious deviance, and the like. Thus, it may be possible to arrive at conclusions concerning the extent of the particular deviance, its relative rate from one year to another, and the manner in which it correlates with demographic and social variables. Such information is extremely valuable, but it can give only approximations, at best. Some approximations of sexual conduct are derived from Kinsey and his co-

¹ There is considerable disagreement over the validity and usefulness of official crime statistics. Rather than summarize this dispute, which involves the size of the "dark figure" or "latent figure" of crimes known to the victim but for a variety of reasons unreported and others unknown except to the perpetrators (see particularly López-Rey, 1970:1-97), I shall leave this study to the related field of criminology and pass directly to the question of counting deviants and deviance.

workers (1948, 1953), but it appears that their figures have been interpreted to reflect a greater exactness than they warranted, although they may have been much more exact than earlier estimates and may have been necessary correctives of the previous data. There are numerous estimates of the number of people, broken down by race, age, and sex, who are addicted to heroin, and as many, or more, estimates of the extent of marijuana use. Charles Winick and Paul Kinsie (1971) point to the difficulties of estimating the number of full-time female prostitutes in the United States, and note that students of the subject have suggested a figure between 250,000 and 550,000, with many more working part-time. When one shifts to areas of involuntary deviance, there are some rather accurate figures on the extent of mental retardation, leprosy, paraplegia, dwarfism, and other highly stigmatized conditions.

Yet deviance goes beyond any and all of this. It enters into the manner in which people greet or fail to greet one another, into the question of rudeness and stares, into anger, hostility, and hate. It is a matter both of mental illness and of attitudes toward mental illness; a matter both of prostitution and of attitudes toward prostitution.

As a sociological problem rather than a social one, the first requirement is to determine what the norms are and how people feel about deviations. Anthropologists have traditionally been more successful than sociologists in "locating" the norms, because they study rather strongly unified societies. They may not always have understood, certainly not so well as they led themselves to believe, the function of a particular mode of behavior for society as a whole; but they could observe rites, rituals, ceremonies, taboos, punishments, and know that in the world they were visiting, there was a clear demarcation between right and wrong, valued and disvalued.

It is not only the complexity of modern societies and the differential degree of hostility toward a transgressor as the observer moves from one sector of society to another that makes the situation problematic but, far more, the coexistence in the modern world of an "official culture" and a façade or a world of make-believe. This is not a question of concealment so much as it is of pretense. Erving Goffman (1959, 1969), drawing from George Herbert Mead (1934), has shown how so much of man's activities involve impression management: the deliberate effort to present a view of oneself to others that distorts, hides, and in other ways places oneself in a desired light. Irwin Deutscher (1973) has studied this phenomenon in the form of what he calls the discrepancy between "words and deeds." Whereas people give one set of answers to sociologists and other interviewers, in the privacy of an inner circle they display their true views. This is especially apparent if there is a sense of guilt or shame about their beliefs: People pretend to be more

religious than they know themselves to be, more self-righteous about sexual matters (or less so, as in adolescent groups); as American mores change on racial matters, people pretend to be more liberal on race than they are, while at the same time their anger is directed toward those who act in accordance with their words or speak in violation of them.

How do sociologists know what the norms themselves are? How do they know what acts are condemned, by whom, and how strongly? Does the disapproval take the form of a cooling of ardor, a breaking of friendship, or stronger action? In the study of crime, this aspect of the problem can begin with a reading of penal codes and court decisions, but deviance offers no similar codification.

To some extent, this gap in knowledge of the norms has recently been overcome by two forces: the public-opinion pollsters, who have moved more and more into attitudinal studies, and the growth of empirical sociology, given great impetus by the cybernetics revolution. Stratified samples are being asked whether they approve or disapprove, strongly or mildly, of a variety of matters. While this type of study has potential value, it is sometimes carried out naively, in that sophistication in matters of statistics is used as a substitute for knowledge of content. Thus, questions are sometimes phrased in a manner that betrays the prejudice or ignorance (or both) of the researcher. For example, *Today's Health*, an official publication of the American Medical Association, polled several thousand readers, giving them three choices for the expression of attitudes on a variety of issues:

Lesbians are:

- a. sick women who need treatment, but who generally should be avoided.
- b. probably women with variant yet not abnormal sexual orientation who should disassociate themselves from the women's liberation movement because they tend to be too radical and cause bad publicity.
- c. a small, but integral, part of the movement who should be included as sisters.

One can only be appalled at a journal published by the most prestigious organization of physicians that would suggest, as one of the choices to be made, that sick people "who need treatment . . . generally should be avoided." This is all the more shocking because no choice is given that provides an opportunity for people to see others as sick and in need of treatment but not to be avoided, or as well and not in need of treatment but better avoided. Unless survey makers are capable of phrasing questions in a manner that does not channel an answer in given directions and that allows meaningful options for the

respondent, no determination of the norms can be obtained. If this situation is not improved, social science will remain at the stage it was at when a young man was asked (yes, in a serious questionnaire that was published in a serious journal): "Has anyone ever tried to give you the mistaken idea that sex intercourse is necessary for the health of the young man?" (Hughes, 1926; cited by Kinsey, 1948:26).²

Thus, two broad goals of a study of deviance are to find out what the norms are, who cares about them, how strongly they care, and with what consequences; and to discover who violates them, how many people, with what real effects if apprehended, or anticipated effects if not. While surveys are useful, they must be not only structured in a sophisticated manner but interpreted in the light of other information, particularly the observation of behavior. People may express complete approval of racial intermingling and yet resist strongly and react negatively when confronted with the reality of their own situations. They may express approval of integrated schooling but choose schools that avoid the dreaded intermingling. Are the words and deeds compatible? Can they be reconciled?

Even when the sociologist has decided what is deviant and what is not, when he has taken the pulse of the people on an issue and weighed the extent of their negative responses, giving consideration as well to the matter of indifference and making an effort to see through the masks and pretenses, there is still the problem of discovering how many people are engaged in a given behavior or have the trait that places them in a given category. Various strategies have been developed for this purpose; these include the use of official records, questionnaires, interviews, participant-observation studies, unobtrusively obtained data, and reports from journalistic, biographical, and even fictional sources.

While much attention to official sources for crime statistics has been focused on underreporting, there is another side to this picture, the rate-producing processes, described by John Kitsuse and Aaron Cicourel (1963), among others. Control agencies, in their work of defining, classifying, and identifying, do not necessarily create deviants, but they

² A significant feature in attitudinal surveys that has tended to be overlooked is the matter of indifference. "Do you approve or disapprove of premarital sex if two people have a commitment to each other?" a question may be worded. Fine, and the wording is improved if there is a scale that gives the respondent an opportunity to express the degree of his approval or disapproval. Between the two groups of answers there is often a no-man's land, worded "Don't know" or "Undecided." What is lacking is an opportunity to express indifference, which may be the most important factor determining what constitutes deviance. It is expressed by a lack of anger and indignation and a concomitant lack of ardor and advocacy; it is the shrug of the shoulders that does not say "I haven't decided," but most eloquently proclaims "I couldn't care less." The French have an expression for this: *Je m'en fiche*.

do sharpen conceptions of the boundaries so as to include more people, not fewer. Since agencies, as Howard Becker (1963) points out, must justify their existence, they tend to overestimate the number of deviants in certain categories, or broaden the definition of deviance so as to encompass persons or activities previously considered nondeviant, an activity that produces more funds from legislative and other bodies. In the section on deviance and disability, I have mentioned the work of Robert Scott (1966, 1969) along similar lines: how an official agency defines blindness in such a manner as to show that the incidence of blindness is increasing rather than decreasing. The danger here is not only the sociological one, that incorrect information will result through rate inflation, but also that the definition of some individuals will change their life patterns and turn them into the sorts of persons that they might not have become were they not so defined. Here, of course, the problem of counting becomes intertwined with the controversies over labeling.

When the sociologist has decided whether a type of behavior is indeed disvalued, and when he has accumulated data on the prevalence of such behavior, there remains another dimension to deviance that is beyond quantification, although it may be intuited by an observer—that is, the degree of civility in a community, the extent to which people react to strangers and to strange ways with acceptance, tolerance, indifference, suspicion, or antagonism. Although elusive and beyond validation, this may be the key to an understanding of the effects of conformity and deviance on the quality of life of a people.

Learning About Deviants

IN SOCIOLOGY, the word “learning” is usually used in the context of cultural-transmission theory. In the conceptual framework of Edwin Sutherland, as I have noted above, all behavior is learned, anti-social as well as social behavior. Here I employ the word differently, not in the sense of people learning to behave in a given manner, but in the sense of sociologists learning that people do so behave (if they do) and learning the specifics of such behavior.

In the study of normative behavior, sociologists are confronted with numerous problems: They are too close to the scene to be able to observe it with objectivity; they take it for granted and do not see it as fraught with uncertainties; they assume that it is good and imbue it with rationality; they reflect on it so infrequently that they not only understand little of it but are unaware of the poverty of their understanding. These are some of the difficulties that important figures in the behavioral sciences have grappled with: George Herbert Mead (1934), in the development of the concept of the self; Georg Simmel (1950), in the study of forms of social behavior; Sigmund Freud (1901) in the hidden and unconscious meanings of slips, errors, and mundane acts of forgetfulness; Karl Marx (see Schaff, 1970) in the meaning of alienation; and in the 1960s and 1970s, Erving Goffman (1971) in placing the everyday acts of ordinary people under relentless, microscopic analysis.

Deviant behavior is both easier and more difficult than normative life patterns to study. The sociologist is more often alien to it. He cannot bring a familiarity to it, and frequently he has little empathy. He has a feeling of distance between himself and those he is studying, and if he feels at times some sorrow for their plight, this is not the same as learning what the plight is or how it appears to those under study. In his effort to identify with his subjects, he may succeed only in introducing new distortions to overcome old prejudices. In order to show both others and himself that he has rejected the world's prejudices against those under study, that he does not believe in the truth of stereotypes, and that as researcher he is with his subjects although not one of them, the sociologist is often tempted to overreact and to embrace ideas and world views that are not at all rationally convincing to him. In a sense, his position may be analogous to that of the convert or the *nouveau riche*, although the latter are parts of the group whose ways they imitate; like the convert, the researcher is suspect, he must prove his credentials—not his credentials as sociologist or investigator, but as one who is free from bias against those he is watching.

The difficulties in a study of this type are many and involve the possibility that both researcher and deviant may present to each other (and even to themselves) an inauthentic image. Their interest in each other may be a great rip-off, an effort of each to exploit the other. In fact, it can be otherwise only under the most remarkable conditions. No matter how strong the intentions of the investigator to aid those under study—and if these are his intentions, they may well stand in the way of good research—the sociologist is in this game for the benefit, at best, of some higher value that can be called knowledge or

truth and, at worst, because there is a grant in hand, and he can further his own career. In this sense, he is not in a position analogous to that of the physician or attorney, or even the social worker. His subjects are just that, they are not clients; and he has not been called in by them but he needs them, rather than the reverse. If his allegiance is to these subjects rather than elsewhere, it can be a coincidence, but it can also be an impediment to his work. Fortunate if it is neither.

The exploitation is potentially mutual. Essentially, there is only one reason that any deviant collectivity will want to be studied: What's in it for them? This does not mean financially, although that can be the case, but how will such a study help alleviate a distressed situation? Sometimes the subjects have neither the capabilities, as in the case of mental retardates, nor the freedom of choice, as in the case of soldiers, to reject the researchers. But except for those who are mentally subnormal, they can and often do manipulate a researcher and frequently co-opt him into becoming the agent through whom they speak to the world of squares or normals.

The researcher who is aware of such dangers may be able to overcome them. Awareness itself puts a social scientist on the alert, makes him challenge his methods and findings, and particularly the logic of deductions that he draws therefrom.

CHOOSING A FIELD OF INQUIRY

The reasons one chooses any specific subject for study are varied. It may be a matter of convenience, a grant that is at hand, an accident that has opened up a potentially interesting area, or a previous interest that has its roots in one's personal history, family life, or circles of friendship. No research is worth pursuing unless the researcher is committed to the proposition that it has value. One studies deviants for many reasons: to gain information on the people, their actions, and their life-styles. The study of behavior that violates norms should illuminate the nature of those norms, helping to clarify the basic problem of how social order is possible, the conditions under which that order is challenged, the process of social change, the effects (both detrimental and beneficial) that are derived from behavior that violates an imposed and agreed-upon order, and other aspects of society. Deviance in some instance implies suffering, and knowledge about suffering is often desirable in order to alleviate it—although such knowledge may also be used the better to impose it on others and increase it.

The first task, following the choice of a field of study, is to locate the subjects. Chronologically, it may be that the location of the subjects comes before the choice of such people for study. Although this would

make the task easier (in the sense that the search for the people might be unnecessary or there could be a rapid entry into deviant subgroups through those one already knows), one would have to question the representativeness of those known. In other words, to what extent are they similar to others with the same trait who are not known to the investigator?

Suppose that one were to study alcoholism and alcoholics. The problem of locating the subjects is simplified by the large number of such people, their considerable degree of visibility, stigma that is not extremely severe, the existence of hospital and police records, bibliographies that register thousands of entries, official and unofficial agencies handling the problem, organized groups of a self-help nature, and large numbers of biographies, autobiographies, and highly perceptive works of fiction. Merely facing this mass of information, one is confronted with several problems. Are those with hospital and police records different from other alcoholics? In what respect do those who join self-help groups differ from those who do not? Is there a less visible segment, perhaps of a higher social class, that is unlike the more visible and hence the more easily obtained sample? Thus, one starts by saying that locating the subjects is simplified and ends by seeing that one was only seduced into believing that this was so, that the complexities are not only hidden but also the more difficult to handle for that reason alone.

Yet, facing the very bulk of the previous work, one must ask what justifies additional vast expenditures of effort on this phenomenon, other than the hope that new work may add to human knowledge and the fact that one can never be certain to what good use further knowledge might be put.

Knowledge of alcoholism might serve as a guide to social policy, to the decision as to whether an effort should be made to reduce the phenomenon, to accept it with modifications or in its present manifestations, to treat it as a criminal behavior or as a psychiatric malfunction, to see it as an addictive disease with biological and biochemical symptoms, or to reach some other conclusion. If one understands the family life of alcoholics, one might be able to determine how family tensions and dissensions contribute to alcoholism, and vice versa, and such information might enable one to assist families or their counselors by alleviating such distress and perhaps saving family units from being torn asunder.

When one studies the patterns of alcoholics in different social classes, one can see to what extent the differential class attitudes toward deviants contribute to the worsening or alleviation of the condition. An investigation of the manifestations of alcoholism in different racial,

religious, ethnic, and national groups may provide a key to possible biological and genetic factors (it seems unlikely that these exist, but the investigation can contribute by disproving the possibility), and to the social contexts in which alcoholism grows, takes hold, and assumes a variety of forms. A study of Alcoholics Anonymous can show the extent to which this kind of group is effective in aiding people to overcome a type of behavior that they seek to conquer, the conditions under which such a group can be successful, and the possibilities and potentials for similar groups among people who define themselves as having problems that they cannot solve through other channels.

This is not to suggest that all information will be useful, worthwhile, or put to uses that the researcher would welcome, nor that the search for knowledge for its own sake should know no restraints. It is comforting to believe, as some have stated, that truth in the long run cannot be hurtful, but this is a position that has many drawbacks. For one thing, no one ever amasses and publishes "the whole truth": There is in fact no such thing, for the whole truth would place any phenomenon in its full social and historical context, and this would require one to know and say everything there is about it, which means everything there is about everything. Only a small part of the truth can ever be discovered and disclosed, and in the social context, this may in fact do harm where the researcher would have wanted it to do good. Further, one can never be certain that he has uncovered even this partial truth; there is no absolute certainty that one has seen what he thinks he has seen, or that the answers mean what he thinks they mean. Yes, data and research may help people in the long run, but the long run may be a very long one for some people, and it may be that they cannot wait, that they may personally be hurt, even destroyed, or the social group or movement with which they are associated may be injured or annihilated. So that discovering and revealing information about deviants is not to be seen as something inherently having a high value. The value depends on many factors, such as who the deviant is, what the aim of the researcher is, and what the deviants see as the aim of the researcher.

All this will depend to some extent at least, if not as an overriding factor, on the values and attitudes that one brings to the people, group, or movement under study. One may approach the group from a hostile viewpoint, defining its members as enemies, or from a friendly view, classing them on the side of the gods. These divergent views would be apparent if the researcher were studying a racist, nationalist, terrorist, or revolutionary group or deserters from the U.S. Army living in exile in Sweden. One is unlikely to approach with value neutrality a study of armed robbers, fences, rapists, or alcoholics.

Although some of these people are thought of as enemies, others are disvalued not only by the society but by the researcher, whereas in the instance of the Army deserters, the researcher might be approaching the people with friendliness and support.

LOCATING THE SUBJECTS

Many kinds of deviant people are either so few in number or so well concealed that it is extremely difficult to locate them; further, the fact that some can be found may be an indication that the sample under study is unrepresentative of the group as a whole. The gathering of the sample may be made more hazardous by the sensitivity of the deviant to the prying eyes of the researcher.

How does one gather a sample of albinos, for example? Certainly this would make an interesting sociological study in disability deviance: the social interaction of such persons, their feeling of differentness, the extent to which their special condition becomes mentionable, their courtship and dating habits, and the like. A small amount of study would reveal that there are no formal organizations of albinos, no eye clinics specializing in this condition, and no informal subculture in which they tend to group together and interact among themselves.

The sampling in this case would be extremely difficult, but not impossible. A study of the medical literature will uncover the names of a few physicians who have written on the subject, and these doctors may have contacts who can be located. But the medical men themselves may be dead or impossible to locate, or may choose to ignore one's entreaties for cooperation. A physician who does answer the researcher's letter may have known only one or two patients, could have lost contact with them, or they (the patients) might be dead, geographically inaccessible, or uncooperative. All this sounds as if the pursuit of a sample can only lead to nought; but not so—it is a path that has to be followed and that may turn up a few good leads.

Where does one go from there? The best possibilities of gathering a sample, short of finding a medical specialist whose contacts are wide, probably lie in long, patient, and arduous search through social contacts. By word-of-mouth and by letter, the researcher makes known to very large groups of people the nature of his interest. He urges them to send him the names and addresses of every likely person. Then, an approach can be made: "I understand that you have a condition known as albinism, and I am doing a study," and so on.

There would still be a problem if a considerable percentage of the persons approached refused to be interviewed, for in that instance one would not know whether the refusers differed in life adjustment,

personality, and other factors from those who accepted. In a good research design, an effort is usually made to overcome this impediment by systematically following-up on the "no replies" and refusals, in the hope of convincing some of them to go along with the study. It is interesting to compare these people, the "had-to-be-coaxed," with the original group, those quick to respond.

Until the late 1960s, women who had had abortions were difficult to locate, and it was hard to obtain a representative sample because the practice was both illegal and generally disvalued. From the viewpoint of the sociological researcher, this group differed from the albinos in two respects: The abortionees were a relatively large group, estimated in the 1960s to encompass from a million to a million and a half annually (Lader, 1966). On the other hand the albinos were a very small one. Whereas the former group could not be identified as physically different from the rest of the female population between the ages of fifteen and forty-five, the latter group was visibly most distinctive. Hence, the abortionees were hard to locate despite their great numbers, and the albinos despite their high visibility. It would appear, then, that the subject-group should be both large in numbers and highly visible if the researcher is to obtain his subjects with ease. Unlike albinos, abortionees have been studied, but it required the Institute for Sex Research to conduct such research, utilizing a staff of trained interviewers and other excellent facilities.

When all the factors surrounding a situation are taken into account, most groups of deviants can be located. One can find interracial couples, sex deviants of almost every type, people suffering from numerous kinds of rare diseases, grown-ups who had been subject to abuse as children, prostitutes and their customers, and the like. Even successful suicides can be studied, although obviously not interviewed. One can study the notes they left, their medical and other histories, and one can interview their families.

REPRESENTATIVENESS AND TRUTH

Deviant people may be difficult to locate in some instances; dangerous, unethical, or illegal to involve oneself with in others; not easily believed; unlikely to be observable in their natural setting; extremely difficult to "understand" in the sense of empathize with; and adept at seducing the researcher into becoming their spokesman or public relations expert.

The first problem after locating a sample is to gain assurance as to its representativeness, and the manner in which it is obtained will, of course, affect the degree to which it is representative. People engaged

in homosexual behavior have pointed out for years that almost all studies in that area of behavior had been conducted either by psychiatrists or by court and prison researchers, and that this would of necessity produce a sample of persons more disturbed than would be gotten through social contacts. There is validity to this argument, although, as I have noted in my discussion of "deviance and sickness" (pp. 192-94), it can be countered in several ways. But the obverse is also true, that people concerned with homosexual civil rights may be unrepresentative of the disturbed and the compulsive.

The nature of some activities is so illegal and secret that studying them presents almost insurmountable obstacles. How does one do research on a group of organized criminals or spies? Certainly a researcher cannot just walk in and announce himself, even if he has a name and address to go to. And how would he know whether the responses he obtained have any relationship to the truth?

Two examples will illustrate the extremes on the matter of credibility of the subjects. In the first instance, one is studying mental retardates. These persons may, at least in severe cases, be unable to understand the nature of the research sufficiently to give meaningful responses; on the other hand, there can be an advantage here, in that the retardate is unlikely to be able to manipulate a researcher by deliberately projecting "false" signals. He would not be adept, in the terminology of Erving Goffman (1959, 1971), at impression management.

But suppose that this entire focus were to change, and one were looking at a group of people who had committed acts of perjury. It is found that they had certain personality and behavioral traits in common: namely, that large numbers of them perjured, not for monetary or other "obvious" gain, but rather because they enjoyed telling falsehoods. Assume that the research was dealing with so-called compulsive liars. Imagine the difficulties involved in interpreting the responses on a questionnaire.

The reader may object that there is no such deviant entity as "liars"—and that if one were to study those who had been convicted of perjury, there is no reason to believe that they would have a greater tendency to lie than a cross-section of the populace with the same demographic characteristics. This may be true, but it cannot be assumed; it would be a matter for empirical investigation. The fact is, however, that there are some categories of deviants that become adept at dissembling and that have a vested interest in projecting a given image for the researcher. Does not every group have such a vested interest? Probably so, but to greater and lesser degrees, depending upon group cohesion, vulnerability, perceived outgroup hostility, and other factors.

The first problem is to determine the motivations, if any, that might

lead those under study to change their behavior when they are aware that they are under study or when they are responding to questions; the second is for the researcher to question his own readiness to believe. The latter factor, which has thus far been little studied, may be one of the most significant areas for further investigation. The eagerness to believe (or in rare instance disbelieve) the subject divests the research act of the self-critical challenge that is essential to the quest for truth.

What if one starts with a view of the respondent as not believable? Many researchers make an assumption to the contrary only because without it the research cannot be continued, or so it would appear. This is then complicated as one sees the values, prejudices, precommitments, obligations, and identifications of the researcher. Have these all structured his mind in such a way that he will seek to obtain certain results, and will he thus bring to the responses a selectively skeptical mind, that challenges some answers and unquestioningly absorbs others? ³

METHODS OF STUDY

If there are many reasons to pursue information about deviants, there are also many ways of so doing. No one method should be used to the exclusion of all others. Each will give partial answers only, and some are just not available in certain instances while they are most useful in others.

If one were to enter a group, formal or informal, to be studied, under what conditions should this be done? A group can be entered surreptitiously, as if one were a "member" in the sense that one had the aims, attributes, statuses, and conditions of all the others. This is disguised research, in which there is pretense of belonging. In such an instance, the research aim of the sociologist would usually (but not necessarily) be suppressed. It can be imagined that a person who does not share the ideology of a group of true believers awaiting the end

³ For example, Albert Reiss (1961) studied a group of lower-class male youths who were participating in sexual "hustling": a sort of part-time prostitution with older males whom they (the youths) called "queers," a pejorative term that they did not apply to themselves. Their relationship with the older men was impersonal and nonaffectional, and even the body contact was exclusively mouth-genital, the payer being the fellator in all cases, and the entire transaction being purely fiduciary, with no pleasurable sensation being obtained by the fellated youth. At least, this was the story the youths told Reiss. Yet in the same article, just a few pages away, the author suggests that information given to him by middle-class youth on masturbation may have been deliberately falsified because of unwillingness to report such matters to a middle-class investigator. It is not to be excluded that the lower-class hustlers were also putting on the investigator, as they did not wish to reveal the extent of their physical and affective participation with their clients.

of the world might present himself both as sociologist and as a partner awaiting with certainty the coming of doom. Although this is not a frequent combination, it is by no means an impossible one.

Then, a group can be entered in which the researcher shares the trait, but he may or may not announce that he does share it (despite his being "a member," he may desire to conceal this, for professional or other reasons), and does not necessarily announce that he is doing research.

Finally, there are those conditions in which the researcher does not share the trait and makes known that he does not; his interest would have to be presented as being of a professional nature.

The possible combinations are shown in the following scheme:

1. Self-view and self-presentation as member
 - a. and as a researcher
 - b. but not as researcher
2. Self-view and self-presentation as nonmember
 - a. and as a researcher
 - b. but not as researcher
3. Self-view as member and self-presentation as nonmember
 - a. and as a researcher
 - b. but not as researcher
4. Self-view as nonmember and self-presentation as member
 - a. and as a researcher
 - b. but not as researcher

All of these possibilities exist, but 2b and 3b are most unlikely, because if one is presenting oneself as not sharing the traits, ideologies, or other characteristics of the group, it would be necessary to find some justification for being present. You can't expect to go in just because you're nosy. Of course, the researcher can claim to be a journalist, but this is hardly likely to get a warmer reception than the admission that he is a sociologist. He can also claim to be sympathetic to a group without sharing the characteristics, but again, the open avowal of a research aim could probably accomplish the goal of gaining confidence and obtaining information much better than a story of that type, and the deception could prove embarrassing and limiting in inquiry and data-gathering as the research proceeded.

The choice of strategy, in the opinion of some, should be based primarily on values and ethics. However, there are circumstances that may limit the alternatives available: If the attribute is visible—a physical characteristic, such as skin color, a disability, or whatever—

it is clear that someone not sharing the trait may find it difficult to pretend. One can, however, enter a group of former mental patients although one has never been institutionalized and has not suffered from anything diagnosed as mental illness; it is not an easy task, however, and the patients are likely to be quite astute in seeing through the mask. It is not so difficult to join a group of self-styled neurotics or of people who have been diagnosed as schizophrenic. White people have been known to pretend to be black, and the reverse more frequently, and it is not at all impossible to pretend to have homosexual interests without ever getting involved in a sex act that is repugnant to the researcher.⁴

Placed in a slightly different cast, a participant-observation study can take on several different forms, so different that they should not be confused. One is a retrospective autobiographical reconstruction of participation in a group before one had an interest or a training in research methods; in a sense, this is the truest and purest form of participation, because it is not sullied by the effort to obtain information, nor are people on guard against giving such information. However, it suffers because great opportunities are lost when people could have been questioned and were not; and like all true participant observers, the researcher is often ideologically motivated, does not state the limitations of his work, and presents his view of the world as if it were the world, not his view of it. Finally, this type of observation is sometimes not possible because the nature of the group under study is such that its membership cannot produce a trained observer. For example, participant-observation studies of the mentally deficient and mildly retarded would not be possible in the way that such research has been described here.

The pure participant observer brings to his work the subjective understanding (discussed by Max Weber as the concept of *verstehen*) of a group member, plus the sophistication of one who has been trained to observe such phenomena. Perhaps an outstanding example of this, in the field of anthropology, was the work of Jomo Kenyatta (1938) on his own tribe in Kenya; in America, the work of W. E. B. Du Bois (1903) can be cited. In deviant groups, investigations of this sort are likely to be apologies rather than studies, on the one hand, or are sometimes obscured by the unwillingness of the individual to make known his secret deviance. Few sociologists—it is believed—have been

⁴ Laud Humphreys (1970), in *Tearoom Trade*, describes an ingenious solution to one such problem of observing deviance: he pretended to be a "watchqueen"—i.e., someone who gets his kicks out of watching homosexual escapades in semi-public places.

prostitutes, armed robbers, or transvestites; and when they do write on such subjects, if they have been such, they are constrained to conceal this fact, so that their methodology is unknown.

There are also some difficulties in making known one's findings and in articulating the manner in which they were obtained when one had been a member of the group. If the social stigma is extremely strong, as is the case with armed robbers, pimps, prostitutes, homosexuals—until recently—and mate-swapping swingers, the researcher is going to be reluctant to spell out the methodology, and the entire work becomes suspect, difficult to verify, replicate, or challenge. A study of addiction by an ex-addict turned behavioral scientist might be well-received, but child molesters, even reformed ones, are in a less favorable position. Mate swappers frequently suppress vital information by pretending that they were observers when they were actually participants. It is only when the nature of the deviance is far less stigmatizing that such research is possible. Thus, Ned Polsky (1967) has done a study of poolroom denizens, and James Henslin (1967) of cabdrivers.

In the past it has usually been assumed that hard-core criminal groups could not possibly be entered in this manner. Polsky (1967) insists that this is not so, although he warns of the dangers: There are some things one would not want to observe or be an accessory to. While a great deal of valuable information could be obtained in this manner (and an astute observer can pick up cues, understand when material is being concealed, how it is being made to look prettier than it is), one must generally be wary of the snow job that people in a vulnerable position are likely to try to give to others.

Polsky suggests that all situations can be studied by a carefully planned presentation of one's credentials as a researcher. He contends that one can enter into the inner circles of even the most criminal groups, so long as they are assured that no confidential information will be divulged. Valid as this may be as a rule of thumb, I should hardly recommend it as a firm guide, and less, far less, for students than for the better trained and more highly skilled experienced researchers. Just as the failure to announce one's presence can be an obtrusive force, so the announcement can be as well. It is unlikely that armed robbers, extortionists, and people who, in the pursuit of their aims, commit murder are going to permit penetration of their inner circles by a researcher, although pot smokers and prostitutes might. It would hardly be desirable if a sociologist were free of the moral obligation to warn potential victims and the authorities if he knew of a criminal act before its occurrence; and further, he could be bodily harmed, if not murdered, if his work were ever later

regarded as a threat, as might occur if he were subpoenaed to testify in a criminal trial.

Finally, participant observation takes the form of concealed research. The sociologist may indeed be a true participant but conceal his research intentions (a very common practice, by the way); or he may pretend to be a participant though he is not (the form usually discussed under the heading of disguised research). To this latter practice Kai Erikson (1967) has offered several ethical and methodological objections, among the most important of which are that it is distortive and that it may prove harmful to the group. In Erikson's view, one is always a pretender, never a participant, in such circumstances, and this is worsened by the illusion of participation. One never obtains a view of a scene as others see it but seldom realizes that this deficiency exists. Erikson concludes that one should avoid this role at all costs. (Perhaps there are exceptional circumstances, as in the area of political deviance, when one is studying a group of racists. There are many methodological pitfalls—and some personal dangers—in disguised research on the Ku Klux Klan or White Citizens Councils, but I see no ethical problems.)

One of the issues plaguing sociologists is that a researcher, by the nature of his presence, particularly if it is disguised, may change the phenomenon that he is studying. This is also true, and perhaps even to a greater extent, in undisguised research, where the observer is known to be there as an observer. On a sociological level, the research can bring about a distortion in the findings without the observer's becoming aware of the effect of his actions upon the results; on a social level, considering the welfare of society or of the deviants, the nature of the change cannot be controlled, its beneficial or harmful effects cannot be foreseen, and the sociologist acts as an unwitting change agent.

A further problem arises when the deviance involves matters of criminality that a researcher is aware of before or after the facts. Not having prevented the act or reported it to authorities, the investigator may be legally accountable both for his own behavior and for that of others.

Some have argued that sociologists and other researchers with qualified scholastic credentials should be granted privileged communication, so that they could not be interrogated on what they had observed. There are many difficulties with this proposal. For one thing, the researcher's activity does not directly aid his subject, unlike the physician, attorney, psychiatrist, minister, and others who are sought out by the client for the services they can render to him. Further, the privilege is not so sweeping as many people believe; there are

numerous instances in which information cannot be withheld. For example, a lawyer is not permitted to proceed with a case in which he knowingly allows another to perjure himself on behalf of his client (something he takes care of in many instances by being sure that he does not know). And a physician is under legal obligation (often ignored, it is true) to report patients who have come to him with certain contagious diseases, gunshot wounds, and other conditions. A man of the cloth would seldom be privy to information about crimes that were about to be committed, but if he were, certainly there would be a strong obligation to report the event before it happened, if only to prevent the occurrence.

While it may be quite defensible to demand the right of researchers to study with impunity marijuana and even heroin users, as well as others in their natural habitat, it seems to me to be neither likely nor desirable for researchers to expect the same immunity or freedom from social obligations when studying murderers, rapists, robbers, or child molesters. It is extremely interesting and important that social scientists know how these people behave, what groups they form, and how they interact with each other and with their victims, but knowledge is not always of overriding significance. The sociologist, well-trained for observation and analysis, is at the same time poorly trained for the protection of self or of his subject (as potential victim) and has no ethical right to self-appointment for that task. The little-known word "misprision" should here be noted: It refers to the active or passive concealment of a felony or treason from the authorities by someone who has himself not been a party to that act. But it is not simply to avoid punishment for one's misprision that certain types of research immunity cannot be granted; it is that sociologists, in their capacity as citizens or residents, as persons in the community, do not have the right to fail to take active steps to prevent certain crimes from taking place and to apprehend the criminals in other instances.

Desirable as it might seem, it is not absolutely essential that one enter a group in order to study it. The understanding of a group should in the final analysis be a synthesis of the views of many people from many perspectives, not each taken and added together, but reconciled with one another, fitting each piece into place as in a puzzle. As I have noted, information about deviants can be obtained from biography and autobiography, fiction, journalistic accounts, court records, everyday experiences, astute observation, and in numerous other ways. Persons may be interviewed without entering into their milieu and observing them in interaction with each other, if only because the nature of the situation is one that does not foster such

interaction. Sometimes, as in the case of albinos and abortionees, the subjects of the study must be individuals, not groups, formal or informal. The study of people organized into groups is easier than that of loners, and it is tempting to slip into this method if only to avoid difficulties in amassing a sample. However, a group study brings forth the complex problem of determining whether organized people differ from loners with whom they share a trait, and whether the interaction within a group is a variable that modifies behavior.

In the end, knowledge is verified in many ways: The investigator can participate in the group and live with the people under study; he can obtain a sample of the population and do open-ended or highly structured surveys with interviews and questionnaires; he can work out an experiment and study one group against a control. Any single study and single method should be verified by comparison with results obtained in another way or at another time. The sociologist, in short, looks at phenomenon A from the vantage points (or with the instruments) of B and C, a means of approaching A that has come to be known as triangulation (Denzin, 1970).

Further, the researcher questions the motivations of people to be honest or not and their abilities as well as their willingness to reveal themselves. He puts together the pieces of knowledge that come from various sources to see whether a given aspect of it fits with another. Above all else, he challenges—challenges others, challenges himself, challenges his own beliefs and findings, placing them mercilessly before any evidence that might disconfirm them. If the researcher is always reluctant to believe, then what he comes to believe will in all likelihood prove believable.

Conceptualization and the Problem of Minorities

THE DEFINITION of deviance involves conceptualization, and this in turn requires drawing distinctions between deviance and related concepts. One draws parallels and notes similarities as well as differences. For the sociologist, the parallels are significant because they

permit the development of theory on a high level of abstraction and enable him to understand the applicability of observations and conclusions made about one group to another that has not yet been studied.

The most important single sociological concept that parallels that of deviance, and that is not a definitional consideration so much as it reflects a way that scholars look at the world, is the minority group. That there is a great deal in common between ethnic minorities and deviants is apparent to any observer. On several occasions, sociologists have expressed the usefulness of conceptualizing oppressed racial and ethnic groups as deviants; this was made explicitly by Fred Davis (1961) when he included Negroes in his list of deviants. One turns to Erving Goffman (1963:4-5) for a note on the similarity of the stigmas that attach to people because of who they are and because of what they do:

Three grossly different types of stigma may be mentioned. First there are abominations of the body—the various physical deformities. Next there are blemishes of individual character perceived as weak will, domineering or unnatural passions, treacherous and rigid beliefs, and dishonesty, these being inferred from a known record of, for example, mental disorder, imprisonment, addiction, alcoholism, homosexuality, unemployment, suicidal attempts, and radical political behavior. Finally there are the tribal stigma of race, nation, and religion, these being stigma that can be transmitted through lineages and equally contaminate all members of a family. In all of these various instances of stigma . . . an individual who might have been received easily in ordinary social intercourse possesses a trait that can obtrude itself upon attention and turn those of us whom he meets away from him, breaking the claim that his other attributes have on us. He possesses a stigma, an undesired differentness from what we had anticipated.

Goffman examines the social processes common to deviants under four headings: intrapersonal, interpersonal responses within the deviant groupings, interpersonal responses between members of the deviant grouping and the wider society, and collective responses. In each of these four categories, the “normal deviants” and the “tribally stigmatized” not only have similar responses but have indubitably influenced each other.

Social scientists have for many years delved into the phenomenon by which some groups of people are hereditarily assigned to a subordinate position in a society on the basis of their race, religion, caste, country of origin, ancestry, language community, and, perhaps, class. Excepting class, one can combine the variety of hereditary or ascribed groups under the single heading of ethnicity. In a pluralistic society, when an ethnic group is kept in a subordinate position and its members

are judged collectively rather than individually, the subordinate collectivity is called a minority group. The superordinate is generally called the dominant or majority group; the former term is preferable because it expresses power relationships and avoids placing the minority into a numerical framework.

One of the first efforts to define the concept of minority, after it had been in use for several years, was made by Louis Wirth (1945:347):

We may define a minority as a group of people who, because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in the society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment and who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination.

Implicit in this definition is that the minority singled out for differential and unequal treatment is accorded inferior treatment. Quite obviously, the whites of Mississippi (or for that matter of America generally) have been singled out from others "for differential and unequal treatment," and the white schools have been separate and unequal just as have the black. But the whites were on the upper end of the inequality continuum, and from that point of view, a minority existed, but the whites were not such.

Here is another definition, whose simplicity would tend to conceal its sociological origin. From Arnold and Caroline Rose (1948:3): "The mere fact of being generally hated because of religious, racial, or nationality background is what defines a minority group."

THE MEANING OF COLLECTIVE DISCRIMINATION

Collective discrimination has been likened by Peter Berger (1963) to "bad faith," *la mauvaise foi* of Jean-Paul Sartre. The bad faith consists in perceiving an individual as a member of a group and fitting him into a mental framework for prejudging him accordingly. In the colorful expression of Libby Benedict, (1945), what a minority group seeks is

. . . the right to have fools and scoundrels—without being condemned as a group. Every group has about the same proportion of wrongdoers. But when wrongdoers belong to a minority their number is magnified in the minds of other people. . . . Minorities would gladly give up the reflected glory of their great men, if only the world didn't burden them with the ignominy of their scoundrels.

This theme runs through the Simple stories of Langston Hughes and the best works on prejudice and minority-group relations.

"Give us the right to have scoundrels among us!" suggests Libby Benedict as a rational slogan for minority groups. When the theme of collective discrimination, of being judged collectively and at the same time negatively as a member of a group rather than as an individual, is studied, it becomes clear that it is applicable to many deviants as well as to ethnics. Several writers were to see an association between ethnics and other peoples in a similar position, but it was not with deviants that they drew an analogy, but rather with women. Early in American history, the feminist and the Abolitionist movements were linked, many of those in one movement lending support to the other. Frederick Douglass, in fact, ardently supported woman suffrage as part of his struggle for total human suffrage and equality.

MINORITY AS A LABEL

There are several problems that should be considered before the minority group is redefined to include deviants, or before deviants are thought of as minority groups. The first consists of an objection that one may encounter from the self-righteous ethnic victims, who, instead of seeing themselves with new allies, will find their struggle vitiated by the inclusion of people who are sick, often denigrated (and, in the eyes of some ethnics, justifiably so), whose subjection to discrimination may not be entirely irrational, and whose struggle does not carry the intellectual respectability that has become part of those fighting anti-Negro racism and anti-Semitism, for example. "Why link us with them?" a black student, unwilling to be tarnished with guilt by association, will ask with some indignation when he is shown some similarities between the treatment of Negroes, Jews, homosexuals, and epileptics, and one can only imagine his heightened indignation had the professor included (as indeed he should have) lepers among these groups of people. Why link "us" (the good guys) with "them" (the bad guys)?

It is an important question from the viewpoint of strategy. One always picks allies to strengthen one's own cause. But social science is involved here with description, analysis, concept sharpening and concept broadening. To compare two things because they are alike in some respect is not a normative process unless the area of likeness is one that involves being "good" or "bad"—that is, unless the concept itself has normative boundaries, or ethical ones, or unless the category is based on valuations, such as would be the case if one were to create a group called "great works of art" or "profound literature." Donald Cressey (1969:158), for example, draws useful comparisons between the organizational structure of organized criminals in America and

Phi Beta Kappa, but in so doing he is not suggesting that the two groups are equally good, desirable, or useful.

This theme, of the value-free nature of definitions and the conceptual frameworks surrounding them, runs through the works of Max Weber but is specifically explicated by Max Rheinstein (1967) in his introduction to an English translation of some of Weber's writings:

In legal philosophy we find time and again definitions of law which imply some ethical or political value as a necessary element of the very concept of law and which thus excludes from the concept of law every phenomenon which does not live up to the particular value postulated. . . . The sociologist has to deal equally with the social order of primitive cannibals, the ancient Babylonians, Greeks or Romans, Angevin England, or the contemporary United States, the Soviet Union, or National-Socialist Germany of the recent past. Nothing in the nature of things prevents him from reserving the term "law" to those orders which happen to please him. . . . The only question is whether or not . . . a variation of terms is helpful within the framework of a scientific inquiry. . . . Weber would see no practical use in making a terminological distinction between those orders which happen to please and those which would displease his ethical, political, or esthetic sensitivities.

It may need reiteration, axiomatic as it may sound, that to say that two things are similar in some respects (hence belong to the same category and are described by the same label) never implies that they are identical, or even that they are alike in any way other than that expressed by inclusion under the given rubric.

There is, however, another problem, in some respects the reverse of the first—namely, that some disadvantaged groups might seek to use the "minority group" umbrella in order to receive the fallout of respectability and to be seen as victims of injustice. It might seem at first glance that no group of people wants to be or to become a minority, with all the stigmatization and subjugation that this implies; but it is very possible that some groups might want to emphasize that they are minorities (whether they are or not) because they find this useful as an ideological weapon, particularly if they do not have to have the unpleasant consequences of being minorities. The police come to mind; many would say that they are the dominant group, they have the power or at least the authority, they are free of stigma (depending on who does the stigmatizing) and are only slightly subject to negative collective judgment; at the same time they seek the advantages of displaying themselves as the disadvantaged. All this has a special irony when it is recalled that no groups want to be called deviant, many want to be seen as minorities, and the problem here is whether deviants are indeed minority groups.

An interesting example of an effort being made to display a group as a minority in order to arouse sympathy or, more exactly, anger among those victimized is found in the oft-reprinted article by Jerry Farber, "The Student as Nigger." Here Farber (1967) writes:

Students are niggers. When you get that straight, our schools begin to make sense. It's more important, though, to understand why they're niggers.

So Farber takes a look at what's happening on the American college scene, where students have separate and inferior dining facilities and where there is an unwritten law barring student-faculty lovemaking. College students are politically disfranchised although given a toy government, "run for the most part by Uncle Toms and concerned principally with trivia." Students, furthermore, are expected to know their place; the student calls a faculty member "Sir" or "Professor," and "he smiles and shuffles some as he stands outside the professor's office waiting for permission to enter. The faculty tell him what courses to take . . . what to read, what to write, and, frequently, where to set margins on his typewriter."

ETHNICS, DEVIANTS, AND INJUSTICE

There are few areas of sociological study that have become as outdated by fast-moving events and a fast-changing society to the extent that has marked the study of racial and ethnic relations. History itself, in a manner that sociologists cannot claim to have foreseen, has made the texts, the conceptual frameworks, and the approaches of the 1950s and even later largely irrelevant. Black protest, militancy, and confrontation tactics have imbued the ethnic scene with a sense of urgency; but more than that, the new racial struggles brought home to Americans an awareness that they had hitherto lacked of oppression, injustice, and victimization, on the one hand, and the power of the oppressed to change their condition by group identification, organization, and solidarity, on the other. What happens in one portion of society cannot help but affect all others, and so it was that black militancy brought new efforts at organization not only to Indians, Mexican-Americans, and other ethnics, but to women, homosexuals, and even ex-convicts.

If, during this time, that subsection of sociology centered around intergroup relations had largely ignored this phenomenon, if it was unaware that the old-fashioned perimeters of the minority-group concept were things of the ancient past, buried a decade earlier, the same cannot be said for those sociologists who were turning their

attention to deviance. Deviant behavior, long linked with criminal behavior, was being examined, particularly by Lemert, Becker, and their colleagues, from the vantage point of the victims of the process by which some people are labeled deviant and are reacted to, not as whole human beings, but as incapacitated persons, with damaged identity and spoiled self-image. In the manner in which many of these sociologists described the plight of the physically and mentally handicapped, the homosexual, and others, one can find striking similarities to the social conditions of the ethnic minorities. What some but not all of the deviants lacked, however, was a sense of collective membership in the deviant group, while others sought to escape from such membership, or at least to conceal it.

Many of the problems that beset the students of ethnic minorities will be found when one studies deviants. Under what conditions do people who are victimized form subcultures of their own? Do these subcultures look to assimilation into the larger culture of the society or to equal treatment as a separate group without assimilation? Will ethnic minority status take precedence over other minority status in a clash for loyalties? How does one stop a cycle in which discrimination results in inferior training and ability, and the latter results in discrimination? And how does a society plan for social differentiation without inequality?

Although it is useful to conceptualize some deviants as minorities, others do not readily belong in such a category. The sociological problem is to understand not only the criteria that one uses for each concept but why some deviants are subject to collective discrimination and, further, why this discrimination should be both negative and irrelevant. This would involve not only matters of stereotypes but tests to determine the validity of stereotypical images held by large numbers of people. Furthermore, the sociologist would have to be concerned about conditions under which deviant collectivities or subcultures, with their sense of shared identities, emerge. In the end, it may prove more useful to see deviants as minorities than to see minorities as deviants.

Some Sociological Dilemmas

COUNTING, LEARNING, participating, conceptualization: These do not begin to exhaust the sociological and methodological problems in the study of deviance. Briefly, a few others are mentioned here:

There are ethical questions, and they transcend the matter of whether disguised research is permissible. They involve the rights of people not to be researched, and the alternatives open to sociologists when a mandate of that sort is given. There is the matter of whether the gain of knowledge is worth the alleged ethical transgressions. "How else could the knowledge be obtained?" is hardly a rhetorical question that is to be answered by stating that, with no other available source, anything goes. There are limits that one must place on both the ethical imperatives and the value of expected knowledge, and these are to be carefully weighed.

One must consider, further, the damage done to sociology as a profession, and hence to social science as a scholarly enterprise, by those who abuse and misuse their credentials. A sociologist who enters a home under the protection of one research task when he is actually amassing information for another that he does not wish to reveal to the respondent can create suspicion against legitimate and honest researchers for years to come; and it is only the relative lack of publicity given to his masquerade that serves to mitigate the harm he has potentially caused.⁵

Perhaps the most difficult of all problems in sociological research is that of the bias of the researcher. Bias is of course not confined to studies of deviants; there is favorable bias toward the taken-for-granted ways of one's own culture, political bias toward one's own side in a

⁵ Take, for example, the work of Laud Humphreys (1970) in *Tearoom Trade*, in which the sociologist obtained license-plate numbers of those he had seen participating in furtive homosexual acts, traced them through these plates, allowed a period of time to elapse so that he would not be recognized, and then went to the homes of these people under the guise of seeking information of an entirely different nature. The awarding of a sociology prize to this work endowed it with the implied stamp of approval of the profession, despite several disclaimers and voices of protest.

conflict situation, and scientific bias toward ideas in which one has an investment or to which one has a commitment. In deviance, it is usually seen in the form of prejudice, but the upheavals of the 1960s, the struggles of the oppressed, the challenge to the world of respectability, have brought forth a sympathy for persons once reviled and cast out, and this sympathy has found expression in the underdog bias of researchers and observers. This is not confined to sex deviance but is exemplified thereby.

Underdog bias (or overdog, as well) leads to the distortion known as ideology. This word is used in at least two different ways, one of which has positive connotations, the other negative. In the former case, it refers to a set of values around which a group may rally.⁶ In the latter (as it is being used here) it is Marx's conceptualization of ideas employed as weapons; as such, the goal to which the weaponry is put becomes more important than the truth or validity of the ideas.

Karl Mannheim (1936), in his classic work on the subject, emphasized that one's view of reality is position-based and hence must be at best partial and therefore distorted. While it is usually one's socioeconomic position (or social class) that determines the view one holds of the world, it might be a political, religious, or organizational position. Mannheim pointed out that people try

. . . to cover up their "real" relations to themselves and to the world, and falsify to themselves the elementary facts of human existence by deifying, romanticizing, or idealizing them, in short, by resorting to the device of escape from themselves and the world, and thereby conjuring up false interpretations of experience.

Later, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966), in their study of the sociology of knowledge, wrote: "When a particular definition of reality comes to be attached to a concrete power interest, it may be called an ideology." Furthermore, they say: "Frequently, an ideology is taken on by a group because of specific theoretical elements that are conducive to its interests."

It is self-evident that ideology should be absent from the world of science, including social science. What the world ought to be should in no way influence a scientific observer in his view of what the world is. Only if the world of science, however, is aware of the danger that ideological bias may obscure and becloud the study of a given phenomenon can such biases be overcome.

Mannheim stressed social class as providing the position from

⁶ In this respect, Anselm Strauss and colleagues (1964:8) define ideology as "any body of systematically related beliefs held by a group of people, providing that the system of beliefs is sufficiently basic to the group's way of life."

which one sees the world, but this is not the only status that contributes to distortion. All the roles that people have in their highly segmented lives may influence them toward wanting to arrive at a conclusion (that is, wanting to see the world as it ought to be) and therefore may disorient them in their view of the way the world is.

When this is applied to the sphere of deviance, one can see several groups that share ideological goals, which in turn influence their cognition, or at least their public presentation of this cognition. These groups include deviants themselves, civil libertarians, sociologists, social workers, psychologists and psychotherapists, sympathizers with underdogs, and many others. The position of some of these people on deviance should be viewed as an expression, not of their effort to arrive at truth, but rather of their effort to arrange reality so as to help convince themselves or the world that their goals are worthy of support.

Let us take, for example, the sexual deviant himself. He lives under a condition of extreme difficulty. He is frightened that his secret may be discovered; he does not have the public sympathy accorded most people who are suffering from physical, mental, and emotional disturbances; and his view of himself is frequently a hostile one. He develops an ideology of deviance primarily for two reasons. First, his self-image is constantly being attacked by the total impact of a culture that has rejected him and that expresses this rejection in language, humor, vilification, and innumerable minute everyday experiences. If he can create a set of firmly held beliefs in the propriety of his actions and the worthiness of his person, these beliefs may serve as reinforcements so that he can function without self-punishment and self-castigation. Second, if he can project to the world a set of ideas that will bolster the concept that his way of life is a good, sane, and healthy one, then he may alleviate the social pressures that help to victimize him.

In either instance, the goal determines the arguments, beliefs, and structuring of reality, rather than a conclusion being drawn as a logical position based on the observation of reality.

For the researcher into deviance, the problem of ideology is twofold. He must be ever on the alert against ideological distortion emanating from those under study, whether this be willful and conscious or a more "natural" and less effortful interest in projecting an image favorable to the goals of the deviants. In addition, the researcher has his own sympathies, goals, commitments, and ideologies, and he may selectively believe, magnify, or place before the public those deviants who have his sympathy, while doubting, avoiding, or suppressing information that does not confirm and uphold his sympathies.

Furthermore, sympathies and commitments should be derived from

research, and not the reverse. In deciding that a certain form of deviant behavior should be decriminalized, socially accepted, or institutionalized, the sociologist may not be aiding those whose side he is on, for it is possible that research, impartial and objective, might lead to the conclusion that it would be in the best interests of that particular type of disvalued person to be urged or persuaded to undergo change. Consider, for example, the difference in the assumptions with which researchers start when they look at child molestation, homosexuality, prostitution, and transsexualism. How easily the label of "sick" is placed on some of these groups and rejected for others. Yet this is seldom based on researched validation.

This is not to suggest that the behavioral scientist can or should be free of values; only that his science itself should be value-free. For example, he may conclude that his acceptance of the oft-repeated concept of the deviant as anxiety-ridden, disturbed, plagued by inability to make lasting relationships with others, having a life marked by extremely ephemeral contacts that lack affection in no sense implies that he joins the ranks of those who condemn the deviant or urge punitive action. It is true that his conclusions may be used by those who would create a lynch spirit against the deviant, impose ultra-conformity on the country, and distort the scientific information for purposes contrary to the scientist's own values. Although one must be aware of the uses to which one's work may be put, and the work itself should be presented so as to minimize the possibilities of misuse, the uses to which scientific findings are or can be placed are in no sense relevant to the truth or falsity of the findings.

Finally, to describe the deviant as disturbed, anxiety-ridden, and in other terms that are considered by some as less than flattering is not to vilify, except in the eyes of those who condemn the mentally ill and emotionally distressed. It does not insult a man to say that he is blind or has one leg; and to declare that he is senile or epileptic should carry no value connotation either. So with the concepts of mental and emotional ill health: that these may be used to condemn or, as Szasz has indicated, even to imprison does not mean that the scientist, in making his diagnosis, is himself condemning.

The First Case History: A Conflict Between Ethics and Research Goals

LET US examine a specific problem in the study of deviant people, one that involves a group of people who, of their own free will, decided to espouse an idea and a plan of action that they knew would bring down upon them the wrath of a considerable portion of the society from which they came. At the same time, this voluntary deviance involved social conflict, for in this situation there was no general consensus on the norms. Some people saw the violators as enemies, traitors, turncoats, and cowards; to others, they were victims, heroes, idealists who had made great personal sacrifices in order to live by their beliefs. Such was the situation during America's involvement in the war in Vietnam when a number of American servicemen decided to desert the armed forces, go indefinitely AWOL, and find refuge in some foreign country. Many of them (although their number was always rather small) surfaced in Sweden.⁷

The background, problems, behavior, adaptations, and difficulties of the deserters, as well as their interrelationships as an American emigré group and their relationships with natives of Sweden, were matters of sociological importance. There were many reasons that a sociologist who was interested in deviance, political and military behavior, adjustments of humans under difficult conditions, and other areas of study might find it worthwhile to investigate such a group. Furthermore, the sociologist might well have been deeply sympathetic to the antiwar struggle and personally involved in the campaign against the war; hence, he might have seen his research

⁷ The material in this chapter is based on factual information. A researcher went to Sweden to study American deserters, who asked the sociologist to leave. When the researcher returned from Sweden empty-handed, he blamed the deserters for misunderstanding his role and for mistreating him. The discussion here summarizes my position, which has been dealt with at greater length on two previous occasions (Karmen and Sagarin, 1970; Sagarin, 1973).

role as assisting in that work. The opposite, too, might have been the case: The sociologist might have brought to his research task a bias against those who had deserted the country. Either bias would have been equally handicapping in the task of arriving at the truth. But all this omits one important consideration. What of the people being researched? Did they not have some rights in determining whether they would be researched?

The right *not* to be researched is a problem that has received relatively little consideration from sociologists, or for that matter from other students of human behavior. There has been a great deal of concern about the invasion of privacy, but by and large this has been directed against government, big corporations, employers, credit investigators, landlords, or just gossiping neighbors; yet there is a real question here about invasions of the privacy of people by researchers. In the case of the deserters in Sweden, there was a fear that they might suffer from the results of an investigation and a feeling that they could not gain from it. They saw their obligation to be self-protection and the propagation of their faith; in their view, they had no obligation to research or to the "public's right to know."

But it is not merely the people under scrutiny who might decide that knowledge for its own sake is not in all instances defensible; the social researcher might take the same position. If a researcher charged with having used unethical practices to obtain information were to counter with the question, "How else could the knowledge be gathered?" he would be in a weak position. His question would imply that if there were no better or more ethical manner, then knowledge should always take precedence over ethics and foreseeable consequences. Few if any social scientists would offer medical researchers such *carte blanche* to do what they wished with their subjects in order to gain information. In fact, it is a major indictment of the Nazi regime and its researchers, as well as of American physicians who used diseased blacks in order to gain information about a disease rather than to treat them, that they pursued just such a course.

This is not to suggest that the medical analogy is a perfect one. The social scientist is essentially an observer, not an experimenter. He seldom creates situations in order to study them. It is doubtful that any sociologist would favor subjecting a human infant to extreme isolation, under planned and controlled conditions, to replicate the studies made by Kingsley Davis (1947) in two instances where this had occurred. One can bring up a chimpanzee as if he were a human being, but no social scientist would do the reverse, although much could be learned from this process. What is involved here is the precedence of values over research and knowledge. Yet the medical analogy should

not be entirely dismissed, for the social investigator, even if he does not experiment, affects the persons he is observing at least to some extent.

Then there is the question of confidentiality. Even if the antiwar group in Sweden feared the researcher, can they not be protected by the pledge of confidentiality that almost any investigator would make? However, whereas a client exercises his right to choose his physician, lawyer, or therapist, the researched group might reject an investigator precisely because they had not chosen him. But if the analogy with physicians and other professionals is to be pursued, no sociologist would give medical men the right to use their subjects (or clients) without the latter's knowledge and consent.⁸ Yet, disguised research is the equivalent of studying people without their knowledge; and insistence that a group has no right to exclude a researcher means that people can be studied without their consent.

TAKING THE VIEW OF THE OTHER

If one looks at research from the standpoint of those who are the potential subjects of investigation, a paradox is encountered, for the researcher must start by seeking to understand the way in which he is defined by the people he wishes to study. This may lead him, if he is sufficiently astute and self-critical, to the discovery that he is defined as an enemy by them, his research as a threat, and not at all for irrational or absurd reasons. He may in turn define the group as suffering from paranoia, but usually this would be either amateur psychologizing (a case of sour grapes) or a technique of neutralization in which one blames the victim (Sykes and Matza, 1957). He may righteously proclaim that he is a pure and neutral investigator, unsullied by values, who will report only the truth, and that the truth need never be dangerous.

A commitment to neutral, scientific research fails to take into account the values of the subjects and the gross inequality of resources usually found in a conflict situation. The deserters were in conflict with the power elite and the military might of American society. From their perspective, it appeared that they might be hurt by research even when

⁸ But it is done! When prisoners are used for experimental purposes, consent is obtained and the men are paid a meager sum; however, as Jessica Mitford (1973) points out, this is not for the benefit of humanity but for the profits of pharmaceutical manufacturers and the enrichment of physicians. Further, can one speak of voluntarism and consent when men are captives? If it were a question of sexual gain rather than monetary profits, the consent would be regarded as spurious and the act called statutory rape.

conducted by sympathetic or "objective and detached" social scientists. They worked, in this instance, from an almost nonexistent power base. There was a constant threat hanging over them, individually and collectively. They were almost penniless, had limited access to mass media, and were in many instances anxiety-ridden because of their ties with families suffering from government pressure in the United States. They were locked in constant battle with a military machine with literally billions of dollars at its command.

In the deserters' view, a single false step, a single leak of information reaching their enemy, would be fatal, and well it might have been. Aware of social-class conflicts in the society from which they had defected, they saw a danger not in the purely descriptive material that might emanate from a study (although that, too, might be threatening to people in a precarious position) but in the use of such intelligence and information by those who command the resources, manpower, influence, technology, and institutions that deserters, as a politically powerless deviant minority, were challenging.

Regardless of the freedom of research design that the American scholar may feel, the group under study can make its decisions only from the vantage point with which it sees such investigation. They take note of the sponsorship of grants and contracts by the very power that they so strongly oppose. The oppressed see a danger that the social scientist, by studying opponents of the military or some other hostile institution, is in effect giving counsel and advice on how best to suppress, channel, co-opt, deflect, or avoid movements that could thwart the will of those in control of decision-making in a society. Men in power are not always in accord with respect to strategy and tactics, but disagreement among members of the ruling elite must not be mistaken for the weakening of structural constraints upon permissible dissent.

But some people found it difficult to understand the hostility that they encountered from the deserters. They knew that they were not threatening those they wished to study and could not grasp why others did not see this as well. They might have, had they been able to envisage the situation that would develop if a group of anti-Castro exiles in Miami were approached by a social scientist from the University of Havana, credentials in hand and grant in pocket, seeking consent to study the refugee colony. One may well argue that the analogy falters because the American sociologist, no matter what the source of the money, has a degree of independence that the Cuban has not; even if this is true, it does not mean that the subjects for investigation would view the two researchers differently.

It is the institutional base that sponsors the investigation to which

the researcher must report; and it is the same institution, or others closely allied thereto, that will support or reject his requests for funds and facilities for further work.

The sociologist may take a different view of his research than the group that rejects him. He may proclaim his sympathies, or at least his neutrality, and be convinced that the knowledge he will unearth can only help the potential subjects. However, he may be wrong about this; he cannot be certain without knowing what he is going to find. And there is no reason to accept his view against that of his subjects.

There are what have been called by Lee Rainwater and David Pittman (1967) "publicly accountable" groups, including government agencies, large corporate enterprises, philanthropic groups that appeal for funds for specifically declared uses, and others. A politically dissident and deviant group would not fall into such a category and has no obligation to welcome an investigator doing social research. Such a group has the right to withhold information, and if the members so decide and cannot be convinced to change their position, their decision should be respected. Sociologists, for the sake of their own ethics and for the future of the profession, should not be placed in the role of invaders of privacy, save when such an invasion is part of an open struggle in which they have taken sides and is not conducted under the mask of pure research.

VALUES AND THE CONFLICT MODEL OF SOCIETY

In some situations involving deviant people, there are opposing forces in society, locked in combat, and sociologists may be compelled to choose sides and make alignments among them. The idea of commonly shared core values of a society, held together in a state of dynamic equilibrium, cannot be applied to voluntary political deviants, whatever other area of application it may have.

One set of assumptions held by social scientists leads to the view that the competing claims are resolved through democratic procedures within a pluralist framework. Sociology, as one of the social sciences, is seen as essentially objective, neutral, value-free, and untainted by competing ideologies. Social theory and research are means for searching for truth, solely in the interest of progress. Whereas basic abstract social research is innocent of responsibility for its uses and consequences, applied research explicitly attempts to solve practical problems through social engineering.

An alternative set of assumptions, associated with conflict schools of social theory and particularly the Marxist tradition, leads to the view

that a social system is beset by internal dissension and resistance at home and involved in the exploitation of peoples abroad. The overall functioning and development of the system are such that basic social institutions work in collusion to transform all qualitative demands for meaningful social restructuring into quantitative demands for a share in the existing order and deflect all unsanctioned attempts to go beyond the limits of existing structures into channeled collaboration in the ongoing system. From such a standpoint, sociologists cannot be free of responsibility for the consequences of their research (although these are of course not always foreseeable) and must approach a problem with value-laden assumptions and covert, if not overt, partisanship.

While it is possible but difficult for the sociologist to observe, collect data, analyze, and describe the social world without permitting his biases to influence his findings, it is not possible for him to be free of the context in which he found, investigated, and pursued a problem. Both he and the group that he is seeking to research must recognize that basic research into behavioral patterns provides the concepts and tools for applied research, which in turn is used primarily by the dominant interests in the society. Government, industry, and other forces, having an investment in the continuity of institutions whose purpose is the control and manipulation of people in their immediate social environment, not only have funds and other resources but also provide the basic definitions of reality that serve to legitimate existing social relations. The "independent researcher" is often at the mercy of this power structure.

In a conflict model of society, social problems are defined by the dominant groups as those arenas of activity where dangerously intense unfavorable polarization is occurring, power is being effectively challenged, dominant institutions are faltering, manipulation is failing, and subtle coercion is insufficient. In short, situations threatening to a power group require solutions that will re-establish social equilibrium; and the researcher is in danger of being co-opted for this task, particularly if he is unaware that this is occurring. On the other hand, social problems are defined by the victims, by those whose systematic exploitation has caused them to challenge the social institutions. In the former instance, it is the breakdown of exploitation that produces the social problem; in the latter, it is the dominant institution itself that constitutes the problem.

From the viewpoint of those who are challenging existing class, caste, or other institutional arrangements, much of contemporary sociological research is suspect. Sponsorship of the majority of empirically based projects seems to come either from private foundations, universities, or the federal government, and independence in the pursuit of research

and in the control of its findings is tenuous, likely to be tolerated only within carefully drawn limits, unlikely to be rewarded by further and renewed grants, and may be either discouraged or suppressed when the findings are a serious threat to the existing order. From these basic theoretical vantage points, one not only can understand but can agree with the mandates of threatened groups that some investigators be excluded.

THE DESERTERS WHO TOLD THE SOCIOLOGISTS TO GO HOME

Let us take a look at the situation of the men who repelled the overtures of the researcher. Of the small percentage of deserters who took refuge in foreign countries, those who sought asylum in Sweden were best known. Sweden granted asylum on humanitarian grounds and provided some financial assistance. If Sweden was a haven, however, it was not a heaven for deserters, for it had many serious domestic problems: job shortages leading to high unemployment rates, a housing squeeze causing severe overcrowding, and inflation.

It is practically universal in international law to prohibit the extradition of deserters and other types of political offenders.⁹ Nonetheless, the American government sought to negotiate the return of deserters from foreign countries on the ground that desertion is an act of moral turpitude, and America offered reciprocal arrangements as an inducement.

Since military authorities are unable to extradite errant soldiers, they attempt to score a propaganda victory by enticing deserters to return to American jurisdiction. In order to do this, repatriation loans have been made, light sentences meted out, and parents and relatives subsidized to act as intermediaries. This policy of the State Department is essentially one of low-key psychological warfare.

Under these circumstances, deserters do and must look with suspicion on emissaries from the United States, including those who come in the role of researcher. For deserters are not free from government interference. The deserter community, fearing infiltration, is suspicious of outsiders. Journalists report that undercover agents have been suspected of sowing dissension within the community in order to divide it internally and to discredit it with influential Swedes externally. Several experiences with supposed sympathizers and deserters who turned out to be working for the American military have been reported.

⁹ For sources of the factual information contained in the remainder of this chapter, see Sagarin (1973). I am indebted to Andrew Karmen for gathering a great deal of this information.

The workings of the intelligence services of the various agencies and departments of the American government with reference to desertion were unveiled in executive session and, hence, are unavailable to the public. It has been charged that agents of military intelligence and criminal investigation keep tight surveillance on antiwar servicemen and that they infiltrate the ranks of GI dissenters. It is reasonable to believe that this would be equally true of deserter communities. Mail from distressed parents counseling return home finds its way to deserters attempting to avoid pressure and conflict by leading an underground existence; and poor parents, who have somehow obtained unlisted telephone numbers, make expensive calls from the United States to their indecisive vulnerable sons.

Although the Swedish Government has not publicly cooperated with American authorities, every instance of a deserter's arrival in Sweden has been reported to the Department of Defense, the FBI, CIA, and other agencies. Army intelligence maintains dossiers on all deserters, and organizations that seek to encourage desertion are under close American governmental surveillance. The concern of American authorities with this issue was dramatically presented in an editorial in the *Congressional Quarterly* under the title "Military Discipline: Ebbing Morale of Men at War." Furthermore, the official figures on desertion show that this is not a small matter, nor was it being solved in the closing years of the Vietnam war. By 1971, the total number of annual desertions from all branches of the service was just short of the 100,000 mark and was two and a half times the number and rate of only four years earlier.

The situation that deserters in Sweden, relatively the most hospitable refuge, find themselves in is clearly tenuous. The strained ties with Swedish liberals and peace forces and the weak ties with domestic antiwar groups preclude any chance for a strong pro-deserter lobby in Sweden or in the United States. The failure to attain political asylum, permanent immigrant status, or Swedish citizenship makes the existence of these people precarious. The United States offers inducements for their return, on the one hand, and diplomatic pressure against them, on the other. While one cannot be certain that undercover agents penetrate their community to spy on them and destroy their political and social unity, it is reasonable, and not at all paranoid, for the deserters themselves to believe and to fear this.

The distinction between information derived from research and intelligence gathered from surveillance is sometimes slight, and the consequences of the two types of knowledge may be similar. Descriptive research provides data and substantive facts that can be used against these men, individually and collectively, at trials in America if they return home or in public inquisitions in the host country. It is logical

for a group living under such precarious conditions to suspect that pure or basic research may produce findings that can be applied either to destroy the internal structure of its community or to prevent its growth and development. Any self-knowledge or politically useful information that a sympathetic or objective researcher may unearth for the benefit of the deserters will be essentially useless to them because of their political impotence and their inability to implement meaningful programs; and a researcher supported by an American governmental or quasi-governmental grant can hardly be expected to release his findings to the people being studied while refusing to report these to the grantor.

The researcher who is rejected should understand that the social problem is not the deserters, but the military—its war, its racism, its brutality. If he wishes to carry out a research project, he should turn his attention in that direction. If he does, he will discover much more significant information about deserters than if he had distributed a questionnaire among a small group of expatriates in Sweden. But who would sponsor such research?

RESEARCH AND RESPONSIBILITY

Conscientious but naive researchers may accept the challenge to solve problems for the military or related branches of the government, with the attitude that it might as well be sensible, humane people who do such work: people who may be able to educate the military to foreign realities, or who may get the opportunity to help reconstruct American attitudes or policies. The assumption is that the military, industrial, and political powers can either be deceived or dissuaded from pursuing a given course and that the men on top are divisible into two camps, the good guys and the bad guys (Sahlins, 1967).

Simplistic views of politics and policy ignore the realities of power and the structure of decision-making institutions. They assume a great degree of freedom and a significant role for social science in bringing about social change. The scholar's effect on the course of America is likely to be less than that of the sponsors of research on the nature of scholarship. Findings will be applied to maintain the *status quo* or to implement planned change in such a way as to render opposition ineffective. This was the lesson of the ill-fated Project Camelot.

Herbert Blumer (1967) points out that, because of several cases of poor judgment, typified by Camelot but not exclusive to it, social scientists have tended to observe various precautions when doing government contract work: They employ only tactful, discreet colleagues; they establish good lines of communication within the project;

they maintain good relations with government officials; they avoid cloak and dagger activities; and they are diplomatically hesitant to become embroiled in interagency rivalries and fights. Clearly, these procedures point up the underlying fears of social scientists concerning their profession. They are afraid that they might lose some federal support of research, influence in government circles, access to restricted or classified areas for research, allies and options if caught up in interdepartmental rivalries, and freedom from censorship in publication of findings. The overriding concern is the protection of the privileges, opportunities, and contracts of the field, rather than the rights of the subjects of their research and the consequences of the implementation of study findings on them.

VALUES AND RESPONSIBILITY

The argument over value-free sociology continues. "The only choice," Alvin Gouldner has written (1962), "is between an expression of one's values, as open and honest as it can be, this side of the psychoanalytical couch, and a vain ritual of moral neutrality which, because it invites men to ignore the vulnerability of reason to bias, leaves it at the mercy of irrationality."

If values are to be taken seriously, they cannot be expressed and laid aside but instead must be guides to action for the sociologist. They determine who will be investigated, for what purpose, in whose service. The problem of how such investigation can be methodologically sound becomes more challenging, but it is certainly not solved by a pretense that the values are nonexistent.

In the end, the responsibility of the researcher is both to truth and to values. He cannot evade the latter by concealing himself behind the former. But the responsibility of those who are activists in struggles against war, colonialism, and racism is to the protection of their cause and of themselves, and no one has a moral or ethical right to place his personal career as a researcher above the commitment of such activists. Be their voices muted or strident, sociologists should be able to hear them when they say, "Researchers: Keep out."

The Second Case History: Proposal for a Study of Certain Deviant Couples

THERE IS a problem at hand, and the researcher wishes to proceed; assume, for example, that he will undertake a study of interracial marriage. He has arrived at the point of engaging in the work because he is evidently convinced that the investigation is worth pursuing, that it will reveal something worth knowing, and that he is capable of conducting a study that will yield meaningful results. There may be other reasons as well for the work: that money or a job is available, that the study will advance a career, that it will please someone.

The first task is to define the problem. This involves, but is not limited to, defining what is meant by interracial marriage: What types of unions are included and what excluded? Is marriage defined only as a union that exists between a man and a woman and that has received legal sanction? Is interracial to be confined to the two major racial groups in the United States for the purpose of this study, or is it to include any marriage in which the two partners come from two different backgrounds in a list that might include white, black, Hispanic, Oriental, Amerindian, Asiatic Indian, and some others?

If this is conceptualized as a problem in the sociology of deviance, and if a theoretical approach from that area of sociology is to be used, then the researcher is under an obligation to determine whether, by what standards, and in whose eyes it is deviant to be a partner in an interracial marriage. In fact, some understanding of the social attitudes that people encounter, or at least their perceived and anticipated attitudes, would be essential in order to understand the frame of mind that they bring to the marriage, to the world around them, and to the researcher. While a study of attitudes toward interracial marriage might in itself be a major project and could not very well be undertaken as a small and introductory part of the research into the marriages themselves, some knowledge of public attitudes must be attained.

This might be available from previous research, in scientific and in popular literature, and in other forms.

A research study should usually begin with a more clearly defined and narrowly focused area than "interracial marriage." The study might be concerned with the backgrounds of those who intermarry, the ideologies that they bring to their relationship, the conditions under which they developed an interest in each other, the strains on the marriage, the outlooks of the parties on matters of race, the relationships with families, the circle of friends in both racial groups, the element of secrecy (if any) about the marriage, perceptions of encounters in public, or other areas of interest.

The researcher may proceed to develop hunches or hypotheses, expectations of what may be found based upon previous experience, in order to guide him in the investigation that is planned. The hypotheses are not biases, they are not conclusions that one has reached before a study is undertaken. They are guidelines for avenues of study, in the form of suggesting what might be encountered, so that the expectation will give shape and structure to the exploration, will act as a map, and will be confirmed or disconfirmed by the ensuing experience.

One must now set out to become acquainted with the field of study. This involves primarily making a thorough study of the previous literature and, when possible, becoming acquainted with ongoing work. Almost every area of investigation turns up a considerable amount of literature: dissertations and theses and research papers, books in the social sciences, articles in a scientific and a popular vein, biographies, autobiographies, journalistic accounts, legal decisions, biological and medical studies, psychological work—and the list can be continued. Some of this material contains bibliographies, and one work leads to another. After a while, the literature study begins to reach a point of exhaustion, the same references turn up in different articles, little new information is obtained. Out of this, one has received the impression that a good deal of work has been done in the past, and, at the same time, there gradually emerges the realization that some areas have not been studied at all, or not in the way that is now being planned. Also, the researcher should have obtained some ideas as to how common the phenomenon under study is—how many people are involved, and from what social class, educational levels, and religious backgrounds—and whether they are numerically more frequent when the male is of race A and the female of race B, or the reverse, if the division is not more or less equal. The quantitative information can serve as a guide in the development of a satisfactory sample and also as a background when the study report is written.

Is the researcher a true participant in the group under study? In an

investigation of this sort he might well be, but it is unlikely. He may be a party to a consummated or an anticipated interracial marriage, may be the offspring of such a union, or may have been strongly associated with the problem because of a sister or brother, aunt or uncle, who married someone from another race. While this will provide a good beginning in the development of information and knowledge regarding where one can obtain subjects for study and how to proceed, it offers other drawbacks. If directly involved, one has a tendency to generalize from a narrow experience that may be atypical, and to enter into the research with ideological biases that may be difficult to overcome and so taken for granted as not to be recognized for what they are, namely biases.

A major problem now confronts the researcher: to find subjects in large enough numbers so that it will be a good sample quantitatively and representative of those involved in interracial marriages with respect to income, occupation, life-styles, home backgrounds, children, and other variables. For some deviant groups the sample can be found without difficulty: There are institutions, agencies, organizations, circles of friends, and other bodies through which the people can be discovered. A question, then, is whether subjects obtained through such sources are representative of a larger population having the same characteristic or trait; if not, will those in the group or encountered through the agency be able to lead to others? It is entirely possible that social clubs of interracial couples do exist, although I do not know of any. Some careful investigation either would turn up clubs or informal networks and circles of friends or, on the other hand, would leave the researcher with rather definite information that they are not to be found.

At this point, the researcher will have to develop his sample the hard way—by searching out one lead and another. He lets the nature of his research interest become known among friends, colleagues, people involved in marriage counseling (but he must watch out—he's going to receive cases of people whose marriages are in trouble from a source like this), interfaith and intergroup workers, and many others. A great deal of time will be spent just turning up leads, but interracial marriage is not so rare, and he is likely to find that almost everyone knows one or two couples. More problems: Some people are reluctant to turn over names, and some couples are reluctant to be studied. This is not just a matter of difficulty in getting a large sample; it brings up the gnawing question of whether those who do not wish to welcome a researcher are significantly different from those who do welcome him. Further, to obtain a sample through the types of contacts suggested here may make the sample unrepresentative of the social-class, occu-

pational, educational, and other distribution of all those involved in this type of relationship.

Boundaries have to be set. Must the people have been married for a certain length of time at the moment of the study? Are separated and divorced couples to be included? If so, how are they going to be obtained? If not, is the sample not going to be biased in favor of the enduring and successful marriage?

It is likely that the interracial-couple sample can be developed by the snowball effect. Many of these couples will know one or more others and may be induced to ask them to cooperate. It is better that these new subjects first be approached by those who have already been interviewed rather than by the researcher directly. But even the snowball method does not easily break out of a social class and educational group. It is not likely to lead from middle-class to upper, from fairly well educated to poorly educated, and it seldom leads to loners.

A sample is finally obtained. It is large enough to work with and represents enough to give generalizable results; or it may be a non-representative sample, which is fine as long as one makes explicit exactly what group is studied: only the well-educated, or college students, or lower social class, as the case may be. The researcher must then have a strategy for investigation. The strategy chosen depends on the nature of the problem that he is looking into as well as upon the practicality of alternate available paths. It may be necessary to spend considerable time at social clubs and at semi-public functions with the subjects, to invite groups of them to parties where they will mingle with other couples (not interracial), to be in their homes for meals and spend time playing with their children. Interviews, structured or unstructured, may give a great deal of information, and this can be combined with the results of observation at parties, in restaurants, or in homes. The nature of this study may make it very desirable to interview siblings, parents, and others. It will be found that some couples have lost all contact with other members of their families. It may be possible to discover the relationship, for example, between the success of the marriage and the continuity of close family ties; or between the view of the marriage from the parents' viewpoint and that of the couple (and how each perceives the others' perceptions).

In evaluating what one has found, there are many guidelines. To what extent are the answers given by the subjects consistent with what one has seen of their behavior when they were "off guard"? What motivation might they have had for deliberate deception, for making the marriage appear in a better light, more fulfilling, happier, than they actually perceive it to be—or perhaps the reverse, for painting a gloomier

picture of it than they felt the experience warranted? With what group of persons in society can they be compared in evaluating their experiences? How typical of behavior can one consider a single observation? How obtrusive was the presence of the researcher in the home?

These are the sorts of problems and questions that a sociologist must face. The value of the work will depend upon patience, thoroughness, ingenuity, willingness to recognize one's own biases, ability to overcome bias once recognized, and realization that the findings must support all the inferences that are drawn from them. Most areas of deviance can be studied; most do not present personal dangers or formidable ethical problems—but the investigation is seldom easy. While the nature of the questions raised here about research into interracial marriages will change when attention is turned to some other area of investigation, problems and questions will always arise, and usually answers can be found for them.

REFERENCES

- Becker, Howard S. (1963). *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*. New York: Free Press.
- Benedict, Libby (1945). "The right to have scoundrels," *Saturday Review of Literature* 28 (October):13.
- Berger, Peter L. (1963). *Invitation to Sociology*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
- Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann (1966). *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
- Blumer, Herbert (1967). "Threats from agency determined research: The case of Camelot," in Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot*, Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
- Cressey, Donald R. (1969). *Theft of the Nation: The Structure and Operations of Organized Crime in America*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Davis, Fred (1961). "Deviance disavowal: The management of strained interaction by the visibly handicapped," *Social Problems* 9:120-32.
- Davis, Kingsley (1947). "Final note on a case of extreme isolation," *American Journal of Sociology* 52:432-37.
- Denzin, Norman K., ed. (1970). *Sociological Methods: A Sourcebook*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Deutscher, Irwin (1973). *What We Say/What We Do: Sentiments and Acts*. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman.
- Du Bois, W. E. B. (1903). *The Souls of Black Folk*. Chicago: A.C. McClurg.
- Durkheim, Emile (1897). *Le Suicide*; translated by John A. Spaulding and George Simpson, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1951.

- Erikson, Kai (1967). "A comment on disguised observation in sociology," *Social Problems* 14:366-73; critique and discussion, *Social Problems* 15 (1968):502-6.
- Farber, Jerry (1967). "The student as nigger," *Los Angeles Free Press* (March 3).
- Freud, Sigmund (1901). *Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagsleben*; translated by Alan Tyson, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1965.
- Goffman, Erving (1959). *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
- (1963). *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- (1969). *Strategic Interaction*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- (1971). *Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order*. New York: Basic Books.
- Gouldner, Alvin W. (1962). "Anti-Minotaur: The myth of a value-free sociology," *Social Problems* 9:199-213.
- Henslin, James M. (1967). "The Cabdriver: An Interactional Analysis of an Occupational Culture." Ph.D. diss., Washington University, St. Louis.
- Hughes, W. L. (1926). "Sex experiences of boyhood," *Journal of Social Hygiene* 12:262-73.
- Humphreys, Laud (1970). *Tearoom Trade: Impersonal Sex in Public Places*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Karmen, Andrew, and Edward Sagarin (1970). "Perspectives on deserters, perspectives of deserters, and perspectives on researchers seeking perspectives on deserters," paper presented to the Association for Humanistic Psychology, Miami, Florida.
- Kenyatta, Jomo (1938). *Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of Kikuyu*. London; reprinted, New York: Vintage, 1962.
- Kinsey, Alfred C., Wardell B. Pomeroy, and Clyde E. Martin (1948). *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male*. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders.
- Kinsey, Alfred C., Wardell B. Pomeroy, Clyde E. Martin, and Paul H. Gebhard (1953). *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female*. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders.
- Kitsuse, John I., and Aaron V. Cicourel (1963). "A note on the use of official statistics," *Social Problems* 11:131-39.
- Lader, L. (1966). *Abortion*. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs Merrill.
- López-Rey, Manuel (1970). *Crime: An Analytical Appraisal*. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Mannheim, Karl (1936). *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Mead, George H. (1934). *Mind, Self & Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mitford, Jessica (1973). "Experiments behind bars: Doctors, drug companies, and prisoners," *The Atlantic* 231 (January):64-73.

- Polsky, Ned (1967). *Hustlers, Beats and Others*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Rainwater, Lee, and David J. Pittman (1967). "Ethical problems in studying a politically sensitive and deviant community," *Social Problems* 14:357-66.
- Reiss, Albert J., Jr. (1961). "The social integration of queers and peers," *Social Problems* 9:102-20.
- Rheinstein, Max (1967). Introduction to *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Rose, Arnold, and Caroline Rose (1948). *America Divided: Minority Group Relations in the United States*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Sagarin, Edward (1973). "The research setting and the right not to be researched," *Social Problems* 21:52-64.
- Sahlins, M. (1967). "The establishment order: Do not fold, spindle or mutilate," pp. 71-79 in Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot*, Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
- Schaff, Adam (1970). *Marxism and the Human Individual*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Scott, Robert A. (1966). "Comments about interpersonal processes of rehabilitation," pp. 132-38 in Marvin B. Sussman, ed., *Sociology and Rehabilitation*. Washington, D.C.: American Sociological Association.
- (1969). *The Making of Blind Men*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Simmel, Georg (1950). *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*; translated by Kurt Wolff. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
- Strauss, Anselm, et al. (1964). *Psychiatric Ideologies and Institutions*. New York: Free Press.
- Sykes, Gresham M., and David Matza (1957). "Techniques of neutralization: A theory of delinquency," *American Sociological Review* 22:664-70.
- Uniform Crime Reports*. Washington: Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- Winick, Charles, and Paul M. Kinsie (1971). *The Lively Commerce: Prostitution in the United States*. Chicago: Quadrangle.
- Wirth, Louis (1945). "The problem of minority groups," pp. 347-72 in Ralph Linton, ed., *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*. New York: Columbia University Press; reprinted, pp. 244-69 in Wirth, *On Cities and Social Life: Selected Papers*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

V

Survival Patterns and Social Control

THERE ARE many ways in which society can deal with deviants. The reverse is also true, that there are many ways deviants can deal with society. In fact, one method for society to deal with deviants is to deal with (or change) itself; and, again, the reverse is true, that deviants likewise can undergo change. It is only when such change takes place, whether it is an alteration of social attitudes or of behavior patterns, that the social problem posed by an aspect of deviance can be said to have been solved. This can take the form of complete acceptance where formerly there was hostility; one can see this occurring in America with regard to nonmarital cohabitation, and some people are struggling for a change in this direction vis-à-vis homosexuality. Or the modification can take place in the deviant, by either renunciation or rehabilitation, whichever is the more fitting. Less complete than either of these two would be what might be termed accommodation: a mutual tolerance (or, more precisely, a tolerance by the normals of the deviants), a muted hostility cloaked in the language and mannerisms of good taste—something short of acceptance but not quite what can be termed oppression. On the receiving end of this accommodation is the deviant, accepting the limited opportunities that exist and learning to live with them.

There are other mechanisms for handling deviance as well—complex strategies that involve the two sides in constant but less than deadly conflict.

Strategies of the Deviants

LIFE, EVERYDAY LIFE of the most familiar and widely accepted nature, can be seen as a set of strategic relationships and interactions. People are involved in endless gamesmanship, doing the proper thing because they anticipate the proper response. The image of man as "actor," in the sense not merely of one who performs, who does, but of one who is on stage, may appear to be overdrawn until one takes note of unconscious mechanisms, on the one hand, and of the endless pretense of good manners, propriety, and putting one's best foot forward, on the other. Perhaps it would be more meaningful to speak of putting one's best *face* forward.¹

Numerous social and psychological strategies are available to those who are stigmatized, in order to handle their life patterns in the most self-fulfilling manner. The path that is chosen depends on the nature of the deviance, including its visibility, its imputed immutability, the degree of social opprobrium it evokes, and the primary-group relationships it may involve. Sometimes these factors are idiosyncratic and idiopathic; that is, they are chosen by the individual, and his choice depends on personality and other traits unrelated to the nature of the stigmatizing condition. But for the most part, it is the nature of the condition and the surrounding cultural ambience that are paramount in determining strategic choices. In all instances, it is the way these factors are experienced by the deviant himself that will exert the most influence on his course of action.

One of the strategies available to some people is secrecy. However, under most conditions (the spy would be an exception), secrecy requires an enormous expenditure of energy for ego strength and self-justification. If secrecy is adopted as a strategy, it would suggest (although it does not have to do so) that there is something inherently

¹ This is largely what Erving Goffman (1959) describes under the concept of impression management (see above pages 222 ff). So great is my debt to Goffman in this part of my book that only stylistic considerations prevent a repetition of the acknowledgment on the pages that follow.

wrong with the individual or with his behavior. It is true that one pursues secrecy as a protection against punishment by others, and in that sense it is a logical and reasonable choice. Secrecy is in fact urged upon deviants by their in-the-know friends and family among the normals: "That's what you want to do, okay, but why advertise it?" they say. But it cannot help but occur to persons that they would not be subject to such sanctions if their behavior were not in some way evil or wrong.

The deviants who are subject to punishment if apprehended tend to fall into two groups: those with a condition (who are therefore in no way responsible for what they are), and those who commit voluntary actions over which they ostensibly have control. However, there are behavioral patterns in which the deviant action is voluntary but appears to come from what one "is" rather than from what one "does," and this notion is strongly entrenched in the language and often internalized. For example, when talking about sexual deviance, people speak of tendencies and predilections, terms that are seldom used in discussing larceny or forgery, except in the case of kleptomania, and are still less frequently used in connection with assault and homicide, except as one talks about compulsive violence. Note here that the inherent nature of the condition, the "isness" or ontological component, serves as both exculpatory and condemnatory, the former because the "isness" relieves the individual of responsibility, the latter because it places him outside the realm of both normality (or healthfulness) and rehabilitation.²

Strategies come to depend largely on the manner in which the society, deviant groups and individuals see an action as falling into one of three categories, or floating somewhere between them, as at a point on a continuum, or at different points depending on one's life stage:

1. Voluntary actions that one commits although one knows that they are condemned.
2. Involuntary states that one occupies, free of responsibility although not free of stigma.
3. Actions that one commits as a result of states that one occupies, where the degree of voluntarism is debatable, and that may differ from individual to individual and within an individual from one situation or period to another.

² Unless of course the deviant condition is redefined as normal and healthy, and the person in that sense is rehabilitated. That brings the sociologist back to the problem of deviance and mental illness, an issue that cannot be laid to rest.

Voluntary actions require self-justification in all people not suffering from hallucinations, amnesia, or psychopathology. No matter how evil or unjustifiable the act may be considered by society, no matter what depths of degradation it may have brought him to, each person, in the language of everyman, must live with himself. How does a person live after bombing innocent people, participating in a lynch mob, stealing from a church, or raping an innocent girl seized on the street? Each of these acts is so different from the others that they would bring forth dissimilar answers; moreover, each perpetrator would in retrospect see his own act in an idiosyncratic manner. But all share a common problem: that of ego, the face in the mirror that must be confronted.

The person may take one of two roads: The first is that of self-condemnation, atonement, confession, repudiation of the past, absolution, redemption, expiation, and internal suffering; the second is that of self-justification and denial of responsibility, blaming others, including the victims, for the actions one has performed. While it would appear that the first course would lead to self-rehabilitation, this is not always the case. On the contrary, internal suffering, as various schools of psychiatry have taught and as many have experienced, may serve only to release the individual to commit the same disapproved act again. This is not merely because he has, in his own mind, "paid for" his offense, but also because the suffering has convinced him that it is not the real "self," the true person, who is doing this, but some other. The Jekyll-Hyde complex is here at work. It is the belief that the Hyde is not the real self and that he is detested by Jekyll that releases Jekyll from the restraints and permits him to embrace the evil personality again and again. In such an instance, the perpetrator does not require justification of his act; in fact, he is likely to be all the more vehement in condemnation of the person who did it, a person who is not himself. His self-censure is extreme, and this type of individual is sometimes associated with masochism. While behavior that assumes the proportions of a Jekyll-Hyde personality is rare, exaggerated, and perhaps even entirely unknown, there is something of Stevenson's two-men-in-one in the ordinary person's rationalization for committing a certain act "despite himself." In less extreme form, this condition is called schizoid, and perhaps there is a little of the schizoid in many people.

VOCABULARIES AND JUSTIFICATIONS

If one starts with a vision of a society in which people are socialized to do that which is considered correct, and if one puts aside matters involving conflicts of conduct norms and divided loyalties to focus instead

on acts of deviation toward which there is widespread if not near-universal condemnation within the society, then it is necessary to explain not only what social or psychological forces impinge upon some individuals to divert them into deviant paths but also how these persons justified their activities to themselves as well as to others. Such justifications may take place before the event, acting thus to neutralize the forces that bind people to the norms of their social groups, or they may be *post hoc* and retrospective, having little to do with the motives that existed at the time that the event occurred, or, finally, they may be a very conscious presentation of self, with deliberate dissembling, in order to gain converts to a cause or to mitigate one's responsibility and reduce, if not entirely escape, the fury of a punitive society.

One of the outstanding thinkers to address himself to this problem was C. Wright Mills (1940), who made it central to his lifelong interest in the relationship between language and society. The "imputation and avowal of motives by actors are social phenomena to be explained," wrote Mills. "The differing reasons men give for their actions are not themselves without reasons." Note here the sharp line that Mills draws between cause and explanation or account. He focuses not on the reasons for the actions of men but on the reasons men give for their actions.

Borrowing Max Weber's use of the concept of motive, Mills discusses motive as "a complex of meaning, which appears to the actor himself or to the observer to be an adequate ground for his conduct." One might add here a third dimension: adequate not only as it appears to the actor himself or to the observer, but also *as it appears to the actor that it will appear to the observer*. Motives such as this express themselves in very special vocabularies; they must satisfactorily answer questions concerning social and lingual conduct; and they must be accepted justifications "for present, future, or past programs or acts."

Various vocabularies of motives are present in different epochs and in different social situations. The Freudian vocabulary was popular for a long time; people spoke of unconscious motives, of rationalizations. In Marxist terminology, motives were linked to a vocabulary of class and power. For Mills, the acts were always associated with the available vocabulary of the actors, and the view of an act as good or bad could explain how and why it was able to take place. Placed in a framework of class and culture conflict, the vocabularies of motives serve as explanatory mechanisms, but they tell us only that one who has violated the conduct norms of his own group must have a vocabulary that guided him; they do not elaborate on the source of such a vocabulary. The vision of Mills and his collaborator Hans Gerth (1953:278) seems to be powerful for explaining the type of vocabulary of motive

used in a particular social structure or group within that structure:

The vocabulary is a major element in the style of life which sets off different status groups. It is one of the first things we notice about a person. In terms of his speech, his choice of words and pronunciations, we place a person in the hierarchy of the status sphere. The words that may with propriety be used on given occasions are circumscribed by status conventions, which may be maintained esthetically in terms of "good" and "bad" taste, or magically, in terms of "foul" language, or religiously by taboos being placed upon certain modes of speech, for example, cursing. Conformity to the status conventions of the symbol sphere is upheld by the formal and informal educations of status-group members.

Utilizing this relationship among social group, action, motive, and vocabulary, one could state that nonconformity "to the status conventions of the symbol sphere" is a breakdown or failure of the formal and informal educations of status group members.

NEUTRALIZING THE MORES

The concept of the vocabulary of motives was extended to the field of deviance by Fritz Redl and David Wineman (1951:145ff.), who took note of the manner in which children freed themselves of the restraints of the moral order so that they could perform acts that they knew to be "wrong" or that they were at least ambivalent about:

Even the toughest children with whom we had to deal would reveal, upon closer inspection, that the aggressive front of behavior with which they would surround themselves needed many "special tricks" to be maintained at all. . . . It is fascinating to watch the special machinery these children's ego has developed in order to secure their behavior against post-situational guilt feelings. . . .

What we mean here is not this verbal skill of arguing with the representative of responsibility and guilt from the outside world, but the "system of delusions" which they have invented in order to talk themselves, so to speak, out of the demands of their own conscience—where it is still intact.

The children discovered for themselves or seized upon many phrases and ideas to handle their internal feelings. They said that someone else did the delinquent act first, that it is something that everybody does, that everyone was in on it, that the victimizer had himself been victim of the same behavior at the hands of another, that the victim had it coming to him, that the delinquent had to perform as he did in order not to lose face, that he did not himself gain from the act, that the victim was himself a scoundrel, that the accused was a good

kid but everyone was always picking on him, that he had to reach his goal and could not have attained it in any other way.³

The work of Redl and Wineman leads to the influential theme developed by Gresham Sykes and David Matza (1957). They too start with the idea that deviants (specifically, juvenile delinquents) have not embraced antisocial goals, that they believe in the values of society, and hence require some vocabularies in order to neutralize the restraints that the norms exercise over their actions and lives. They have summarized these notions under several headings: the denial of responsibility, the denial of injury, the denial of the victim (that is, saying that the victim is not a worthy person, that he "had it coming to him"), the condemnation of the condemners, and the appeal to higher loyalty.

In one form or another, these mechanisms can be used to account for a great many socially disapproved acts. People deny responsibility by saying that they are the products of social conditioning and their family background; they bring into play a sort of deterministic outlook in order to show that they did not choose to become the sort of persons they have become. This is not to suggest that their reasons are either "sincere" or "insincere." It is easy for most people to believe in a set of ideologies or rationalizations that will give justification to their acts. Nor does it deny the validity of their claims: They may well have committed the disapproved behavior for the very reasons that are given. The important thing here is that they require the reasons in order to do what otherwise would have been unthinkable or to build a satisfactory self-image after the fact.

Some deny that injury has been done to others. This is not universally available as a neutralizing force, for sometimes the injury is too apparent to be contradicted. But at other times the act was all in fun, no one got hurt, the girl who was raped enjoyed and wanted it and was just waiting for some persuasion, the people whose belongings were stolen are insured and will probably put in a claim for twice what was lost and then take it all off their income taxes anyway.

The victim is unworthy. The drunk or the homosexual gets rolled, the ethnically stigmatized are just naturally evil, the bribed and blackmailed people deserve no better. Large corporations and bureaucratic setups that are bilked are so impersonal that there is no victim at all, in addition to which it is well-known that the corporation is an evil

³ As I read this material, written about children, who were not only delinquent but also highly disturbed, I am struck by the similarity of these vocabularies to those invoked by the people caught up in the Watergate scandal: They could not have attained their goals in any other way, others did the same thing and did it first, people (the Eastern Establishment and the mass media) are always picking on them, they had been victimized too.

entity; moreover, no one was hurt, because the company or government has so many billions that it is impossible to think in terms of anyone paying.

One condemns the condemners. The condemners are the straight society, always hypocritical (in the eyes of the transgressor), never living up to the established standards of morality. Everyone is doing these things or other things just as "bad," or would be if they had the courage and the opportunity!

Finally, there are other loyalties—to peer group, to ethnic group, to the demand that one display courage; loyalties to turf, loyalties to a girl, response to a slur.

The image that emerges is of the deviant who does not entirely believe in the behavior and roles he is pursuing and who requires vocabularies, mechanisms, and rationalizations in order to pursue them. Some have rejected this image as inapplicable to the deviant as rebel, or as underestimating the extent to which a new morality has been embraced or overestimating the degree to which the old one has been internalized or even accepted.

Justifications and explanations take on a variety of forms. After the defeat of Germany in World War II and the arrest and prosecution of numerous persons accused of genocide and other crimes against humanity, some escaped and a few were apprehended later. Of those criminals who were caught and brought to trial after a lapse of several years, the most famous was Adolf Eichmann, accused of playing a major part in transporting large numbers of Jews and others to their deaths. But Eichmann pleaded that he was but a cog in the Nazi machinery, a petty bureaucrat doing his duty in a genocidal society from which he could not escape and for which he was in no way responsible. Many of those who rained death on innocent villages said the same: I was doing my duty, I was doing it for my country, I was a small man and could not change things, I did not make policy, I had orders from above. If it hadn't been me, someone else would have done it. People working on anti-personnel missiles justified their work in this and other ways: by an appeal to patriotism and to the struggle against Communism. Finally, they spoke of their victims, saying that these people were better off dead. This type of justification receives support from national or subcultural groups, and it is rooted in ethnocentrism and culture conflict. The bandits of one group are the revolutionaries of another; the terrorists of one group are the national patriots and freedom fighters of another. Self-justifications are not difficult to bring about if deviance is accepted or glorified among a portion of the population; one takes refuge by identifying with that portion, its values and its way of life.

When one speaks of justifications, one is making an assumption that there is not only sanity, responsibility, and voluntarism in the action, but also some degree of value consensus. No justifications are necessary if the deviant strongly believes that what he is doing is best and right. He is aware that he is stared at and ridiculed, but he pities those who condemn him, and may even forgive them. This is true whether he does no evil to others, as the Hare Krishna, or whether he turns others over to be killed, as an informer who is ideologically motivated.

The types of justification that men make for their actions may be in effect at the time that the acts take place or may be retrospective efforts to explain and live with the memory. All men are bound by the norms and rules of the game, and while some of these rules are minor, telling how to cross the street and how to behave in a store or in a subway, other rules exert strong moral force upon almost all people. Yet they are violated with such frequency that it would appear either that social thinkers have exaggerated the strength with which these moral strictures have been internalized, or that there are mechanisms for countervailing them that are easily effective.

There may be considerable differences between justifications that are made after the fact and those made at the time of or before the commission of an act. However, if the act were premeditated and carefully planned, the justifications would have to be firmly set in advance. The *ex post facto* justifications may appear to be rationalizations of just such actions, and they are likely to be the same as those that were in the minds of the actors at the time the deviant act was planned or committed. This is not to suggest that they are always conscious and well thought out; they may be blocked from the mind or given little conscious thought as one concentrates on the accomplishment of the act or on effective methods for concealment and avoiding apprehension. On the other hand, situational factors may impel a person to behave as he would not have done had he not suddenly been confronted with an unexpected scene. In such a case, he might retrospectively reorder that scene in order to justify what he wishes had not occurred.

Thus, vocabularies of justification are particularly needed when an act is done "on the spur of the moment." The phrase itself, in fact, serves as such a vocabulary, suggesting a line of reasoning such as the following: If I had had the time to think it through, I would not have done it, and in that sense it was not the real me who did the bad thing, so that I suffer only from impulsiveness, poor judgment, lack of restraint, and not from being evil or having evil intentions.

In the United States, techniques of neutralization seem to be especially apparent in oppressive actions against blacks and counterattacks against whites. How was it possible for "good people" to go to their churches,

look at themselves and each other in the streets, greet one another in their homes, after *literally all the white families in a town* were involved in a lynching? First, one blamed the victim individually: One had to believe that the victim had committed an evil act, even though the evidence for this was flimsy, and even though the American system would call for such an act to be judged in a court of law. Then, the lynching was necessary for the preservation of "the system," for if one did not teach the colored people a lesson, they would be wanting one's job, one's home, and one's woman, not to speak of the right to vote. Soon the whites would be overrun and outnumbered, and self-protection demanded strong action. All this, furthermore, was predicated on an unquestioning belief in racial superiority. But then it was the belief in racial inferiority of the victims that neutralized the norms, so that one could commit the murderous acts without thinking of oneself as a murderer. Thus a circular process was set into effect: the beliefs making the acts possible, and the acts calling for a further set of reinforced beliefs.⁴

Strategies of deviants include neutralization and secrecy. The latter usually requires the former, but the reverse is not true, as neutralization may also be accompanied by open commitment. One of the techniques of neutralization is to reject the rejectors, a strategy that has been utilized by blacks and other ethnic minorities in America, and later by homosexuals and other groups. It would appear to be most effective where one is the victim of oppression. It can involve an expression of contempt for those who express contempt, a demonstration that there is greater evil in the others' act of rejection than in anything that is condemned in oneself.

The term *accounts* has been suggested by Marvin Scott and Stanford Lyman (1963) to encompass under one heading both justifications and excuses. Accounts are verbal or linguistic devices utilized whenever an action is subject to question; they are statements made by an actor "to explain unanticipated or untoward behavior." In the case of justifications, the actor accepts responsibility for what has occurred but denies that it was wrong; in excuses, he mitigates his responsibility. Whether conceptualized as linguistic forces that permit a person to commit an act that he allegedly knows is wrong or as a mechanism to explain that act in such a manner as to lessen the probability and severity of punishment, accounts appear to be an important weapon of the deviant in his struggle for survival.

⁴ William Ryan (1971), in a work called *Blaming the Victim*, discusses this technique, but the blamers are not deviants, they are the self-righteous and solid good white citizens, supporters of the society responsible for the plight of the poor blacks, while the latter are the victims who get blamed.

RENOUNCING DEVIANCE

A technique for the management of deviance that has received a great deal of attention from authorities—but that some sociologists have tended to downplay—is renunciation or rehabilitation. The term “rehabilitation” suggests something wrong to be corrected, and for obvious reasons the word generally does not meet with favor when applied to victimless deviants, although it is more acceptable when used in connection with criminals. Renunciation, on the other hand, suggests only a change of course in one’s life, but the term seems to propose that such a change is easy to effect, requiring only a resolution, as on New Year’s Day, to bring it about. Either view involves changing the individual rather than the social reaction to him.

For some types of deviance, normalization of the person is not a possibility.⁵ There are physical conditions and facts of one’s past that are unchangeable. One may go from being a convict to an ex-convict, but one can never cease being an ex-convict (except to become a convict again, which is a far cry from normalization). However, if the ex-convict status also implies that one has renounced criminal behavior, then one has traveled from being a lawbreaker to being a law-abider.

A great deal of attention has been focused on changing the deviant. In some cases, there appears to have been an overemphasis on the difficulties of effecting such change, and this has not only discouraged many people from making the effort and dampened the enthusiasm of potential funders of rehabilitative programs but has also worked against acceptance of the reformed and restored person at face value. There is a strong conflict in certain instances between the orientation toward destigmatization and decriminalization. Many people fear that the deviant might be discouraged from renouncing the unacceptable path he has embraced if he believes that his “error” may soon become one of the accepted diversities in life; and, on the other hand, others fear that widespread public knowledge of the ability of some persons to effect such a renunciation may impede the struggle for destigmatization and enhanced social acceptance. If one says, “Once an addict, always an addict,” this has tremendous social implications: It might discourage

⁵ The term “normalization” is generally used in two different and perhaps antithetical ways. I use it here to mean rehabilitation in order that one may follow what is considered a normal course of life. Others speak of normalization as meaning a change in social attitudes so that the previously condemned behavior is regarded as normal. To make this distinction, I shall refer to the latter as institutionalization (not to be confused with confinement in a prison or mental hospital).

those who would like to cease being addicts, but it might also aid in the effort to obtain social acceptance for addicts without "rehabilitation." There is a third possibility, that it might strengthen the hands of the most punitive members of society, who would lock up the addicts and "throw away the keys."

Some people deliberately, voluntarily, and for a variety of reasons give up deviance. Some outgrow it; some are subjected to successful professional therapy; some hit bottom, which jolts them into changing their ways; while there are others who receive the care, love, acceptance, and affection that can often act as effective therapy.

While deviance as a *social* problem is not going to be solved by rehabilitation, and certainly not by individual renunciation, these are viable mechanisms for dealing with deviance as a *personal* problem. People can and do change their modes of behavior, although they continue to be stigmatized (if they are not exalted) as having once behaved in the proscribed manner. That renunciation works at cross-purposes with justification and self-pride makes for difficulties, not only for the individual deviant, but for all those like himself.

Dissembling and Dissimulation

BY AND large, one of the major strategies for dealing with one's own deviance is to wear a mask—that is, to pretend to be what one is not, or not to be what one is. For those who wear these masks, the problem becomes to a great extent one of impression management; for others, it may be a matter ranging from an effort to pierce the masks to pretending not to have done so.

Although it is true that many deviants are unknown to the public, at least in that aspect of their selves that would define them negatively, this is not universally the case. In some instances, the nature of the status is such that it is highly visible and hence beyond the possibility of concealment. In other instances, it is almost never made public. Between these two poles there are many gradations and numerous variations.

HIGH VISIBILITY

High visibility may be due to an easily perceived physical condition, an act that has received public attention through processing by an official agency, or special circumstances in which an otherwise non-conforming but still nondeviant situation is turned into a deviant one by the fact of its having been transformed from the private to the public domain, as for example by mass media.

The first of these situations is illustrated by obesity (as differentiated from overweight, which may not be a sufficient departure from the normal to elicit stares and other manifestations of devaluation). There is no way for a 300-pound person of average height to conceal his condition except by complete retreat into a hermit-like existence, thus refusing to expose himself to the public—a rare but not unknown situation when visibility of the defect is high and there is a strong sense of shame unaccompanied by compensatory ego-building features. Not all stigmatized people have conditions of high visibility; some may be of such low visibility (as the colostomy patient) as to make it rather easy and tempting to keep the characteristic secret. But for the most part, stigmatization due to disability is usually related to its visibility, although other factors play a part, such as contagion (or the fear of it), awkwardness in the performance of everyday activities, and the moral opprobrium associated with having contracted the condition.

Visibility sometimes comes about when a hitherto secret matter reaches the attention of authorities. Predatory crime is committed by secret deviants, who want their identity to remain unknown and who take measures to prevent themselves from being seen by any but the victims—and not always by the victims. In the case of burglary, the act may be planned for a time when the victims may be away; in rape, truck hijacking, and kidnapping, the victims may be blindfolded, so that they never see the offenders. In these cases, it is the act of being apprehended that creates the visibility of the individual, that is, that identifies him with the crime.

These situations are closely related to another category, in which the act is taken for granted and accepted as an ordinary event until it becomes public knowledge. At that point, and by virtue of that fact, it becomes deviant, unlike violent crime, which is deviant even when the perpetrator's identity is unknown. Examples include influence peddling, fee splitting, and the signing of restrictive racial covenants. A disbarred attorney says, "I did what practically every lawyer does,

but somebody made a fuss about it.”⁶ Getting caught was not the crime, but it did transform the act into a deviant one, through exposure and visibility. This type of transformation takes place through what might be called deprivatization. It has in fact been codified into law on occasion, as, for instance, local statutes prohibiting open cohabitation of unmarried persons where such behavior flouts the morality of the community. The wording of the laws as well as the interpretations of the courts have given evidence that sanctions are not meant to be applied against those who engage in nonmarital sexual activity (including the sharing of a dwelling) in an unobtrusive manner.

GOING PUBLIC

Instances of this sort, in which those on the borderline between the normative and the deviant slip into the latter category, may be considered examples of “going public.” The act or status was previously existent, but it was its deprivatization that constituted the crucial condition for being labeled deviant.

Going public may also be a voluntary act, in which one’s attitudes or behavior would be ignored if it did not become blatantly advertised. In American society, for example, few seem to care if one is an atheist. It is considered a person’s own business, an entirely private matter, but something that one is not supposed to proclaim publicly. As has been said in the popular folklore of sexual relations: “All right, but you don’t do it in Macy’s window,” and only if you do it in Macy’s window is it termed offensive. This might be called the creation of deviance through self-advertisement.

Visibility as a result of a deliberate effort by the individual may come about for the purpose either of coping with a problem or of advancing an idea and proselytizing for it. In the former category, one may place the theme, so popular among some people engaged in homosexual activities, of “coming out.” By ceasing to conceal their activities and propensities, they feel better able to lobby, to advance their organizational struggles, to propagandize for their way of looking at their own activities and at themselves, to counteract shame, and to

⁶ Becoming deviant through getting caught for what “everyone does” is a misunderstood and abused phenomenon. While it may be true that fixing parking tickets and fee splitting are things that most people having the power to do so actually do, the same is not the case with bribery, extortion, burglary of the offices of political opponents, and the like. To say of the revelations of Watergate that the practices were normal procedures of American political skulduggery is an exaggeration to the point of utter falsehood; at the same time, it is a condemnation of the entire American political elite, not an exculpation of it.

disarm the hostile world. By contrast, the political deviant (unless he wishes to use the tactics of a spy) goes public because it is the only road open to advance the policies to which he is committed.

The deliberate attempt to achieve visibility is a strategy not open to all types of deviants. It requires one or several (but not necessarily all) of the following conditions: (1) an ideology that supports one's own self-righteousness and the propriety of one's activities; (2) a feeling that the condition is immutable or that the ideas—in the instance of political deviance—will not be relinquished; (3) frustration that one attributes to concealment of one's deviance; (4) sufficient strength so that the individual (who may be a highly regarded celebrity or a person of independent means) believes himself to be relatively immune from greater stigmatization when he goes public; (5) a feeling of collective strength in a portion of the deviant population to which he looks for support.

Whatever the reasons for visibility, whether it be inevitable (as in the case of the obese) or deliberately chosen (as in the case of the militant atheist), the visible deviant has options that are not open to the secret deviant. The visible deviant is both more and less vulnerable, in that he probably lives in a world of greater discrimination but of lesser fear than the secret deviant.

PRETENDED DEVIANCE

A small and almost neglected area in this entire matter of visibility is the pretended deviant, the make-believe who does not really have the status or condition that he claims to have. In some instances, the pretender may be a police informer or spy working in a subculture of deviants, or even a sociologist in such a group; or an informer in terrorist groups, in the Ku Klux Klan, among drug-users, or in the underworld; or a legitimate member of a deviant group who has privately, to himself, renounced the group's ideology, but nevertheless maintains his ties with the other members to whom he is not yet ready to declare that he is a renegade. In most cases, the groups themselves would be secret, so that one's being a part of the deviant collectivity would be known only to oneself, to one's superiors (in the instance of a police informer), or to the other members of the group. In such examples, the impact of being deviant or doing deviant things can be relatively minor, because the pretender rejects the deviant label, and few others know that he has it.

There is a danger, however, when one must manage episodes and relationships involving severe role conflict in situations involving this type of pretense. Such conflict may come about with the de-

velopment of strong personal and social bonds, particularly sexual liaisons, with other members. The knowledge that you are a stool pigeon, or that you will betray someone who has been personally kind, may take its toll. The informer, for example, may have an affair with a woman whom he is preparing to turn over to the authorities. The impact of these experiences on the pretended deviant's self-image, which can be counteracted by an appeal to higher loyalties (as ideology or government), can be considerable.

Furthermore, all these groups may not be secret, and one may be assigned to work in one that is open, so that there is a problem of manipulating the knowledge of one's "real" identity to a group of significant others. Thus, there are members of Communist and other radical organizations who are secretly FBI informants. To be effective, they must pretend to be loyal to the group in which their loyalty is not truly invested. Does the wife know the truth? Do the children and neighbors know? At what age can the children be told? Are friends aware of the pretense of deviance? If not (and the answer with regard to friends and neighbors would almost always be in the negative), do they approve of the behavior that they misunderstand and misconstrue? If they do, then they are also part of the enemy that is being fought; and if they do not, then there is a real problem of maintaining good familial and social relations with people who wrongly suspect one of what they call evil, yet whose suspicions and false beliefs cannot be rectified.

Pretended deviance has some analogies with pretended illness, particularly but not exclusively of a psychological nature (that is, mental illness). When indulged in for the purpose of avoiding other unpleasant tasks, this is known as malingering or goldbricking. Army officers and especially medical personnel try to see through such pretenses and to compel the malingerer to retract the claim of illness; if they fail to accomplish this task and the person repeats his act with some frequency, they define such a pretense as mental illness and hence as deviant, although not the same deviance as the person claims. The danger could arise, and in the armed services is said to have been not uncommon, that pretense was suspected when the condition was genuine.⁷ This situation can be described as falsely

⁷ An interesting case of real and pretended deviance imputed to a member of the armed services was revealed in the Florida trial of Vietnam veterans who were charged with plotting violent action at the time of the 1972 Presidential nominating conventions. A chief prosecution witness against the veterans was a man who, when he had been in the Army, had a considerable record of alleged mental illness: hallucinations, paranoia, delusions, amnesia, and others. When asked if he recalled these disorders, the witness replied that he remembered all of them except the amnesia!

imputed deviance that takes the form of an imputation of pretended deviance.

Sometimes pretended deviance is a mechanism for disavowing one type of disvalued trait by taking on another. Thus, although drivers almost invariably deny that they were under the influence of alcohol, child molesters and others accused of certain types of crimes frequently insist that they were intoxicated, shoplifters like to claim that they suffer from kleptomania, and people accused of many types of misdeeds often claim amnesia. Although intoxication and kleptomania are themselves deviant labels, they are less stigmatizing than the accusations that are being disavowed, and they relieve one of a sense of blameworthiness and responsibility for a highly disvalued activity by allowing one to assume the stigma of the lesser disvalued.

In a study of mildly retarded people who had at one time been institutionalized and later were living in the outside world, Robert Edgerton (1967) tells of a woman who, when given something to read, pretended to have bad eyesight and not to have her glasses with her. She had never been able to learn to read but was intelligent enough to know that illiteracy is a highly stigmatizing characteristic and so learned to handle situations in which her handicap might prove embarrassing to her. Here, one might say that blame was accepted (the blame for not having one's glasses) when the original situation (low intelligence and illiteracy) was one for which the individual was blameless. All of this was to shift from a highly deviant situation (being vulnerable to such pejoratives as "dumb," "stupid," or "moronic"), to the slight one of having lapses and being forgetful. The example illustrates, among other things, the usefulness of excluding blame and responsibility as essential criteria for locating deviance.⁸

Probably the best-known example of pretended deviance occurred in the United States during the period 1964-72, when young men were being subjected to the military draft and feared that they would be sent to fight in Vietnam. While some males claimed (with what proof or degree of prior history it is not known) that they had migraine headaches or backaches, or that they suffered from a variety of fears and other nervous disorders, many claimed that they had homosexual tendencies, had had and were having sexual affairs with other men, or simply that they were homosexual.

It is doubtful that pretended homosexuality played a big role in the mass induction of men through Selective Service during World War II.

⁸ Although there is pretense here and it is used to conceal deviance, it is not pretended deviance, because forgetting glasses or having poor eyesight is not very stigmatizing. It is, however, an example of what Goffman (1969:12) calls a control move.

While in some respects this may be considered an indicator of the wide support that the war effort commanded among youth and the suspect and almost deviant status applied to young males in apparently good health who were not inducted ("I wonder what's wrong with him!"), this cannot account entirely for the difference that occurred over a period of a quarter of a century. For efforts to avoid the draft in previous wars did not include such widespread avowals of homosexuality as were invoked during the Vietnam years. But the loathing inspired by the Vietnamese war was concurrent with a diminished feeling of stigmatization or embarrassment if one had to tell a psychiatrist, or have it recorded in some permanent file, that one had a history of sex relations with other males.

Pretended deviance can be a mechanism for earning money, obtaining pity and other rewards, carrying out research, or ridiculing the deviant. An example of the avaricious would-be deviant is found among the beggars, who are said to exaggerate their disabilities and to enhance the visibility of their somewhat concealable handicaps, or to claim them when they are free of such altogether.

To pretend to be deviant can be fun ("sick fun," some would say), but the pleasures are enhanced by the reaction that one arouses without any feeling of being a despicable person. A story of that sort was told to me by a student:

I was up in the mountains, at this real nice place; and the first day at the table we were eating dinner, everyone was getting acquainted, people asking each other what's your name and what kind of work do you do and all that. So I said, in the most casual way, "I'm an embalmer." You should have seen their faces. So I just added, "We had so much business this month, my boss just gave me the week off. I felt if I handled one more stiff, I'd go out of my mind." After that, no one would shake my hand, nobody asked me to pass anything on the table. I had the time of my life just watching these people.

Perhaps one can raise the question, "What's deviant about being an embalmer?" Of course, there's nothing antisocial about embalmers, but just take note of how one relates to them in social intercourse and the stigmatizing nature of the profession becomes apparent.

The activity of the young man who said that he was an embalmer is an example of drama; it is an act that appeals to someone who likes to be on stage and who delights in watching himself manipulate others and make them uncomfortable. There is a passage in Goffman, (1959:18) that offers an exquisite explanation of the pretended embalmer:

It should be understood that the cynic, with all his professional dis-involvement, may obtain unprofessional pleasures from his masquerade, experiencing a kind of gleeful spiritual aggression from the fact that he can toy at will with something his audience must take seriously.

IMPUTATIONS, SUSPICIONS, AND FALSE ACCUSATIONS

So accustomed are people to speaking of "the two sides of a coin," and then interpreting the metaphor literally, that they forget that there may be many sides to a controversy or to an abstract concept. Perhaps there are three sides to "the coin" of masked deviance: These are pretended, secret, and falsely accused deviance. In the first, the person does not have the discrediting characteristic but claims to have it; in the second, he does have it, but it is effectively concealed; and in the third, he is accused or suspected of having it, although the imputation is false.

The imputation of deviance and the accusation of it may come about through the search for the culprit of a disvalued act reported to have taken place; or it may be that there never was such an act, and the accusation is false insofar as both the event and the person accused of it are concerned. False accusations may result from and result in rumor and gossip, in which case they can be particularly deadly; or they may result in official proceedings and prosecution. Criminal proceedings by their very nature raise the question of deviance, for the indictment is itself an imputation of such, but it remains only an imputation and goes no further so long as there is no verdict of guilty. Until adjudicated guilty, an accused is said to be innocent, and this is indicated by the almost mandatory use of the word "alleged," without which a newspaper libels a defendant. But the strength of the imputation is expressed in the saying, "Where there's smoke, there's fire."

Sexual behavior often gives rise to suspicions of deviance. False accusations can result from jealousy or may be deliberately created in order to justify disruption of an agonizing relationship.

Suspicion need not be and often is not articulated. A state of tense equilibrium grows up, in which A suspects B of having performed a deviant act, B suspects A of suspecting B, and A suspects B of suspecting A of suspecting B, almost *ad infinitum*.⁹

⁹ R. D. Laing and his colleagues (1966) develop this house of mirrors concept and apply it to marital situations, in their work *Interpersonal Perception*. Goffman (1969) describes these as moves in an expression game.

It is the fate of the suspected deviant that he can almost never be found innocent. There is no court of law, but only the court of public opinion, and it gives its verdict according to whims and fancies, even more so than the highly imperfect agents of the judicial processes. Protestations of innocence may serve only to draw attention to the rumor or charge, very much as do the shouts and protests of an entirely sane man who is taken away in a straitjacket.

THE UNAWARE DEVIANT

A departure from the mask of dissimulation may arise when the actor is unaware of his own deviance, either because (1) he knows that the act is wrong but does not know that he is committing it; or (2) he knows that he is committing it but does not know that it is wrong. In both types, the individual might be considered an unaware deviant.

The first of these two would usually have lesser consequences, because the incident would more likely be trivial and gauche rather than tragic. A person emerges from his home wearing unmatched shoes. Or a teacher stands in front of his class and goes through an entire lecture, not knowing that his fly is open. In most such instances, the inadvertent nature of the act (or of the oversight, which is itself an act) is sufficient to relieve the performer of responsibility. He has had a lapse, and if he is stigmatized at all, it is as one who has lapses, which if they result in nothing more serious than putting on the wrong shoes or failing to zip one's fly, are only mildly deviant.

The second type of unaware deviant is the wrongdoer who does not know that his transgression is just that. This is a more serious matter, and it is sometimes related to migration, pluralism, and other aspects of culture conflict, as described by Thorsten Sellin (1938). An example is cited by Shlomo Shoham (1966:61) of a Moroccan Jew who emigrated to Israel and "did not know that Israeli laws prescribe life imprisonment for killing a daughter who became pregnant out of wedlock." Such a person claims to be utterly shocked when arrested and cannot understand that he is being accused of wrongdoing. There is some question regarding the frequency of seriously deviant acts committed by people who are ignorant of the law; there is always a possibility that their surprise at the societal reaction is feigned. The slaying of an unfaithful spouse or a "wayward daughter" may fall into the category of acts that Moroccans (no matter of what religion) know are illegal but for which they do not expect to be prosecuted, believing themselves to be protected by what has been called the unwritten law.

Urbanization, communication, literacy, and exposure to the mass media seem to have diminished the number of acts that are so deviant that they outrage the public yet are committed by persons who do not know that such acts will be legally as well as socially condemned. One hears from time to time of parents accused of cruelty to a son or daughter who has been dishonest; the mother or father has taught the child a lesson by burning the hands that stole. Such people may be genuinely surprised and bewildered when they are put under arrest. They do not believe that what they did was wrong or that it was the business of society or the law to interfere with the upbringing and disciplining of their child. This would be an example of an unaware deviant, someone who knows what he has done but does not know that it is wrong. One can contrast this with the case of the doctor who performs euthanasia. He believes in the moral righteousness of his act but knows that it is legally condemned. He would not fit into any definition of unaware deviant.

THE SECRET DEVIANT

Although a good deal of the interest in secret deviance has focused on the homosexual, the category is far wider, taking in large numbers of criminals who have not been apprehended as well as people who simply have something in their past that they wish to conceal.

Many secret deviants develop circles of friends and colleagues who are "in the know" while intermingling with others who are not. However, this is not necessarily the case, as sometimes the secret is so closely kept that no one but the secret deviant himself knows. Impotence is an example of an extremely stigmatizing condition that is hardly ever mentioned except to a physician or psychotherapist, and, if the man is unmarried, may be unknown to anyone other than himself and his sexual partner (the incapacity having been demonstrated to him in a vain effort with a girlfriend or a prostitute with whom he may no longer be acquainted). Impotence would not lend itself to interaction with others sharing the same problem, except in the limited case of group therapy, and then only if the therapist structured his groups by bringing together those whose problems were similar.

The question of who should be in the know and who should be excluded is a major one for the secret deviant. A married man and a married woman are having an affair, unbeknownst to their respective spouses and children, but they may have a circle of office friends,

motel owners, and others who do know.¹⁰ For the secret deviants, the in-the-know circle provides a milieu for "letting their hair down," a relaxation in which the constant fear of penetration of the mask is put aside. However, this is not an inevitable stage of being in the presence of those in the know. Interaction between the deviant and those aware of the secret can be handled by verbal avoidance, in which there is a tacit understanding that a given situation is unmentionable even though each is knowledgeable of things about the other.

The secret deviant often, but not always, exaggerates the disaster that will befall him if his discrediting characteristic becomes known. Actually, this depends both on the nature of that characteristic and on the social, educational, and other statuses of the vulnerable person. There is a corollary here to the slightly deviant or even normative behavior that is transformed into its opposite when it is deprivatized—that is, the highly discrediting characteristic which, when it becomes known, is greeted by indifference. "So what?" people say. Before he goes public, the secret deviant calculates whether most of his friends and acquaintances will have that reaction or make some other gesture expressing lack of indignation, even if he is unaware of the attention he is paying to the problem. Is it in the nature of the condition and of the social atmosphere that it will bring sympathy and pity, or only condemnation? To what extent is one morally responsible? Does the unmasked one become threatening to others? Furthermore, what are his other statuses? Are they sufficient to override the denigrated one? If he is disclosing something in his past, has he been rehabilitated? Along this line, a man who has harbored a fear that some day it will be learned that he had escaped from prison some twenty years earlier, and who has been married and regularly employed since that time (a model and upright member of the community), will often find friends and neighbors rallying to his side after his secret is exposed. "It's a great burden off my mind to have this come out after all these years," he will say.

Sometimes the deviance consists in the very fact that it is secret. A person with one set of characteristics who pretends to have another, where neither identity is (necessarily) deviant in itself, is called an impostor. In the language of race relations, this exists when a light-skinned black person pretends to be white (or the reverse, which is

¹⁰ In some deviant circles, when people who do not share the discrediting characteristic are aware of it in one who is stigmatized, the outsiders are said to be "wise." Goffman (1963) however, uses the word "wise" in another and closely related manner (I have found both uses current): In Goffman, "wise" connotes outsiders who are sympathetic to the condition or cause of the deviant. Some of those in the know, however, may be not at all sympathetic; they can be said to be wise in one sense of the word, but not in the other.

rare but not unknown), and it is spoken of as "passing." The word might well be used to cover any such deliberately false claim, where the deviance resides only in the deception, as, for instance, one who passes as a physician without having the credentials. To pass means to be successful in navigating with the assumed identity.

A special case of passing would be transvestism, for it is clear that there is nothing deviant about being male or being female, or about appearing in male or in female attire. The socially disapproved act resides only in the pretense. When a male can successfully wear the mask, one can say that he is passing as a female. When in feminine attire, male transvestites speak of themselves as being "dressed," but this, unlike passing, does not imply any degree of success in deluding an onlooker not in the know. Although the word "dressed" is derived from the fact that one puts on certain apparel, it could be extended to the idea of wearing a mask or a costume, even in a figurative sense, and would be useful to indicate situations in which a performer can pick up the mask and then lay it aside.

Transvestism has also supplied a term to describe the state when passing is unsuccessful, suspicion is aroused, and people can see through the mask or know that it is being worn. The transvestites say that they are being "read," or that others can "read" them. To read means to understand that an identity is assumed. It would be a valuable term for general use in the study of both deviance and secrecy.

The problem of passing becomes very complex when there are psychological motivations, so that gratification is increased if others know how successful the mask actually is. This makes for a self-contradictory situation: One wants to pass, but one wants others to know that one is passing. This knowledge must not be derived from being read, because then the costume is a failure. Transvestites may handle this by having parties. One such party was observed by a trained therapist who was an accepted outsider, Hugo Beigel (1969). According to Beigel, everyone knew who was in costume, and the greatest compliment the transvestites could receive was to be told, "I'd never know, nobody could ever tell."

An aspect of secret deviance is the skeleton-in-the-closet syndrome. This often involves what Goffman (1963) calls courtesy stigma, or what might be termed stigma fallout: being discredited because a family member or someone else with whom one is closely associated has the negative characteristic. Having a mentally retarded child in the family was often kept a deep secret. This has been attributed by some to the imputation of genetic defect to the parents, and hence to all other family members, with concomitant reduction of the marriageability of brothers and sisters. Whatever modicum of ra-

tionality there may be in this explanation for concealment of mental retardation, it is very difficult to use to account for the stigma when a family member has an illegitimate child, is sexually promiscuous or homosexual, goes to prison, or enters into an interracial marriage. Deviance, even when it is a matter of birth, accident, or other blamelessness, is seen as a moral blight, and to the extent that one is associated with it, one is contaminated. This is the concept of fallout.

In fallout, the characteristic is not contagious, but the disvaluation that it carries with it most definitely is. Secrecy is one of the available mechanisms for handling this problem, because the deviant can sometimes be hidden, as in another city, in an institution, literally in a barn or attic, or, much less literally, in a closet. Secrecy, however, is not the only option used in the case of courtesy stigma, and it is being resorted to less frequently, it would appear, when the stigma derives from a biological condition and even for behavioral problems. Students have told me of acute alcoholism in their families (usually a father, sometimes a brother, occasionally a mother). They do not hide this from their friends but overcome the factor of stigma by meeting it head-on. In calling for sympathy, they forestall rejection.

One strategy for concealing deviance may involve engaging in another form of deviance, also secret, but the second deliberately assumed to protect oneself from the damaging results if the first should become known. An example is the flat-chested woman who wears falsies. When she is scorned for wearing falsies, she is doubly scorned, both for the imposture and for the anatomical deficiency that motivated her to become an impostor. In this case, the masquerade might be considered false advertising (although all masquerades are that, to some degree). In one of Goffman's works (1969:19-21), the assumption of a second deviance to conceal a first is called a counter-uncovering move, as distinct from the ordinary mask or cover.

A study of the process by which normals become suspicious of others, and hence transform the secret deviant into the imputed one, was made by John Kitsuse (1962). Among other things, he found that the normals would retrospectively reinterpret the behavior of the secret deviant (this would be done after an incident had occurred or after they had heard a rumor). Kitsuse's work involved the recognition or suspicion of homosexuality. In certain respects, however, there is a wide difference between how one finds out about homosexuals and about other types of people with secrets. Homosexuals are motivated both toward secrecy (or at least they were until a concerted movement was made against this in the United States starting in the late 1960s) and toward revelation. This is because it is sexually advantageous to reveal oneself, so long as it is within a

carefully controlled group. Some of Kitsuse's subjects were propositioned—the coach started rubbing the boy's back, the man in the taxi put his hand on the other fellow's knee. A revelation of this type, however, is not the same as going public, although it can have the same eventual consequences.

In many other types of deviance, not only is there no advantage in self-revelation (except possibly catharsis) but there is seldom rumor unless it is specifically planted or well-founded. People do not go around "wondering if he's one," when the "one" refers to ex-convicts or rapists, child molesters or the brother of a mongoloid, to the extent they do homosexuals or, on occasion, former mental patients. If they wonder whether someone is a mugger or a confidence man, this is a matter of self-protective fear or suspicion of large segments of the population, not specific to a given individual.

When the secret deviant is strongly motivated toward revelation about himself, he may, rather than go public, make confidences to a small group or even to only one person. Before he removes his mask, he sizes up the other or others, and decides that the next step can be taken with safety. The cues, verbal and nonverbal, are arranged in an escalating sequential order. Each leads to the next, and each suggests or discloses more than the previous. However, an avenue of retreat must be left open so that the discarded mask can be retrieved if it should become necessary. One can say that the secret deviant does not burn his bridges behind him; more accurately, he abandons these bridges, always aware of alternate roads, bridges, and tunnels. There is an avenue of escape, consisting in recovery of the mask, with sufficient aplomb so that one can pretend both that it is not a mask and that one has never discarded it.

THE TWAIN THAT MUST NOT MEET

If getting through the day is a matter of impression management, the more so for the deviant, and doubly so for the secret deviant, the invisible deviant, the pretended deviant, the falsely accused, and the impostor. If all men wear masks and deliberately strive to present impressions of themselves, deviants do so with greater consciousness, with enhanced awareness of the incongruence between different levels of reality, and often with guilt and shame. Unless one can construct excellent self-justifications, one tends to internalize the attitudes of the culture toward oneself, and this is accentuated by the fact that one lives a lie. The lives of such people are fraught with fear and with tremendous risk, for their house of cards may at any time collapse. Writing of the precarious position in which these performers place

themselves, Goffman (1959:59) points out that "at any moment in their performance an event may occur to catch them out and baldly contradict what they have openly avowed."

But the pretended and the secret deviants are involved with a self-conscious presentation of the person. Since they cannot be their "natural selves," as this would endanger the interaction they so precariously maintain, they must decide what that unnatural self is like in order that it be convincing. This may lead them into a study of others, even into rehearsal of the roles that they are going to play. For a person to pretend to be what he believes he is not means that he must have a mental image of how the staged self should be presented in order that the performance will not collapse. In his dramatic presentation, he has no director to guide and correct his every move. More fearful that he will underplay the part than that he will overplay it, he often manifests overreaction, and sometimes selects atypical stereotypes as models to imitate. The police informer tries to be the perfect hippie or radical or Klansman; the transvestite often shows exaggerated traits that are not considered feminine but, rather, effeminate.

There is a dynamic interaction between the worlds of visibility and invisibility. A man may travel from the latter to the former; this is the coming-out process. But he may also go in the opposite direction, the going-into-hiding process. A former convict or mental patient carefully conceals his past status and in so doing conceals his present one. This may require some manipulation, sometimes a change of locale or of significant persons with whom he interacts, and even a change of name. Extreme cases of such rebuilding of the past can be seen in people who have undergone a transsexual operation. Some postoperative cases present themselves as just that: former males, now females. But others conceal the past and ask for change on birth certificates, school records, and elsewhere.¹¹

Little studied in the area of secrecy is how one chooses the people who are to be in-the-know about one's secret, how and why one excludes all others, and then, most important, the manipulations so that cues are not confused and so that the twain does not meet. This process takes a great toll on the secret deviant, and it is one of the arguments made by those who call on homosexuals to come "out of the closets." There are, however, disadvantages in deviance avowal, to use the expression of Ralph Turner (1972). The greatest draw-

¹¹ A women's college with which I am familiar received a request from an alumna that all records and transcripts should show that the graduate in question was a male. Complications of this sort are not easily solved, and sometimes the best solution is to avoid them whenever possible. This postoperative ex-female would do well to avoid situations in which her college transcript has to be produced.

back, as I see it, is that it often acts as a reinforcement or fixation of the deviant status and closes the door on change or development that might otherwise have been pursued.

IS THE SECRET DEVIANT DEVIANT?

One of the contentions sometimes made against the labeling school of deviance is that it is a conceptual outlook that cannot handle the secret deviant and the falsely accused. Whatever may be the merits of other charges of shortcomings against the labeling perspective, it appears that this is usually not a serious or justified one, as Edwin Schur (1971) has demonstrated. The secret deviant suffers from societal reaction, not by being actually apprehended and processed through agencies of social control, but from the internalization of the anticipated reaction, and of the disapproval that he feels all the more strongly because he is not free to face and combat it. He must manage his problems in the light of how he believes others will react to him should they discover his secret. Much of his self-image is a reaction to social hostility, and an understanding of his behavior has to take into account not only what motivates him to conduct himself in a manner that is so strongly condemned (the etiological aspects of behavior are indeed downplayed by the labelists) but how he can manipulate his life to avoid that social reaction which the labeling perspective identifies as central to an understanding of deviance.

Nevertheless, some of the formulations of the labeling outlook would indicate that they do in fact fail to bring the secret deviant into their fold. For example, John Kitsuse (1962) writes:

Forms of behavior *per se* do not differentiate deviants from nondeviants; it is the responses of the conventional and conforming members of the society who identify and interpret behavior as deviant which sociologically transforms persons into deviants. Thus, in the formulation of deviance proposed here [the labeling formulation], if the subject observes an individual's behavior and defines it as deviant but does not accord him differential treatment as a consequence of that definition, the individual is not sociologically deviant.

A formulation of that type does not take into account the deviant's fears and apprehensions, not only of having his secret revealed to one person who may indeed be very accepting, but the meaning of the inner secret to himself and to society at large. The falsely accused acts bewildered, indignant, righteous, injured, not merely because something has been incorrectly imputed to him, but because it is an imputation for which he knows there is strong social hostility.

All these types of deviants have a threefold problem: whatever led them to engage in their present behavior, the inner feeling of being inauthentic, and the fear of being found out. "The impression of reality fostered by a performance," writes Goffman (1959:56), "is a delicate, fragile thing that can be shattered by very minor mishaps." Yes, and with very major repercussions, or sometimes—and this is little consolation—with the expectation of major repercussions although they eventually prove to be minor.

Nor does this take into account the effect on one's vision of oneself of wearing the mask. Nathaniel Hawthorne wrote, in *The Scarlet Letter*:

No man, for any considerable period, can wear one face to himself, and another to the multitude, without finally getting bewildered as to which may be the true.

Subcultures

ONE STRATEGY open to deviants, as in fact to all those who differ from many of the people surrounding them, is to form a subculture of others like themselves or, if such a grouping exists, to become part of it. That certain types and kinds of deviants tend to congregate together is quite apparent, a fact that has at times brought forth expressions of public indignation. Under some conditions, their intermingling and interaction are limited to that portion of their lives involving their disvalued trait; under other circumstances, they derive their deviance from the fact that they have mingled together; and finally, there are conditions in which they tend to develop large portions of their lives in close interaction with others similarly situated. A variety of patterns emerges; they take on different forms, with some gains apparently to be extracted from the existence of a subculture, and perhaps some potential losses as well.

Considerable controversy has centered on the question of whether there are such things as subcultures of deviants. Some of this involves the rather complex matter of the definition of a subculture. The latter may be identified as a group of people, partially but never entirely

removed from a larger society of which they are a part, who interact among themselves to a large extent and in important sectors of their lives, sharing with one another some common values and common outlooks on the world which impart to them a sense of ingroup similarity not extended to others.¹²

When we utilize such a definition, it appears that some deviant people do form and participate in subcultures. Milton Yinger (1960) has made an important differentiation between the subculture and the counterculture (before Theodore Roszak [1969] and others had popularized the latter term as synonymous with the life-style of youth in rebellion against the overtechnologized society). For Yinger, what characterizes the counterculture is that its values and activities are in direct conflict with those of the larger society, so that the two cannot peacefully coexist with mutual toleration.

To illustrate, a small religious group might constitute a subculture. However, if it should proselytize in a manner that created hostility to any ecumenical spirit, and if it suggested to its adherents lines of action that would be beyond the limits of tolerance of society (such as polygamy), then it would move into the realm of the counterculture. Some political deviants might well be in conflict, most directly and even violently, with the surrounding institutions, and yet the extent of the interaction of the adherents with one another could be so slight, albeit meaningful, that they would hardly be a subculture, much less a counterculture. Here, one would speak of a social movement in conflict with the power structures of their society. In addition to the concepts of subculture and counterculture, a third pattern emerges, the alternate culture.¹³

Not all types of deviants develop close and frequent interrelationships with similarly situated people. Some by their nature are loners. Even when they work in groups of twos and threes, they are not in contact and do not share a common outlook with other individuals and groups. There are no subcultures of child molesters, for example, nor of rapists. This is not to deny that there could be subcultures of violence-prone males who, among other things, have more than their share of men who commit rape; or of sexual freedomists who, as part of their program, would sanction child molestation (but not call it that, of course, for in their view of the world, nobody would

¹² Sociologists say that such persons have a consciousness-of-kind. It is a useful expression, and it implies that the members do not extend their sense of identification outside the borders of group belongingness. For want of a better phrase, I would use the neologism consciousness-of-unkind to refer to the awareness of differentness.

¹³ There is a similarity between such people and the \pm group (the rebels) in the anomie paradigm of Robert Merton (see p. 106).

be molested) and attract to their ranks some persons interested in or involved with children in an overtly sexual manner. In general, these people act and behave as individuals, and if they possess in common with others like themselves a certain stigma, fear, knowledge of how to commit their acts, and other traits, there is nevertheless insufficient interaction and value-sharing among them for one to speak of their being immersed in a subculture.

At the other extreme, there are those whose deviance derives exclusively from the fact that they interact with others like themselves. Many examples might be found, but one can cite a group of young people who form a commune, obtain some real estate, live off the land, and have a distinctive life-style clearly unlike that of their neighbors, with whom their relationships are minimal. If this were a unique group of a dozen or a score of people, the total influence on a society of two hundred million would be so slight that the matter might be ignored, except by their families and those geographically close by. But these communards, as one might call them, do not restrict their relationships to those with whom they cohabit, but develop a sense of identification with groups of a like nature throughout the nation, influencing them and being influenced, and with some ease in exchanging members from time to time. The simultaneous development of numerous such groups, the commonality of their ideology and way of life, their demarcation from those unlike themselves, all impart to them some of the traits of a subculture. To the extent that they constitute no viable threat to those who are not part of their groups but are a beacon to the disaffected, they can probably be conceptualized most lucidly as an alternate culture.

Some have contended that the entire concept of a subculture of juvenile delinquents is meaningless when compared to an ethnic or regional subculture. In the latter instances, while one retains some value commitments, interactions, and relationships with the nation as a whole (of a political, economic, or other nature), one's entire life pattern, of a day-to-day nature, is involved in the intermingling with one's own ethnic (or regional) group. The extent to which one deviates from any shared values is no greater than (and may indeed be less than) the manner in which any individual in a cultural milieu, no matter what that might be, develops his own idiosyncratic ways.

There is force in this argument. Juvenile delinquents (and some other deviants, it should here be added) have only a limited amount of interaction with others like themselves, in the view of David Matza (1964). They leave their fellow-teenagers and go into their own homes; many go to school, some to work; and it is only in the most limited sense that they spend a portion of their time and money together or

share a sense of what the world is all about with those like themselves. Do these youngsters ever have a set of values of their own, or do they actually believe in those of the authority figures in their society, while pretending, with some bravado, to defy them? Perhaps youth itself might be seen as the subculture, and delinquent youth as only one aspect of it. Do not the youth have their own values, attitudes, symbols, outlooks, gestures, verbal cues, styles of dress and appearance, music and other cultural commitments, all combined with high interaction with others of the same age groups? Yes, but not without relating to families, ethnic entities, and others, and depending on these others, not on themselves, for survival.

Against this, there is what Albert Cohen (1955) has called "the culture of the gang," and there are, albeit in a limited way, subcultures of homosexuals, certainly of drug addicts and somewhat less so of winos, yet more so of Skid Row alcoholics; and while some types of crime inhibit group activity and subcultural formation, others promote or even demand it, as organized crime and fencing, and this is even more true among persons engaged in such marginal (but not criminal) activities as bail bondsmen.

These subcultures must of necessity differ from one another; all are limited in a manner that ethnic or religious subcultures would not be; and they may or may not be countercultural. There are even degrees to which they exist as subcultures. The criteria would involve the extent to which roles and life patterns are taken from and shaped by the deviant aspect of life and the contribution of the latter, in turn, to the shaping of the former.

One also encounters a linguistic argument, perhaps somewhat nit-picking but one that should be mentioned here. Matza (1964) would separate the concept of a subculture of deviants from that of a deviant subculture. The former consists of people who share a deviant status or trait, getting together and becoming involved in some aspects of one another's lives. They separate themselves more and more from people who do not share the trait that binds them (their consciousness-of-unkind). However, their contact with individuals with whom they do share the disvalued trait may be limited to one phase of their lives in which they have need for each other. A deviant subculture, by contrast, would be a way of life that deviates in a negative and disapproved manner from that of the surrounding, normative, and officially recognized world. Involuntary deviants (as paraplegics or deaf-mutes) would, in this view, form subcultures of deviants and, David Matza contends, young delinquents fall into this category as well. This ought not to be confused with the deviant subculture that requires commitment, an all-life pattern that youths tied to families

cannot have. It would consist of denizens of a marginal world, of whom prostitutes and pimps, addicts and Skid Row derelicts, would serve as examples.

Setting aside this fine point of differentiation, several questions arise. Inasmuch as subcultures do emerge among some deviants but not among others, what are the conditions for such development? The major one would be that the nature of the trait differentiating such people from others requires goods, services, or other desiderata best fulfilled by the creation of a network of similarly situated men and women, or even others unlike them but willing and eager to serve them. Further, that the vulnerability of the deviant to the sanctions of society should not be seriously increased by the nature of such interaction and the ensuing enhanced visibility.

Of the first criterion, one might contrast such groups as drug-users, winos, abortion seekers (before the liberalization of the laws in many jurisdictions of the United States), prostitutes, homosexuals, check forgers, and partisans of the antiwar movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Each becomes or became involved (if at all) in a subculture of deviance to a different extent, in a different way, and to bring about different goals.

The drug-users, limiting this term to users of hard-core and completely illegal narcotics, would be a prime example of people who are compelled to develop and utilize a subcultural network as a strategy for survival. Heroin-users generally, perhaps physicians and nurses excepted, need contacts. They must have a connection to obtain a fix, and they generally need several such connections, because one may not be available at the right time and place. Sometimes they obtain the illegal material for someone else or use a friend to collaborate in a scheme to obtain money. Their lives become increasingly embroiled in a succession of acts centered around the drug scene and around others involved in it: enjoying the high, letting it wear off, scheming to get money to enjoy the next, borrowing and lending and even stealing within the charmed circle, locating the connection, avoiding arrest, pushing and dealing, and then getting through the day until it is time to repeat these performances. Or at some point, getting cleaned, permanently or temporarily, exchanging experiences about cold turkey with denizens of their world, resolving to relinquish the drug life, becoming part of a program that is still subculture-oriented although not in the same sense that the earlier period of life had been; and finally, rehabilitating completely or splitting to start the cycle again, but this time with a cheaper habit, at least to begin with.

All of the above requires knowledge of others like oneself, knowing

whom to trust, how to proceed warily and to watch each step. Simultaneously, two occurrences complement each other: growing dependence on other users, and both independence from and rejection by the square world. There is increasing inability to function with family, friends, and acquaintances who are not part of a drug-using community. Language, outlook, commonality of interests, mutual dependence, significant knowledge, and survival techniques—all bring the apprentice addict into closer and more frequent relationships with other apprentices and with veterans of their war with the authorities. Even for those who leave their addict relationships and return to a family for sleeping and eating, perhaps for some begging or stealing, or for those who take brief leaves from their companions for work or school, their involvement with the addict world grows. Like a web, it entwines and ensnares each person until it encompasses a near-totality of life, and at that point one can speak of an addict subculture.¹⁴

The addict subculture, like most deviant subcultures, is not itself a cohesive and unified grouping, in the sense that small ethnic groups like the Basques in America or religious sects like snake cultists usually become. An addict subculture is more amorphous and ill defined, with members who drift in and out. It consists of a large number of little collections of persons, quick to learn of the other islands in the same or other cities. They are islands that those in the know can easily locate and that may differ from one another in important respects (such as racial composition, degree of poverty, types of illegal activities other than commerce in drugs), but their common characteristics and their isolation from the mainstream of society are sufficient to conceptualize these people as constituting a subculture of deviance. They had been brought together primarily by the need for an illegal service, but they found in one another mutual understanding, acceptance, and reinforcement; they found in others like themselves people with whom they could make contact, who would grasp the nature of their troubles even if they could offer nothing more than empty solace. Without some subcultural network, illegal trafficking in drugs would be extremely difficult.

The same is not true of winos, nor is there need for an illegal network of check forgers. The latter do not form such groups, and in fact they are on safer grounds if they work alone or with only one other

¹⁴ The process has been traced in great detail by Howard Becker (1953), in his paper "Becoming a Marijuana User." My only demurrer to this work (other than that marijuana use is not the best example of deviance) is that it appears to me to overplay the significance of learning how to use the material and how to learn to enjoy its use.

person. They do not need an apprenticeship, although here and there the forger may pick up a few pieces of useful instruction that will net thousands of dollars or prevent apprehension. In short, the forger is a loner for two reasons: There is no need to be otherwise, and there would be disadvantages rather than gain from interacting with other forgers. To mingle with people like themselves would only attract attention and might result in arrest, in addition to offering unwanted competition by saturating one area (as a bank, store, or town) with more bad checks than it can assimilate.

Nor does one require similar deviants to get the bottle of cheap wine, the can of beer, or the low-grade whiskey that single-room-only habitués, derelicts, and Skid Row inhabitants imbibe. Yet, unlike respectable alcoholics of all social classes, these people do drift together with people like themselves. Here, it is not the need to be part of a network of illegal sales that impels them but the quest for social acceptance and relief from rejection and loneliness.

On the one hand, the subculture of deviants offers the rejected person ego reinforcement; on the other, it tends to imprison him in the unacceptable way of life.¹⁵ To the extent that relationships with other deviants fill the hours of his day and the needs of the day, to that extent it will be not only fulfilling but will result in the further withdrawal from the world of normals. A person who has been rejected, or who has felt that he was rejected, by ordinary people at every turn; who has been insulted and wounded on innumerable occasions, or who has felt such insults and wounds—such an individual may well see withdrawal as a step toward liberation. But it is at the same time a step that the world of normals would call backward, separating the culture from the subculture, and hence the inhabitants of each, by greater chasms than had originally been caused by the deviant act or the hostile reaction to it.

The deviant subculture often develops a sense of pride. Mutual reinforcement leads to the evolution of a shared world view, in which persons lead others and, through these others, themselves to an outlook on reality that they come more and more to assimilate as the only true reality. Rather than having role models who have “rehabilitated” or “reformed,” they look to those who have tried this road and failed, and they come to believe that if they try, they too will fail. At the same time, they believe that the effort is not worth it, for their own life is a good and worthwhile one.

¹⁵ That is, unacceptable to the society, not to the individual in his subjective experiences. That's just the point; it may make it more acceptable to him to be part of a group of others like himself.

In some deviant subcultures, there may indeed be a great dramaturgical put-on, as David Matza (1964) suggests about juveniles: None believes in the delinquent values, but each must make the pretense to all the others. More frequently, there is deliberate role debasement, encased in self-mocking humor, as among transvestites.

For transsexuals, there is a learning of the mechanisms by which one gives the right answers to psychiatrists and other doctors, appearing in the light most favorable to obtain the responses they require for the validation of their operation.¹⁶ This is not unlike the learning experience that takes place in prison, where people are coached on the types of answers to give to social workers, parole officers, and others.

Some deviant subcultures retain an amorphous character. The nature of their deviance, and of the social situation, may require that they be hidden from public light as much as possible. Those who move in and out of networks of black marketeers or smuggling rings would prefer that the very existence of this maze of relationships be unknown except to the select ingroup. Other social deviants wish to influence public policy in regard either to themselves or to the world. If there is sufficient oppression to make their condition intolerable, but sufficient democratic tolerance to make their protest possible, they can emerge into social movements and highly organized groups. The development of a social movement, however, should not be seen as a displacement of the more amorphous subculture; it is, rather, a part of it, one in which usually only a small part of the eligible population participates. This fraction might be termed a vanguard, but this is an emotionally loaded term that suggests that it is leading the masses. Such may well be the case, but the contrary may be true: The masses (that is, of deviants or eligibles) may be hostile, indifferent, or unaware.

Even when a subculture of deviants is thriving, not all those who make the deviant identification become part of it. A prostitute can be a loner or a frequent commingler with a world of prostitutes and pimps, and the same is true for those involved with homosexuality, drug addiction, or alcoholism, but each to a different extent and with unlike consequences. Sociology will find a fruitful field of study in con-

¹⁶ Mark Sulcov (1973), who has done a great deal of work with transsexuals, suggests that learning the right answers to give psychiatrists takes place to some extent in the interaction between doctor and patient. "Do they learn 'the mechanisms by which one gives the right answers' or do they simply learn of answers that have worked in the past?" he asks. His studies were conducted entirely with transsexuals in a medical setting. While the answers may be learned from doctors, they are also passed on from one patient to another; but Sulcov's example is a subculture of deviants in which certain normals (the physicians) are deeply intertwined. It is clear that there has been co-optation, but just who co-opted whom is not quite so evident.

trasting those who inhabit the deviant subcultures with others who are similarly situated so far as the discredited or discreditable trait is concerned but who remain aloof. What determines the two divergent pathways for two individuals? And with what results?

Organizations

CLOSELY ALLIED with the question of subcultures is that of formal organizations of deviant people. The appearance of such organizations does not necessarily stem from the existence of a subculture, nor does the permanence of a subculture necessarily manifest itself in organizational form. The relationship is close and it is frequently encountered, but the organization does not depend upon the subculture, nor does the latter invariably lead to the formation of the former.

When deviant people form organizations, it is in response to a felt need, as a strategy for coping with their personal problems or with hostile surroundings. The associations are sometimes characterized by secrecy or by ritual, although in most organizations these elements play a minor role. The ritual can be seen as a mechanism for binding the members closer to one another and differentiating them from outsiders—not the outsiders who do not share the disvalued trait but those who have not joined. Ritual also has links with illegality and terrorism. An illegal group uses ritual as self-protection; a terrorist group uses it to frighten and intimidate. For most but not all deviant associations, ritual seems to have diminished in importance, as the members generally have sought to strengthen ties with others, not to separate themselves in this additional manner.

Organizational secrecy assumes at least two different forms. First, there are associations whose very existence is kept hidden from the world; an example would be a spy ring or a criminal conspiracy. Somewhat related to this is the group that conceals its purpose or identity behind an innocuous name; it is presented to the public, in the colorful phrase of Erving Goffman (1963), “in a plain wrapper,” thus avoiding embarrassment in relations with landlords, tenants, postmen, and

others. Homosexual organizations utilized this method for many years (viz. the Mattachine Society), but the growing openness of the movement has made this type of secrecy less necessary and less effective.

A second form is the open organization with secret membership, and some element of this is found in many voluntary associations of deviants.¹⁷ This may involve the use of pseudonyms or merely circumspection with regard to one's membership in the organization. However, as such groups attain a feeling of self-righteousness and as they communicate this to their members—or even more, to the potential reservoir of joiners, so that those who do join are already inculcated with the self-righteous ideology—the idea of concealment takes on less appeal. There is not only a conflict within the individual but between those who have dropped all pretense (they have gone public) and those who still cloak themselves in the robes of the normal and respectable.

Geographic mobility and urbanism have produced an atmosphere of anonymity in which deliberate secrecy seems to be less and less necessary, except for well-known persons. The vastness of the cities and the proximity of the surrounding suburbs make it possible to compartmentalize lives, allowing people to be active in organizations of various sorts without this ever coming to the attention of neighbors, friends, and the community at large.

In my studies of this subject (Sagarin, 1967, 1969), I suggested that voluntary associations of deviants can be classified in two ways. Each classification in turn can be broken down into two categories. One type involves the pre-existence of the deviant-defining trait; the other, the goal or motive of the member or organization.

The first differentiation to some extent coincides with that of voluntary and involuntary deviance. There are organizations of fanatics, unpopular political and religious crusaders, and others. These would consist of any formal and structured group of people who are strongly opposed either by the overwhelming majority of the people (as the Communist Party) or by the major value thrust of the society (as the Ku Klux Klan), or who are generally considered to be “crackpots” because of their program or policies. In a certain sense, modern-day sabbatarians, apocalyptic groups that have decided that the world will end on a given day, John Birchites, and Maoists are all organizations of deviants. These people are twentieth-century missionaries. They are

¹⁷ To avoid confusion, note that the phrase reads: *voluntary associations of deviants*, not *associations of voluntary deviants*. The term “voluntary association” is widely used in sociology. Herbert Maccoby (1958) defines it as a group that is “private, nonprofit, voluntary in that entrance rests on mutual consent while exit is at the will of either party, and formal in that there are offices to be filled in accordance with stipulated rules.” The question of voluntary and involuntary deviants (or deviance) is quite another matter.

deviants, but not in the sense in which that term can be applied to, say, alcoholics.

The major difference between organizations of right- or left-wing believers or activists, religious sectarians, and Klansmen, on the one hand, and associations of alcoholics, homosexuals, transvestites, former mental patients, and the physically stigmatized, on the other, is that among the latter, deviance is believed to reside in the individual who has certain attributes, traits, characteristics, or behavior patterns. Belonging to the organization may make these traits more visible but does not in and of itself confer them upon the actor. On the other hand, in the former types—political, religious, racist, and others—to the extent that the collectivity is deviant, it is the act of joining that confers this status upon the individual rather than any trait, behavior pattern, or even ideology that the actor brings to the association.

In other words, believing in right- or left-wing politics or in a way-out religious faith does not constitute deviance, but the belief is translated into action by joining with others in an organizational form. However, being identified, privately or publicly, by oneself or others, as homosexual, alcoholic, or addicted to drugs constitutes the deviance (if it is so defined in one's society), and joining with others in an organization merely increases the possibility of detection, the degree of vulnerability, but not the deviance itself. Political, religious, and other such groups are *deviant organizations*, but the members presumably are normals (or, if they are not, any deviation would be irrelevant); the homosexual and alcoholic groups are *organizations of deviants* and hence, by definition, the members are not normals.

In the second set of differences, one finds divergent goals. One type of organization is involved in an effort to change power relationships in the society; a second, to alleviate the stigma that brought the individual into conflict with the surrounding populace and perhaps with himself. These differences may appear to coincide with the distinction already made between deviant organizations and organizations of deviants, but they do not do so entirely. The religious group may not be seeking to alter power relations, although this is the central aim of the political group as much as of the racist (or even racial) associations. But if the associations of alcoholics are little concerned with legislation or power, the same cannot be said, particularly in the protest era of the 1960s and later, of groups centering around the theme of homosexuality.

If one focuses only on organizations of deviants (and not on deviant organizations), one could begin by stating that the fundamental attribute such groups share is that the motivation behind their formation, and behind the recruitment of their members, is to overcome stigma.

The escape from stigma takes on two divergent and usually mutually exclusive patterns, although there may be some convergence: (1) The deviant may escape from stigma by conforming to the norms of the society; that is, by "reforming," by relinquishing the stigmatizing behavior, a goal that has received widespread publicity under the rubric of "corrections" and "rehabilitation"; or (2) he may escape from stigma by reforming the norms of society, by reducing the sanctions against his behavior; that is, by changing, not himself, but the rule-making others. In this case, he is obtaining from society a relinquishment of the stigmatization of his behavior. These two patterns constitute, as I see it, the most important single factor differentiating some of these groups from others and enabling the student to make meaningful hypotheses and to attempt prediction of group life.

Whether the goal of the organization is to assist individuals in conforming to more normative behavior or to change the attitudes of a hostile society, difficulties and contradictions will manifest themselves in the world of deviant organizations. The act of joining may increase the stigma, by transforming the individual from an invisible to a visible member of the socially disapproved category. But this is met in two ways, by utilizing anonymity to protect the individual and by utilizing the greater visibility as a mechanism for the reduction of social disvaluation.

With this conceptualization, one might foresee that groups in which individuals seek to change themselves would gain wide social approval from the greater society, except from those who are geographically and in other ways so close to the deviants that the congregation of individuals in an organization becomes threatening. Furthermore, these groups would function very much like group therapy; would often turn to religious or pseudoreligious concepts for reinforcement; would embrace many middle-class aims in order to return to a life of propriety, while scoffing at the hypocrisy of the middle class that rejects and opposes them. Such a group would paint the deviant as a worthwhile individual, a soul to be saved, but deviance as immoral, sinful, and self-defeating. It would frown on members who stray, attempt to exert extreme pressure through inner-group loyalty, and would develop a pattern of overconformity in the area of deviance itself.¹⁸ The last characteristic would in fact result in a harsher condemnation of the disapproved behavior than is found in the general population; a fear of the "enlightened," the liberal, and the permissive views, all buttressed by a

¹⁸ Many will find an analogy here between deviants and ethnics begging for acceptance. Using the concept of tribal stigma, one can say that Booker T. Washington sought to improve the lot of the tribally stigmatized by self-help (like the deviant's self-change), whereas W. E. B. Du Bois demanded a change in the attitudes of the hostile society.

moralistic stance and reinforced by religion. To those seeking to relinquish their deviance, any suggestion that the consequences of the behavior would be less severe if only social attitudes were to change becomes a threat to the organization and its program, and a temptation to return to the abandoned pattern. The individuals who are attracted to such a group are primarily those who are in need of authority figures and ego reinforcement; these are the compliant and submissive, who nevertheless have a strong component of aggression and are going to transfer this, during the therapeutic process, from hostility to society to hostility within the group. As penitents they will both comply and gripe, willingly accept and let off steam.

The second group, those who seek to alleviate the definition of their condition as deviant, consists of people who share some of the attributes of the former group but not all. Even when sharing them, they do so for entirely different reasons and hence with different consequences. Seeking to change the public attitude toward the deviance, such a group might turn to religion, not for moral support, but for a responsible front and a respectable ally. There would be a reinforcement of the ego, not through group therapy, but in a process of mutual reinforcement of one's deviant values and ways of structuring reality. The middle-class norms would be scoffed at, but not entirely rejected, because acceptance by society might be viewed as more easily attainable if one were moralistic, law-abiding, and in most respects conforming. The group must thumb its nose at society in order to foster pride in the deviant; and at the same time must become obsequious before those in power, in order the better to beg for acceptance.¹⁹ Such a group is likely to attract rebels and nonconformists and yet use a façade of squares and professionals (some of whom may be secret deviants) as front men and window dressing. Its members might vacillate between ultraconformity, as an expression of anticipatory socialization, and rebellion and rejection, as a reaction formation against the society that has cast them out. Because of the enhanced stigmatization that ensues when one joins a group of this type, the organization is likely to attract some neurotics and personality misfits who require social disapproval and ridicule, together with chronic rebels who relish any battle with the world of respectability. Because of the unceasing aggressive nature of the struggle against society and the small degree of success that can

¹⁹ There is sometimes a division of labor between the militant and the obsequious. They complement each other, although they have not planned it conspiratorially in that manner. Malcolm X told Mrs. Martin King, as he slipped into a seat next to her at a celebration of one of her husband's victories, that it was his (Malcolm's) militant struggles that had made those victories possible. Again, remarkable similarities can be found between the ethnic and the other minorities.

be seen, such groups are likely to have considerable membership turnover, and to have bitter internal battles for leadership, fission, competition between organizations, skulduggery, and the like.

The two types of groups travel in diametrically opposite directions in their attitude toward the deviance with which both are involved. The first group will condemn, moralistically and scientifically, unwaveringly pointing to the road of eternal damnation that awaits the one who slips backward; and the second group will likewise invoke science, philosophy, and ideology, but for the eternal condemnation of those who condemn them. The latter type of organization will seek to convince the world without, as well as the members within, that their deviance is normal, natural, moral, socially useful, and that all who deem otherwise are deluded and ignorant hypocrites, self-serving exploiters, or repressed deviants themselves. Both types of groups will present a distorted image of themselves; they will fall victim to the temptation, almost inherent in the nature of organization, to project a self-image that glorifies and "prcttifies."²⁰ But the first type will show its members as being almost saintly because they are renouncing deviance; by contrast the devils are not only lost souls who have not seen the light but opponents in the world of respectability. In the second type of association, there is a glorification of the deviant (member and non-member alike), and the devils are those in the world of respectability who scoff at such an image.

When one combines the groups seeking to change power relations with those seeking to alleviate stigma by social acceptance or institutionalization and contrasts these with organizations whose members are attempting to change their own behavior, there emerges something akin to the distinction between instrumental and expressive groups. The former are formed, joined, and supported for the purpose of influencing society; the latter, for the pleasures of attending and the gratification and rewards to oneself. Thus, an association of right- or left-wing persuasion is in the mainstream of traditional influence-oriented organizations in America, such as sabbatarians, anti-saloon leagues, legions of decency, and innumerable others, a category that encompasses groups as respectable as the NAACP and the Anti-Defamation League and as disrespectable as the Klan. Somewhere on that continuum one can place the Gay Activists Alliance. All are instrumental. And while Alcoholics Anonymous, Gamblers Anonymous, and the like may occasionally enter the propaganda scene and attempt to exert influence in

²⁰ Behavioral scientists, from Mead to Goffman, have analyzed the projection of an embellished self-image by individuals; the same process, probably on a much more deliberate level, takes place among voluntary associations.

the social world, their main attraction is what they can do directly for their members, and in that sense they are in a tradition that includes organizations of bridge and chess clubs.

Of the organizations that exist primarily for the benefit of members, the best-known and most successful has been Alcoholics Anonymous. The success of AA and its generally favorable public reception resulted in a rash of other groups that attempted to emulate the structure and form, though usually not the content, of the prototype. These included organizations of narcotics addicts, gamblers, self-styled neurotics, and overweight persons. The proliferation of "anonymous" groups of this sort seemed to indicate in some instances that AA had attained a positive status of its own, that it was "proper" to belong, and that not only was the stigma of being deviant overcome, but a positive esteem was attached if a man or woman had the "ailment" and then was able to renounce it, especially through AA.

The abilities of these organizations to accomplish their manifest goals for individual members have not been examined, except in the cases of AA and Synanon. In the latter instance, one should note that Synanon has certain structural features that differentiate it from voluntary associations. It is largely what Goffman (1961) has called a total institution; in fact, it rejects addicts who will not relinquish their occupation and life in the world outside and move in, family and all.²¹ The voluntary association is part of one's life, not one's entire life.

Syanon could perhaps better be analyzed as a correctional hospital, offering group therapy and aid in "kicking the habit," but using unusual methods to accomplish that goal. It is a hospital in which there is voluntary self-induction and depends to an enormous extent on inner-group norms and loyalties for its success. To slide back into deviance is to betray the people who have become one's "family" and who have placed trust in the former addict.

Not all organizational efforts of deviants succeed, whether success is measured by the goal of changing social attitudes or rehabilitating members, or by the mere fact of organizational continuity and growth. The failure of some of these groups may be due to their own definition of their behavior as deviant, which definition was not made by significant others previous to the group's formation. This is an interesting twist on the labeling definition that deviant behavior is behavior that others (the normals) so label. Sometimes it is only the deviants who are labeling themselves in that manner, while the rest of the com-

²¹ Synanon has undergone many transformations. Even if it is not a total institution at the time that this is being written (and the matter is not at all clear), it was such formerly, and in this respect differed not only from AA but from virtually all other organizations of deviants in American history, except for some religious collectivities that withdrew into communities of their own.

munity is friendly or indifferent. The searching out of companions with a similar problem is suspect; for unlike the alcoholic or the addict, some of these people did not feel that they had a crippling problem making them into malfunctioning persons until the organization caught on and they thought it might be "campy" or "cool" to get involved. Their organizations, with "anonymity" part of the title, seem to be the work of the poseur and the romantic rebel, who seek to exploit the status attained by AA rather than to find the strength to change their own behavior. Among the groups of this type are those catering to fat persons, self-styled neurotics and schizophrenics, and gamblers.²²

The contradiction in this situation would seem to be largely as follows: that whereas AA seeks to function by building up self-confidence and ego reinforcement, the act of joining a similar group among gamblers can accomplish the very reverse. AA infuses in the individual the belief that alcoholism is an evil which he can overcome to the point of functioning, although he is never free from the danger of falling back (the warning is an excellent device to retain the loyalty of the member and thus to strengthen the organization). Hence, for AA there is no category of ex-alcoholics; there are only sober alcoholics, the term applying not to people who are in a temporary and brief state of sobriety between bouts of intoxication but to those who are in a long and, it is hoped, permanent state of sobriety *after* frequent periods of intoxication. The hold of AA is rooted in the belief that the sober alcoholic is a likely victim for relapse, if he is not infused with strength and power that can best be gained through inner-group cohesion and mutual reinforcement in interaction with others seeking to be saved from the lure of the bottle.

Alcoholics, then, are defined as deviants by others and then accept this uncomplimentary view of themselves (a labeling process which, in the ideology of AA, results not in secondary deviance but in rehabilitation). Gamblers—whatever financial difficulties there may be in their homes due to their habits—are deviants only if they so define themselves, and the act of joining an organization would seem to be a step toward such a definition. Certainly the large number of people who flock to the racetrack, avidly watch for the announcement of the win-

²² Objection is made by some to the inclusion of the obese in this list. Some of the organizations of overweight persons are commercial enterprises, and while an unwanted trait may be overcome with the aid of counselors who are paid for their activity, there is some question as to the qualifications for this task. But primarily my concern is that the organizations have a vested interest in convincing people that they are overweight. If it is true that deviants are people who are so labeled by others (to return again to the inescapable statement of Becker), then it is dangerous to endow people with a vested interest, financial or other, in thus placing such a label.

ning number in the daily newspaper, take or give bets in the shop or office, buy government lottery tickets, attend church-sponsored bingo games as their main interaction with ecclesiastical figures, rush to betting offices owned and operated by the government, and follow each day's stock market gyrations with hopes that they will receive no frantic margin calls, are hardly social deviants. To compare these people with social drinkers, and then to state that the voluntary association is meant to aid compulsive gamblers who are more akin to compulsive alcoholics, offers a point of clarification. However, it is doubtful if the compulsive gambler sees himself as deviant until he joins with others in an organization in which he is compelled to take this view, and the association is therefore as likely to prove ego-damaging as ego-reinforcing, even if it is successful in aiding some people to overcome their habit (a point which is very doubtful, indeed).

There are factors in an organization like Neurotics Anonymous that make it difficult to take this group seriously. Again, there is no reason to believe that being neurotic (a vague term at best, and not easily self-diagnosed) carries with it a deviance or stigma of its own. These people would seem to be stigmatizing themselves by joining with others, not because they thus expose their failing to public view, but because they redefine themselves as having a stigmatizing trait. Furthermore, whereas it is possible to understand people who give each other strength, through sanctions, reward, disapproval, appeals to group norms and loyalties, in order to refrain from drinking, taking narcotics, or even gambling, it is difficult to see how they can obtain strength from one another to refrain from being neurotic. With proper guidance and leadership, the pseudo-organization can be transformed into a sort of group therapy; in that case, it might be larger than the usual therapeutic group, and the price somewhat smaller. In such an instance, however, the organizational structure is merely a front that might attract people to the therapy.

A number of studies have been made of organizations of former mental patients, and for the most part they indicate that lonely people, meeting great rebuffs and rejection, can find solace in one another. Like alcoholics, they can look to those among the members who have made the most successful adjustments, use these people as role models, and gain encouragement from them. There is danger that the ex-patient may be more self-blaming when in contact with success that he cannot emulate and that even rehabilitated ex-patients may be so seriously disturbed that they serve as poor models, giving ill-advised counsel that is heeded because it arrives from a big brother. This latter problem does not face members of an ex-convict group, but here there is a public—and official—suspicion that the mere association of such peo-

ple with one another is conducive to a return to criminality. Although widely believed, such a statement has not proved to be true.

The ex-patient and ex-convict types of groups have in common that they are joined by people who have a stigma which they are seeking to escape. However, they bridge the gap between two conceptual categories, in that they are both seeking to live by the norms of the society in all respects and at the same time to reduce the hostility that society has toward people like themselves. There is no contradiction because they socially define themselves with the prefix "ex-" and they do not see mental patients or convicts in a derogatory manner but view them rather with sympathy. They function in a manner not unlike AA in many respects but have a greater problem in convincing the world "out there"—as well as themselves—that they are members of a category that can be trusted to manage their lives. However, they are unlike AA in that they are not so much involved in changing their own behavior (there is a little of that) as in gaining acceptance. One might say that AA is attempting to turn its members into ex-alcoholics, though it shuns the word, but the mentally ill and former prisoners in voluntary organizations are already in the "ex-" category, no matter that further internal change or rehabilitation may still be seen as desirable.

Of the deviants who have formed voluntary associations in order to escape from deviance by influencing the society to redefine them as normals (or, to resort to sociologists' jargon, as nondeviant nonconformists), the most prominent are the organized homosexuals. They call their groups homophile organizations, a euphemistic term that is meant to project an image of people involved in love relationships (sex is secondary and incidental) with others of the same gender. Organizations of this character indignantly deny the unhealthy, neurotic, or abnormal character of homosexuality, a denial necessary (in their view) to gain acceptance both from others and among themselves. At the same time, there are many manifestations of the denied neuroticism found in the publications and declarations of these organizations: the appeal to sadomasochistic interests is an example. And although the organizations declare that they are not seeking to proselytize for homosexuality, and particularly for its spread, their literature urges that homosexuality be considered on a par with heterosexuality and that children be exposed to both ways of life in an impartial manner so as to be able to make a free choice.

One could cite many other examples of the contradictions in which the Mattachine Society, the Daughters of Bilitis, and other groups of this nature are entrapped. The problem seems to be as follows: Since the aim of the groups is to escape from stigma by having the behavior redefined as nondeviant, the organizations seek to sponsor that

redefinition by painting a portrait of homosexuals as psychologically healthy, functioning, loving, nonpromiscuous persons, even if this portrait contradicts one's knowledge of reality. Whether this sort of problem is inherent in any social movement of people seeking acceptance of their deviance is a matter for further investigation.

Robert Michels (1949), in his classic sociological work *Political Parties*, suggests that organizations tend to lose sight of their original goals and become involved in the struggle for self-perpetuation, growth of influence, and obtaining what today might be called a greater piece of the action. This would account for the tendency of almost all organizations of deviants (from AA to Mattachine) to deny that one is ever really changed or "cured"—that is, to deny that the ex-alcoholic or the ex-homosexual exists—and thus to enhance their hold on their followers, who can never escape from the need for protection. It would also explain the rivalry that has marked these organizational movements. It would not, however, account for the image that is put forward, which is far more acceptable to the public than the reality that is effectively concealed. What is occurring here might be conceived of as a combination of impression management, ideological distortion, and a common-sense approach to public relations; it is found in political, ethnic, and corporate groups, as well as elsewhere, and it is not confined to deviants, nor is it their special invention.

As protest movements of various types increased in number and in strength in the United States during the 1960s, the deviant collectivities increased in militancy. Inspired by the demand for black power, one heard voices that called for gay power; the slogan *Black is beautiful* received its analogue in *Gay is good*. Despite the obvious disadvantages associated with people whose cause had less than unanimous and enthusiastic appeal, the Black Panthers made an alliance, however shaky and ephemeral it was, with homosexuals, and many people in the women's liberation movement pushed strongly for a similar alliance with lesbians. What seemed to hold these groups together was their common anti-establishment stance, their unified opposition to oppressive and discriminatory practices.

The involuntary deviants have very special problems that lead them to organize. Their groups cannot serve to reinforce their disability and, in fact, through an exchange of medical and social-service information, may mitigate it. The formal associations become socializing groups, where people meet, talk to, and interact with one another without the inhibitions that they harbor when with normals; and, derived from this, the organizations become courtship, dating, and marriage markets for people with limited potential for meeting partners. However, they are instrumental as well as expressive groups, in that they seek to

change public attitudes, to substitute sympathy for pity, acceptance for scorn, and normalized relationships for the strained ones that comprised their social intercourse in conventional society. One problem that they present, however, is that they offer advantages for ingroup interaction that may serve to encourage withdrawal from the world of normals, to the impoverishment of both. The organization acts as a new type of protective screen, effectively concealing individuals although, ironically, the formal group itself is combatting secrecy.

Organizations of deviants in the end have proved to be one more strategy for the management of social hostility. If for many they become a mechanism for escape from deviance, for others they are an entrapment therein. If they give some people strength to overcome a behavior that is personally debilitating, to others they give pride in self and the ego boost of knowing that such behavior has its strong defenders. But in this last statement one finds the contradictions in such organizations, and in fact in movements for social change when they do not take on organizational form, for by their propaganda, their ideology, their very existence, they can entrap the neophyte in a world view and outlook that closes the door for him on further growth, development, and change. He may have come out of one closet only to go into another.

INVOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS AND VOLUNTARY CLIQUES

At several points in this work, I have discussed voluntary and involuntary deviants. One can also speak of voluntary and involuntary associations.²³ As the term is used in sociology, the voluntary association is not only a group that a person can enter and exit at will but one that is formally organized. An involuntary association would be one to which the individual member belongs through no will of his own and which he cannot leave as he pleases; it might take on formal or informal organizational character. As a formal structure, it could be a prison or mental institution into which the inmate is placed because of some alleged antisocial behavior or disvalued status. In such instances, the institution intensifies the stigma, although it may be working toward an ideal of rehabilitation. In these terms, the analogy with voluntary associations that seek to change the traits of the member would be apparent: The act of joining can make one's trait more visible but at the same time more transient.

In some situations, the association with one's own or with other

²³ The use of these contrasting themes and their application to deviant people was suggested to me by Fred Montanino.

types of deviants may be less than institutional and enforced but not entirely voluntary. There may be no other recourse open. Rejected by family and friends, people turn to other sources of protection. They can reach out to a population beyond those with the same trait toward other rejects and outsiders. The prostitute gets herself a pimp; this is not entirely voluntary on her part, but she sees it as a necessity, or perhaps as something forced upon her. The bail bondsman finds himself gravitating toward the development of friendly relations with those who are most likely to need his services; he can withdraw from this type of association only at the risk of jeopardizing his livelihood. Under such conditions, can one speak of the relationship he forms as a voluntary one?

What can sometimes emerge are networks of relationships that are subcultures not of specific types of deviants (as would be found in homosexual or drug-using circles) but of people sharing their fate with those who are also targets of respectable society. There is a common bond of concern for one another and contempt for the morals of those who have expelled them.

The involuntary associations generally serve no useful purpose when analyzed from the vantage point of the deviant. They are agencies of social control and hence are best avoided by those who do not wish to be controlled. The voluntary clique is like the voluntary association in that it is sought as a protection in a hostile world, but it is designed to accomplish neither of the two major aims of the voluntary associations of deviants—that is, it neither aids the individual to change his own traits (it does the reverse, in fact) nor propagandizes for changes in the social attitudes of others. It is more of an abandonment of the normals, at least a partial abandonment, in favor of a search for satisfaction on the margins of society.

In the end, formal association and informal clique, voluntary belonging and involuntary relationship are to be seen as two intersecting gradations on a continuum. Visibility, vulnerability, need for contacts, problems of legality, and other factors will determine the forms that different groups will take in their never-ending search for strategies of survival.

Normals Against Deviants

THE STRATEGIES open both to society and to individual members and groups for the management, punishment, exclusion, or rehabilitation of the deviant differ with the nature of the culture (traditionalist, religious, secular, or fast-changing, for example), the nature of the subgroup or individuals doing the judging, and the scope and character of and threat posed by the deviance. The strategies should be seen in two dimensions: (1) the power to enforce one's will and to impose sanctions, reflective of the official and unofficial societal reaction, and (2) the clash of the real patterns of behavior with the spurious, make-believe, or pretended morality.

A great deal of emphasis has been placed on the official societal reaction to deviance. For one thing, it fits rather neatly into the labeling perspective (also known, in fact, as the "societal reaction to deviance" theory). Further, it is much easier to see, comprehend, measure, and describe than the unofficial reactions that are not buttressed by law, codified, and handled through institutions and agencies of social control. However, there is a considerable tradition in American sociology, from Charles Cooley (1902), James Mark Baldwin (1911) and George Herbert Mead (1934), to Erving Goffman (1959), that is concerned with symbolic meanings, gestures, cues, and the subtle forms of communication, whether one is conveying approval or disapproval to others.

The heavy burden of guilt and shame that people carry is often not for fear of punishment if one is apprehended for having done wrong. Rather, it derives from a horror of being disapproved of by others, particularly by meaningful or significant others, and from the fact that the values of these others have often been accepted by the rule-breaker. Mead and Cooley both worked with the concept of a "looking-glass self," the notion that each person develops an image of himself as he sees himself being seen by others; that is, the eyes of others constitute a mirror in which he sees his own image and makes judgments of it. Normative behavior would be understood not only in terms of avoidance of official punishment or governmental sanctions and the

gaining of official rewards (jobs, promotions, invitations, and the like) but also as avoidance of feeling that one has been negatively judged and, from this, is compelled to judge oneself negatively.

The unofficial mechanisms for the punishment of the deviant range from overt and blatant exclusion to subtle patronization. They include the raised eyebrow, the wink, the slight sneering smile, the tacit communication to another, "Let's be tolerant; we know what the score is." Overt expression of contempt is often suppressed, but the victim is given to know that it is there, and that he is not a whole person in the sense that someone else is, that in fact everyone else is, including those who have other shortcomings and defects which are not reacted to negatively.

Language strongly expresses social hostility, reflecting the aura of a society showing contempt for its deviants. These are seen in the vocabulary of ethnic slurs, and even in the fact that they come to lose their hostility when used, somewhat affectionately, within the social group itself. The scorn in which homosexuals are held is likewise illustrated by a rich vocabulary: and it is interesting that males have an arsenal of scornful terms not only for females who are sexually promiscuous ("whore") but even for those who are permissive ("broad," "lay," "pushover," and others).

Humor is used to express the putdown that characterizes the attitude toward deviants. Probably no group has been subjected to more systematic humiliation through humor than the American black people, and it is all the more important that this was reflected in the world of respectable Americans; for example, in after-dinner jokes at meetings of "scholars" and of political, labor, business, and community leaders. This antiblack humor is chronicled in American art, journalism, and scholarship, starting at the time of the Colonies and disappearing for all practical purposes at about the time of World War II.²⁴

Few mechanisms against the deviant are more widely used than social exclusion. While there are many criteria for deciding who should and who should not be made a part of a private or inner group, when a person is systematically excluded and he has a given characteristic, he is likely to believe (or to want to believe) that that characteristic is responsible for the exclusion. True, one may be denied the invitation, the job, or the proposal of marriage for an entirely different

²⁴ Its disappearance may be misleading; perhaps it has been driven underground. But for an example, see D. W. Griffith's classic film *The Birth of a Nation*, as racist in its humor (and other aspects of the life it depicted) as anything that came out of Nazi Germany, but hailed by white America, its film critics and other intellectuals, and the President of the United States at the time of its appearance, and by others for years thereafter.

reason. But those who have received such rebuffs regularly and who have watched others, presumably less qualified, passing muster while no one with traits like their own does so are unlikely to be able to blame anything but discriminatory practices.

Exclusion takes the form of oversolicitous efforts to avoid being the excluder or, at least, having one's exclusionary actions become known. There is here a presumed sensitivity to the feelings of the others, as seen in seating arrangements on a public vehicle. The first seats to be occupied are almost always lone seats, usually next to a window, and the adjacent seat will be occupied only if the window-occupant is accompanied by another person. Then, when all the lone seats have been taken, those entering alone must choose. If a white person enters, he must choose a white companion, and the black must choose a black, for fear of violating the rules governing exclusion and excluded. But a white person may deliberately go forward with just such a violation, in order to express his freedom from the prejudice that characterizes the black as deviant, but in so doing he is actually expressing his realization that that prejudice exists. For the black person, the options are even more restricted.

But now consider a young girl who conceives of herself as attractive and who enters a railroad car. If she seats herself next to a male, particularly one who is fairly young but not younger than herself, she is projecting an image of herself as an "open person"—that is, she is inviting a sexual encounter. The restrictions that she must place upon her own activity, circumscribing her freedom, are protections against the fear that she will be negatively viewed by others.

Rebuke is the mechanism frequently used for the handling of children who have overstepped the bounds of propriety. With children, however, it is a learning process. The rebuke is part of a system of punishments and rewards; it is a mild punishment, telling the child that the behavior is unacceptable and that other activity is expected and will be welcomed. Thus, the rebuke teaches as well as corrects; one might say that it corrects by teaching as much as by punishing.

When the same type of rebuke is given to an adult, it is meant to be purely punitive. One does not seek to bring the adult into the orbit of acceptability and often respectability; instead, one communicates by the rebuke that not only the act is reprehensible but so is the person committing it.

In some instances, the exclusion is leveled solely against the activity, not against the perpetrator. This is frequently so with adultery, for example, but almost never with other forms of sexually disapproved action, as child molestation, rape, or homosexuality. Adultery in this

way is defined as being socially undesirable and to be avoided, but as within the orbit of activities performed by otherwise normal, decent, and lawabiding persons.

Gossip is a major form of expression and communication in which the deviant is made to feel that he is disliked. "There is only one thing in the world worse than being talked about," said Oscar Wilde, in a quip that few take seriously, "and that is not being talked about." While it is possible for gossip to be neutral and have no negative tone about it, or even on rare occasions to be favorable ("Gossip has it that he is dating the boss's daughter"), for people outside the celebrity realm, it is almost always meant to be damaging to the reputation that the subject has tried to establish as an upright, normal, and moral person. Gossip is the expression of information that has not been confirmed, much of it based on guesses and hunches, put together with little strands of clues and cues, and which the purveyors do not want to confront their subjects with lest they be rebuked because it is untrue, embarrassed because it is true, or just told that it is not their business. The gossips avoid the embarrassment to protect themselves, but in so doing they make their work all the more pernicious. Where the idle talk is essentially true, it conveys to the subject the strength of disapproval that he is meeting; where it is untrue, it conveys the nature of that disapproval to all others, in light of the fact that it has to be stated in a surreptitious manner. In an urban setting, one is protected from gossip to some extent by the anonymity of a dense population where people do not know their own neighbors. The scandals of Peyton Place, then, are small-town phenomena, not because such events occur only in villages and hamlets, but because there they are more prominent and give rise to gossip. The attempt to escape to urban anonymity is probably rarely so successful as may have been believed. People are subject to gossip within family circles, on jobs which they cannot leave without personal loss, in schools, social circles, at churches and temples, and even in urban neighborhoods. There is a sense of ill-ease that someone knows and thinks ill of one, even if the individual in the know is powerless. He may just be the postman who knows that an individual is obtaining welfare assistance, something that person had sought to conceal; yet the lack of ability of the postman to do anything punitive does not mitigate the individual's resentment that he knows and the fear that he may be talking about it.

It is sometimes stated that people cannot be forced to like others or to socialize with them if they do not like them. People will choose their friends, even as they will choose their mates. But in the case of deviance, they exclude others from the friendship circle and the mar-

riage reservoir not only for themselves but for friends and family as well. They express disapproval not only of a relationship but of the person entering into it.

When the deviant is subjected to official handling and treatment by power groups in the society, it appears that his difficulties derive from legal and other official sanctions. Oppression, however, is not necessarily legal and can be the more burdensome as it becomes difficult to pinpoint, as it conceals itself behind façades and pretends to be what it is not. While it is difficult to imagine any oppression that equalled the extermination, genocide, and enslavement visited upon American blacks and Indians, Armenian nationals during the rule of the Turks, and Jews in Germany from 1933 to 1945, there is a very real oppression that expresses itself in terms of contempt, inequality of opportunity, and downgrading of the person. Victims have been those afflicted with epilepsy, leprosy (so terrible in the way that the diseased have been treated that even the name of the ailment has had to be changed), mental retardates, the insane, blacks, homosexuals—in short, deviants. Those who are conceptualized as being capable of responsibility for their actions and statuses are, by some curious irony, actually better regarded, not worse, by their brethren. This may be because there is hope: Because they are in control of their fate, they may become reasonable and see the light, deciding that their moral failing need not continue. Thus, it is easier to think in terms of rehabilitation for the bank robber than for the former mental patient; the latter has a permanent and ineffaceable mark, branded by a society that believes, of some things: If once, then always.

One of the ways of demonstrating that a status is downgraded is that the status is used in place of the person: She is a broad, one says, but there is no common analogous term for the male who is sex-hungry, precisely because the male in that capacity is not disvalued. The replacement of the individual by the category with which he is identified, the failure to see the person as a person, has been viewed as the touchstone of the minority group. It is the ultimate in depersonalization and hence in dehumanization. In terms of the deviant, it occurs only when his deviance occupies a master status that takes precedence over all his other statuses: No matter what role such a person occupies, he does it as, for example, a black or a homosexual. "Former mental patient" is another category invested with master status; no matter what such a person achieves, for good or ill, it is the achievement, accomplishment, or dereliction of one who has been institutionalized for mental illness.

COPING WITH AN ELUSIVE ENEMY

The condition of being disliked or despised is often not congruent with the official sanctions taken by a society, although in earlier eras and in highly unified societies it may well have been. Thus, if legal codes have been modified so that people formerly considered criminal are excepted from penal sanctions, this does not automatically make their lot a comfortable or happy one. In many instances, it might act to alleviate suffering, but this would not invariably be true, for the suffering can continue in unabated form, without the government as "whipping boy" on whom to place the blame.

People facing unofficial sanctions, which are often silent and subtle, have to cope not only with their unofficial and elusive oppressors but with their own self-image under conditions of being disliked or believing that they are. They limit their interactions so that they are not subject to rebuke; they protect themselves wherever possible, by insulating themselves from the hostility of others. This insulation is twofold. It is physical, in that they limit their encounters with many people. And it is one of communication management, in which many of those encountered are not in the know. Finally, both sides enter into a conspiracy of silence. Neither will say anything that will bring forth a potentially embarrassing response; to initiate such a conversation is a matter of bad taste. There is a precarious and uneasy truce, a tacit peace.

Facing this situation, the other or normal may not suffer from any great burden. If the deviant has a physical stigma, the other does not think of himself as being an oppressor or as patronizing but merely as one who can offer compassion, kindness, and acceptance. He defines, justifies, and structures his avoidance as something that is supportive of the well-being of the unfortunate one. If the stigma is behavioral, and hence moral, he justifies his exclusionary and discriminatory practices and thinks of himself again in terms of kindness, compassion, forgiveness, and tolerance because he offers limited acceptance of the person, but not of the failing. Yet, as will presently be seen, the normal has problems, too, although to say that he suffers may be an unjustified exaggeration.

The deviant has problems both of self-image and of coping with the elusive character of an unseen enemy. Although the financial cost, social embarrassment, and fear of potential punishment may be overwhelming if a man is charged before a court of criminal justice, he is still in a somewhat better position than when he is constantly "on trial" before a world that has served him with no indictment and given him no oppor-

tunity to answer any charges. The deviant, even more than the criminal, is Kafka's protagonist and victim. He cannot face his accusers; his guilt or innocence, justifications and excuses, mitigating factors or lack of them, are irrelevant because they are not heard. He is the perennial juvenile in a court system where the mythology contends that society is only his protective big brother, that a judge does not judge and an accuser makes no accusation. He is sentenced to social exclusion, which is not a prison because it is not called one.

Fighting a very real enemy, not a straw man, the deviant faces some strategic alternatives of his own: To accept himself as spoiled, to join those who despise him, to mirror their view; to reorient his own thinking so that behavior and self will become acceptable and justified; to retreat more into a world of people like himself; to hide more effectively in the masses and melt into them; or to escape from the deviance by one route or another—these are among the competing options.

If the deviant act is illegal, then social sanctions are formal. A game is played and if, in the courtroom scene, the accused is victor, he walks forth unsullied. True, some will say that he could not have been hauled into court for nothing, although exoneration is occasionally so complete that the very reverse feeling sets in. But if there is a lingering doubt and if the accused suffers because of it, then his strategic position must shift: he must shadowbox with unseen persons and must fight gossip and avoidance rather than the realities of a court and the threat of imprisonment.

Official and unofficial disapproval are, in the end, one and the same. Backed by the jailhouse or by the contemptuous sneer, they act to accomplish the same purpose: social control, keeping people in line.

INFORMAL CONTROL

Once again I return to the short man and his tall wife, to the problem of being deviant without violating any law and without becoming a client for some agency of social control. Although proponents of labeling have emphasized that official agencies of control make or manufacture deviance, they have not entirely excluded from consideration the effect of informal control on the deviant. The problem here is that the latter, even without being handled officially, comes to feel that what he does (or is) is wrong, inferior, or rejected.

When one speaks of the agencies of social control, one is usually referring to governmental bodies, as the police, the courts, or perhaps some youth board or authority that stands between the police and the alleged young offender. However, agencies of control can be of

other types. They can be organized and quasi-official without being quite governmental, as a social welfare office or a charitable organization. Finally, there are powerful social-control agents with no official or semi-official status, as friends, peers, neighbors, significant and even not very significant others.

So long as one differentiates deviance from crime and sees deviance in terms of activities that arouse stigmatization, indignation, horror, abhorrence, antipathy, or some similar reaction among the general public, then unofficial and popular attitudes toward the transgressor, or negative definitions of him, must be considered powerful forces. These are the factors that contribute so largely to an individual's sense of shame and guilt, and to his viewing himself as an inferior being or as being inferior in some important respect, and often confusing the two. It is not to deny the force and effect of a policeman with gun in hand to emphasize that this is only one way of instilling in an individual the sense that he is one of the rejects of society. While those in prison may feel that freedom alone will bring happiness and fulfillment and that they would be able to reject the rejectors and thumb their nose at the haters if only they were given the option to do so—and given freedom along with it—for others, rejection by friends, family, and peers is a problem with which they must constantly cope. Many of those who carry involuntary deviance (particularly for a physical disability) or courtesy stigma (for which they are equally devoid of responsibility) know the great burden of being rejected without being flogged or imprisoned.

The mechanism by which informal control operates and its effects on the deviant (the object or, one might say, the victim) have been studied less frequently than formal control. It is relatively easy, for example, to see how social class will help to determine whether a youth is sent home with an apology from the judge or whether, for the same offense, he finds himself in prison. It is not quite so simple to determine the social-class factors in informal rejection. There are clues, but they are hard to quantify. We might conclude that, as one goes up in the class scale, acceptance of the deviant seems to increase while painful slurs and rejecting attitudes appear to be muted. The acceptance, in short, seems to be greater with higher social class, but at the same time it is enshrouded in circumspection that is subtle and sophisticated.

Formal sanctions affect the official label. However, there is an unofficial label—when, for example, everybody knows because “Big Mouth” was talking on the block—that can be just as oppressive and more difficult to combat. The informal, above all, may have a severe effect in influencing the day-to-day activities and personality formation of

the deviant. It plays a significant part in his decisions about the strategy to be used in managing his spoiled self and in navigating not only during the events of the day but for his entire life.

When are informal controls at play? For one thing, there is usually a moral imputation to the deviant behavior; it cannot be something that everyone openly accepts so long as one gets away with it. Informal controls cannot be effective for what Robin Williams (1960) calls patterned evasion, a form of behavior that has the social support of the general public but is against the "official rules" (usually the laws) of the society. Almost everyone cuts corners on income taxes and violates parking and other less-than-dangerous automobile offenses; many people, when it was necessary to do so, signed blatantly false affidavits to obtain a divorce by collusion. These acts carry no moral ignominy, although if one were apprehended and actually prosecuted, and for some reason found oneself behind bars, the trial, verdict, and imprisonment would constitute what Harold Garfinkel (1956) calls a public degradation ceremony. Just being a prisoner would turn the person into a pariah, unless he could thunder forth with the voice of righteousness, as did Gandhi and King.

Contrast this with the short man and his tall wife: They violate no law by being together, but their situation places them in the line of fire as objects of ridicule. A rule has been violated, and no matter how irrational or silly the rule, it is believed in strongly by almost everyone. The "transgressor," if he can be called that, is not accused of doing harm to anyone, but he becomes the object of universal putdown. He is made to feel that he has violated a rule, the breaking of which makes him in some fashion an inferior person. The elusive material that social scientists have so far studied only very little is the process by which deterrence takes place when the social reaction is entirely unofficial, as well as the process by which the "indignant" or "hostile" others manifest their feelings.

Such manifestation can be overt or subtle. When it is not overt to the offender, it may be to others, which the transgressor learns about in a variety of ways. It takes the forms of ridicule, sneer, scorn, snicker, gossip, mimic and parody, exclusion from certain functions to which one is otherwise eligible, discrimination in jobs or in other capacities, name-calling, slurs, and forthright denunciations. It is expressed in the area of sociability, and particularly in opportunities for courtship and marriage, all to communicate not only that what one does (or is) is disvalued, but that people are doing something about it. What are they doing? They are talking, making fun, acting out, ridiculing, and excluding.

Among children, the expression of hostility is usually lacking in

subtlety, giving rise to the general belief that children are crude and cruel, lack social graces, and cause embarrassment. They stare, point, and ask questions out loud. They blurt out openly, "Your father's a cripple!" although they may have come from homes where that would never have been said. They do not hesitate to call other little boys such names as "sissy," and they enunciate this word and others of a more pejorative nature so that the negative intent is unmistakable.²⁵

When they are somewhat older, children are taught that people's size, shape, physical defects, and even their moral lapses are taboo topics, particularly in the presence of the sufferer. Then the latter feels the strong weight of the silence; he knows, precisely because the subject is unmentionable, that he has been classified as a deviant. Except for a rare relationship in which interaction is frequent and all aspects of the person are taken for granted, going unnoticed because they have become assimilated into the general mode of living of the participants, silence is oppressive. As Fred Davis (1961) points out, the sensitivity that there is something wrong can come about either because one is deeply aware of avoidance (of persons or topics), or because one is aware that certain topics are being artificially discussed, as if there were a pretense that nothing were wrong. It is the blatancy of this pretense that itself announces that something is very wrong indeed.

The snicker and the stare come to be so expected by some highly visible deviants that, even when they hear laughter unrelated to a given situation, or when there is no lengthy eye contact, it is caught or imagined, and a meaning is imputed to it. Under these conditions, the deviant often comes to resent onlookers. His reaction may be to make his disvalued characteristic even more obvious; to scorn those who scorn him; to retort in kind and in anger, staring back hard and fast.

Such a deviant lives in constant fear of gossip, knowing that it is going on around him, and imagining it when it is not there. On a superficial level, one can say that gossip is not very dangerous. ("Let them talk, I'll cry all the way to the bank.") The gossip cannot cause imprisonment nor, usually, impoverishment (although there can be a heavy economic burden carried by the deviant because of job discrimination). But gossip reduces him to a person who is talked

²⁵ Some observers find children particularly astute. They can even recognize transsexuals, it is said, where others are unable to be so discerning. Hogwash! The children have not yet learned their good manners—that is all. But they are no wiser than the adults (except for the social scientists who reach this peculiar conclusion about them).

about. The celebrity can ignore this and perhaps turn it into an advantage, but not so the ordinary man or woman. People laugh, and those who are laughed at become attuned to the laughter. Or sometimes there is a sudden silence as one person enters the room.

It is in the social arena that the deviant meets the greatest rejection and unless he joins forces with others who are like himself or who have some other deviant characteristic, he may go so far as to retreat into almost complete isolation. I recall a handsome man in his mid-thirties, well built, but only four feet tall. He complained of his loneliness, of the stares that he felt. (One had to look closely to be certain that he was not a short adolescent, entering the period of his growth spurt just a little late.) Above everything else, he cried out against the lack of any social life. He had found it impossible to make and retain friends (possibly because of factors other than his height, but probably height was at fault; the crucial factor, however, was that he had a mechanism for blaming everything on this defect).

Humor is a two-sided weapon; it can be used not only to subject people to ridicule, but to disarm those who are likely to be uncomfortable in the presence of the deviant. It makes light of tragedy, brings the unmentionable into the forefront of conversation, and, in short, permits the heavy air of embarrassment to be lifted. It was termed *minstrelization* by Anatole Broyard (1950), who was writing about racial stereotypes:

Minstrelization takes innumerable forms, in each case involving the Negro's willing capitulation to the anti-Negro's definition of him. A subtle example is the attribution of inherent greater "rhythmicality" to the Negro, and the inauthentic Negro's acceptance of this alleged trait, which is taken to show, of course, that the Negro is a more primitive creature, more animal-like, not yet emancipated by the short-circuiting effects of full consciousness from the primeval earth-throb.

What is involved here is a deliberate impersonation of the stereotype in mockery of self. In the words of Goffman (1963:110), "the stigmatized person ingratiatingly acts out before normals the full dance of bad qualities imputed to his kind, thereby consolidating a life situation into a clownish role."

But it doesn't always work. The extremely short young adult, invited to a friend's home for dinner, asks if there is a high chair for him when he sits down to eat. Such a remark may reduce the tension by suggesting that the guest knows that people are thinking about his size and wants to let them know that it is not unmentionable; but his mention of it at the same time may accentuate the tension by embarrassing the hosts, who do not have an acceptable response in their available repertoire. Further, minstrelization played out by

a black man, or by an effeminate male, may be a sharp though subtle manner of showing contempt for the normal who holds the stereotype, a mechanism for ridiculing not the stereotype but those who believe in it. The deviant is here a sort of double agent. For the physically disabled, this usage of the role of clown is not appealing. Most people with spoiled identities are too sensitive about the defect to be able to handle it in this manner. Again it is something that only a celebrity, or one with other strong compensatory features, can cope with. Self-mockery, however, is not to be confused with humor as a weapon by normals to subject others to ridicule. The latter, in fact, is a major educational weapon by which a society makes certain of its normative requirements known to its members. It is especially damaging to the secret deviant, who must often join in laughter directed at himself.

Within the family, there is often particularly strong expression of hostility toward the wayward one. The ambience hovers thickly everywhere. A brother or sister does not bring a friend to the house because there is a physically handicapped parent, an effeminate boy, or some other stigmatized person, and the latter becomes aware of the strategies. Even the mildly retarded often have a sensitive grasp of such a situation, although the severely retarded would not.

Informal sanctions can be understood only as a mechanism for informal social control. In addition to sneering, ostracism, and ridicule, it takes another form: the rule of the mob, or even of one individual or of a small group unauthorized by law who decides to inflict punishment on another. The punishment may be to kill him, hold him captive, to run him out of town, to put him out of business, or perhaps to place illegal pressure on public officials to punish him.²⁶ This type of informal sanction is often invoked with the connivance of public officials, in which case it can be said to be institutionalized and quasi-official public policy; or it can be done with no official approval, collaboration, or connivance, in which instance it takes the form of criminal acts (seldom prosecuted as such).

Informal sanctions are forms of rewards and punishments (mainly the latter), warning each person against behavior that will make him one of society's rejects. It aims to strengthen the moral stance of the normals, infusing them with a sense of correctness, well-being, and uprightness, as they join other good, whole, and normal people—like themselves, of course—in heaping ridicule on the outcast. In

²⁶ While America suffered from the unofficial rule of violence more openly in the nineteenth and early twentieth century than later, not only through murder (in the form of lynching) but also through systematic disfranchisement of the black people, the oppressive measures continued in a more subtle form when open lynching was abandoned as a way of life.

short, it keeps people in line—not everyone, of course, but then, if everyone were kept in line and there were no deviants, there would be no expression of the social-control mechanism at all.

In some instances, informality acts to supplement the official government-sponsored reaction, infusing it with public support and leaving the transgressor almost alone and friendless. Sometimes this can be seen in an extreme form: the convict who is despised by his fellow-prisoners, so heinous in their eyes was his crime.²⁷ Without support by some informal sanctions, the formal rules tend to be rather ineffective, although strong government-sponsored propaganda can combat this. But it is with regard to matters that are not the business of the law—such as the relative size of two people who marry—that social control operates entirely through informal methods. How effective this can be is seen by the infrequency with which a strongly held norm is violated when mere ridicule awaits the violator, as contrasted with the frequency with which serious crimes are committed while the threat of imprisonment awaits the apprehended transgressor.

Those subject to informal sanctions are particularly helpless, for they often live without an enemy they can engage in combat. Even when aware of the source and reason for the hostility, the deviant continues to be a helpless victim, for to defend himself and counter-attack might only produce greater difficulties. He cannot establish his innocence before a judge and jury, for no one has accused him; informal sanctions are punishments without accusation or indictment. And if he does place himself before an official body which finds him innocent, he may still be subject to the rebukes of peers, friends, family, and neighbors, whose judgments are not affected by an official exoneration.

Informal control may take on the form of muted hostility. This occurs when the anger against the transgressor is for some reason unable to gain open expression. Max Scheler (1961) has described this process (although he did not apply it to hostility toward those who violate group norms) under the concept of *ressentiment*. This is defined as “an attitude which arises from a cumulative repression of feelings of hatred, revenge, envy and the like.”

On the surface, it may appear that *ressentiment* is by definition incompatible with deviance, because the latter arouses indignation, while the former is a repression of it. There is no contradiction here, as the negative feelings may be aroused and then, for reasons of gap between words and deeds, the hostility does not gain overt

²⁷ But one can be misled. This can be a rationalization for them to express their own anger, ventilate their frustrations, victimize the man with their brutality, pour out racial hostility, and finally commit rape upon him, if he is an attractive prospect.

expression. If there are closet deviants, then there may be closet anti-deviants as well.

Lewis Coser (1961), in his introduction to Scheler's work, noted that resentment "arises out of impotence and moral impoverishment." Drawing from Nietzsche, Coser finds that resentment connotes "the inability to act out antagonistic impulses in open conflict." If the uptight middle class cannot act out its impulses, how can those impulses serve as a mechanism for control? Pent up, they express themselves in social exclusion and heightened ridicule of others, a blaming of the evils of society on "them," all the more rancorous because the self-righteous condemners cannot turn their anger into official acts of oppression.

The hippies of the late 1960s saw this repressed indignation sometimes bursting forth as unofficial and extralegal punishment, often with connivance of law officers and authorities. Welfare recipients have seen this muted hostility, and so have black people throughout American history, as well as immigrants, Jews, radicals, and others at various times.

In the end, social living is a gamble. Each step in one's daily pace through life is an exposure to which the deviant is highly vulnerable. Much energy is expended avoiding, responding to, or defending oneself against rejection. Perhaps it can be summarized in the situation of the pregnant unmarried girl. She hides her protruding belly as long as possible with tight girdle and loose coat, and she feels the sting of neighbors who turn and look. She even feels the rebuke of those who do not turn, but who she believes must be staring at her as she passes them on the street, or whom she sizes up as studiously avoiding such a stare in order to spare her feelings, which itself is a rebuke. She raises her head higher than others, because she feels it is falling lower. Finally, she moves, changes her name or puts "Mrs." in front of it, and takes on the biography of a widow or a divorcee. Few believe her, but a new game is being played, and the rules of informal sanctions are now cloaked in silence and mutual make-believe.

Sanctions are needed to the extent that rules are required but not accepted as the best and most natural way of doing things by all members of society. For some rules, it is possible to tolerate both the rule and its transgressor. Heaping ridicule upon the latter is a cruel but usually effective means of enjoining people from doing what powerful others do not want them to do, but it results in an unnecessary amount of suffering for those who cannot or will not keep in line.

For the involuntary deviant, informal sanctions appear to be meaningless. They cannot control him. They cannot get him back in line.

They do, however, reaffirm the standard of the group; they glorify beauty, health, youth, strength, and physical and mental perfection. That this can be accomplished without ridicule and ostracism seems apparent, but it is not a road that people in all societies often choose.

Strategies, Types, and Typologies

THE ATTITUDES that are assumed both by those who must cope with a hostile society and by their adversaries will vary considerably according to the type of differentness under study. Deviance itself is a wide spectrum. It covers a vast number of dissimilar people and situations, differing in the manner they came to be deviant, their degree of responsibility, the type of reaction they elicit (although always negative, by definition, it can range in nature, certainty, and other respects), and many diverse ways. An area like deviance would thus lend itself to a description of types or kinds of people and of typologies, the latter being sociological constructs used to study and better understand either the strategy of the deviant against the world, or the reverse.

Under ideal conditions, a typology should be all-inclusive, and furthermore, it should have categories that are mutually exclusive and not overlapping. Sometimes these are not possible, because some types of persons or conditions just do not fit easily and smoothly into any of the groups—and one should avoid at all costs a “miscellaneous” catch-all file, where nothing can ever be found and from which no useful theory or prediction can arise. Further, there are people or events that seem to fit into more than one group, and others that fit only slightly into a group.

Perhaps the most significant of all typologies would divide people according to the voluntarism of their deviance. In a way, this somewhat overlaps with classic sociological investigations of ascribed and achieved statuses, but some involuntary deviant statuses are neither ascribed nor achieved, such as getting sick or being in an accident and suffering a permanent physical handicap. The voluntary-involun-

tary division should be seen as more of a continuum than a dichotomy, and it is closely related to that of responsibility and irresponsibility. There are midpoints in all such instances, and they tend to be lost in looking at the polar extremes.

A typology that is particularly useful comes from Joseph Gusfield (1967). He sees essentially four forms of deviants: cynical, repentant, sick, and enemy. Utilizing Gusfield's categories, one can extend them and find deviants who are self-pitying, proud, victims of fate, and even, as contrasted with the enemy, the deviant might be seen as friend.²⁸ These can strongly overlap, not only in such obvious ways as that persons may be both self-pitying and seeing (or presenting) themselves as victims of fate, but even in being both cynical and proud, or in so apparently contradictory a pair as repentant and proud. For people do not have to be consistent to survive, and they may use alternating styles of seeing or presenting themselves to others; or they may present themselves in one manner to some and in another manner under other conditions to a different audience.

What Gusfield's four types and the others that are broadly drawn from them suggest is that deviants—not unlike other people—project an image of themselves that is intended to be most useful in coping with an environment. (In this instance, the surroundings are defined as being highly hostile.) The image must also have some relationship to the mutually viewed and agreed-upon reality, and the strategy must be seen as having some likelihood of bringing about the desired goals. The Gusfield typology fits these prerequisites because it demonstrates the degree to which an individual is willing to call into play, and is able to manipulate, the sentiments of the social world around him, his ability to neutralize their hostility, and, in so doing, to manipulate their attitudes (or at least to modify them) so that this becomes one more mechanism for survival.

A few comments on the four groups derived from Gusfield:

The cynical deviant. This is the criminal type, the villain who commits antisocial acts with no pretense of bringing about any social good. It is all for personal gain, he hopes to get away with it, and he has cynical attitudes toward the norms of society, or at least toward those which he has violated (although he wants protection lest these same norms be violated when he or someone closely associated with him is chosen as victim). The cynical deviant knows that the norms are "right," that he has violated them, and that when

²⁸ The deviant as friend would be a complex instance of culture conflict. Surely some people saw the Abolitionists as enemies, others as friends, but the sociologist would, in either case, have to conceptualize them as targets of hatred and anger, which is what a study of disvalued people is about.

he is apprehended, his punishment is deserved, much as he would like to escape it.

This is an accurate portrait, but as I see it, it applies only to hard-core criminals and perhaps to white-collar criminals (as, for instance, public officials taking bribes); and, in America at least, perhaps not to so many as might be expected by those who cannot imagine any justifications for predatory acts. Retrospectively, many criminals begin to politicize their acts and see themselves as victims of a system; they recall the many instances in which the rich and the well-placed committed similar acts only to receive minimal punishment or none at all, or perhaps even to be rewarded with a political appointment. So that although cynical deviants exist, most do use excuses and whatever techniques and mechanisms are at hand to justify their behavior. When the behavior is supported by large numbers of people in the society, the supposed cynic looks to these others for his values and refuses to entertain the notion that he is deviant.

Cynicism is directly related to the public image of men in power. Racism and the decline of America's civil rights commitment, the war in Vietnam, and the revelations of Watergate have had the combined effect of offering criminals excuses and justifications that would not have been as easily available without these events.

The repentant deviant. The deviant as penitent and contrite is found where there is no apparent justification for the misdeed that has been perpetrated, and where repentance is utilized as a method of neutralizing public hostility. In these instances, the deviant does not believe that his act is no different from those committed by others who have not been caught or whose activities are condoned. Rather, he stands apologetic, with no excuses, although he likes to display the mitigating features of his situation; he asks only that he not be judged too harshly.

His repentance, however, in my view, may be a mask, cleverly manipulated because he knows that it is necessary to win him leniency. It is a mask that he wears particularly in court and before parole and probation boards, and it is communicated not only by phrases that express regrets and sorrow but by lowered eyelids, facial expressions, and body posture consistent with the image that he is trying to project. Often, on the other side of the imaginary fence, the officer of the law knows that the penitence is a mask. But he nevertheless requires it and considers it a victory that he can force a person who is not contrite, particularly a rebellious youth, to stand and express repentance that he does not feel. Everybody gets into this game, but nobody wins.

The deviant as sick. The deviant as sick gains public sympathy not

because he is sorry for what he has done (or for what he is); he asks for and gains it because he had no control over *what occurred* to him. Sickness just happened, and it is something that is explained or excused because it is not a chosen path. Whatever may have been one's responsibility for having exposed oneself to danger, one did not wish to become disabled.

As a technique to manipulate the public and officialdom, sickness is a complex and many-pronged tool. When applied to behavior rather than to disability, it is invoked primarily as an alternative to punishment and to facilitate the redefinition of the criminal as treatable rather than punishable. Thus, the shoplifter wants to be viewed as a kleptomaniac rather than "an ordinary thief," and the child molester chooses the label "sick" in order to avoid the severe hostility that would be directed at him were he viewed as evil. But the homosexual, who, despite laws against his activities and occasional arrests, grapples primarily with social attitudes and is more likely to resist the label of sickness in favor of one signifying pride, self-righteousness, or propriety. Thus, despite the stigma attached to mental illness, particularly when the label is used as a mechanism for social control, it is less oppressive in some instances than alternate categories that are available and likely to be accepted, and for this reason the deviant under some conditions has a vested interest in displaying himself as sick and under others in avoiding such a classification.

The deviant as enemy. The deviant may show no repentance; or if he does it may be a front, an example of clever impression management; or he may reject the view of himself as sick and flay those who so define him (as in the case of political deviants who are declared "insane" by groups in power that want to discredit or silence them). His behavior may seem to be perfectly correct and proper to him, but in this respect he goes further than the homosexual who defends the propriety of his acts (with "Gay is good" or "Gay is just as good as straight"); he may see his acts as better, as the only proper and good ones, and the normatively accepted ones as an embodiment of evil. The public norm is illegitimate in the eyes of the deviant, writes Gusfield, and the "enemy deviant" refuses to incorporate it into his self-definition.

Even this can take two forms: There is the "enemy deviant" who sees and is seen by the upholder of norms and laws as an enemy; in this case the deviant is seeking tolerance of his activities, in a live-and-let-live relationship. This would be the case with gambling, and it would fit the pattern of the homosexual movement. But in other instances, the deviant is searching for a change in power relationships, seeking not only to modify the norms but to replace them with his

own. This type of deviant is exemplified by the civil rights activists; such "enemy deviants" constitute a threat to the old order. They can be neutralized in several ways, not only by repressive measures but also by accepting their aspirations on a cultural-intellectual level while making few if any changes in the social relationships that they challenge.

The fourfold typology of Gusfield is primarily a classification according to the manner in which people are defined and reacted to by others. Somewhat different from the Gusfield typology and most useful, albeit in a different way, is one presented in an essay by Simon Dinitz and his colleagues (1969), who construct a typology based upon five categories of deviant people: the deviant as freak, as "sinful," as criminal, as "sick," and as alienated (the quotation marks are in the original).

The deviant as freak. The word *freak* is perhaps unfortunate, but this is the same argument that has been invoked against the use of the word *deviant*, and I have defended the latter (in fact, I do not know how I could get along without it) and shall use the former, at least in the description of Dinitz's work. *Freak* is a part of the vocabulary, and if it contains the aura of ridicule of an unfortunate victim of fate, sociologists in using the term are not accepting that attitude but are merely recording it. Perhaps it would be better that the word not be avoided, for it constitutes a commentary on the attitudes of the public whose norms and reactions are under study.

The deviant as freak is a gross and, I would add, visible departure from the physical, physiological, and intellectual ideal. His aberrance consists in what he is, not in what he does, although much of what he does will be structured by what he is (or thinks he is), how he defines himself in terms of one undesirable characteristic, and how this is seen by others (or, more exactly, how he sees this as being seen by these others). Examples cited are midgets; ugly, obese, or disfigured persons; and the mentally retarded. Dinitz and his colleagues seem to regard this, as well as other forms of deviance, as being a matter of either/or: One is or is not in the category. "Terminology used for physical attributes," they write, "as tall and taller, cannot be used to describe deviance, as criminal and more criminal." But there are degrees, and even the "freak" category has them: Some people are more obese than others, and some more severely retarded. And even within the larger group here labeled "freaks," certain physiological deviations are far less "offensive" to normals than others, as deaf-muteness—so much so that they gradually lose their deviance, slip out of the category entirely, and many years pass without the label of "freak" being applied to them.

The "aberrant-in-being" group is usually categorized by freedom from responsibility for what they are. Although they elicit a generally negative reaction, they are also treated with compassion, pity, and a combination of avoidance of interaction and avoidance of the overt recognition that the trait in question exists or that it is deviant. Aberrants-in-being include, in addition to midgets and others already mentioned, cripples, paraplegics, and spastics. As a group, they bear strong resemblance to those in the sick category. What happens when one tries to place the leper in one category or another? Physiologically, he is the victim of a bacterial disease, but socially the high degree of stigmatization is more akin to attitudes toward the freak than toward the sick. Dinitz makes an effort to solve this dilemma by confining the category of "sick" to those with psychological and psychiatric problems, manifested in their behavior rather than in their being.²⁹

The deviant as "sinful." Bearing in mind that this is how deviants are conceptualized by normals, and the manner in which the conceptualized category becomes a mechanism for social control, oppression, or acceptance, one arrives at the second group, the deviant as sinful. In placing the word *sinful* in quotes, Dinitz indicates that he is not speaking for himself but is identifying an attitude of normals. Sin is a bit out of fashion in behavioral science, but not with the public; it does not fit in well with a secular society, yet it continues to pinpoint the nature of some condemnatory attitudes.

Under ordinary circumstances, the concept of sin would be replaced by that of immorality, not in the sexual sense of the term, or at least not exclusively in that sense, but rather to connote the contravention of moral and ethical codes that demand that one do good deeds, be kind and considerate, avoid actions that will be harmful to others, and the like. It is true that some of these moral strictures are written into law, and these fall into another category: namely, the deviant as criminal. Others, however, are not matters of law, but involve good taste, etiquette, and canons of decency. Those who violate these norms are described, when they are not criminals, as sinners, perhaps as good a word as one can find to capture how they are seen by the nonviolators, particularly the victims.

²⁹ Perhaps the greatest difficulty with this group in a typological arrangement is that, given the name *freak*, rather than the concept of socially devalued physiological or anatomical difference, it is impossible to place racial minorities therein. Yet, if one started with the notion of deviance-in-being rather than -in-doing, with the idea that people are stigmatized sometimes for what they are and sometimes for what they do, the racial groups would find a ready place. That is why they seem to be so well described by Goffman (1963) in his phrase "tribal stigma."

For example, it is deviant and in most Western societies would be considered immoral not to attend one's mother's funeral (unless there are strong mitigating circumstances) but it is not criminal. I would find it immoral to exploit a spouse, to be supported while one goes through school and learns a profession, and then abandon the other.³⁰

For Dinitz, the category of "sinful" is for the use of those who have rejected the orthodox and prevailing normative order, whether of religious or secular ideologies. The sinner is the heretic or traitor, the apostate or deserter, the renegade from a group to which he once belonged; and the group views him with greater suspicion because he once belonged. The deviant in this instance has often deliberately assumed, and sometimes advertised, his deviation: He rejects the world around him, rebels against it, and seldom suffers from shame or guilt.

Whereas in political, religious, and nationalist thought, in dogmas and loyalties, the deviant retains his unorthodox view of the world, or at least of some segment of it, and has considerable pride, this is not the case with "ordinary sinners." Theirs is not an intellectual expression, although they may develop an intellectual argument to support it. So that the concept of the sinner, in the usual secular sense, as personified by someone viewed as immoral, cannot easily be grouped with the rebel. "The presumption is that the sinner, or the immoral person," writes Dinitz, "*accepts* the doctrines and norms that he *violates*." [Italics in original.] He has little in common, then, with the heterodox label, although traditional religion places the term "sinner" on both of them.

The deviant as criminal. There are persons whose deeds are proscribed by law. These are acts evil in themselves or made evil because they are defined as such. This definition, writes Dinitz, is derived from the requirements of contemporary social life for a degree of conformity, without which "chaos and anarchy might follow." There are petty violations, curfew restrictions, the so-called folk crimes, and to these Dinitz adds what he terms status offenses, such as drug addiction and homosexuality. These are similar to the so-called crimes without victims, and they are called status offenses to suggest that a person is punished for what he is rather than for what he does.³¹ The difficulty here is

³⁰ There are problems of vocabulary here, for while one might redefine sin to include such acts and to proscribe them, this is not what is usually meant by sinfulness, nor is it categorized as crime.

³¹ While many sociologists find it useful, I prefer not to use this concept of "status offense" because of the conflict with my theory of isness and my rejection of the imputations of permanence contained in the idea of being (see pages 144-54).

that some of these would probably be deviant even if decriminalized, and hence the category of "the deviant as criminal" will not be entirely useful. What seems to be involved is "status deviance" of an achieved and somewhat voluntaristic nature that would separate it from the "aberrant-in-being" category.

Finally, there are crimes with willing victims. (The differentiation between crimes without victims and those where the victims are willing is usually not made, and might be difficult to carry through, but can be useful.) Here Dinitz includes gambling, abortion (at least formerly), and prostitution. Again, decriminalization in and of itself is not going to change the public view of this behavior, unless it is accompanied by institutionalization of the behavior. Abortion is coming close to being accepted even before it is completely decriminalized; gambling was probably never seen as particularly deviant (is the numbers player deviant? or the Wall Street gambler?); and it is likely that the prostitute will be regarded as a whore, a slut, or a tramp, in the pejorative sense in which those terms are uttered, even if she plies her wares with government sanction and protection, as many experiences in Europe and in a few places in the United States have illustrated.

The deviant as "sick." The fourth category of Dinitz again finds the author using quotes: He wishes to express his reservations about the term "sick," even as he did about "sin." This is a category of pathological behavior that is interpreted as a symptom of a psychological and psychiatric disorder, not of a physiological one. Where there was physiological disorder that brought forth a negative response, Dinitz had conceptualized it differently: namely, in the deviant as freak. The two groups differ primarily in the basis on which they are defined as deviant: the freaks for what they "are" (the physical state) and the sick for what they do (the behavioral manifestations). Thus, the freaks may be more definitely sick, from the medical viewpoint, with less controversy over what the illness is and whether there is illness.

Within the sick-rather-than-freak category, one places the psychotic, the alcoholic, the schizophrenic, people whose behavior is unsuccessful and faulty in coping with the world around them. The use of the label "sick," although often condemnatory and standing in the way of acceptance of the behavior as an alternate mode of diversified normative activity (as the homophile movement proposes that homosexuality be seen), suggests therapy. One of the difficulties is that it offers little alternative to therapy, and for some people this would mean compulsory therapy, although it need not.

The deviant as alienated. Finally, as the last group in the Dinitz typology, is the deviant as alienated from the normative order.

Examples are bums, tramps, suicides, hippies, and bohemians. The alienated have rejected the dominant values of the culture, but theirs has by and large not been an intellectual rejection; rather, primarily a behavioral one. They have not been conscious rebels, offering an alternative to the orthodox and normative, but simply fallouts and dropouts from the society, retreating from it, rejected by it, sometimes making fun of it, criticizing it, laughing at it, and generally feeling few or no ties to it.

The two classification systems, of Gusfield and of Dinitz, respectively, illustrate approaches to such a problem, and many variations can be developed. One that appears to be worthy of mention is advanced by Shlomo Shoham (1966:247-50), who suggests that these can be conceptualized on a scale starting with the most inwardly directed behavior to the most outwardly directed. They are: autistic (or alienated-autistic), self-destructive (or suicidal), escapist (as addicts, alcoholics, and tramps), bohemian (creative, marginal, the perennial stranger), accidental (not by accident, but deviant as a result of a single transgression, a short-lived episode), passionate (motivated by desire for sexual gratification or from wounded love), acquisitive (property offenders, racketeers, white-collar criminals, unethical businessmen), the chaotic rebellious (generally young, and aggressive for the sake of the vandalism), and ideational rebellious (searching to change society).

Before offering further comments on these typologies, a few words on three largely overlooked forms of deviance may be in order.

The deviant as a social creation. Many social thinkers, particularly since the work of Tannenbaum and Lemert, have pointed out that societies create deviance or deviants. Thomas Szasz (1970) entitles one of his works *The Manufacture of Madness* (dealing primarily with drug-users and homosexuals who are created as social enemies in very much the way heretics were turned into witches); and Martin Hoffman (1968), in his work on male homosexuality, describes the phenomenon in a subtitle as "the social creation of evil."

Whatever may be the merits of these and related positions, there is a more literal sense in which transgressors are created; that is, by *agents provocateurs* and police agents who encourage, entice, aid, and in other ways make possible certain lawbreaking acts, in order to make arrests, gain political advantage, or defeat an opposition. In the trial of Father Berrigan and his antiwar allies at Harrisburg, it was revealed that a police agent recruited students who had not previously been involved to participate in militant activities. Among the revelations surrounding the Watergate scandal was the admission that Nixon

advance men arranged rowdy anti-Nixon demonstrations in order to vilify the opposition for its "deplorable tactics."

The process of manufacturing lawbreakers in order to discredit or arrest them is known as entrapment.³² In a study devoted to this subject (Sagarin and MacNamara, 1970), entrapment was described as

an act of the police or other law-enforcement agents (including non-governmental individuals acting on behalf of the police) in initiating, suggesting, advising, provoking, and encouraging the commission of a crime which would not have been committed had the police or its agents not wished to make an arrest.

Thus, one may take a politically radical youth, whether right-wing or left-wing, who confines his criticism of the social order to propaganda and convince him to commit acts of dynamiting and bombing in order to "break the case" and make a big arrest. In the United States, a defendant is not guilty if he can establish that the police encouraged the crime and made it possible, and that it would not have taken place without police suggestion, aid, and cooperation.

In entrapment, the evil inheres in the ones who do the manufacturing, but the hostility is directed against those who carry out the overtly objectionable acts. Deviants and deviance can literally be manufactured, and the dangers to a democratic process are apparent.

Collective deviance. The transgression that incites hostility can be unplanned, even out of character, and transitory. It may be situational, arising out of collective action that sweeps a community. The Boston Tea Party was such an act (there is considerable doubt as to how much support the activity had among the colonists), and the ghetto rebellions of the 1960s were such as well. In both instances, and numerous others that mark every decade in American history, people were transformed for a short time into vandals, assaulters, defiers of authority, and other roles that had been alien to them a short time earlier and were to become alien again. Collective deviance is a special instance of deviance as conflict: It is a temporary confrontation of powerful forces that leaves in its wake heightened hostility and, at the same time, possibilities for a redistribution of power.

However, collective deviance is not always so consciously aimed at changing power relationships as in the instance of the ghetto rebellions. Nor does it always lend itself to the liberal reaction that asserts "Their goals are okay, but we can't approve their methods." Sometimes, the

³² Goffman (1963:75) misuses this term—that is, he attributes to it a meaning that it does not have—when he writes that it is "an art detectives practice to cause criminals to reveal their habitual criminal practices and thus their criminal identity." What Goffman is describing is generally called staking out, laying a trap, or just trapping, but not entrapment.

political meanings of the outbreak of anger are more effectively concealed and in such cases would not be in the consciousness of those who show their hostility. Although both types of collective behavior—the obviously political and the apparently apolitical—are immediately termed “senseless” by those in power, there is considerable question as to the senselessness of the former, but usually rather little as to the latter.

Perhaps the clearest example of the seemingly nonpolitical expressions of collective anger and violence, sometimes resulting in death, can be seen at sports matches. Under ordinary circumstances, particularly in the United States, the violence has been kept within such acceptable confines as booing, denouncing an umpire and throwing debris on the field while the match is in progress, thus making continuation of the event difficult if not impossible. Although on the surface, outbreaks of this kind seem to involve only loyalties for local or national teams, there are underlying states of discontent easily inflamed by a small incident, somewhat similar to events characterizing ghetto riots. Thus, Ian Taylor (1971), writing of what has been called “soccer hooliganism” in England, states that association of such violence with social conflicts in the 1960s and early 1970s is nothing new:

The violence may now be taking the form of attempts by certain sections of the [working] class to assert some inarticulate but keenly experienced sense of control over “the game that was theirs.” That is, the violence may have different meanings compared to the violence of early “fotebal.” But those who control soccer and those who control the mass media see the violence as motiveless and meaningless and are asserting that they favor the professionalized spectacle that is contemporary soccer. They are accommodating to the definitions . . . [of] soccer as a passive form of commercial exchange and “entertainment,” rather than as the participatory sport of the [working] class; the distinction between “true” supporters and soccer “hooligans”; the continuation of the hold of the directors, the sponsors, the mass media and the mass-circulation glossies over the soccer game. They are refusing to envisage alternatives such as soccer as a form of consciousness within leisure time and soccer as a form of release from the constraints and limitations of society.

The prison riot is still another manifestation of collective violence that is temporary but not entirely transient, for it has a very lasting effect upon the relationships among which it erupted. It is met with extraordinarily repressive measures because the rioters usually cannot make the same claim of being victims and hence oppressed (or if oppressed, not without some rationality or justification, in the opinion of many outsiders) that can be made by the ghetto protesters. But

like the latter, the convict rioters usually achieve meaningful change, long overdue. However, the beneficiaries of the change are not the rioters themselves, who are severely punished for their leadership or even participation (beaten, intimidated, given solitary, denied more privileges after the riot than the meager ones they had before), but benefits are seen in concessions granted to the broad category of people who constitute prisoners in the United States, or wherever the protest had occurred.

Collective deviance is not so senseless as it has been called; nor is it senseless for its opponents to call it senseless, although they know better.

Deviance as martyrdom. A special case of the intellectual or political rebel or revolutionary is the self-righteous person who performs his task with deliberate martyrdom as an aim, often to draw attention to his opposition to the immoral ways of powerful groups in the society. Civil disobedience is his most effective weapon, and by casting himself in the role of defier of authority, he compels a confrontation between his morality and that of the established legal order. Thoreau, having spent one night in jail, emerged a saint.

Not all martyrdom is so successful, and sometimes one acquires a halo of saintliness that can be discerned by only a few, the followers who did not require a dramatic act to become convinced. Martyrdom is a phenomenon that can arise only in a conflict situation, when the forces in society are sharply divided. Although the martyr may not gain many new adherents by going to prison and may even remain a villain in the minds of those who were convinced of his villainy before, he is often successful in drawing attention to the forces of evil. No one performed this task more successfully in America in this century than Martin Luther King, Jr. He was not hated the less by his enemies as he became a martyr, but his side gathered strength and the area of neutrality tended to disappear, as he succeeded in compelling Americans to face the immorality of many of the institutionalized and taken-for-granted ways of society. They had been unable to confront such a view of their world before and have been unable to do so again since his death. As a prisoner, King was both martyr and leader, but as the victim of the assassin's bullet, he was only the former.

Occasional deviance. A form of behavior that is not easily placed into any of the other typologies may be called occasional, unplanned, or now-and-then deviance, performed by people who do not have a regular commitment to such activities and who do not gain the reputation or label as the sort of person who does that sort of thing. Shlomo Shoham (1970) refers to this as accidental deviance, but this term is ambiguous and would be better reserved for the unaware or even for

the individual who finds himself in an awkward position against his will (that is, by accident). However, the division that Shoham suggests between occasionals and regulars is significant. It cuts across some of the other types, but not all. For the most part, typologies have been concerned with the regulars, not the occasionals. In the study of youths who are defiant of authority, rebellious, surly, and perhaps in the eyes of elders somewhat ungovernable, one sees the close relationship between occasional acts and regular ones: how the occasional delinquent is impressionable, is often on the brink of becoming a regular, and how easy it is for him to drift—in the language of Matza (1964)—toward delinquency when he associates with others who are at similar points in their own life-styles or when apprehended and handled as if he were a regular.

Idiosyncratic and eccentric behavior, when it is sufficiently annoying or disruptive to be disapproved and yet not sufficiently commonplace in an individual to cause him to be associated with the activity or sufficiently threatening to others for them to take action against him, provides numerous examples of occasional deviance. Many people lose their temper from time to time, perhaps with some provocation, and for a brief period behave in a manner that they cannot control and that they later regret. Unless it occurs with great frequency and with intolerable consequences, this will not confer the status of deviant on the culprit. In the terminology of Becker (1963), being hot-tempered would not be a master status.

Heroic deviants. Another type that is suggested, and it is more an image that the public may have of some people than an image held by social analysts, is that of the deviant as hero or demi-hero. As described by J. L. Simmons (1969:22), it is a sympathetic point of view in which the deviant appears as sensitive and courageous, a semi-tragic figure “who strays from the beaten path because he has been victimized by society or because he is too strong and restless to be fettered.” It is a romantic image,

particularly strong among the disaffected fringe who are at loggerheads with conventional society and therefore sympathetic toward its outcasts. But it is certainly not confined to them. No matter how law-abiding we are, most of us harbor a streak of lawlessness and rebellion within us. . . . As long as the deviance isn't a personal risk or loss, we seem to derive some vicarious satisfaction from the rebellion and lawlessness of others. Almost none of us is so well indoctrinated with society's rules and regulations that we wholeheartedly support them.

Only a few examples neatly fit into this vision of deviants, but they can be found. This deviant has usually undertaken an act of daring, courage, imagination, innovation, or skill, and there is a glorification of

the perpetrator of the deed because of the talent, finesse, and perfection with which he has committed the act. There is little sympathy for an ordinary bank robber, but when there is a Great Train Robbery that is pulled off like a Hollywood scenario and in which the loot is in millions of dollars or pounds, the heroic halo can be seen.

TYPOLOGIES AND STRATEGIES

The use of typologies raises many problems in the understanding of strategies and the formation of social policy. Primarily, typologies should prove useful in delineating theories of deviance, in clarifying the nature of societal reaction to different kinds of deviants, showing the effectiveness (if any) and limitations of punitive action, the relationship of behavior to personality, and the like. A major difficulty inheres, however, in the effort to place some individuals and groups (or types) into one category, precisely because they fit into several, sometimes one more than another, or fall between categories. Is the prostitute immoral, sick, criminal, or alienated? If some of these labels are to be used, is the sickness or the alienation the result of the activities or their cause, the result of the societal reactions or their cause? The same questions can be asked for others: homosexuals, alcoholics, and the like. Where is the interracial couple to be placed? They have rejected one particular aspect of orthodox values, but in a pluralistic society their rejection may be merely a reflection of identification with one subgroup (such as that of youthful, radical activists), more than with the subgroups that are doing the labeling; or they may merely be ahead of their time in a changing society. The typology gives us the addict as criminal and the alcoholic as sick, but this can be reversed by court decision or legislative fiat.

Utilizing the approach of both Gusfield and Dinitz, it would appear to me that an understanding of uses of strategies can be reached by seeing deviance as a manifestation of sickness, immorality, rebellion, or rejection. Sickness is manifested in physiology and/or behavior, sometimes coinciding with mental retardation, which in turn is a form of but not the same as mental illness (for example, all retardation is illness, but only a percentage, ostensibly a small portion, of the mentally ill are feeble, retarded, or in any way below normal in intellectual capacity). Deviance as immorality involves the deliberate and intentional contravention of the norms of society, when such rule-breaking is defined by others as morally wrong, sinful, evil, or harmful to others. This immorality may be defined as criminal, as not the business of the law, or as noncriminal (if the immoral persons are the lawmakers and powerholders). Deviance as rebellion closely overlaps with Merton's

category of that name. The rebel is self-righteous, and if he adopts a façade of penitence, it is a maneuver to further the aims of the rebellion. It is an altruistic deviance, one might say, and again takes on criminal and noncriminal forms, depending upon the nature of the society (is it totalitarian?) and the form of the rebellion. Finally, deviance as rejection, retreat, and alienation overlaps with some of the other categories, because it can have its roots in sickness (a mental or emotional disorder); it can take on the form of rebellion as well as alienation (the alienated rebels, as described particularly by Kenneth Keniston [1960]); or it can be simply a retreat to an alternate lifestyle.

All these groups may present different images of themselves than the self-image inherent in the typology. This brings us to the Gusfield typology. His terminology and descriptions are valuable, demonstrating not only the self-presentation but also the view from the vantage point of the normal. Indeed, they can be seen as cynical, repentant, sick, or as enemy; also as proud, self-righteous, victims of fate, or even as friend. They can be both enemy and friend, not only to different subgroups in the social system but to themselves as friends in self-presentation, to the outside world as enemy in the way that presentation is received, interpreted, and rejected. This scheme would enable one to understand certain aspects of the civil rights movement of the 1960s, particularly the movement led by Dr. King, which called for the victims to pray for and love their victimizers, and which was met by these victimizers with electric cattle prods, pressure hoses, and worse.

In addition to types, there are stereotypes, which are closely related to types, little understood, and primarily a mechanism for social control—that is, for strategy against the deviant.

Stereotypes

A STEREOTYPE is a firmly held image of a group of people in which the characteristics of the group are attributed to all its members, although they may occur in many, a few, none at all, or no more frequently within the category than without. The term *stereotype* is

usually used in the sense of the attribution of negative qualities to people, although one can speak of positive stereotypes as well.

The stereotype is a rigid, exaggerated, oversimplified, and negative extension, with potentially harmful consequences for social interaction, of a manner of viewing the world that sociologists have long found to be universal. People, when they come in contact with others, particularly strangers, size them up in terms of expectations that develop in accordance with the roles and statuses that these others apparently occupy. Whether the initial relationship is with a policeman, teacher, waiter, pedestrian, or rider on a bus, there are anticipations that the other will conduct himself in accordance with the rules governing the multiplicity of roles that he occupies.

Categorizing such people is a necessary and certainly not a dehumanizing process, although it assumes that there is relatively little room for flexibility, idiosyncrasy, and individuality and looks upon the other exclusively as a group member. The traits of the group are automatically assigned to the individual. This process was described by J. L. Simmons (1969:26):

Interpreting the world around us in terms of stereotyped categories seems to be a necessary human process. How else could we organize the infinite detail and complexity of events around us into some kind of coherent order? But such categorizing is necessarily a simplification of the actual objects or events—a *selective* simplification which discards a lot of information and which may add a lot of misinformation. [Italics in original.]

Erving Goffman (1963:51), ever ready to see the similarities in different types of human behavior, suggests that the difference between categorizing a stranger according to status and stereotyping the stranger according to group may be spurious:

Stigma management is an offshoot of something basic in society, the stereotyping or “profiling” of our normative expectations regarding conduct and character; stereotyping is classically reserved for customers, Orientals, and motorists—that is, persons who fall into very broad categories and who may be passing strangers to us.

If one takes Goffman’s little list and substitutes the phrase “women drivers” for motorists, one sees the difference between generalizing about groups of people and stereotyping about groups of deviants.

The stereotype is used as a mechanism for social control. It is a form of put-down, by which images that are frightening or comical or that lend themselves to exclusion or ridicule are attached to persons because they have other traits—that is, they are members of something, whatever that thing may be—although the attributed characteristics do

not define the thing that they are members of. As such, stereotypes reinforce negative thinking about the group, serve to give justification to oppressors, and act to prevent the development of sober analysis and description, in which the members are seen as individuals, with such personalities and qualities, likable and dislikable, as they may have.

Howard Becker (1963:61) suggests that stereotyping has a further function: namely, to paint the group in such repulsive or evil terms as to discourage recruitment:

If a user's family, friends, or employer discover that he uses marihuana, they may impute to him the auxiliary status traits ordinarily assumed to be associated with drug use. Believing him to be irresponsible and powerless to control his own behavior, perhaps even insane, they may punish him with various kinds of informal but highly effective sanctions, such as ostracism or withdrawal of affection.

What Becker here calls auxiliary status traits (irresponsibility, lack of self-control, even insanity) are identical with the idea of stereotyping. However valid may be the function of the stereotype as a means of discouraging people from joining a group when applied to drug-users (valid, but not too successful, it would appear), this cannot explain stereotypes of the tribally stigmatized or the involuntary deviant.

Stereotypes have long been associated with ethnic and racial prejudice. They support and fortify the prejudice by impressing upon persons the idea that all (or all but the exceptions) of the ethnic outgroup are lazy, untrustworthy, conniving, drunk, immoral, oversexed, or have other uncomplimentary traits; hence, they justify the failure to offer employment, trust, and opportunity to members of the group. Even the apparently favorable racial stereotypes function to keep racial and ethnic groups apart, prevent equality, and serve as a warning against social commingling. Victims of this type of stereotyping have been particularly abundant in America: the happy-go-lucky, carefree black (like a child), the loyal and reliable black (makes a good servant), the clever and ambitious Jew (hence untrustworthy); and not only blacks and Jews, but Indians, Irish, Greeks, Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, Orientals—practically everyone, in short, but the Anglo-American conformists.

Perhaps as much as ethnics, but with greater complexity, various types of deviants have been subject to stereotyping, and many have suffered therefrom. One of the sources of stereotyping is the paucity of interpersonal relationships on a level conducive to mutual understanding. The public has even less chance of learning about the average deviant than about the average member of an ethnic group separated

by housing arrangements as well as by great social chasms. Who comes in contact with the prostitute except others like herself, her customers (who learn little about her), the pimps, and persons traveling in a related subculture, such as narcotics addicts? There are a few others: physicians, occasionally psychiatrists, corrections officers, and judges. There may be still others, who meet her while she is out of her prostitute role: She is the customer at the corner grocery or one's neighbor. In such instances, these people may not know her as prostitute, just as they usually do not know and frequently do not suspect that another customer or neighbor is involved in homosexual relations. So that, although there is contact with the person, it cannot serve to correct or diminish the stereotype. However, if knowledge of the deviant pursuit is known or strongly suspected, without the ability to observe how that person performs in that role, the stereotype remains disturbed and can even be fed and inflamed by fantasy. All in all, this is a situation where there is little contact at all, or contact without realization of the status, leaving one unable to form beliefs grounded in experience; contact of an atypical (or apparently atypical) nature, as with prison turnkeys and psychiatrists or relationships in which the role is recognized but no information about it is conveyed.

It is thus almost inevitable that the public should learn about prostitutes from the few cases that make the newspapers, and certainly these must be atypical (for otherwise they would not be newsworthy), or from fiction, movies, and television, or just word-of-mouth folklore. It is difficult to expect the public to know much about her, or about other deviants (for example, mental patients and former mental patients), again excepting the same types of sources, merely substituting one institutional guard for another, and adding such experiences as are told by friends and relatives, often distorted in the telling by rumor, gossip, exaggeration, and, sometimes, the need for self-justification (for instance, to explain why someone "had to be put away").

It is not that one is entirely dependent for information on journalistic stories that make the papers precisely because they are unusual. It is, rather, that some qualities or attributes that may appear rather infrequently, perhaps no more frequently than among the normals in the society, become impressed upon the mind and associated with one particular group. There develops a selective memory, which begins rather automatically to associate the trait with the group even though it appears rather infrequently. "Practically no white people are sufficiently incited by self-interest to scrutinize their beliefs critically," wrote Gunnar Myrdal (1944) with regard to racial stereotyping in America, and the words are equally true with regard to stereotyping of deviants. On the other hand, Myrdal also expressed his optimism about

human nature: "People want to be rational, to be honest and well-informed." How many people? What groups of people? How strong is this want? Nobody seems to know.

Deviant stereotypes are in all likelihood as widely held as racial ones, although there are important differences. Thus, mental patients are thought of as being potentially violent and, in that respect at least, untrustworthy. Thomas Scheff (1966) contends that the released mental patient is as good (or bad) a risk for "senseless" violence as a cross-section of the populace. The belief in the mental patient as potentially violent serves to justify a sort of indefinite imprisonment, it fortifies a feeling of rationality and sanity in those who were never such patients, and this separates the two groups by enhanced differentness. Faced with information that disproves the validity of the stereotype, many people cling to it by asking: "Okay, so they're not all that way, or not many, but why take the chance?" The same question is posed with many other groups: ex-addicts, ex-convicts, homosexuals ("maybe they don't go around seducing little boys, but why take a chance?").

The entire field of deviance and stereotyping has hardly been studied. In fact, the same could have been said of racial stereotyping until quite recently. Thus, in 1944, Gunnar Myrdal was able to write:

Practically nothing has been done in a comprehensive and systematic compass to study the popular racial beliefs as social facts. . . . In order to lay the factual basis for a truly scientific analysis, which is more than suggestive and conjectural in character, *beliefs must be observed and recorded in a systematic way under controlled research conditions.* [Italics in original.]

The concept of stereotyping came to be recognized by scholars of deviance long after it had gained such recognition by those who were turning their attention to race relations. Deviant people had few friends or advocates in the academic and research world ready to struggle with the problems aroused by the process of stereotyping.

In fact, some of the rare studies that have been conducted by sociologists on this subject have muddied rather than clarified the atmosphere. There have been few research efforts to discover the images that the public has of deviants. For the most part, scholars have assumed these images, the negative ones, to be popularly held. For example, William Simon and John Gagnon (1967:247-48) write:

To most people, the lower class, certain minority groups, a number of occupational roles, and the female who is not linked to a conventional family role are seen as differentially available sexually and, consequently, as more sexually active. Such persons are seen as having greater sexual appetites and less self-control over these appetites.

The authors of these words may well be right, but they cite no evidence, have revealed no research, and all they are doing is expressing a popularly held belief (in sociology) about a popularly held belief (in America). There is a special irony in assumptions of what "most people" think, for in making and accepting them, sociologists are themselves showing that they hold unfounded stereotypes about the public, or about middle-class upholders of propriety. In other words, they are betraying the same fault they attribute to others.

Furthermore, the entire concept of stereotype has been in some instances misunderstood and in other instances misused by sociologists in the area of deviance to a greater extent than can be said for the more sophisticated use by scholars in race relations. Thomas Kando (1972), in a study of transsexuals, particularly those who have had the operation performed and have had a sex reassignment (which Kando erroneously refers to as a change of sex), asks several questions of people to determine their attitudes toward this aspect of gender disorientation. He poses such controversial questions are "Should the conversion operation be available to transsexuals? Should the operated transsexual be allowed to adopt a child? Is it better to permit the operation?"

The author then proceeds to state that a negative answer to any of these or the other questions is an expression of intolerance. Ironically, if anyone is intolerant in this situation it is Kando, who betrays an inability to accept an opinion that differs from his own and anxiety to impute a negative characteristic (intolerance) to anyone who disagrees with him. What he is saying here, and in this respect he is similar to large numbers of sociologists, is that to accept any view other than that projected by the deviant is to believe in stereotypes and to be an intolerant person.

Even more dangerous along this line is the statement, frequently made by those working closely with transsexuals, that to fail to accept the postoperative female (former male) as a true female no different from any other is to adhere to a stereotype of what constitutes a transsexual. Now, it is one thing to understand why people who have been assigned to the female sex as a result of surgery should want to conceal their pasts, but it is quite another to deny that there is any conceptual difference between persons with XX chromosomes and those with XY when the latter had past histories as males and the former only as females, although later events made them physiologically similar in certain respects in which they had previously been dissimilar. To see a difference between these groups is not to hold to a stereotype or to be intolerant but, rather, to delineate something that is the objective distinction between two categories of human beings. Nor is it intolerance (for scientific opinion is far from unanimous) to assert that

it is better not to have the sex-reassignment surgery. In the same way, it would make no sense to accuse people of adhering to stereotypes because they believe that black persons have darker skins than whites or that blacks are harder for an automobile driver to see on the street at night. Again, to return to Myrdal: "Our task is to criticize and refute the [popular] beliefs *when they are wrong*." [Italics added.] And it is the interest of social science to criticize and refute the scholars' beliefs when they are wrong—as they so often are.

Sociologists have been quick to place the label of stereotype or of misconception, intolerance, and prejudice on those who hold views unlike their own. Elizabeth Rooney and Don Gibbons (1966) tested people to discover what "misconceptions" (not conceptions) they held about abortion, homosexuality, and narcotics. Consider three of their seven sentences about narcotics, to which the respondent was to state whether or not he was in agreement:

1. People who are using drugs, such as heroin and marijuana, are usually physical wrecks.
2. It is almost impossible for a drug addict to keep a legitimate job while under the influence of narcotics, since he is not alert and is unable to pay attention.
3. Most addicts are poverty stricken and come from the slums.

All of these statements are badly worded. The first asks respondents to place marijuana- and heroin-users into one category, when people may believe (rightly or wrongly) that the latter are indeed physical wrecks but the former are not. The second statement does not state what kind of a job is involved, nor what kind of narcotics; the third groups together poverty and slum provenance, when the poverty may be due to the spending of money on the illegal habit. However, when I asked four of America's leading authorities on drug addiction whether the second and third statements were essentially correct (I eliminated the first question because the collapsing of marijuana with heroin makes it impossible to obtain meaningful answers), they all agreed that if I were talking specifically about heroin as the drug, not marijuana, alcohol, or tranquilizers, they would regard both statements as true. In other words, the sociologists conducting this study have assumed that these are popular misconceptions when they might be popularly held beliefs which social scientists share.

The questions posed on homosexuality were not less ambiguous and were similarly founded on an assumption, without study, that they must be wrong. For example:

If two men in their 40's live together in a home they have bought and furnished, there is reason to suspect that they are homosexuals.

Again, they do not clarify how strong a suspicion would be reasonable, although it is difficult to imagine a knowledgeable respondent declaring that there is no reason for such a suspicion.

To study the images that people hold and the correlation of these images with their degree of acceptance, tolerance, discomfort, or dislike of groups of people, one cannot start with the assumption that some sets of beliefs are wrong. Now, it happens that only 23 per cent of those queried held to the "misconception" about two men living together, and the authors then go on to state that in their view:

. . . These responses are suspect and may not reflect the actual beliefs of many of the subjects. It may be that many persons who carry these stereotypes are loath to admit them publicly. In this regard, the situation may be similar to that of racial prejudice, in which individuals who verbally assert their disbelief in racial stereotypes do, in fact, hold private allegiance to such notions.

It seems doubtful that people who hold stereotypical images of deviants are loath to admit this and pretend to disbelieve in these stereotypes. But this is a question that can hardly be investigated if one does not start by examining the empirical facts (to determine whether the images are false) and then determining how many people hold them.

An effort to clarify this matter was made by J. L. Simmons (1965, 1969), one of the few sociologists to examine stereotyping as part of the study of deviance. When he asked people to list those whom they considered deviant (and he seemed to have interpreted literally Becker's statement that deviant people are those who are so labeled, which of course did not mean, for Becker, that others used that word, but merely the idea of disvaluation), his subjects—all students—named homosexuals, prostitutes, and so on, down the list, as one would indeed have expected. As a psychological test of the types of persons, or even words, that are triggered when one sees the letters that spell *deviant*, this may have some small interest; and if Simmons had explained the meaning of the word deviant, it might indicate either how people saw the society or how they saw these generally devalued others (depending on the nature of his explanation). But to say that homosexuals, prostitutes, and atheists are deviants is saying nothing about stereotypes; it is merely indicating that these are the devalued members of the society. That some of these groups were not listed indicates either that the respondent did not happen to think of them, that the explanation of deviant (if any) was inadequate, or that the respondent is just inadequate as an observer of society.

Proceeding from this, Simmons sought to discover what people thought of deviants and he came up with the following outcome:

that the most common attitude toward deviants is that they are disliked!

Beyond this, there is little research to go by. However, a few of the problems can be outlined:

First, one should determine what the stereotypes are of various types of deviants, how firmly they are held, by how many people, and with what consequences. Do people think of the prostitute as dirty, diseased, oversexed, probably a lesbian, a white slave held by a pimp against her will, a narcotics addict, or just what? Do they believe that she robs her customer? Or do they think of her as a depraved person who could step out of "the life" and become a salesgirl or typist if only she had the will power, courage, and decency to do so? Little is known of what the public images are. One can be relatively certain, but only as a matter of intuiting a situation, that various images do exist.

Second, one should try to discover whether the image is characteristic of the group or only a popularly held belief about it. It is not a stereotype to believe that gluttons are big eaters; it is merely a tautology. But it may be a stereotype to believe that obese people are gluttons. To say that homosexuals are child molesters may well be a popularly held stereotype; to describe child molesters in terms of the sexual advances that they make to young people is simply to discuss that trait which characterizes the group.

Then, a third issue, deriving from the second, is whether the stereotype is consistent with reality or is a distortion of that reality. Is it a complete fiction, or is it merely a view of the portion of a group which has been generalized to the entire group? Does it exist in the disvalued collectivity in greater proportion than among other people in the population? For example, consider the stereotype that male homosexuals are effeminate. Are they? How many? To what extent? What is the frequency distribution when people with homosexual interests are compared with men without such interests?

Finally, the fourth issue is the one of the labeling perspective and of self-fulfilling prophecy: To what extent is the characteristic, its exaggeration and frequency or incidence, a result of the social stigmatization, of the tagging and identification, and of closed opportunities? Suppose one finds that former mental patients are suspicious of people around them; this might well be a protection because they have been treated in such a manner that suspicion became for them a necessary part of daily living. Or if delinquent youths have a stereotypical surliness, did this come about as a result of their having been tagged as delinquent and treated as such? If large numbers of hairdressers are effeminate, is it because effeminate males were offered opportunities in the field and were given few chances in others, whereas, as the field became stigmatized with the idea that its occupants were effeminate, potentially inter-

ested males not having such characteristics were motivated to remain aloof from it?

That stereotypes are mechanisms for exclusion and oppression seems obvious. They are also strategies for survival by the deviants, who take the disvalued characteristic and subject it to ridicule by labeling it a stereotype. Thus, homosexuals have been prone to draw a portrait (perhaps it is a caricature, perhaps a true picture) of the world of normals that holds on to absurd beliefs about homosexuals: not only that they are effeminate but that they are child molesters, sick, promiscuous and always on the prowl—so the image continues. By putting this forth as a stereotype, the content of these beliefs is never challenged; rather, it is summarily dismissed as a means of combatting noxious ideas. Some ethnic minorities have been successful in like manner in turning the stereotype to their advantage, by flailing those who hold it. All this leaves unanswered the question of whether, in large numbers, some members of the deviant group do indeed have the particular traits. It leaves this question unanswered because it defines it as unworthy of serious consideration.

The deviant who does have the stereotyped trait is in a particularly difficult position. One might say that he is a many-faceted failure. He has failed to be a part of the world of normals, and then he brings disgrace on and is repudiated by the rejects, making him a double reject. Former mental patients are threatened by one among them who acts as former mental patients are "supposed" to act or are expected by hostile others to act. The "normal deviant" does not want to be associated with the stereotypical one, and he often shuns the latter, in the same manner that he has himself been shunned. The homosexual pedophile receives less sympathy from the world of homosexuals than from anywhere else. He threatens their cause, he makes them all vulnerable, he is blamed for causing the stereotype to exist, and then is blamed for reinforcing it. By differentiating themselves from him, other homosexuals reinforce their own image as unlike him. They are in effect combatting the stereotype by repudiating and isolating the one person who fits into this prearranged belief. It is one further strategy in a complex world of moves and countermoves.

STEREOTYPES, EXPECTATIONS, AND DEVIATING DEVIATES

People have rigid, fixed, highly negative images of the deviant; they also hold images, no doubt largely grounded in reality and experience, of anticipated behavior when they are in the presence of the deviant. Deviance, in fact, is not to be confused with unpredictability, for

sometimes the breaking of a rule is very much expected but is not less severely punished for that. But not all deviants behave the way they are expected or supposed to; even that most unpredictable category, the mentally ill, largely respond to the environment and to others the way mentally ill people are expected to respond. In one sense, this makes the social control of such people easier: Within the area of rejected behavior, persons tend to conform to what might be called the "norms" for their specific roles (or the "anti-norms" for society). In some cases, this makes them "good deviants," in other cases cooperative ones, sometimes just easy to keep in line, but in a new line especially reserved for people who cannot be kept in line.

Deviants, then, tend to be conformists, in the terminology of Judith Lorber (1971), conforming not to the general rules of behavior, but to those specifically created for the deviant roles. Sometimes they conform because their will is broken, or because they are given little opportunity to deviate, or because there are rewards for such conformity. There are standards that one must live up to in order to perform in any role, whether it be to please others like oneself or to adjust better to those unlike oneself. Lorber writes of "proper or conforming ways of being a delinquent, a homosexual, male and female, a prostitute, a prisoner, a skid-row wino, a blind person, a disabled person, a dying patient, and a schizophrenic." Those who have learned the norms of such roles and are willing and able to abide by them can be said to be participating in "conforming performances." Lorber found that hospital patients were expected by doctors and nurses to be "cooperative, trusting, stoical, and obedient to the rules and regulations of the hospital and to the medical regimen prescribed for them."

But why should people who have rejected the rules of society choose to abide by new rules? It may be that they find their new roles comfortable, or that their peers in the new roles will not accept them unless they abide by the rules of even the outcasts' game. Without some degree of conformity, there would be chaos, disruption, and an inability to function in the role that has been entered.

One might say, at this point, that although all of the individuals in a group may know that their behavior is deviant and may even agree that it should be disvalued, they create new norms for their own members, and the violation of these norms makes the members deviant deviants rather than conforming deviants.³³ An example may be found

³³ It is an oversimplification to write of their creating new norms, although such a situation is possible. The norms may be created for them by doctors, corrections officers, or others in authority, or by generalized others or normals in society, or by previous groups of people who found themselves in the same situations and passed down the norms governing deviant people in a manner similar to the way norms for conforming people are transmitted.

in prison, where those who will not abide by the written and unwritten rules, the hierarchy and power structure of the inmate culture and of the relationships between officials and convicts, are not only deviants because they are prisoners but also deviants (that is nonconforming) within that prisoner role. One can carry this a step further by supposing that recalcitrant prisoners should form a clique of their own (not unlikely) and that norms should emerge governing the behavior of those in this small group of "double outcasts." These would be norms of secrecy, mutual aid, pledges of noncooperation with certain officials or with some of the other inmates, and the like. Some member of this outlaw circle might violate one of the inner-clique rules: He would be deviating from the rules of the deviant deviants. A situation of this sort is not beyond imagination: it can be found not only among groups of prisoners but also in groups of narcotic addicts, prostitutes, and many others. It would appear that at this level (the nonconforming member of a nonconforming group of disvalued persons), the theme has probably exhausted itself. It illustrates the pervasiveness of images of anticipated behavior, of which stereotypes are the exaggerated and potentially most destructive examples of a much more widespread phenomenon.

Strategy in Reverse: The Burdens of the Normals

IT IS NOT to diminish the seriousness of the problems facing the outcasts and rejects of society to point out that they have no monopoly on the strains that take their toll of participants in anxiety-laden interaction. Normals, too, find the going difficult. One might say that they become victims of their own victimization. Not knowing how to behave with the stigmatized, they seek to maintain a standard of fair play and a pretense of smooth relationships, but they fool themselves even less than they fool others. Awkwardness obtrudes into all phases of interaction between the disvalued and the disvaluator, even when the individual in the latter category is there only by default, as a result

of guilt by association; even when he repudiates the disvaluation, expresses sympathy (often interpreted as pity), he still cannot escape the burden of being part of the stigmatizing group in his society.

This is not to suggest that the burden of the "good-legger" is comparable to that of the cripple or paraplegic; if the man with two healthy legs encounters problems of discomfort, they are slight indeed and perhaps may contribute to sympathy for all those who are victimized. But this is unlikely. A more readily available course for handling such situations is to avoid them entirely, an avoidance that occurs by arranging matters so that one is seldom physically present with the deviant. Social relations that would bring persons together and would elicit embarrassment are not arranged unless they are strong necessities. People are not invited to occasions where their presence will cast a pall over the glad air, unless good manners compel such invitations. People with visible or known-about stigmas are not easily hired, even when their difference would not be an impairment: It is felt that their presence would create embarrassment for other employees as well as for customers. No doubt the institutionalization of handicapped persons was designed in part to physically separate the normals from others who would thus be spared many awkward moments and reminders of suffering.

When physical separation is not possible, one can still follow a policy of avoidance. There is a pretense that the situation is normal, although everyone knows it is not. Such a technique is readily available in the presence of the "morally blemished," as is indicated by this description of the relationship between an unmarried couple living together and the girl's parents:

They know all about us, but they make believe they don't. Mother will never call me in the morning, because she's afraid that Joe will answer the phone. She always says she's coming to my apartment, but she's afraid to visit, because she knows she's going to find his clothes all over the place. Dad asks me if I have enough money for rent, when he knows very well that I'm paying only half. But don't get me wrong, they like Joe, and they're nice to him when he comes over with me. They pretend that we're not living together. Maybe if they admitted to themselves, they think Aunt Stella would find out, and that would be the end of their world!

Goffman (1963:30-31) suggests that to treat the stigmatized person as if he were a normal is a very special type of mechanism for dealing with deviance; he terms this "normalization," in contrast to "normification," which is "the effort on the part of a stigmatized individual to present himself as an ordinary person, although not necessarily making

a secret of his failing." Periodically, I have used "normalization" for personal change, rehabilitation, renunciation—that is, becoming a normal. In the case of the unmarried couple, the girl's parents seem to be approaching something akin to "normalization" in Goffman's sense of the term, but it is a fragile edifice that they have created; the girl, on the other hand, is dealing with this by normification, not because of any shame or guilt or internalization of self-hate, but because these are the terms that her parents have laid down for her. In this case, she accepts the scenario because the matter of pretending is not an important issue, and the rewards are probably enticing.

The methods people use for dealing with the deviance of others are varied. People banish, ridicule, and chastise; they create special enclaves where the stigmatized will not have to be seen and where the normals will not have to be reminded so frequently of the existence of these others. Sometimes the normals blurt out their hostility in the form of humor, demonstrating forcefully that the others are so fully accepted, so completely taken for granted, that their difficulties can be joked about, in the manner that ethnics make jokes about themselves that they would not permit from outsiders. It is a sign of the degree to which an outsider is accepted that he is permitted to hear the self-mocking humor, and even rarer to be responsible for narrating it. For the deviant, usually such mockery either is too painful to express or when expressed by others reveals too clearly their underlying hostility.

The management of tension and the reduction of strain are particularly apparent with those for whom the term "courtesy stigma" has been coined. Theirs is a double tension, the management on the one hand of relationship with the stigmatized individual (often a member of the family) and at the same time with normal others. The latter must constantly be on the alert to pick up cues telling them whether a subject is taboo and to give out their own feelers to suggest that something can be said, but to suggest it in such a way that, if an error has been made, there can be a full retreat without loss of face.

Not all normals suffer. They escape, they compartmentalize, they give to charity and feel self-righteous (and at the same time make note of a tax-deductible contribution), and sometimes they mock, mimic, and vilify without concealment. Perhaps activities of this latter sort fulfill the needs of some people; certainly open mockery can reinforce the feeling of normality, and such reinforcement may at times be necessary. But the final irony is that if they mock and ridicule too much, ostracize blatantly, and display their hostility, then they, the normals, become by reason of such acts deviants themselves. It is an interesting cycle that is a lesson in poetic justice.

REFERENCES

- Baldwin, James Mark (1911). *The Individual and Society; or Psychology and Sociology*. Boston: R. G. Badger.
- Beeker, Howard S. (1953). "Becoming a marihuana user," *American Journal of Sociology* 59:235-42.
- (1963). *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*. New York: Free Press.
- Beigel, Hugo G. (1969). "A weekend in Alice's wonderland," *Journal of Sex Research* 5:108-22.
- Broyard, Anatole (1950). "Portrait of the inauthentic Negro: How prejudice distorts the victim's personality," *Commentary* 10:56-64.
- Cohen, Albert K. (1955). *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang*. New York: Free Press.
- Cooley, Charles Horton (1902). *Human Nature and the Social Order*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Coser, Lewis A. (1961). Introduction to Max Scheler, *Ressentiment*. New York: Free Press.
- Davis, Fred (1961). "Deviance disavowal: The management of strained interaction by the visibly handicapped," *Social Problems* 9:120-32.
- Dinitz, Simon, Russell R. Dynes, and Alfred C. Clarke, eds. (1969). *Deviance: Studies in the Process of Stigmatization and Societal Reaction*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Edgerton, Robert B. (1967). *The Cloak of Competence: Stigma in the Lives of the Mentally Retarded*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Garfinkel, Harold (1956). "Conditions of successful degradation ceremonies," *American Journal of Sociology* 61:420-24.
- Gerth, Hans, and C. Wright Mills (1953). *Character and Social Structure: The Psychology of Social Institutions*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Goffman, Erving (1959). *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
- (1961). *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situations of Mental Patients and Other Inmates*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
- (1963). *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- (1969). *Strategic Interaction*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Gusfield, Joseph R. (1967). "Moral passage: The symbolic process in public designations of deviance," *Social Problems* 15:175-99.
- Hoffman, Martin (1968). *The Gay World: Male Homosexuality and the Social Creation of Evil*. New York: Basic Books.
- Kando, Thomas (1972). "The projection of intolerance: A comparison of males, females and transsexuals," *Journal of Sex Research* 8:225-36.

- Keniston, Kenneth (1960). *The Uncommitted: Alienated Youth in American Society*. New York: Dell Publishing.
- Kitsuse, John I. (1962). "Societal reaction to deviant behavior: Problems of theory and method," *Social Problems* 9:247-56.
- Laing, R. D., H. Phillipson, and A. R. Lee (1966). *Interpersonal Perception: A Theory and a Method of Research*. New York: Springer.
- Lorber, Judith (1971). "Deviance as conformity," paper presented to American Sociological Association, Denver.
- Maccoby, Herbert (1958). "The differential political activity of participants in a voluntary association," *American Sociological Review* 23:524-32.
- Matza, David (1964). *Delinquency and Drift*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Mead, George H. (1934). *Mind, Self & Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Michels, Robert (1949). *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
- Mills, C. Wright (1940). "Situated action and vocabularies of motive," *American Sociological Review* 5:904-13; reprinted, pp. 439-52 in Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., *Power, Politics and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills*, New York: Oxford University Press and Ballantine Books.
- Myrdal, Gunnar (1944). *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Redl, Fritz, and David Wineman (1951). *Children Who Hate: The Disorganization and Breakdown of Behavior Controls*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
- Rooney, Elizabeth A., and Don C. Gibbons (1966). "Social reactions to 'crimes without victims,'" *Social Problems* 13:400-410.
- Roszak, Theodore (1969). *The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
- Ryan, William (1971). *Blaming the Victim*. New York: Pantheon.
- Sagarin, Edward (1967). "Voluntary associations among social deviants," *Criminologica* 5:8-22.
- (1969). *Odd Man In: Societies of Deviants in America*. Chicago: Quadrangle; reprinted, New York: Franklin Watts.
- Sagarin, Edward, and Donal E. J. MacNamara (1970). "The problem of entrapment," *Crime and Delinquency* 16:363-78.
- Scheff, Thomas J. (1966). *Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory*. Chicago: Aldine, 1966.
- Scheler, Max (1961). *Ressentiment*. New York: Free Press.
- Schur, Edwin M. (1971). *Labeling Deviant Behavior: Its Sociological Implications*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Scott, Marvin B., and Stanford M. Lyman (1963). "Accounts," *American Sociological Review* 33:46-62; reprinted, pp. 111-43 in Lyman and

- Scott, A *Sociology of the Absurd*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970.
- Sellin, Thorsten (1938). *Culture Conflict and Crime*, Bulletin 41. New York: Social Science Research Council.
- Shoham, Shlomo (1966). *Crime and Social Deviation*. Chicago: Henry Regnery.
- (1970). *The Mark of Cain: The Stigma Theory of Crime and Social Deviation*. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications.
- Simmons, J. L. (1965). "Public stereotypes of deviants," *Social Problems* 13:223-32.
- (1969). *Deviants*. Berkeley, Calif.: Glendessary Press.
- Simon, William, and John H. Gagnon (1967). "The lesbians: A preliminary overview," pp. 247-82 in Gagnon and Simon, eds., *Sexual Deviance*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Sulcov, Mark (1973). "Transsexualism: Its Social Reality." Ph.D. diss., Indiana University.
- Sykes, Gresham M., and David Matza (1957). "Techniques of neutralization: A theory of delinquency," *American Sociological Review* 22:664-70.
- Szasz, Thomas S. (1970). *The Manufacture of Madness: A Comparative Study of the Inquisition and the Mental Health Movement*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Taylor, Ian R. (1971). "Soccer consciousness and soccer hooliganism," pp. 134-64 in Stanley Cohen, ed., *Images of Deviance*, Harmondsworth, England; and Baltimore: Penguin Books.
- Turner, Ralph H. (1972). "Deviance avowal as neutralization of commitment," *Social Problems* 19:308-21.
- Williams, Robin M. (1960). *American Society: A Sociological Interpretation*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Yinger, J. Milton (1960). "Contraculture and subculture," *American Sociological Review* 25:625-35.

VI

Prospects and Policies

THE SOCIOLOGICAL problem is to accumulate knowledge; the social problem is to utilize the knowledge in the formulation of social policy. The former confronts sociology as a profession; the latter confronts society and the people who comprise it. Does society have a social problem that can be called deviants and deviance? If so, is it because some types of behavior do harm to people and should be prevented, discouraged, or, if this is not successful, the persons themselves contained or in some other way handled? Or is it a problem because there is suffering, not on the part of the normals of the world, but on the part of those who are unable or unwilling to conform to the rules, be like others, and keep or be kept in line?

The sociological task is to conceptualize: that is, to determine in what respects different phenomena or people are alike, and what consequences these likenesses have. The social issue is to offer guidance in accordance with the facts at hand, the observations of sociologists, and finally the values of those who make recommendations concerning social policy. For the sociologist, the central questions are cognitive and classificatory; they involve the determination of categories as exemplified by investigation of the norms to discover what these norms are and how strongly they are held. For those who seek to influence social policy, the central questions are normative; that is, the problem is to reach a conclusion not as to what the norms are but as to what they ought to be; and then, from that conclusion, to decide such matters as what to do about those who violate them.

Deviance and Social Policy

THERE CANNOT BE a single social policy toward deviants and deviance, except to say that no society should have outcasts, no matter who they are or what they do. No individual or group should be cast aside, despised, made to feel hopeless, and a society that "expels" anyone from the family of man is expressing in that act only its own departure from humanity.

Some forms of behavior can cease to be deviant. They can come to be seen as acceptable acts in their own right, whether they become normative or merely unconventional. The problem is how to achieve a simultaneous broadening of diversity and strengthening of social bonds in a society in which people are different from one another.

Other forms of deviance appear to call for destigmatization without social acceptance; to accomplish this would require that the general social reaction change from hostility to discouragement, an extremely difficult shift to manage. It might or might not require official societal reaction in the form of adjudication and punishment.

Another type of deviance requires hostility to the act for the very survival of the society, although this almost inevitably has taken the form of hostility to the actor. Then, there are types of deviance and deviant acts that require care, rehabilitation, perhaps containment, for discouragement itself is insufficient. A further category of persons are in one sense or another disabled; it is quite apparent that such disabled persons can and should be accepted as equals to all others in society, but that their disability need not be.

Finally, there is a group that is highly personal, based on one's own values. They are people who are accepted and in fact often highly honored in society, but who (according to the values that each person brings to his view of the world) should be conceptualized as worthy of social condemnation and hostility. Can a single social policy be derived from these diverse groupings?

In his book *The Right to Be Different*, Nicholas Kittrie (1971), a professor of criminal law, argues, and very persuasively, for the right of people to resist enforced therapy mandated by a court or some other

governmental body. Differentness, like deviance, can cover a wide variety of actions and people.¹ A person has a right to be crippled or in some other manner physically handicapped, although if his affliction is of a contagious nature the society has a right to contain him. In the modern industrialized world, many contend that a person does not have the right to be a public nudist or to be violent toward family, friends, or strangers.

There are indeed instances when society should respect the right of people to be different from others, but this is not a categorical idea that can be embodied into a philosophy of living, as if it were or ought to be guaranteed by the Constitution, as is the right of life itself (guaranteed but often violated by those who are guardians of the Constitution). As for the right to resist enforced therapy, one can make a good case for this as a generalized principle, but those who resist treatment may have to be subjected to alternative types of handling, which could include punishment.

Examples of the various possible social attitudes and policies, with their extension to specific areas of disapproved behavior and devalued people, are given below:

From deviance to diversity. As the social mores undergo change, with deviant behavior often the instrument for effecting such change, acts once viewed with hostility change in status, sometimes becoming acceptable, sometimes only tolerated, and at other times taken for granted among large sectors of the population. These may concern fashions in dress and appearance: The fellow with long sideburns or a beard and the girl in miniskirt or slacks were strongly condemned at one time, but the mere persistence of the youth culture brought about a diffusion of these fashions among larger and larger sections of the young and even the older populace. Sneered at as "hippie," thought of as immoral and dirty, these identifiers became badges of identity for large numbers of people. The problem for sociologists, social planners, and political and cultural leaders is to determine the potential harm—if any—that will accrue from the expansion of a formerly condemned and often only narrowly practiced way of life to one that, upon becoming acceptable, gains in popularity as well. If the action is a matter of growing beards or wearing slacks, it is relatively easy to determine the harm, although this is more apparent in retrospect than it was for some people when the styles were only beginning to make their appearance.

Certainly there is a wider acceptance in America and many other countries of the world of couples who engage in nonmarital sexual relations, particularly when it is nonpromiscuous, and even when it is ac-

¹ Kittrie uses the word "different" to connote a difference that is not accepted by the "official" standards of society.

accompanied by nonmarital cohabitation. While destigmatization of such activities has traveled so far that one can speak of them as comprising an alternate life-style, and virginity can be considered out of fashion, there is still a portion of the population that remains hostile and for whom the new sexual morality is deviance. But social policy demands that many questions be asked: Will destigmatization be more conducive or less to short-range and long-range happiness? Will people engaging in such activities be psychologically harmed or aided by the experience? Can it be anticipated that such activities will have a harmful effect on the survival and functioning of the family, or, on the other hand, might they even serve to bring about modifications in family structure that will be useful to society and to the individuals concerned?

To answer these questions with sweeping statements that express either revulsion against a new morality or espousal of what was once deviant would be irresponsible. Instead, the problems involved in nonmarital sexuality, with regard to affection, commitment, consent, age of partners, avoidance of disease, freedom from fraud, and other factors, must be examined on their own merit. In the case of consensual heterosexual relations among the unmarried, it would appear that in an age of advanced technology, birth control, desirability of a low birth rate, and growing consciousness of women's rights to sexuality without guilt, sound social policy would demand not only the destigmatization of consensual sexuality among adults but social acceptance of it without discouragement.

This is not a policy that applies exclusively to nonmarital sexuality. In the opinion of some, it is applicable to marijuana smoking and perhaps the use of hard drugs as well; hard-core pornography openly displayed and sold; homosexual acts and even child-adult sexual relations. As regards each of these and numerous other focuses of conflict between individuals and the social body, the potential for good and for the alleviation of harm must be evaluated. For such evaluation, the accumulated *sociological* knowledge and its theoretical orientations are a necessity, but they do not replace the formulation of social policy.

From hostility to discouragement. Part of the social revolution of America during the half-century following World War I has been the wide acceptance of divorce and of people who have obtained divorces, whether or not they have children. To have a marriage legally untied was at one time something that only the wealthy could afford to do, and this they did, with neither concealment nor stigma, while the poor either remained unhappily together or had a poor man's "divorce," also known as desertion. The word "divorcee," referring to a divorced woman, carried a strong stigma (more than its masculine

counterpart), and the fact that one had had a previous marriage was frequently a deeply held secret to which the family of a boyfriend was not privy. In many instances, the second marriage produced children who grew up without knowing that their mother or father had had a previous marriage, or that there were half-brothers or -sisters.

Divorce has been made legally easier, and even the religious groups that most strongly oppose it have many adherents whose marriages have been legally dissolved. The expression "till death do us part" is interpreted as a metaphor, certainly not to be taken as a literal mandate. Perhaps the stigma of having been divorced remains, particularly for the woman, although the strength of the disvaluation has probably been reduced—but this is an empirical matter that in the long run ought to be studied by sociologists rather than intuited even by sophisticated observers. (Complicating this problem is the possibility that the study might reveal that the stigma exists but is erased by a remarriage.)

Divorce is given here as an instance of behavior some people would say should not be seen as deviant but should be discouraged. Others would name interfaith and interracial marriages, smoking marijuana, or homosexuality in this category. In all such instances, social policy demands that there be free debate as to the desirability of the action and the extent to which it is likely to spread when social hostility is diminished. As for discouraging physical ailments and disabilities, there is no problem; it is clear that deafness, blindness, and epilepsy, among others, are undesirable, and the fact that there is today less stigma attached to such conditions does not result in their increase. But this may not be true of such voluntary actions (and somewhat voluntary deviant states) as divorce and the others mentioned above. A health campaign against smoking, if it were to prove successful, might serve as an example of discouragement without stigmatization. The National Task Force on Homosexuality, headed by Evelyn Hooker (1972) suggested acceptance of people who engage in such patterns of behavior and at the same time urged studies of more effective methods to prevent its occurrence.

Hostility to the act, not the actor. Despite the efforts to categorize deviance in terms of how people are defined by others rather than by any intrinsic qualities of the act itself, some acts require forceful hostility, and this may include adjudication by society and official punishment. The rules of society cannot be brushed aside without great damage being done to the effort to survive as a social group. All societies need protection to prevent predatory actions against persons or their property.

If people can see the transgressors as victims of the society in which the acts were nurtured, then compassion can be extended to them. This is not to suggest that all or even many such persons are sick but, rather,

that what is required is strong defense against the act and only such defense against the perpetrator as is necessary to contain him so he does not repeat his offense, or so that others do not emulate him.

Discouragement without deviance. A problem with regard to deviant behavior, and one that has not been given sufficient study by scholars and social philosophers, involves the destigmatization of the act and the actor when there is general consensus that the form of behavior should be discouraged. The first prerequisite for such a policy would be that the status of the behavior be subject to change; that there be no biological or other essentially unmodifiable "identity" involved. The second and related factor is that it be learned behavior (related because, if learned, it is unlearnable), but it is not the unlearnability that is the most important concern; rather, it is that, if it is learned, the behavior can be avoided by teaching. People are recruited to learned activities by exposure to other persons, their propaganda, and their ideology. Impressionable and psychologically susceptible individuals can be "seduced" to become the sort of persons who do and desire to do certain things (a seduction that can be sexual but is more often a more subtle learning process in association with those who are not even aware that they are acting as teachers). A further factor is a highly conjectural one: that there be some general agreement that, even with a maximum degree of acceptance, extending beyond the limits of the tolerated and embracing the regions of the "just as good," with no social opprobrium to grapple with, the individuals involved in a given way of life cannot achieve the fulfillment and human happiness that they would achieve if they were not so involved. In other words, there may indeed be a "social creation of evil," to use the words of Martin Hoffman (1968) about male homosexuality, but some people suggest that there would be intrinsic and overwhelming human suffering even without stigma that is socially created.

These are three interrelated but separable factors that should be looked at on their merits. People are not "born losers," except for a few with physical or mental handicaps that make losers of them, and they are not born as or destined to become prostitutes, sadists, masochists, homosexuals, or transsexuals, and probably not alcoholics. If they are in certain rare instances addicted at birth, they are not born to be addicts. The problem of whether the particular form of behavior is intrinsically such that it will produce human suffering, or whether that suffering is brought about by social condemnation—a problem that has been seized on by the labeling school—is one that fails to produce absolute answers.

In the instance of homosexuality, there is no society—neither a primitive one nor the famed Greek civilization—that accepted homo-

sexuality as being on a par with heterosexuality, except as supplementary, temporary, or adolescent behavior, but not as the exclusive and preferred form of sexuality in the manner that the phenomenon manifests itself for some people in the modern world. Probably a better example of behavior that did not produce evil by-products so long as it was not condemned is the taking of certain habit-forming drugs. Left-handedness, so long as it was condemned (and the persons utilizing their left hand called sinister), produced the very evils that were commonly associated with the condition, such as uneducability, hostility, and envy of those who were fortunate in their choice of a preferred hand. Then the persons manifesting these ill effects could easily be shown to be different from others in personality and temperament, and suffering in other ways. How could one have known, under these conditions, that it required only social acceptance of the persons *and* of their special trait to remove all of the ill effects that accompanied the condition?

Looking back on a period when people had free access to habit-forming drugs but were not condemned for using them, who seemed to function very well nevertheless, and who did not have to borrow, steal, or kill in order to obtain huge sums to support their habits, it is easy to assert that one should return to those halcyon days and to argue that once the behavior ceases to be deviant it will have no evil effects. This argument has many fallacies—particularly in that, following a lengthy period of anti-drug prohibition, the same types of drugs and categories of people were not involved as half a century or more before. The new addicts came to their addiction through different routes than the previous ones, and with entirely different causative factors.² But even more fallacious is the temptation to generalize: that because left-handedness ceased to have ill effects once the condition was recognized as being as good as dextrality, and because this would probably be the case for drug addiction, hence *all* socially condemned forms of behavior require only legalization and social acceptance in order to alleviate the sufferings. People begin to draw the same conclusion about prostitution, homosexuality, and many of the other sexually deviant practices, although they generally stop short of child molestation, and they usually do not generalize to include predatory acts.

For a variety of reasons, and to different extents and with different consequences, I believe that large numbers of acts and types of behavior should be discouraged, even condemned, sometimes with and

² My argument has many persuasive opponents, among whom I might mention Alfred Lindesmith (1965), Edwin Schur (1965), and Troy Duster (1970). The related question, whether illegalization brings with it new evils greater than those that it was meant to eradicate, is discussed in the section on decriminalization.

sometimes without official punishment, but always without the condemnation of the persons perpetrating these acts. This is not because the persons fail to meet some elementary standard of responsibility (such as problems of mental incompetence, extreme compulsivity, and others, which may in fact be the case in certain instances); but rather because, as a philosophic or social-philosophic matter, only the *acts* of people should be condemned, not the people committing such acts.

Activities that demand discouragement fall into several categories: (1) those that require official punitive action by an accepted governmental agency, for protection of all members of the society; (2) others that are inimical to the institutions of the society (an example would be found in adultery, which is harmful to the family as an important institution); (3) others that inhibit the full happiness and development of one or several persons, even when these persons indulge in the behavior entirely voluntarily and do not want to be "treated" any more than they want to be harassed or imprisoned (here one finds the problems of addiction and most of the sexually deviant acts).

A single social policy cannot cover all these people and forms of behavior. For some, one must return to the labeling approach, state that nothing is inherently evil in the act but the evilness is what others impute to it; for other acts, such a theory would fail as a guide to social policy.

The Functions, Uses, and Value of Deviance

CLOSELY ALLIED to the theories of deviance, but not identical to them, are concepts of the functions, uses, and value of deviance. Whereas theories are constructed to account for the advent of the behavior, its origin within individuals or groups, the forms that it might take, and its incidence and prevalence, these related concepts seek to account for the use to which deviance is put by society or by individuals or groups therein. Like theories, the functions, uses, and value may vary considerably from one type of deviant status or behavior to another, or even from one society or epoch to another.

Not every manifestation of behavior has a purpose or a use, either to society as a whole or to the individuals who manifest such behavior. Nor does the development of a use suggest that an alternative method of arriving at the same goal is not available or might not be developed. The very opposite is the case: There may be many alternative roads by which a society can accomplish the same end, whether or not the end is one that is worthy of support. Thus, slavery had a function for American society; that is, it was useful. It provided cheap labor for landowners, depressed the white labor market, and divided the displaced and discontented people so that they directed their hostility against each other rather than against the ruling oligarchy. But some of these functions were not desirable ones, and those necessary to the survival of the nation could have been brought about in other ways.

An approach that postulates the functions of a characteristic, trait, or institution should not fail to see at whose expense they are being provided, and at what cost to social goals and well-being. Even the widespread racism and genocide that have marked the history of Western civilization for several hundred years—against blacks, Indians, Asians, Jews, and others—have not been “senseless”; they were functional for some elements in the society in which they occurred, but at an expense to humanity that far outweighed such usefulness.

In searching for functions of deviance, one can orient an investigation in two different directions. The first would study the purpose of the negative social reaction, stigmatization, and punitive attitudes that some people are taught to take toward others; the second, the function or purpose of the rule-breaking behavior itself. The latter, in turn, can be further broken down: What is its use to the rule-breakers, and what value is derived from it by the masses of people in the world around them?

A wide range of people, conservative and radical, sociologists as well as deviants themselves, have suggested that social good arises out of deviant behavior. Sometimes this is apparent self-justification, as witness the following quote purportedly from a man engaged in large-scale automobile theft.

Look, who do I hurt? I tell you, I don't hurt nobody. The people whose cars are stolen, they're insured, and they get money and buy new cars. The insurance companies are making plenty, and if cars weren't stolen, they wouldn't have the business they got, they couldn't charge these prices for insurance, and they wouldn't make this profit. I give people employment, not only demolishing these cars, but guys in the factories making new cars. Detectives, cops, all sorts of people get work because I'm in business. I tell you, nobody gets hurt.

A somewhat similar argument, couched in more sophisticated terms,

is sometimes heard in scholarly circles. If crime were to stop entirely and the United States were turned into a nation of law-abiding people, it is said, the economy would soon collapse! There is a combined national, state, and local police force in this country of about half a million people, overwhelmingly (although not exclusively) assigned to crime control. There are tens of thousands of judges, corrections officers, criminal lawyers, even sociologists studying these people, as well as manufacturers of guns, clubs, and uniforms, and the raw materials for these products, architects of new prisons and workers engaged in their construction, and so on. Take away all these people, all this demand, and economic chaos would result. We have, in other words, an industry to keep internal order, just as there is an industry to keep external order. Karl Marx put forward this line of reasoning, but for Marx it was an indictment of bourgeois society that its economy depended not only on exploitation and plunder but also, internally as well as externally, on control of and war against people.

The argument that a crimeless society would throw the economy into chaos should not be taken too seriously, not because it cannot happen but because there are alternative uses for the people who would be displaced. America and other crime-ridden nations can use many more teachers, paraprofessional medics, social workers, psychotherapists, and other, and while there may be some dispute as to where people are most needed, it should be clear that no industry is indispensable to the continuity of the economy once the demand for it has ceased. Of course, a changeover from a crime-oriented and war-defense world to one of internal and external peace and trust would create its own difficulties, but they would not be unsolvable.

SOCIAL CONTROL AND CONFORMITY

A major use to which deviance is put is as a mechanism for social control. Every society must teach its members certain rules of behavior; some of these rules are more important than others, and many become internalized by the individual members. People have to be kept in line, at least most people, and lines have to be held within certain limits. Which rules are most important? How much deviation from them can be tolerated? How strong should the social reaction to deviance be? Can some rules be amended so that alternate pathways become equally acceptable? These and other questions generate debate as society undergoes reflection and change. But few would argue with the contention that rules themselves are necessary: rules of everyday behavior governing how we greet one another, rules of civility and etiquette, rules

regulating the protection of the personal property and the body of each person from the onslaughts of others.

The rules themselves constitute a mechanism for ensuring that there will be sufficient conformity in the society so that it will hold together, if not as one cohesive group, then at least in various subsections. A factory or business cannot function without its rules, violation of which might result in the penalty of being fired, or something less severe such as failure to gain a promotion. Neither a classroom nor a courtroom could function without rules governing who may speak and when, and restricting the limits of power. This does not mean that the specific rules are always justified or necessary; they may be arrogant, stupid, superficial, or just a mechanism for the oppression of one group by another, but people could not conduct their lives without any rules at all. And if the rules are there, they must be backed by some kind of sanctions for those who break them, for without this, some rules would be broken with such frequency that the system, within the classroom, factory, subculture, or entire society, would break down.

The function of deviance according to this approach is to control people, to ensure enough conformity and obedience in society so that the major requirements of large numbers of people (or at least of those in power and a sufficient number of others to keep the power from toppling) are met.

In this view, it is not deviance that performs this task but the societal reaction to deviance. It is the devaluation of certain people and acts that keeps people in line, keeps them within permissible limits, or holds down the number of those seriously deviating from those limits. It is the definition of some behavior as evil or sinful, as not being as good as other behavior, that permits this type of control. This is seen not only in attitudes toward traditional forms of crime (crimes against people and against property) but in responses to political crimes (those against the power structure) and to deviant acts that many have defined as victimless crimes (abortion, marijuana use, prostitution), and particularly in attitudes toward those who are raucous, rude, boorish, dull, arrogant, gluttonous, or who have some other socially undesirable "vice" that is not within the purview of crime.

Social control goes further, however; it actually utilizes deviance as a mechanism, sometimes a very necessary one, for inculcating in the members of the society the rules that society expects them or wishes them to follow. This vision of crime and deviance was spelled out very clearly by Emile Durkheim (1893), particularly in *The Division*

of *Labor in Society*. Crime, for Durkheim, was "good" for the society, it was necessary, because it was the negative reactions against the criminal act that defined just what was disallowed by the collective conscience of the conforming people of the society. The act that was disvalued, and the reaction of outrage against it and against the perpetrators of it, drew the boundaries, established the limits of tolerance and made unassailable the rules by which the proper people would abide. Furthermore, as one can see in the attitude toward traitors, renegades, and apostates and in the witch-hunting that has taken place on many occasions throughout human history, a drive against those who would break the rules by which a society abides is something that can bring about social solidarity of those who remain "the good people." They are brought together with one another, in common conscience, to express their disapproval of or indignation at those outside the law. In this view, societies are sometimes driven to create deviants where none exist: witness the Inquisition, the Salem witchcraft trials, the Communist purges, the deliberately created German anti-Semitism, the lynchings in America, the red-baiting of the McCarthy era, and other all too numerous examples.

There is a social cohesion that takes place in a society as a result of the condemnation of the transgressor. As pariah, he becomes excluded; this can be done by execution, excommunication, banishment to another land, confinement to prison, or by the terrible although informal act of making the person an outcast. The ties among the remaining population are strengthened. The people share a common indignation and reaffirm their own goodness, correctness, and morality.

The Durkheimian concept of society was one in which social cohesion was not only necessary but good. It was a view of the world fortified by the study of simple and primitive groups (particularly in Australia) in which pluralism was held to a minimum, and by the fear of internal warfare being conducted against some religious and ethnic groups (Jews in Western Europe, Negroes and immigrants in the United States). The concept of cultural pluralism, which suggests that numerous peoples presumably are able to live side by side without being assimilated by one another and without losing their individual identities in a single "melting pot," had not yet been formulated.

Emile Durkheim believed that crime and deviance are not only necessary and in a sense good for society but are also normal manifestations of that society. A British sociologist, Michael Phillipson (1971), without disputing this view, has pointed out that crime may indeed be normal for a society, but that this does not mean that the criminal is himself normal. One can extend this and say that crime, a general

abstraction, is a normal manifestation that can take on abnormal forms, be committed by abnormal persons, have abnormal frequency, and give rise to abnormal societal reaction.

DEVIANCE AS A CATALYST FOR CHANGE

Deviance is a challenge to the status quo. Every time a rule is violated, that rule is being challenged. Those who make and enforce the rules are compelled to examine the way things are. The challenge to the rules is a warning that the social system is not functioning well. A considerable amount of robbery does not suggest to a political power structure that robbery should be recognized as a legitimate form of behavior and a desirable mechanism for the redistribution of wealth; it does, however, loudly proclaim that there are large numbers of disaffected people, that mechanisms for the socialization of youth are faltering, that power relations are being challenged, and that the moral structures of the society require reexamination. Whether officials react with repressive measures or steps in the direction of social change will depend upon the relative strength of those in power and those who challenge them, the extent to which those groups in office are themselves permeated and penetrated by criminals, and many other factors.³

In another respect, deviance is an instigation for social change: Namely, the deviant way is offered as an alternative to the society. It is both a new model and a demand for examination of the old norms. Deviance becomes the mechanism for dialogue, and the dialogue can and often does result in modification of the original and formerly tenaciously held values. Almost all religious orders have modified their dogma, their teachings, and their practices, but particularly their demands upon their adherents, as heretical views were promulgated by some and disobedience became rampant among others. Sometimes this has resulted in schism, in which two or more groups each pursued its own teachings; sometimes, however, it has assumed the form of modification.

Political deviance takes on this role. When a large number of people not only openly oppose a policy of the established society but sabotage it, march against it, and express solidarity with "the enemy," this stays the hands of those in power and makes demands on them for policy changes. This, too, can be deceptive, and in a democratic society the deception can be particularly acute. For it

³ The power structure can react with both repression and concession, enough of the latter to defuse the deviance, and enough of the former to give warning that more of it will not be rewarded.

is possible that the deviant ideology will be tolerated in order the better to contain it, in order to depict to the entire world how democratic the society is, without in any way modifying the themes that are being challenged.⁴

In this view, a considerable amount of drunkenness can be valuable, for it makes apparent the presence of an alienated populace; and a considerable amount of sexual deviance may be valuable (in another sense) in causing the decision-makers and culture-leaders of the society to examine the puritanical codes, violation of which has led to undesirable developments. But drunkenness can bring on the repression of a Prohibition era, with the resulting decline of liberty and the concomitant secondary deviation that America witnessed in the 1920s, and sexual deviance can result in a backlash, a resurgence of repressive puritanical codes, in addition to suffering for those involved.

DEVIANCE AS A SAFETY VALVE

Another function of deviance in a society is to act as a safety valve, in order to permit the expression of antisocial anger in a manner that is held within limits. It is a process of letting off steam by violating the rules in a manner that is not overly threatening to social order or to the rules themselves. The society continues as an ongoing system, when both rule-violation, on the one hand, and angry condemnation of such violation, on the other, are given free play.

This is expressed by oppressed groups that flaunt their hostility, by students who show their contempt for the way things are and the way they are run, by those in mild rebellion who express it through life-styles (such as hippies, members of communes, topless and nude waitresses, or open transvestites). The safety-valve concept is based upon an image of society as containing many malcontents, people who rightly or wrongly see themselves as having been unfairly treated, and who will be brought back into the good world mainly by being permitted some expression of this discontent.

Whatever the values and functions of deviance, two questions arise: (1) Might these functions be fulfilled in another manner, less harmful to the perpetrators of the acts, their victims, and the entire system

⁴ Was political deviance effective in the antiwar struggle in America? Did it bring the war in Vietnam to an early end? Did it make another such adventure unlikely in the future? These questions can be debated, and in such an argument people will be led astray by their ideological commitments. They will be tempted to reach conclusions that they are predisposed to. But the function of political or religious deviance as the harbinger of change is not challenged if one answers these questions in the negative; it then becomes the further task of sociologists and political scientists to determine the conditions conducive to the success or failure of deviant protesters.

or subsystem of society? (2) Is the individual form of deviance, or the specific and particular act, worth the suffering entailed in order to accomplish the functional goals? For it is one thing to say that violence, assault, murder, rape, can bring about awareness of the shortcomings, failures, inadequacies, and strains within the nation and may or may not result in corrective measures; it is another thing to determine whether the social consequences accomplished were worth the victimization.

Under some circumstances, rules have an inherent and necessary flexibility; in ordinary language, they are made not to be broken, but to be bent. But such a statement contains truth, exaggeration, and oversimplification. The rules, rather, are there to limit the extent of permissible deviation from them. Joseph Bensman and Israel Gerver (1963) studied the use of a prohibited tool in an airplane factory. Without such a tool (called a tap), it was extremely difficult to put out a sufficient quantity of work that would pass inspection; however, the tool was likely to introduce dangerous structural defects that would be unnoticed by the inspectors. The prohibition had a function of circumscribing the use of the tool, permitting it only in the hands of the most skilled technicians, and then only when normal methods of workmanship had been tried and had failed. If one sees the rule-breaker as a deviant, not only is he necessary and tolerated, but the hostile reaction of management if he should be caught (a reprimand or even discharge) is a necessary part of the containment of his actions.

Deviance, then, is part of the façade, of the charade that is played by groups of varying power in society. Of not all forms and instances of deviance is this true, but where it is, the study of deviance is enlightening in the understanding of the dynamic relations between the real and the spurious culture.

Decriminalization

SOME DISVALUED and condemned activity is illegal. For other activities, although they meet disapproval, there is no problem of illegality. They may constitute violations of what William Graham

Summer called the folkways: Things are just done in certain ways, and nobody does them in any other way without risking disapproval, be it weak or strong, selective or widespread, at the hands of others in society. Or the disapproved acts may involve matters of private morality, on the one hand, or may be outside the realm of morality, on the other, in which case it can be said that they are neither moral, immoral, nor amoral. A person who marries outside of his religion in a society where he is legally permitted to do so may still be strongly condemned; a very short male goes on a date with a very tall female; a guest at a dinner party tells the host and hostess how bad the food is; a man turns around on the street and yells at someone who is not there. These are examples of actions not forbidden by law; the perpetrators are not subject to arrest; but this does not necessarily diminish the certainty, strength, immediacy, and effect of the social reaction. That reaction can be expressed mildly or strongly, depending on what has been done, who did it, and who is reacting to it, and the disapproval may show itself in a snicker, a sneer, gossip, or a joke, or by stronger scorn, ridicule, social exclusion, informal isolation, personal discrimination (particularly in the realm of sociability), indignation, and innumerable tacit and overt manifestations of attitudes by which an individual demonstrates that he considers another silly, stupid, inferior, mentally unstable, "touched," incompetent, or in some other respects "wrong."

Nevertheless, a large body of laws govern and in fact outlaw activities that some would consider private and personal, as remote from the legitimate concerns of government as is the height of the mate one chooses or whether an adult speaks in respectful and considerate tones to his mother. Sometimes these are described as matters involving private morals or morality. It has been said that the tradition for legislative control of private morality is particularly strong in the United States, and this is traced to the puritan ethic. There is some justification, but not a great deal, in this charge. Noah Webster, the great American lexicographer, bowdlerized the dictionary and even eliminated from the Bible that naughty word *leg*, for which he substituted *limb*.⁵ He was followed by such antisexual crusaders as Anthony Comstock. Later, the United States gained its reputation for criminalizing private morality when it launched the notorious Prohibition era, illegalizing the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages. American penal codes at times banned the sale of contraceptives and the dissemination of birth-control information, enforced

⁵ The outstanding American dictionary, ironically still bearing the name of Webster, did not make restoration of the censored words until 1965, when the *Third New International Dictionary* (Merriam-Webster) appeared.

the closing of businesses on Sunday, illegalized sports and other recreational events on the day of worship, and by law prevented social interaction among people of different races, particularly cohabitation and marriage. Eating in the same public restaurant was forbidden, as was being buried in the same cemetery. A committee studying the California penal code for the purpose of proposing revisions found that the code authorized "criminal convictions for such offenses as failure by a school principal to use required textbooks, failure of a teacher to carry first-aid kits on field trips, gambling on the result of an election," and many other matters either too trivial or not a logical area for criminal prosecution. Many such laws still remain on the books, although they are only rarely enforced.

It would be improper to assume that this is a purely American problem, although it is difficult to see in other nations, where it has taken on a variety of dissimilar forms. Stringent anti-drug laws are almost universal, and public support for their retention is, if anything, probably greater elsewhere than in the United States. After a permissive period immediately following the Revolution of 1917, the Soviet Union went in the direction of restrictive legislation in the areas of sexuality and abortion. Adult consensual homosexuality is illegal in almost all Communist countries, in the Moslem lands, and in parts of Western Europe, where it is punished far more severely than in the United States. Prostitution is illegal but usually tolerated in many parts of the world; on the other hand, the Cuban revolution saw a suppression of prostitution, with a revulsion by the new Castro regime against the popular conception of Havana as "the whorehouse of the Western world." Censorship of allegedly pornographic material in books or film is stronger in most countries (except the Scandinavian) than in the United States, but prediction of future American policy in this regard is hazardous, because of both the gyrations of the Supreme Court and the possibility that local law may at least partially prevail.

LAW AND MORALITY

The problem of the dynamic interrelationship of law and morality has plagued social philosophers for generations. The utilitarians, represented by the writings of Jeremy Bentham (1743-1832), contended that the concept of the greatest good for the greatest number should guide public policy. This led to the libertarian position that more good could be accomplished by allowing activities that do not harm anyone except possibly the participants than by seeking to control them through legislation.

More recently, the debate has been drawn between two major

British thinkers. Patrick Devlin (1965) has argued that the purpose of all legislation is to protect morality; that the matter of murder and robbery is one of morals; and that the duty of the state is to protect people against their own weaknesses, foibles, and the exploitation of these by and with others. H. L. A. Hart (1963) has probably been the most eloquent spokesman for the opposing view that the state should limit itself to the illegalization and prosecution of activities that threaten the well-being of others (that is, people other than the willing participants) or of the social body as an entity (the state or society).

Sociological tradition in America was both moralistic, with its small-town and middle-American view of what constituted moral right, and at the same time deeply entrenched in the philosophy of *laissez faire*. The latter, as American as the puritan ethic, was based on the concept of free enterprise. William Graham Sumner (1840–1910), spokesman for social Darwinism, saw government intervention in the lives of citizens as potentially dangerous and believed that, by education and evolution, Americans would and could uplift themselves from the wrong ways that they were pursuing. If this led to a conservative position on the regulation of business and on race relations, it led to a libertarian one in areas of private morality.

Derived from the attitude of Sumner was a formulation of the dean of American criminologists, Edwin Sutherland (1940).⁶ Where the mores are strong, Sutherland contended, there is no need for law, and where they are weak, the law cannot be effective. Both clauses, I believe, are exaggerations, although they have an important measure of truth in them. Even where the mores are very strong there can still be a minority of people attracted to disobeying them, and, as a result, the law may be needed for the protection of others against such persons. Certainly there are strong social pressures against forcible rape, but laws are required because there are some people impelled to violate the mores, and the protection of the victim compels us to discourage, contain, and punish the violators. By contrast, so strong are the mores with regard to the incest taboo that there would probably be little or no increase in incestuous activity between consenting adults if there were no legislation.⁷

Are strong mores sufficient to protect the society without the enactment of law? This depends on several factors: (1) whether

⁶ There is a study in contrast between Sumner and Sutherland, for the latter was hopeful of effecting radically needed social change, while Sumner was essentially conservative. Yet, on the issue of the need for less legislation, their viewpoints tended to converge.

⁷ Furthermore, it is argued by adherents of decriminalization, what if there were? The same question cannot rationally be posed about rape.

discouragement from the act takes place through internalization of the mores or primarily through fear and the threat of sanctions for violators; (2) whether violation of the mores becomes attractive to a small minority of the populace despite the emphasized strength of disapproval; (3) whether people require protection as individuals against victimization; (4) whether the society as a whole has a stake in the continuation of the mores; and (5) whether the enactment or repeal of legislation would seriously increase the incidence of the activity.⁸

Where the mores are weak, Sutherland writes, the law cannot be effective. Aside from the fact that a law may have dysfunctional and unanticipated effects (effective not in a sense intended by the lawmakers or expressed by Sutherland), the matter has some other complexities. It depends upon the commitment of large portions of the society, particularly its governing body, to enforce the law and to assist in changing the mores. Further, there may be strong pressures in favor of the legislation and its enforcement despite the weak mores, and political or international situations may well make these pressures dominant over those of the lawbreakers. This is the case with much of the civil rights legislation in the United States, enacted in contravention of the mores. New legislation may modify the mores, not only by criminalizing and hence stigmatizing many persons, but by creating new social and interactional situations to which people must and often do adjust. Thus, the mores can change. With the disappearance of separate hotels, lunchrooms, and restrooms for whites and blacks throughout much of the United States, whites had a choice of accepting the *fait accompli* or forgoing the use of these accommodations. Choosing to utilize the facilities, whites adjusted rather quickly; thus the law changed the mores. With weak mores, the law can meet considerable resistance but still be a catalyst for social change by imparting to people a sense of wrongdoing.

Behavior can be transformed from legal to illegal, as well as in the reverse direction, but whereas in civil rights both have taken place, in the realm of private morality the former has been subject to more careful study. The process of criminalization usually takes place at a given moment: A judgment is made or a law is passed. While decriminalization can occur with equal suddenness, as the repeal of the New York State abortion law, it frequently is more gradual. A series of decisions may be handed down, or interpretations by police

⁸ An example of a private consensual act in whose continued illegalization society seems to have a stake is bigamy. Few adherents of decriminalization call for its legalization, and even fewer would favor social approval.

and courts may be less stringent than before, or a law can fall into disuse.

A strong differentiation must be made between the criminalization of activity that is already widely condemned by the public and that of behavior which has hitherto met little moral condemnation except at the hands of crusaders. To criminalize an act that already meets strong disapproval is to codify the public attitudes into law and to seek to transform the informal hostility into official and formal social reaction. This may come about because those expressing the informal hostility are frustrated in their efforts to diminish or halt what they find repugnant. When, however, a hitherto approved activity, or one about which most persons were either ignorant or indifferent, is criminalized, there is likelihood that new and illegal channels for continuation of the behavior will be found. This depends upon objective factors as well as on the moral pressures that are aroused to support the new law (or, in other words, the propaganda for the transformation of indifference or approval into hostility and indignation).

Decriminalization suggests an analogous process. When a movement arises for the removal of criminal sanctions against various types of activities, several quite distinct questions may be raised: (1) Are these activities such that the society still wants to discourage them, but through means that avoid social sanctions? (2) If the activities are seen as harmful, can they be diminished in scope and be better handled and contained by treating the individuals as sick or by leaving them alone entirely? (3) Has the handling of the behavior under the penal law resulted in a great deal of secondary crime that could have been avoided if this were a legal activity, and can this secondary crime be diminished by legalization? (4) Will legalization imply moral laxity and a stamp of approval?

Now, all these questions assume that the action is itself unfortunate and should be discouraged. Decriminalization may be one step in freeing an activity of any moral obloquy, destigmatizing it so that it ceases to be thought of as antisocial, morally reprehensible, or personally harmful. This would be a move toward normalization of the behavior, perhaps toward institutionalization (that is, toward its acceptance and integration into the life of society).

CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS

The movement for decriminalization has largely been linked to the theme of crimes without victims, a concept and a phrase given wide dissemination through the work of Edwin Schur (1965). It has been

particularly popular with adherents of labeling as well as with civil libertarians, but for different reasons.

What are crimes without victims? The term is difficult to define, as Schur readily admits, and seems to take in several overlapping types of behavior. First, and above all, there are adult consensual acts. Because they are consensual, there would be no complainant, and the harm, if any, resulting from the activities is limited to the participants themselves. Second, they are usually acts in which there is a desired commodity for which there is a willing buyer and a ready seller, who would be seeking each other in normative fashion if it were not for the illegality of their activities. To this, one should add that there is considerable social dissension on the imputed wrongfulness of the act—not only on whether it should be a crime, but whether it should be considered wrong at all. Does any evil inhere in it?

Because the activities, although criminal, are continued on a broad scale, the laws become unenforceable, and the result is harassment, occasional enforcement for irrelevant reasons, disrespect for law itself, bribery, corruption, extortion, and other social wrongs. Then there is the evil of secondary crime, far more serious than the thing that was supposed to be suppressed. The new crime is built around a criminal subculture and arises as a result of the illegality, not merely of the demand for the goods or services.

No single criterion among these is essential for categorizing an illegal act as a victimless crime. The fact that it is consensual between adult participants does not necessarily relieve it of its potential for strong antisocial consequences. While adult homosexual acts would fall into the victimless crime category without great complications, consensual heterosexual or homosexual sadomasochism suggests that some persons may be in need of protection against themselves, so psychologically disturbed are they. Whether society opens up a Pandora's box leading to a governmental apparatus using therapy as a mechanism for oppression (a therapeutic state) and to psychiatric injustice, as Nicholas Kittrie (1971) and Thomas Szasz (1965) might contend, and whether this is more dangerous than permitting a person to be free from legal constraints when he inflicts physical punishment on a willing partner as part of sexual play, are matters for debate.

A consensual adult crime, in which there are no victims except the participants, might be illustrated by a murder-and-suicide pact. If, after slaying a companion, the murderer "chickens out" or makes a suicide attempt and recovers, thus not carrying out his end of the contract, it hardly seems logical that he should be exempt from criminal prosecution. Even if it could be proved irrefutably that the dead

person wanted to be killed, this would not justify the state's condoning such an act. Public morality recoils at the thought of giving a stamp of approval to intentional and premeditated murder, and the exceptions that are made (as in war, for example) are not such that man would want to enlarge upon them.

Another adult consensual act that few would categorize as victimless crime is bribery of a public official. Although the donor and the receptor may be equally pleased with the event, and there is no victim in the sense of a complainant, it still does not fit the category. If it is a matter of public bidding—for a work contract, for example—the victim does not complain because he is unaware of the crime. Two other reasons for excluding this from victimless crimes are: (1) that there is little dissension in the public attitude toward the act (that is, almost everyone sees it as a crime), and (2) that there is definitely a victim, the public itself. However, as soon as one makes this last statement, one is deep in the realm of the legislation of morality, for the opponents of decriminalization contend that there are no private immoral acts, that an affront to morals is always a social and public concern.

Unlike the labelists and the extreme cultural relativists, I maintain that some acts are inherently so evil that they must be outlawed, whether or not the acts or their illegalization meet public support. They are basically antisocial and in that sense deeply immoral, a thesis that was defended by Gideon Hausner (1966) in his prosecution of Eichmann. Extending this view, some contend that all penal law consists of the legislation of morality, although some matters of morality are very private, have no repercussions beyond the lives of the participants themselves, and should and do concern only them.

When an act is grossly immoral, those who see it in that light are quite justified in demanding its illegalization. Here it is not a matter of reduction of the incidence of the act but of the stamp of approval that is given to it by the failure to have it condemned through penal law, although mechanisms for discouraging it other than criminal penalties and legal sanctions are open to society. The controversy over abortion, and the place of the Catholic Church in that ongoing debate, is an interesting case in point.

If one defines the fetus as a living human being (a question that is itself a controversial matter and that can never be proved right or wrong), and if one makes an absolute rule that under no conditions should a human life deliberately be taken (no capital punishment, no condonation of any act of war), then it is quite understandable that abortion should be outlawed. Furthermore, people taking such a position can feel justified in wanting to "impose" their views on others,

even as those opposed to forcible rape, burglary, and automobile theft seek to "impose" these attitudes on society. This last statement is countered by the general consensus that burglary must be criminal, that abortion does not command such a consensus, and, furthermore, that everyone can become a victim of assault, theft, and other predatory crime, but not of abortion. However, almost all adults would take a position opposing the right of parents to dispose of the life of an infant during the first months after it is born. No adult could be so victimized, but nevertheless he seeks to impose his morality on others.

Many acts that are criminalized in the penal codes do not involve clear-cut themes of immorality and antisocial activities. On the contrary, they stand on the borderline, not morally neutral, but less tolerable than ordinary acts and more so than crimes of violence and theft. Some are entirely private, as a telephone prostitution service, whereas streetwalking, public solicitation, and the blatant display and sale of pornography are somewhat less so. The use of alcohol and other drugs, as well as ordinary cigarettes, involves private pleasures and private health, although their effects on the users may be such as to endanger the health and safety of others. Gambling, often thought of as an inherently immoral act, takes place in churches and in official government offices, suggesting that the morality changes depending on who gets the profit. In the numbers game, referred to as a racket (although it may be no more so than a bingo game), the gambler is usually poor, and the odds are too heavily weighted against him to make the operation "fair," but this could be corrected by regulatory legislation, such as that governing gambling by richer people on Wall Street.

The arguments in favor of decriminalization generally proceed along three lines: (1) There is nothing inherently wrong with some of these acts; if they were not illegal, they could be conceptualized as being right, good, and proper. This is generally heard with regard to abortion, marijuana smoking, gambling, adult consensual homosexuality, and, on rare occasions, the use of hard drugs. (2) In other instances, these are private matters, with no social repercussions for people other than the practitioners. As a private matter, if that's what these people want to do, it's their funeral and no one else's. Live and let live: The theme is tolerance, which does not imply approval. This viewpoint is often articulated in matters involving sexual morality; it would justify a penal code that does not criminalize adultery, but the act is not meant to be seen as proper, only private. If people want to see pornographic films and seedy peep shows, why should anyone be concerned? They are not compelling those who would be

repelled to join them in the exhibition. (3) In the third category, the acts are defined as improper but are not so compellingly evil that a society will perish for want of official condemnation of them, and the laws against them are so unenforceable that there are more ills caused by the illegalization than by the activities themselves. This is the argument that is most widely stated with regard to drug use and prostitution, for example.

PERCEPTIONS OF VICTIMLESS CRIMES

Abortion is probably the outstanding example of a criminal act that has come to be defended, and the demand for repeal of the laws against it most strongly articulated, on the ground that there is nothing inherently wrong with the action. Abortion would probably be defined by its defenders as something that became evil because it was prohibited, rather than having been prohibited because it was evil. Further, there were secondary crimes that resulted from its illegalization (illness and death, exorbitant fees, services available only to the upper and middle classes, and the abandonment and abuse of unwanted children), but these were not the compelling reasons for demanding abortion reform. The main argument is that, inasmuch as the fetus is not a life, there is nothing wrong: hence a woman should have the right to dispose of and make decisions about matters concerning only her own body. If there was nothing improper about the act except that it was illegal, this could be handled by changing its status and legalizing it.

The degree of acceptance of this view is illustrated by the willingness of women to state publicly that they have had abortions. Abortion was probably an event conceptualized as reprehensible by some people but not others, and to a limited extent this correlated with age, religion, and other factors, while it also changed with the passage of time. Like other deviance for which there was demand, it represented a tension between the real and the spurious culture, with many people apparently opposing it, loudly expressing their outrage, but nevertheless seeking it as a service when necessary.

With regard to homosexuality, the defense of the act as moral and proper, or "on a par with heterosexuality," is usually made only by those who identify with the activity and not by others who might be called "fellow travelers." Evidently, it is a type of behavior disapproved by many who oppose legislation making it criminal. The same is not true of gambling, which many view as a proper form of recreation.

Private matters. The movement to decriminalize certain acts is based

upon the concept that these are private matters, not rightfully the concern of government, society, or even neighbors. This is not the same as approval, although in the struggle for decriminalization or for reform of the penal law, one is likely not only to dispute the arguments that the actions are evil but also to attempt to show these actions in the most harmless light. What frequently emerges is approval or encouragement by implication.

The problem with the "private matter" approach to deviance is one of social policy: how to demonstrate social disapproval, to educate and socialize the young to follow the norms that are generally considered most helpful, without placing official penalties upon the transgressor. Adultery is generally regarded as a private matter that should not be accepted or encouraged but on the other hand should not be prosecuted or stigmatized.

The secondary crime problem. The major problem in decriminalization revolves around those acts which, whatever evil may reside in them, become much more hurtful to members of the society by virtue of the fact that they are illegal. The compelling fact that one must face is that of secondary crime or secondary deviance.

Among the ill effects of criminalization are the formation of the subcultural network of buyers and sellers in a criminal milieu, high prices and poor merchandise, fraud in which the victim is left with no protection, robbery to pay for the illegal merchandise, police corruption, and even the spread of disease, as well as such noncriminal but undesirable concomitants as crowding of court calendars, plea bargaining, overpopulated jails, and the deflection of police manpower away from urgently needed tasks.

DECRIMINALIZATION AS A PROCESS

The application of the concept of decriminalization is more than the effort to repeal a law and remove its penal sanctions. The law must have carried with it the notion of criminality, for without it there can be no decriminalization.⁹ Once that problem is disposed of, de-

⁹ It would seem to be a tautology hardly worth restating that one cannot decriminalize that which was not previously criminal. But it is more complicated than that. I have in front of me a study in which respondents were asked about their attitudes toward decriminalization of three acts, one of which was double parking. This has nothing to do with decriminalization, however, and the responses are completely misleading. The people should have been asked if they favored repeal of laws that prohibit double parking and that impose fines for violators. In all likelihood, those who think through the problem with a sense of responsibility would favor the retention of such laws. When it is posed in the context and language of decriminalization, the error is that one is telling the respondent (by implication) that the violators are criminals (which they are not),

criminalization goes through several stages, but it meets impediments and arouses conflicts and counter-movements.

Sometimes, it is achieved by simple obsolescence. A law remains on the books. Legal and judicial authorities may have forgotten its existence or may have decided deliberately to disregard it. Under such circumstances, its capacity for causing mischief is relatively slight, although the very fact that the law is retained gives it some potential for inflicting harm on the transgressor. The Sunday blue laws came to be disregarded, and important civil rights legislation, enacted following the Civil War, was allowed to fall into disuse, forgotten by all but a few faithful militants, and revived under the pressure of the civil rights movement when it was "needed."¹⁰

There is a danger of innocent victimization and harassment when unused laws are allowed to remain on the books and when an act becomes decriminalized merely through obsolescence, indifference, and disuse. It facilitates the victimization of someone, not because he has violated the particular law (this he may have done, but usually no one cares), but because he espouses unpopular ideas, or because of race or creed. This is illustrated in the case of Father Philip Berrigan and Sister Elizabeth McAllister, two antiwar activists. Together with several of their colleagues, they were indicted and tried on a number of charges, including conspiracy to commit sabotage and to kidnap a prominent person in the Nixon administration. Although the jury was unable to agree on the major charges (which were subsequently dropped), these two defendants were convicted and sentenced for unauthorized correspondence from a federal prison, in violation of a law that had not been enforced for many years.¹¹

A second and clearly related method of transforming the status of an act from criminal to noncriminal can occur without legislative action and without legal repeal through new judicial interpretations

and then asking if they should cease to be considered criminals. The respondents, unable to apply the stigmatic label of criminality in the first instance, can readily offer an answer that favors withdrawal of it.

¹⁰ It was resurrected and invoked to enable the federal government to prosecute those who were accused of murdering three civil rights workers, an act that shocked the conscience of America. While prosecution for the murder of civil rights workers can be justified because the defendants were accused of inherently evil acts, and because the failure of local authorities to pursue the matter constitutes a major social problem that must be met, the invocation of an obsolescent law when it becomes convenient is itself socially undesirable.

¹¹ Historians claim that this was only the third instance of a conviction under this statute in American history; at any rate, the law was repealed soon afterwards. Therein lies another irony: the act is decriminalized because the invocation of the law calls it to the attention of the public, which reacts with surprise and scorn, not at the violators of it, but at its upholders.

of the law, often to conform with changing public opinion. In a few instances, legislation long on the books may be declared unconstitutional, although this can be considered a mechanism for repeal. More frequently, with changing public attitudes and new concepts of morality, novel interpretations of the law are given by courts that are sensitive to political and social upheavals, a process made possible by the loose manner in which the laws were originally written.¹² Most of the laws against public indecent exposure and pornography were not repealed; what changed were the standards and criteria by which certain objects, people, or behavior fell within these forbidden purviews. Progressively liberal or permissive decisions were handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal and state courts.¹³

These are instances of decriminalization by means of a law's falling into disuse or by a series of decisions, usually gradual, and often following changes in public opinion. Developments of this type are interactive and circularly dynamic, with the modified attitudes resulting in new legal decisions, and the latter resulting in further modification of the attitudes. The spiral can travel in the other direction, however, as might occur when the decisions of the courts bring about behavior for which the public is unprepared and shocked and a backlash ensues.

If there is strong conflict of opinion, not so much about the law but about the propriety of the act itself, this may give rise to a social movement for decriminalization. Such a force can take hold essentially under two conditions: (1) when there is a diminishing sense of moral rigidity concerning the activity, and (2) when people have become convinced that the law either has not succeeded in diminishing the act or has brought with it substantial secondary evils. In other words, the criminal sanctions should be removed in some instances, it is argued, because the mores have changed (or perhaps the moral outlook never was what the legislators made it out to be); or, in other cases, because the mores have not changed but there is recognition that society suffers more from the effects of illegality than from the action that has been outlawed.

Several examples will illustrate these general statements. Abortion reform became viable as a result of changed attitudes; homosexual law

¹² Some sociologists (and some legal scholars, too) would argue that the loose wording of laws is functional, even if not intentional, in that it permits interpretation to change in accordance with the changing social climate.

¹³ Actually, in the famous Ralph Ginzburg case, arrest and imprisonment took place in the United States in the 1960s, long after the philosophy that "anything goes" had replaced the puritanism that had once been dominant. This is another example of a law that is selectively invoked against those whom the authorities do not like: In this instance, Ginzburg's erotic presentations aroused considerable wrath, and it is charged by some that the anger was directed against him because his journal depicted an interracial couple in loving embrace.

reform, as a result of a wide feeling that "it's his business, not mine." Laws against miscegenation were repealed both because of a political movement that made all racially discriminatory legislation difficult to defend and embarrassing to American society, and because it was felt that this was a proper matter for social but not for legal action. Most but not all arguments for the legalization of hard drugs, such as heroin, stress that there is greater evil from the illegalization than from the drugs themselves, whereas movements for the repeal of marijuana restrictions stress the positive value of smoking marijuana.

The struggle for law reform is often a mechanism for conducting another and more important struggle—that is, for a change in public attitude, for destigmatization. While there is a great deal of discrimination, official and unofficial, against people suspected of practicing homosexuality, the harassment is less legal than social. There are relatively few arrests in the United States for consensual homosexual activity in private; the arrests are for such acts in semipublic places, for public solicitation, and, until the early 1970s, for the congregation of "undesirables" in various public places (such as gay bars).

The laws themselves give rise to social movements for their repeal. In a sense, these movements consist of the moral entrepreneurs of the liberal morality, similar to the crusaders described by Becker, who take it upon themselves to campaign for repressive legislation. The movement distributes its propaganda, issues press releases, gets exposure on mass media, campaigns, lobbies, enters political battles, all to arouse public ire over the injustices and the potential for harm in continuation of the law. The struggle proceeds, in fact, along a two-pronged line of attack, emphasizing not only the harm brought about by the law but the good that could be accomplished by the act if only it were allowed to flower in full light of day.

THE NATURE OF SECONDARY CRIME

An unenforced law does not have to give rise to secondary crime, but, as Schur (1965) points out, when there is a strong demand for the service (such as abortion, prostitution, or gambling) and it continues to thrive in a subterranean network, there will be new and greater crimes committed. However, it is easy to fall into the error of seeing decriminalization as a panacea. Some of this secondary crime would thrive even if the act were legal.

For example, blackmail is often associated with homosexuality, and it may be true that some blackmail would not be possible if there were no antihomosexual laws. But the blackmail comes primarily from stigmatization, secrecy and the threat of exposure, with

the potential damage to social, familial, and financial relationships, and these could be present without laws. In England, for long periods of time there were no laws against homosexuality, but blackmail appears to have thrived during these times. Adultery may give rise to a good deal of blackmail because a man has a wife and family or a career that would be threatened by exposure, whereas the question of criminality is irrelevant.

The outstanding secondary crime resulting from the search for an illegal commodity is found in the field of narcotics. Illegalization drives the price of hard drugs incredibly high, and since most users are unable to support their habit by gainful employment, they resort to mugging and thievery (often victimizing their own families, at least at the start), prostitution, pushing of drugs, and initiation of new users to obtain funds. It is said that, in the early 1970s, New York City had 150,000 to 200,000 drug users. If one were to estimate that the average habit was costing each of them twenty dollars a day to support, this would be three to four million dollars that they would require daily. Regular employment, prostitution and other "victimless crimes," and marginal methods of making money other than burglary and thievery might account for—at most—one-fifth of this. That would leave about two million dollars a day to be obtained by addicts in an illegal manner.¹⁴ It is contended that in England, by contrast, although there is some illegal trafficking in drugs, the legal dispensing to registered addicts has left the country with almost no problem of thievery for the purpose of supporting a drug habit.

There is a great deal of violence associated with the worlds of prostitution and homosexuality. In part, this may be the result of fly-by-night relationships, anonymity, and to some extent the psychological problems gripping people involved in this type of sexual encounter. However, it would require destigmatization to reduce substantially this peripheral and tangential crime, although decriminalization would be a step toward such diminution.

A CRISIS OF OVERCRIMINALIZATION

Sanford Kadish (1967) refers to the American situation as "a crisis of overcriminalization," and indeed this is no exaggeration. What

¹⁴ If this sounds like a lot of larceny, let it be recalled that when merchandise is stolen (such as radios and television sets, cameras, and other easily disposable commodities), the thief obtains only about one-fourth or one-fifth of the value, whether disposition is through a fence or directly to the consumer. Balancing this is the fact that on any one day many addicts are in jails, many others are obtaining drugs by selling them, and quite a few are on methadone or in other treatment programs or trying to work through an addiction problem by surviving withdrawal.

makes it a crisis is not only the tremendous number of restrictive laws (something not rare in other countries) but also the widespread disregard for these laws, their flagrant violation, and their lack of support by considerable portions of the population.

America is suffering from high crime rates, insufficient police forces, lack of confidence in the integrity of the police by large portions of the populace, extremely long pretrial detention for those unable to put up bail, the crisis of plea bargaining, crowded court calendars, and the simultaneous phenomenon of very crowded jails and prisons while large numbers of criminals walk the streets or hold government office.

Many of these evils could be eliminated by decriminalization, but not all. Drunkenness accounts for approximately half the arrests in America in any single year. An urban society cannot ignore the public (and particularly the chronic) inebriate. To cease to see such persons in the context of crime and to stop sending them through a court system (with its revolving-door policy and its two-minute trials that make a mockery of criminal justice) would necessitate the substitution of social workers, paramedical personnel, and clinics for the present system. While it would diminish congestion in courtrooms and jails, other facilities would be required to take their places. The *Uniform Crime Reports* would no longer show so many arrests, but this would constitute a spurious reduction in crime. It is not even certain that the police could be relieved of handling such persons, for if intoxication were no longer a legal matter, it would unburden the police only if no tasks had to be performed to take care of alcoholics or if other persons were available for that purpose.¹⁵

Decriminalization has many attractive features, but it does not solve the basic behavioral problem that is involved unless it is one that requires no other solution than legalization. Its most important aspect, other than relieving the society of the burden of secondary criminality, may be that it will *assist* in lifting the stigma of crime from many who are now outcasts. But even this partial effect cannot be accomplished automatically by repeal of law, as if by a magic wand. It will require education to help people who have been outcasts to come back and to be welcomed into society. Except for those activities that are defined by people as positive and to be encouraged, or neutral and not to be discouraged, the problem will remain in a new and some-

¹⁵ The police, let it be recalled, spend most of their time answering emergency sick calls, taking people across the street, giving directions, handling traffic, looking after or for lost children, rushing to the scene of an accident, and handling other matters of a noncriminal nature.

times even more acute form: how to channel behavior into socially acceptable and useful ways when people behaving in another fashion are treated neither as criminals nor as social outcasts.

Too Much Deviance— or Not Enough?

ONE COUNTS forms of deviance, and one counts deviants, and gives weight to what has been counted. However, there is no assurance that increase in one type of socially disapproved pursuit is accompanied by an overall increase in disvalued behavior or people. With crime, this can be grasped with greater accuracy, and, making allowances for the dark figure of unreported criminal acts and other statistical failings, a general picture emerges. This may reveal, for example, a higher rate of crimes against property within a single area as one compares a given year with another time period. In fact, this occurred (if the official figures are assumed to be at least an approximate indication) in New York and several other major urban centers of the United States in the early 1970s.

In terms of deviance, alcoholism may increase, for example, while suicide goes down, or adultery may be more widespread at one period than it had been and promiscuity less so.¹⁶ These and other phenomena are somewhat quantifiable, however difficult may be the task. There are methods of estimating the number of people involved and the frequency of behavior, and then breaking this down according to age, sex, and other demographic factors. Out of this there may emerge a view of general trends.

The very real and difficult-to-grasp aspect of deviance is not so much in these areas of crime and noncriminal rule-breaking, nor in the realm of mental illness and stigmatized physical affliction, but rather in

¹⁶ If these should be the findings, the sociologist would seek to determine whether there was a relationship at work here or a coincidence. The point I am making, however, is that it is difficult to speak of increasing or decreasing deviance when so much is placed under that umbrella.

the proprieties, etiquette, niceties and amenities, acts of courtesy, civility, and even gallantry, and their gross violation (when they are not simply ignored) among members of a family, passing acquaintances, co-workers in office or shop, people standing at the same counter in a store, or strangers as they meet and pass on the streets, on subways, or in public buildings.

In this respect, one must rely on a feel for the land, on unstructured and sometimes casual observations, on personal experiences that one has had or been told about by others. Judged by such methods, the urban and industrial world seems to have brought together strangers with little or no sense of belonging to one another, people who come into rather close contact anonymously and with repressed if not overt hostility. When secularism removed the image of a supernatural deity looking over one's shoulder and watching omnisciently lest one do wrong and when geographic mobility brought together what proved to be unassimilable groups compelled to live side by side, not only as strangers but as outsiders to one another, this laid the groundwork for cities and entire lands of mutual suspicion and escalating antagonisms.

The image that Emile Durkheim had of society was one of internal harmony, where transgressors were ostracized, this purging process actually reinforcing the cohesion among those who remained. The modern world has little in common with this portrait. It is not one society that has cast out an unfortunate few but many subsocieties, strongly held together by intricate bonds of economic, political, military, and other forces, yet subsocieties in which people face one another as if separated by barbed-wire fences which no one will take the responsibility for having erected or the initiative for removing. Within these subgroups, there is a minimum of internal unity, except to the extent that the people must face other groups like, yet unlike, themselves. It is a world of conflict, but conflict that has little class unity, for it is based on ethnic, class, age, and other factors that do not lend themselves easily to categorization.

Dominant in American sociology at the turn of the century and for a short time thereafter was what has been called a small-town image of this nation, and no doubt an Anglo-American image as well. Whether at that time there were towns and hamlets where a few thousand people lived gracefully and graciously, without fear of one another, and far from the urban centers where immigrants were streaming into what they hoped would be a promised land, can be argued. It is not a world that has much relevance to the manner in which millions live in America in the 1970s.

Crime is rampant today, and with it the fear of crime and the belief in its ubiquity. It takes the form of crime on the streets and against

the homes of the poor, crime that in all likelihood is traceable to the highest officeholders of the land, that threatens people as they walk from their homes and go shopping or to work or to school, and that likewise threatens them (with perhaps greater consequences but lesser immediacy) as they go to the polls, only to learn that power-hungry forces will steal a nation rather than lose an election. But this is only one aspect of a larger scene: disunity, internal warfare, massive political corruption, universal cynicism, unending suspicion. In this regard, it would appear, in what must be an impressionistic and not a validatable statement, that the small, noncriminal, everyday situations about which people show anger, irritation, hostility, disapproval, fear, and suspicion are greatly on the increase. This raises the problem of whether there is a limit to the amount of deviance that a society can tolerate without itself being destroyed.

The great threat to America appears to me to be twofold: (1) that increase in crime and deviance may be causing a severe deterioration in the quality of life as Americans have known and lived it, particularly in everyday affairs;¹⁷ and (2) that it may eventually result in abandonment of the rights and liberties of the individual citizen, in order the better to combat the depredations of the deviant.

The first of these reactions seems already to have set in, particularly in the big cities. People are living in fear of one another. Children no longer skip rope and play hopscotch in a carefree manner on the streets, for when they are just barely of age to be able to wander alone, they are fair game for older children who rob and molest them, and then a few years later must be protected lest they be recruited for the same antisocial acts of which they had so recently been the victims. They are not safe in their schools, where once they feared no one but a teacher who, at worst, would inflict some corporal punishment, give them a failing grade, or send a note home to their parents. Today, they fear robbers and thieves, in some instances hostile teachers, children of other racial groups (where such go to school together); and if all this is overcome, there is still more than a remote possibility of disruption of the normal learning process by a strike, a school boycott, or profiteering that has resulted in a fuel shortage.

People are likely to be seduced into believing that the quality of life has not declined because they are surrounded by greater technological and, particularly, medical advances. Some of these advances, remarkable in their own right and as pure science, and even conceding their po-

¹⁷ But did Americans ever really know that quality of life, or is it a myth? Did the blacks know it, the immigrants, the Indians, the workers in mines and sweatshops, the exploited in company towns? Did the stigmatized and deviant know it? And, since the decline of the extended family, the aged?

tential for broadening the horizons of mankind and improving the lot of all, have thus far done nothing to aid man and may even have hindered his progress. Certainly the exploration of the moon has benefited only a favored few and has left the mass of American people all the more impoverished because of the misordered priorities to which they fell victim. Yet the steady and unilinear progress in the fields of medicine, the decline in the rate of infant mortality and the conquest of many diseases, together with the advent of television, air-conditioning, easy and rapid travel, computers that store and retrieve information in fractions of seconds—all this conceals, sometimes quite effectively, the fact that the carefree love of living is disappearing. There are beautiful parks, but men and women are afraid to use them; and when they are used, they are filled with individuals who glare at one another with suspicion or who litter with abandon, because there is no sense that the park belongs to the people, or the people belong to one another.

Even if the absolute standard of living were still going upward, which was certainly the trend for many decades, there would be grave doubt as to whether America was reaching out to give its people greater happiness and fulfillment, not from the government, but from one another and from the communities to which they belong.

Likewise one must look at the question of group relationships as well as individual and personal ones. The year 1954 marked the historic end of official apartheid in the United States. The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court—first enunciated in a school desegregation case, and then gradually applied to numerous other areas of public interaction—launched the great civil rights movement, with its significant commitment to the idea not only of equality but of amity. For a period of about a decade, or perhaps half again as long as that, racial antipathy fell into disrespectability.

It was not for long, however. The assassinations of the 1960s, the expediency that drove political leaders to woo a new breed of racists, the fears of old ethnic groups that they were being displaced in the middle-rung bureaucratic positions and offices that they had so long held (or had long aspired to reach but only recently attained) all gave rise to backlash. By the end of the 1960s, although the schools and professions were no longer closed to racial and ethnic minorities (and were being opened increasingly to women as well), the major ethnic groups in the United States faced each other across a chasm of suspicion and hatred as great as at any time since the era of Reconstruction. In the words of the Kerner Commission, America was moving once again toward becoming two societies, after moving slowly and

hesitantly but nonetheless unmistakably in the direction of becoming one society.

Here is both a cause and a manifestation of deviance and an instance of the decline of the quality of life that is hard to quantify. It can be argued that the suspicion on people's faces was always there, but the black people, cowed and frightened, were the only victims of this hostility. For them it was not new. It was only when the formerly unequal hostility took on mutuality, when two groups faced each other with visible antagonism rather than in a slave-master status, that the whites became aware of fear and began to complain. One can well accept this formulation, but it does not diminish this aspect of the deterioration of American life, nor does it point to a solution. For, central to the problem, to the realization uppermost in the minds of many people that one cannot walk or play without fear and suspicion, cannot buy milk or gasoline without feeling that the poor and middle classes are being further exploited because millionaires and top office-holders have been engaging in countless rip-offs, is the manner in which the variety of social classes, races, ethnic groups, age cohorts, and other collectivities see each other in the United States.

With the rise in crime and noncriminal deviance, with the decline in community even within races and the increase in hostility between the races, there is clamor for harsh measures to be taken to keep people in line. Punishments of various types are suggested, but it is possible that America has passed the point where it can create a police, judicial, and penological apparatus large enough to prevent crime and to apprehend and mete out justice to the criminal population. For political and other reasons, measures must be taken, or at least some façade of effort must be presented to the public. There is grave danger that a repressive governmental and police apparatus will evolve out of the conflict-laden criminal and deviant scene in the United States. It can be a quiescent response to the demand for order: a sort of neo-fascism, cloaked in the traditional roles of American institutions, with a two-party system and with democratic trimmings, but with severe restrictions on freedoms of speech, movement, expression, organization, and the like. It has already manifested itself in threats against the press and in calls for the reinstatement of capital punishment. Witness Watergate, the White House horrors, the confessed perjury, the enemies list, the excuses and justifications, the frightening similarity between the statements of those involved (they did it for their leader) and the defense, if it can be called that, of the bureaucrats of Nazi Germany.

Societies and civilizations (and they are not to be confused) do not

collapse from the burden of crime, immorality, or other aspects of deviance, Rome and Greece and some of their historians to the contrary notwithstanding. Whatever may have been the orgiastic expressions of the wealthy Romans, the Empire ceased to be viable for geographic, historic, and other reasons, not because of bacchanalian festivities of the rich and the lazy. When one asks how much a society can stand in the way of crime and deviance, the question is not whether the society will give way or the leadership will be forcibly overthrown, but what new modes of adjustment in the lives of the people will be necessary if such crime, immorality, and deviance continue.

America has evidently reached and surpassed the point where the growth of antisocial and generally disvalued activities can be ignored. To "turn the country around," to set it on a different course, would require an enormous moral commitment. For all of the arguments that many would cite—the failure to raise moral issues while relying on pragmatic ones in urging white Mississippians to accept the integration of the University of Mississippi, in the moral and military disaster of the Bay of Pigs, in the very consciously initiated beginnings of our involvement in the dirty war in Vietnam, in the horse-trading that resulted in a conservative Southerner being his running mate and eventually inheriting the Presidency—it appeared for a time as if John F. Kennedy would provide that moral leadership. He was no modern-day Moses, and his New Frontier was hardly a new Decalogue, yet his people were deeply ensnared in a morass out of which he might have led them. Other men and movements were equally significant, and the name of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., would be foremost among them.

But much has happened since then, and moral leadership is something that exists only as a memory or in a vacuum. Instead, there was a history of assassinations. There followed the betrayal of the civil rights struggle and the nominations for the Supreme Court of men who, to large numbers of Americans, appeared to be racists, throwbacks to this country's own Neanderthal age. Racial animosity was concomitant with a decade or more of the most unpopular war in history, one that had no moral or legal bases in the eyes of many citizens, in which some refused to recognize as "the enemy" the targets of American bombs, bullets, and rockets, and during the course of which several prominent and highly respected people expressed their hope that this "enemy" would be victorious.

Scandal has rocked the highest offices of the American government and the leading parties that vie for that office. This is not new in the United States, for scandals have been rampant before, and cynically

enough, most people seem to believe that they will occur again in the future. But as Cabinet members, White House aides, and others were named and seemed incapable of exculpating themselves before the press and the public, and as this came into millions of homes, via newspapers, radios, the schools, and the overwhelmingly more powerful medium of television, the American society appeared to have reached a nadir of confidence. The message seemed to be "Everyone has his hustle." How can one expect the youth on the street to have respect for property and for morality when there was no such respect coming from those in the highest offices or among aides, advisors, and other men of power close to them?

One can say that the diminution of crime and deviance requires a great new moral crusade: not against marijuana smokers or those who wear their hair in styles that others oppose, not a moral crusade for motherhood and family, not the indignation of those who themselves steal and are responsible for killings. It would be a new crusade for the poor, the oppressed, the dispossessed, an effort to infuse people with a sense of love and peace for others unlike themselves, in their own country and elsewhere.

Such a crusade would require a great charismatic figure, one who might combine the characteristics of a Kennedy with those of a King, to launch and lead it. Since this hardly seems likely, one can only expect an increase in crime and deviance, repressive but inadequate measures, sharpening of conflicts, and great hostilities, out of which some concessions will be gained, which will lead to temporary abatements followed by escalation of the hostility. In this, all Americans will be the victims: those who commit depredations against others as well as those upon whom these transgressions are committed. In the immortal words of John Donne, "never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee."

Perhaps, therefore, we can all do a little more to accept others and to understand them, to know why they behave the way they do, to see the world as they see it; and then, having done this, to spread the word of what has been accomplished, like a new gospel. If people can help others to refrain from doing that which is harmful, if they can learn from one another to do this, then the good word can spread to those who have to be taught. Trust, like suspicion, can be self-perpetuating, cyclical in its growth.

But have no illusions. To come to grips with the problems of crime and deviance, major changes in social institutions and social structures are needed. In the meantime, while working toward that end, hope can be nourished by confidence that there is an element of goodness

and potential for change in everyone; it is to the development of this goodness, in oneself and in others, that each person can contribute, no matter in how miniscule a manner.

Dissensus and Diversity

DEVIANCE HAS been associated with conflict, not merely in the narrow sense that people bringing different cultural norms to their everyday activities will be differentially defined in a negative manner by one another, but in the sense that all deviant behavior is an expression of conflicting individual and group interests in a society. In another sense, however, the deviating persons and collectivities, whose behavior, statuses, appearances, and very existence (or at least their essence) are out of harmony with others', may be located on a continuum ranging from dissensus to diversity.

Deviance is a form and manifestation of diversity, but not the only form, not a necessary one, and not the most desirable or gratifying from the standpoint of the contribution that diversity can and should make to social life. If people were not unlike one another, if they did not have different life-styles and dissimilar ways of approaching their problems, if they were biologically and psychologically as well as socially more or less uniform, there would be no such thing as deviance. Rules would be there, they would be obeyed, and if their obedience were well-nigh unanimous and required little or no social pressure but just normal education in the form of socialization, people would be unaware that the rules existed, much as linguistic rules are followed although it takes a linguist to discover them.

No human society fits such a model, but there are some that are closer to it than others. Small and primitive groups have a natural cohesion of their own; agricultural societies, where farmers and their families till the land and wander little from the sites where they were born, have less diversity than industrial ones, with their urban centers and rapid geographic mobility. Tradition-bound societies, whether the tradition derives from religion or from strong families and clans, have greater unity between the generations, and the less technologically ad-

vanced nations display such unity more than the highly scientific ones. A society with ethnic and linguistic homogeneity has less diversity in behavior patterns than one that is in these respects essentially heterogeneous. A totalitarian regime can impose restrictions on cultural diversity that a democratic society cannot.

As this list is extended, one can see that the Western world, and particularly the United States of America in the latter years of the twentieth century, would not be expected to constitute a cohesive and unified sector of the planet earth. Probably more than any other nation, the United States fails to meet any of the requirements for social cohesion: It is industrialized, secular, not tradition-bound, is ethnically and racially extremely heterogeneous (and, to a slight extent, linguistically as well), is advancing technologically at a very rapid rate, and offers through its Constitution and democratic processes, an opportunity for the propagation of diverse ideas.

A nation, or even a group within a nation, is often unified by an external enemy, real or imagined, sometimes artificially created in the manner that is known as scapegoating; and, under such conditions, the deviance within the group that feels itself threatened usually tends to diminish. It would appear that, whatever internal or external enemies America may have, in the form of powers with giant ICBMs and atomic weapons, or in the form of subversives who oppose the American form of government and might even have foreign alliances (similar, one can say, to the alliances that the CIA allegedly makes with citizens in many lands), there is not a pervasive feeling in the United States of such an immediate menace.

In a classic sociological statement, William Graham Sumner spoke of outgroup attack creating ingroup cohesion. Enemies, in this sense, are "useful" to a country, particularly if they are strong enough to create the feeling of a threat and the unity that ensues therefrom, but insufficiently strong as actually to constitute such a threat. When internal opponents can be labeled subversives and linked with external enemies, the bulk of the population of a nation may emerge unified, and by labeling a small group deviant, the phenomenon of deviance is controlled and diminished in the larger society.¹⁸

It is not only the political policies and alignments that have failed

¹⁸ For an example of this, see Kai Erikson's *Wayward Puritans* (1966), an account of Salem witchcraft trials. On the other hand, the effort to place the label of enemy on opponents of the American war effort in Vietnam (some of whom supported Hanoi and the Vietcong) proved divisive and not unifying to the country, probably because of the broad base of the antiwar forces, the sophistication of their arguments, their professional and intellectual leadership, and the compelling force of their attacks on the legitimacy and morality of the war. As a result, the Vietnam episode in American history was deviance-generating.

to unify America and have created a disunited land in which people have little sense of loyalty or obligation to one another, but the economy of the nation has contributed toward the same end. Industrialization has attracted families to travel long distances and resettle where the job markets are favorable, and a network of transportation facilities have made possible this geographic mobility. As a result, America is what Vance Packard (1972) has called "a nation of strangers," in which the neighborhood and the neighborliness, the sense of community, has almost completely dissolved.

The ethnic heterogeneity of America, which has served to prevent the formation of a unified culture, is severe in many respects: It is visible, it has roots in a culture that believed (and still has need to believe) in a concept of racial inferiority, it has never faced the crimes of its own past, and unlike the heterogeneous populations of such countries as Belgium, Holland, or Switzerland, for example, the various peoples are not located in separate parts of the country. They work together, use the same streets, subways, and buses, sometimes live near one another but more often in areas separated by informal and illegal agreements of an exclusionary nature. They do not reside exactly as neighbors, but they are within a stone's throw of one another, and if the stones are handy, deadlier weapons are even more so. Whereas in the Soviet Union there is a Georgian section of the country, a Ukrainian, and many others, in the United States a single city may be the residence and place of work for large numbers of Irish-Americans, Italian-Americans, Protestants, Catholics, Jews, whites, blacks, English- and Spanish-speaking, and other groups.

Diversity is thus built into America even more than in other countries, and it is probably on the increase in most other countries of the world as well. People come with dissimilar cultural backgrounds and ways of looking at the world: the youth and their elders, the higher educated and the less educated, the professionals and the factory workers, the rich and the poor, those in the seats of power and the powerless, the small-towner and the highly urban, as well as the ethnically diverse.

Diversity, however, is not deviance. It suggests a world in which people follow different patterns, not merely with mutual tolerance, but with mutual acceptance. In the language of the youth of the sixties, "That's his thing, what's it to me?" Or, to use a colorful expression from a previous era, "It don't make me no never mind." Diversity suggests that the land is big enough to embrace atheists and churchgoers, those who wish to marry within the ancestry that they can trace for generations back and those who intermarry, people who live in communes and walk barefoot when weather permits and those who

go to their jobs attired in the apparel of Madison Avenue's latest dictates. Diversity demands that there may be many political parties and cultural avenues and that they clash in the marketplace of ideas, come into sharp conflict where they compete for adherents, and not merely tolerate the expressions from one another but accept such expressions as right, necessary, and good. Such a policy, however, if carried out with logic and precision, would meet self-contradictory obstacles. For some of the competing outlooks preach the suppression of others as their own philosophical creed, and others preach exclusion of the rights of some people from full participation in the diversity that tolerates and encourages them.

Not everyone has to be the same. Nor is it either possible or good for a society that all be the same, for it is out of differentness that new ideas arise and a society moves toward the better solution of many of the urgent problems that beset it. But the problem of distinguishing between antisocial action, tolerable differentness, and necessary diversity is a major one in the study of deviance.

Some people are left-handed; most use their right hands for writing and various other activities in which one limb is favored over the other. Certainly the suppression of left-handedness, whether by teachers, parents, or others, accomplished no good and did a great deal of harm, although it is easy to imagine that at a certain state of ignorance of physiology, people thought of themselves as doing good by imposing the "normal" way on the "sinister" child. And it is very easy to imagine a family, in a society deeply rooted in superstition, believing that the evils that befell it (as evils befall many families) were due to the left-handed child.

So that the world makes progress, and left-handedness is divested of its stigma, ceases to be in any sense deviant, and is no longer subject to formal or informal punishment, although children may still receive a bit of persuasion from parents in the early, formative years. Left-handedness goes beyond tolerance. It is accepted. But it is neither encouraged nor discouraged. It is just a fact of life, irrelevant to most others. However, as one of the elements of diversity in a population, it can best be seen in terms of value neutrality: It is neither a contributor to the well-being of the people that arises out of the diverse strands, nor is it a threat to that well-being that arises out of interference with the life of oneself or others. At worst, it is a small inconvenience.

In this example, diversity is reduced almost to meaninglessness, at least from the social viewpoint. In the words of social scientists (I cannot trace the citation, but I think it was an expression of Kurt Lewin), it is a difference that makes no difference. Such deviations

from the statistical norm are not difficult to accept, although the history of human society is filled with examples where they have met enormous resistance. If human beings could be logical and rational, divest themselves of the burdens of history, tradition, mythology, and prejudice, they could see that eye color is as irrelevant to social good or evil as right- and left-handedness, and the same is true of hair color and skin color.

If people want to write with the left hand, that's their thing, and if they have red hair while most others have black, brown, blond, or gray, that's about as important as whether they wear a size 6 glove or size 7, or no gloves at all. But the danger here is that one uses the "just as" fallacy, easily slipping into an illogical analogy: *just as* some people are right-handed and some are left-handed, *just as* some are red-headed and others are brunette, quite obviously with no ill effects, so some people smoke Camels and others smoke opium, and the minority prefer sex with people of their own gender while the majority do not. And on and on one can go, using the argument of diversity. I would suggest that the argument is valid only when the following criteria are met:

1. if the social acceptance of the persons, their proclivities and predilections, is unlikely to result in an increase in the particular attribute or characteristic; or if the attribute itself, under conditions of social acceptance, is likely to prove as fulfilling to the life structure of all those involved as an alternative path; *and*
2. if all those who do become involved do so in a manner that does not interfere with the major goals the society must pursue if it is to survive and to provide its members with their essential needs.

Certainly people are not born to be opium smokers. This is a learned habit, and its acceptance by society is likely to alleviate some of the suffering caused by its repression, but it is also likely to serve to recruit large numbers of new people into that way of life. It is an empirical question subject to individual study whether such recruitment will result in lesser life chances under conditions of such social acceptance. The "just as" argument should not be used in a facile manner, without full consideration of the consequences resulting from a particular type of socially disapproved behavior, when these consequences would be present, presumably at least, if the disapproval were to be lifted. It would appear to me, for example, that polygamy, adultery, forcible rape, prostitution, homosexuality, incest, child-adult sexual relations, sadomasochism, and involvement in hard-core pornography are all learned forms of behavior, that they would probably all increase with

social approval (although some, such as adultery, would increase much more than others, such as incest), and that they are all inimical either to the family as an ongoing and necessary institution for society, or to human fulfillment for the participants—each, however, to a different extent, in an entirely different manner, and with different consequences.

Yet, some of these forms of sexual behavior require official as well as unofficial action, others call for persuasion and compassion, perhaps for education and socialization processes that will discourage them, and others might best be handled by what Edwin Schur (1973) has called “radical nonintervention.” This would suggest that the deviance is neither irrelevant to the social order nor socially useful, but that it should be understood, discouraged, and in some instances tolerated. Tolerance would mean that the individual would be judged as a person as good as any other, but that his behavior or attribute would not receive such a positive judgment. In bringing forth this social policy, I suggest that an analogy can be useful, even though I hesitate to draw one so soon after warning of the pitfalls of analogic thinking. Blindness and deafness are undesirable, but the blind and the deaf are not undesirables. In that sense, and along similar lines, I would suggest that people who commit acts of prostitution, adultery, and homosexuality are not undesirable *persons*, but that their ways of behavior can profitably and without contradiction be evaluated as undesirable.

There are two major problems that arise from such an analogy. First, in the instance of physical disabilities, there is no possibility that these are learned forms of behavior and hence that changes in social attitudes will increase their incidence.¹⁹ In sexual activities, as in many other forms of deviance and crime, people are presumably responsible for their acts, and to a limited extent at least they have chosen to develop and maintain the attributes in question. For those afflicted with physical ailments, the opposite holds: They are not responsible for their characteristics, did not choose them, and would not continue them had they a choice. This appears to the public to justify, in one instance, seeing both the people and the attribute as undesirable, and in the other, separating the two.

On a second level, interrelated with the first, deafness and blindness do not “require” discouragement. They are intrinsically seen as “bad,” not in the sense of evil or sinful, but in the sense of unfortunate. It is not good to be blind, and in that sense it is bad. All that is required is to discourage the attitude of stigmatization against the people, alleviate any shame or guilt, educate people to see the absurdity of being more

¹⁹ Except that people with impaired sight or hearing might learn to be treated and to look upon themselves as blind or deaf, respectively, and with unfortunate consequences, as Robert Scott (1969) has shown in the case of the blind.

ashamed of blindness than one would be of a toothache, and seek mechanisms for the most fulfilling interaction between the blind and the sighted.

There are, of course, physical conditions that generate a great deal of shame and enormous guilt, even though this is irrational in that there is no sense of responsibility. The limiting example is probably leprosy, but almost any condition that is either visible or contagious will to some extent generate fear, awkwardness, isolation, and with these responses some guilt and shame. When the condition is contracted by a moral lapse (such as the venereal diseases), the shame one is compelled to carry becomes a badge to remind people that the diseased person is a sinner, and hence there is a very special stigma attached. In addition to the element of contagion, there is a restoration of the idea of responsibility. The affliction could and should have been avoided, it is contended.

Occasionally, there have been efforts to approach certain forms of deviant behavior as warranting compassion without approval. An instance occurred when a prominent and well-liked athlete was accused of exhibitionism in front of children.²⁰ The behavior was not condoned, nor was the athlete condemned. "He has a problem," people said, and the man said it himself. If some snickered, this was behind the scenes, as if their snickering were itself something to conceal, a sign of their own failing. It is true, of course, that if people stopped looking upon exhibitionism as evil, the consequences of the act would be entirely different, but this does not mean that the consequences would be beneficial to individuals so motivated or to society as a whole.

Diversity can be a neutral factor or it can be helpful to society. It can also be tolerable and discourageable, or can go beyond the limits of tolerance. This last instance applies particularly to predatory acts, which require more than disapproval and discouragement; they demand social condemnation, containment, and repression. But do they at the same time add to the diversity and make a contribution to the ongoing society? Not in such manner that the result is worth the game; not in a way that cannot be accomplished with less suffering and victimization.

A society of same-thinking and same-acting persons (even allowing for role differentiations) would be not only unthinkable but also stag-

²⁰ The celebrity status often offers an opportunity for breaking down a particular prejudice. The deviant is sometimes handled with kindness because there is a big financial investment in him, and protection of profits demands protection of the individual. Sometimes, however, the celebrity is treated with special severity. This has been attributed by some to middle-class indignation, but I think it may be that district attorneys and others in power find the spotlight too strong for the type of treatment that would be accorded had the accused been only mildly influential.

nant and unlivable. It is sometimes delineated in utopian fiction, but life in these imaginary worlds is ultimately an awful bore. Conflicts of taste, ways of behaving, life-styles, philosophies, views of the world—all contribute to the emotional and intellectual excitement of living. But there is a limit to the type of diversity that can be permitted.

Societies may not be able to attain a world without homicide (the phenomenon, however, can be reduced), but a world without murderers would not suffer from the stagnant sameness of a drab utopia. The problem is to determine whether the differentness contributed to life by religious and anti-religious fanatics, racial and ethnic nationalists and assimilationists, sexual-freedom advocates and puritans, among many others, outweighs the harm that may be generated by wrong ideas and violent or other antisocial acts. The traditional civil-liberties view has been that wrong ideas should be intellectually combatted, not suppressed, and in the end they will not prevail. It is a nice thought to have in one's mind as the head rests on the pillow at the start of a peaceful night of sleep.

In the end, when people accept a deviant mode and incorporate it into the world of diversity (as was done by a considerable portion of the American public in the decades following World War II—with divorce, premarital cohabitation, use of once-tabooed words, and changes in appearance), they are broadening the horizons of diversity and narrowing those of deviance. Not all deviant acts lend themselves to this type of social change, but the more that can be transformed in such manner, the greater will be the potential for dynamic diversity, and the less the oppression imposed on those who, being different, had been labeled deviant.

Who Are the Deviants, Anyway?

THIS BOOK started by posing the question of who are the deviants, and it ends with the same question, but from another perspective. In an article in a leading sociological journal, Alexander

Liazos (1972) takes his colleagues to task for what he terms the poverty of the sociology of deviance. He attributes to sociologists not only a pejorative attitude toward the people under study—as exemplified by the fact that students of deviance speak of the course as one in which they are looking at “nuts, sluts, and preverts”—but of failing to study the real deviants of the society: those who escalate an undeclared war to the point where tens of thousands of innocent people are killed, who foster race hatred, and who live on the exploitation of their fellows. Sociologists, it is charged, by studying the people that they do, fall into the same trap as others who are co-opted by the establishment. They become agents of the ruthless and barbaric regimes which they should be the most vehement in criticizing.

A further contribution to rethinking in the area of the sociology of deviance was made by Alex Thio (1973), who charges that a social-class bias pervades the field. To the layman, and even to students who are becoming acquainted with the discipline, this will appear to be a curious indictment, for their vision of sociologists is that they are reformers if not revolutionaries and are almost always critical of the powers that be and the way things are. But Thio rejects this view:

The sociologists of deviance may be said to tacitly support the power elite because both their research and analysis imply that the powerful are not only morally superior but should not be held responsible for *causing* deviance within their society. [Italics in original.]

To some extent, Thio's position follows from his definition of deviance as “conduct that is in violation of rules made largely by the power elite of a given society or group,” to which he adds that “the most important component in this definition is the concept of a power elite.” He notes that powerful persons will see themselves as respectable and not deviant when they engage in political bribery and deception or unconstitutionally wage wars. A powerless person, on the other hand, sees himself as potentially deviant, which leads him “to commit acts of deviance (such as homicide, robbery, and so-called ‘street crimes’) that he himself is likely to define as deviant.”

At first glance, it appears that this is misplaced polemic. The study of deviants, as was pointed out in the opening pages of this book, involves no evaluation on the part of scholar or student. It is not a study of people who are, in the opinion of sociologists, “nuts and sluts,” but of people so considered by the society in which they are functioning. Just as an evaluation of the norms of a society does not place the scholar in the position of approving of those norms (in fact, he often disapproves of them, and strongly), so a study of those who are rejected by a society does not imply that one approves of excommuni-

cation, but simply that one wishes to understand the people, the process, and the social structure in which it is taking place.

However, there is something to be said for the charges of Liazos and Thio; namely, that the students of deviant behavior, those seeking to conceptualize, understand, and explain phases of life that come under that rubric, have failed to go beyond the effort to comprehend why some people have been cast out.²¹ They have never tackled the problem of why—from the vantage point of sociologist and social thinker—those who commit untold evil are not seen as deviant at all. The closest to such an approach, Liazos remarks, is the study by Everett Hughes (1962) on the “good people” who closed their eyes to the crimes taking place around them in Nazi Germany.²²

Criminologists, unlike students of deviance, have not been equally remiss in their own field. Edwin Sutherland (1940) was almost single-handedly responsible (and with great opposition, at that) for attempting to redefine crime in the minds of the American people, so that they would see respectable people as criminals when they violate laws. The concept of white-collar crime was an effort at just such a redefinition. If there is going to be a generalized notion called crime, it is only bias on the part of a ruling, owning, and managerial class that prevents certain people who breaks laws from being labeled criminals.

Later, the problem of a “higher law” was brought to the attention of the entire world through the Nuremberg trials. But what was involved here was in the first instance unconditional surrender, complete victory of one side over the other; second, many national and international political events, which made it advantageous to pursue such a course; and finally, again it was people of one society passing judgment on those of another.

The white-collar crimes that Sutherland pinpointed were acts mainly against property or against governmental agencies, and sometimes against workers, consumers, and their organizations. For Sutherland, the latter were improperly exploited and victimized, and only the fact that the transgressors were in the same social class as the holders of power prevented their frequent and regular prosecution. In Nuremberg, by contrast, the acts were declared to be *mala in se*: They were evils in themselves of such enormity that they must be punished even

²¹ Actually, sociologists have not even gone this far. They have asked why people disobey rules and incite hostility and have examined the effects of rejection, but little attention has been paid to the motivations of the rejectors.

²² Note that Hughes had to go to a foreign country to locate such a phenomenon; he could not find it in his own land. It is to be hoped that sociologists will pose such questions about American lynch mobs, the slayers of students at Kent State, the architects of the White House horrors, and those responsible for the holocaust in Vietnam.

though they were not against any laws then extant. In fact, it was the greatest indictment of the leadership of Germany and its body politic that these acts had not been outlawed.

It is, then, a proper area for investigation in the sociology of deviance to note the patterns of behavior of those who act in accordance with normative standards but in ways that social thinkers, activists, philosophers, and humanitarians must deplore, and then to study the nature of a society that permits and sponsors such acts without declaring them to be deviant. If deviance is to be defined in terms of the societal response of hostility, anger, and indignation, then the failure to elicit such response when basic human principles demand it ought to shed a great deal of light on the study of a social body.

THE FUTURE OF A SUBDISCIPLINE

Following the suggestion of Liazos, one might say, then, that much can be learned about a society not only by noting who the deviants are, but also adding the usually overlooked corollary—who are not. All societies protect themselves or their members from individual depredations of an unauthorized nature against persons and property. There is a common element not only so far as the definition and location of criminals are concerned, some of the extreme labelists and relativists notwithstanding, but also so far as upholding morality, particularly of a sexual nature. America's definition of deviants would easily disclose to an observer that this is a multigroup heterogeneous society, with little sense of community, but with an overall value system that supports private property and a family-oriented sexuality.

The men who are responsible for war and wanton destruction in a society can never be the deviants, for if they were largely disvalued, if they were reacted to by large numbers of the people with hatred and indignation, then they could not remain in power, except as a purely military dictatorship. Arrogant ethnocentrism is present in all societies, and if sophistication has made it a little difficult to defend the concept of "my country, right or wrong," this is nevertheless a prevailing philosophy. It is a world of nationalism and patriotism, but the view of humanity from the vantage point of one's own national group is not something unique to the United States; it occurs in primitive societies and highly technological ones, in little known and weak lands as well as large world powers.

Few people, except the victims and some "radicals" and "crackpots," saw slaveholders as evil persons; few rose up to denounce them and then to denounce those who defended them; few saw them as the deviants of their day. It was simple for people to express indignation

against the Nazis in Germany, so long as the angry voices were those of victims or of nationals in other countries. Sociologists writing in Germany in the 1930s would not have been able to describe the leaders of that nation as evil, even had they been legally permitted to do so. For the most significant thing that can be said about valued and disvalued behavior during that period is that the men and women who embodied and epitomized evil were those against whom the population did not express any anger, indignation, or scorn.

To be capable of looking upon one's own country and one's own era with the objectivity available for looking at another land or with the retrospective wisdom of history is not a gift given to man. If he makes such an effort and does not fall victim to nationalist and patriotic ethnocentrism, he is likely to do the very opposite and react, almost in self-hatred, against everything that is done by his own leaders and in his name. But the free flow of ideas, particularly in the academic and scholarly marketplace, and the expression of conflicting views of the world derived from the heterogeneous society offer the possibility of just such a critique.

When seen from this perspective, one can say that American society betrayed its alleged principles, betrayed the ideals for which it claimed to stand, in the decade of the 1960s, when an essentially powerless but vocal minority pointed to the illegal and immoral war with strong denunciation. It was only with the disclosures about My Lai and the gnawing and recurrent suggestions that similar crimes had occurred during the entire Indochinese conflict, that American conscience arose in strong indignation—but the indignation was as great against those responsible for the disclosures as against those responsible for the atrocities. Vietnam was a decade of just such events.

Large numbers of social critics contend that America is a country that has gone astray with its priorities, where the people scorn the poor who receive aid from a rich government (where "welfare" has become a dirty word) while those who enrich themselves at the expense of the poor are glorified. It is a country where it is more deviant to stand for integration and equality of the races than to whip up angry mobs to prevent the building of homes that will achieve that integration. The heroes and their opponents of the 1950s and early 1960s were on two sides of an historic conflict: those who stood in the door against the onslaught of progress and those who marched, shouted, fought, and went to jail to achieve integration and equality. Each was deviant in the eyes of the other.

By the time the decade of the sixties had become history, the lines had become blurred. It was no longer respectable to speak against equality and integration; one now had to speak in self-righteous tones,

as did the President of the United States, against "busing solely for the purpose of achieving racial balance"—although busing for all other purposes, such as avoiding racial balance and perpetuating inequality, was not denounced. Code words took the place of outright bigotry, for the latter had fallen into intellectual and moral disrepute. But bigotry continued nonetheless and was probably a major issue in national and local elections. The moral barricades of 1963 had become fluid, and no great crusade or commitment could be found among large numbers of white Americans dedicated to racial equality. Some were taking shelter behind the respectability of facile sloganeering, others were now neutral and on the sidelines, discouraged by a struggle that had lost its momentum.

Who are *not* the deviants in America? The question is seldom posed, but it requires an answer. Historically, the slave-owners and the entrenched racists whose ideology dominated American intellectual life, including early American sociology—these people were never deviants; they were heroes. Those who expressed disdain for the waves of immigrants who came to these shores, who labeled these people deviant because they spoke other languages and were poverty-stricken, who called them greaseballs, greenhorns, micks, kikes, wops, and polacks—these people were never the deviants. They were the makers of American history. And then there were the builders of American industry, robber barons, ruthless swindlers of the nineteenth century, owners of company towns, exploiters of laborers, men who hired company spies, *agents provocateurs*, and often their gunmen—these people were not the deviants. No, they were sometimes criticized, but only in gentle terms, and more often glorified, while their children and grandchildren gained respectability as inheritors of fortunes, patrons of art about which they were ignorant, philanthropists who gave away a small amount of the money inherited from those who had stolen it, and diplomatic and political figures of power.

Who were the deviants? Were they the military men, the early American adventurers and racists and imperialists, who ran roughshod over American Indian villages, wrote treaties that were ignored, assumed the "white man's burden," forcibly annexed portions of Mexico, fomented revolutions in Latin America that would be favorable to American industrial and military designs, suppressed insurgent movements in these and other countries, and committed atrocities against the natives of the Philippines and elsewhere? Obviously not. These were the heroes of their times, and if revisionist historians are beginning to see them in a light somewhat different from the way they were portrayed in civics classes for elementary school pupils, they are still not seen as evil actors to this day.

Even the American Civil War, in which arms were taken up against the government in Washington, and in which enormous suffering was inflicted in an effort to overthrow that government, did not result in the historic denunciation of those responsible for such action. After a short period, general amnesty was granted to those who had fought against the Union and for the victory of the Confederacy; many of the leaders of the rebellion once again became national heroes, the song of the Confederacy was played, and America turned its full fury, its unbridled indignation, against those for whom that war supposedly had been fought. The freedmen of the South and their black brothers in the North became the pariahs, while those who had enslaved them, had held their women in concubinage when the latter were not literally raped, had forcibly removed children from the arms of their mothers, and who were now tricking, betraying, and disfranchising these people, when they were not massacring and lynching them—these became the heroes.

So that it should not be surprising, although it is important, that a century later the men who betrayed the civil rights commitment of the 1960s became heroes in America, and only a few war-weary people would seek to place the label of deviant on those responsible for the adventure in Vietnam, its initiation, justification, continuation, and inglorious finale.

But is this a balanced portrait of American history and American society? It is not, nor is it meant to be. It says nothing of a criminal-justice philosophy which, defects notwithstanding, has contributed remarkably to the concept of a fair and open trial and to the rights of the accused. It ignores the great effort to make education possible for an entire population and leaves equally unarticulated anything about an open class system that has more fluidity than exists in any other major country of the world. It is not a portrait of America that I am drawing but a statement about deviants and deviance that I am making, and what I have been emphasizing here is that there are many heroes in America who ought logically to be denounced by right-thinking and freedom-loving men and women.

It is quite proper that sociologists should study the phenomenon of socially disapproved people, and this is in and of itself a value-free pursuit. To say that alcoholics or unmarried mothers are deviant (if one does say this) is not to say that the sociologist disapproves in any way of these people, for he may or may not; it is merely to state that, as he sees the society he is describing, these people are disapproved. However, it appears to be a further duty not to stop there, but to point out that many of the most evil acts perpetrated in the society, and in almost any society for that matter, are committed with impunity, are seldom

disapproved, and in fact that this must be, for they are the deliberate and significant works of the men in power.

Sociologists are derelict in their duty if, in the study of deviant people, they do not point specifically to those who should, by moral and logical standards, be so labeled but are not. This is the dark figure of deviance, similar to unreported crime. But it is known to us (the victims), and it should be known to us (the sociologists). It may well be the next stage in the development of the sociology of deviant behavior to examine this dark underside and to determine the nature of a society that not only labels some people deviant but fails to place that label on others who are much more deserving of it.

REFERENCES

- Bensman, Joseph, and Israel Gerver (1963). "Crime and punishment in the factory: The function of deviancy in maintaining the social system," *American Sociological Review* 28:588-98.
- Devlin, Patrick (1965). *The Enforcement of Morals*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Durkheim, Emile (1893). *De la division du travail social*; translated by George Simpson, *The Division of Labor in Society*. New York: Macmillan, 1933; New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.
- Duster, Troy (1970). *The Legislation of Morality: Law, Drugs, and Moral Judgment*. New York: Free Press.
- Erikson, Kai T. (1966). *Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Hart, H. L. A. (1963). *Law, Liberty, and Morality*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Hausner, Gideon (1966). *Justice in Jerusalem*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Hoffman, Martin (1968). *The Gay World: Male Homosexuality and the Social Creation of Evil*. New York: Basic Books.
- Hooker, Evelyn (1972). Final Report of Task Force on Homosexuality, in Joseph A. McCaffrey, ed., *The Homosexual Dialectic*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Hughes, Everett C. (1962). "Good people and dirty work," *Social Problems* 10:3-11.
- Kadish, Sanford (1967). "The crisis of overcriminalization," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 374 (November):157-70.
- Kittrie, Nicholas N. (1971). *The Right to Be Different: Deviance and Enforced Therapy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Liazos, Alexander (1972). "The poverty of the sociology of deviance: Nuts, sluts, and preverts," *Social Problems* 20:103-20.
- Lindesmith, Alfred R. (1965). *The Addict and the Law*. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press.

- Packard, Vance (1972). *A Nation of Strangers*. New York: McKay.
- Phillipson, Michael (1971). *Sociological Aspects of Crime and Delinquency*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Schur, Edwin M. (1965). *Crimes Without Victims: Deviant Behavior and Public Policy—Abortion, Homosexuality and Drug Addiction*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965.
- (1973). *Radical Nonintervention: Rethinking the Delinquency Problem*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Scott, Robert A. (1969). *The Making of Blind Men*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Sutherland, Edwin (1940). "White-collar criminality," *American Sociological Review* 5:1-12.
- Szasz, Thomas S. (1965). *Psychiatric Justice*. New York: Macmillan.
- Thio, Alex (1973). "Class bias in the sociology of deviance," *American Sociologist* 8:1-12.

Acknowledgments

THE FIRST debt that I should like to acknowledge is to those scholars with whose viewpoints and perspectives I have taken sharp issue. In social science, as in science generally, the conflict between apparently irreconcilable presentations, whether of data, theories, or even ideologies, can only serve to advance a field of study and assist those involved in it. No one has inspired me as much as those with whom I disagreed, and that I am not alone in reaching such a conclusion is attested to by the large body of literature, often argumentative and polemical, on such approaches to deviance as the biological, the Marxist, and the labeling.

Fortunately, I have received assistance from others, without whose contributions this work would have been impoverished. Arnold Birenbaum, whose studies in the sociology of medicine, mental retardation, and disability do not begin to reflect his remarkably wide range of interests and grasp of complexities of human behavior, wrote a section entitled "The Disabled as Involuntary Deviants," which I have used with only minor revisions and adaptations. Andrew Karmen, a former student who became a colleague, and who brings to radical sociology profundity, commitment, and integrity, wrote an essay on Marxism and deviance that strongly influenced my own chapter on conflict theory. However, this is one of those instances where the author must emphasize that he alone takes responsibility for the printed version and does not impute any shortcomings to the ones who aided him. While Karmen's work was of inestimable value to me, I fear that I have departed so much from it that the reader should be warned that it is mine, not his, and that he would want such a warning.

The manuscript, in whole or in part, has been read by many friends and colleagues. I got more suggestions from them than I had bargained for and enough ideas to fill another book of this size, with a plentitude of material left over. I can say no more than to name them and express my thanks. In addition to Arnold Birenbaum, they are: Robert J. Kelly of Brooklyn College; Mark Sulcov of Baruch College; Charles Winick of City College; and John Bauer of Baruch

(all of whom except Bauer read the entire manuscript). Now, you would have to know these five people to realize the dilemmas that their suggestions presented to me. Kelly is a young sociologist deeply entrenched in philosophy who thinks and writes on as abstract a level as one is likely to encounter; Sulcov is a former student of mine who received his doctorate at Indiana University, from which he emerged wedded to labeling perspectives and to ethnomethodology; Bauer, a professor of psychology and a practicing psychotherapist, is (if I understand him correctly) one of the fast-disappearing adherents of an almost orthodox Freudianism; and Winick is one of those rare individuals equally at home in psychology and sociology; and then there is Birenbaum, about whom I have already said a few words. If ever an author is tempted to pass a manuscript around to a group of friends and colleagues as many-faceted in their interests and orientations as these readers, he should be willing to spend as much time rewriting as he did in the preparation of the original version.

There are many who influence a writer other than those who read his unpublished work. A person would have to start with Plato, or perhaps the Pentateuch. But leaving unacknowledged but not unappreciated those whose writings have helped shape my thought, and focusing only on the person-to-person contact with teachers, friends, and colleagues, I should like to express my gratitude to Robert Bierstedt, H. Laurence Ross, Dennis Wrong, and the late Erwin Smigel, among other professors whom I met at New York University; to Martin Landau and the late Gerald Henderson, among others at Brooklyn College; to Donal E. J. MacNamara of John Jay College and Joseph Bensman of City College; and to Simon Dinitz, Gerhard Mueller, Harry Allen, Bruno Cormier, Marvin E. Wolfgang, and many other colleagues with whom I have been associated in the American Society of Criminology.

Some of this work has appeared elsewhere, usually in much more detail and in another context; I have summarized and abridged such material and adapted it for use here. The material on the conceptualization of deviants as minorities appeared in a somewhat different form as the introductory chapter of my book *The Other Minorities*. The section dealing with organizations of deviants is an adaptation of an article that was first published in *Criminologica*, although I should like to admit, this being the place for confessionals, that I used a similar theme for an essay in *Salmagundi*, and then in an expanded form it was the subject of my book *Odd Man In*. Some of the material on ethics is to be found in an article that appeared in *Social Problems*, which in turn was an adaptation of an address co-authored by Andrew Karmen and myself and delivered by him before the American Human-

ist Psychological Association. The material on ideology is adapted from a paper published in *The Journal of Sex Research*, and that in turn was an adaptation of a paper delivered to the New Jersey Psychological Association.

Something that has annoyed me in the past has been the expression of gratitude toward an editor. Editing is his job (or hers), I felt, and deserves no more mention than the work of the book designer (who is really very important, by the way). But that was before I met Gladys Topkis, who is really not an author's editor but his collaborator. The next time that a male chauvinist pig smugly asks me why there has never been a female chess player of the caliber of Alekhine or Fischer, I shall reply, "And why are there no male editors like Gladys Topkis?"

One final acknowledgment. Titles of books are notoriously unoriginal, and mine is no exception. It is a slight adaptation of a title used by Howard Becker in an article in *The Nation*. It is nice to be able to acknowledge a debt to Becker, because it gives me an opportunity to say, of a man with whose orientation I frequently and strongly disagree, that no one has infused this area of sociology with so much intellectual excitement as has Becker since 1963. I owe him a debt for my title, and for more.

E.S.

Guide to the Literature

IT HAS been said that the deviant is the person on whom such a label has been successfully placed. Whatever may be the merits of this statement, it would appear to be worthwhile to include in the definition those categories of people and behavior described by social scientists as deviants and deviance. This bibliography is meant to cover what sociologists and other social scientists call deviant; it does not cover criminality, abnormality, or other overlapping fields, and does not include substantive areas, such as alcoholism and prostitution. References in the body of the book, for which citations are given at the end of each section, have been omitted from the bibliography unless they meet other criteria for inclusion.

The contents of twenty anthologies and readers and of a series of papers presented over a period of years at an ongoing English conference are itemized herein. In each instance, the original source of the material is given where it could be traced. The anthologies are identified by the following code:

Bec	Becker (1964)	LS&M	Lefton <i>et al.</i> (1968)
Ben	Benson (1973)	NDS	National Deviancy Symposium
Coh	S. Cohen (1971)	Rai	Rainwater (1974)
DD&C(69)	Dinitz <i>et al.</i> (1969)	R&M	Rock and McIntosh (1974)
DD&C(75)	Dinitz <i>et al.</i> (1975)	R&W	Rubington and Weinberg (1973)
D&M	Denisoff and McCaghy (1973)	Rus	Rushing (1969)
Dou(70a)	Douglas (1970a)	S&D	Scott and Douglas (1972)
Dou(70b)	Douglas (1970b)	S&M	Scarpitti and McFarlane (1975)
Dou(72)	Douglas (1972)	T&T	Taylor and Taylor (1973)
F&S	Farrell and Swigert (1975)	ViV	ViVona (1973)
Fil	Filstead (1972)		

Forthcoming books. Three of the works listed above bear 1975 dates. Their contents were made available to me through the courtesy of the editors and publishers. Barring last-minute changes, these entries should be accurate.

British publications. The collections of S. Cohen, Rock and McIntosh, Taylor and Taylor, as well as the papers of the NDS, all originated in England, but the contents reflect an international interest and have been included herein.

Other readers. In addition to the works listed above, several other readers are cited in the following bibliography, but their contents are not listed separately. Three of these readers deal with Canada; one is in French; and others, including one by myself (Sagarin, 1971), deal with specialized aspects of deviance, such as the minority-group concept, rehabilitation, occupational roles, and deviance in the family. These items, of peripheral interest, have not been listed individually for reasons of space.

- Akers, Ronald L. "Problems in the sociology of deviance: Social definitions and behavior." *Social Forces* 46 (1968):455-65.
- . *Deviant Behavior: A Social Learning Approach*. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1973.
- Allen, Richard C., "Legal rights of the disabled and disadvantaged," in *Legal Rights of the Disabled and Disadvantaged*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1969; in DD&C(75).
- Alwyn, Steve. "The politics of Eysenck." NDS, 1972.
- Ames, Richard G., Stephen W. Brown, and Norman L. Weiner. "Breakfast with topless barmaids," in Dou(70a).
- Amir, Menachem. "Forcible rape." *Federal Probation* 31 (March 1967): 51-58; in DD&C(69) and DD&C(75).
- Angrist, Shirley S. "Mental illness and deviant behavior: Unsolved conceptual problems." *Sociological Quarterly* 7 (1966):436-48; in LS&M.
- Anonymous. "The fire this time." *Time* 90 (August 4, 1967):13-18; in DD&C(69).
- . "The desperate dilemma of abortion." *Time* 90 (October 13, 1967):32-33; in DD&C(69).
- Archard, Peter. "The alcoholic dossier: Some problems of research for the participant observer." NDS, 1972.
- Armstrong, Gail, and Mary Wilson. "City politics and deviancy amplification." NDS, 1970; in T&T.
- Astin, Alexander W. "'Bad habits' and social deviation: A proposed revision in conflict theory." *Journal of Clinical Psychology* 18 (1962): 227-31.
- Atkinson, J. Maxwell. "Explaining suicide." NDS, 1970; in Coh.
- Auld, John. "Explanation or mystification? Some comments on the social functions of drug use." NDS, 1973.
- Bacon, Selden D. "Alcohol and complex society," in David J. Pittman and Charles R. Snyder, eds., *Society, Culture and Drinking Patterns*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962; in DD&C(69).
- Bailey, Ron. "Social workers as social policemen." NDS, 1970.

- . "The family and the social management of intolerable dilemmas." NDS, 1971.
- . "Housing: Alienation and beyond," in T&T.
- Bales, Robert Freed. "Cultural differences in rates of alcoholism." *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol* 6 (1946):480-99; in Rus.
- Ball, Donald W. "An abortion clinic ethnography." *Social Problems* 14 (1967):293-301; in Dou(70a).
- . "The problematics of respectability," in Dou(70b).
- . "Self and identity in the context of deviance: The case of criminal abortion," in S&D.
- Ball, Richard Allen. "An empirical exploration of neutralization theory." *Criminologica* 4 (August 1966):22-32; in Ben and LS&M.
- Bayer, Alan E., and Alexander W. Astin. "Violence and disruption on the U.S. campus, 1968-1969." *Educational Record* 50 (1969):337-50; in Rai.
- Bazelon, David L. "Juvenile justice: A love-hate story." Address delivered at New York University, 1973; in DD&C(75).
- Beck, Richard A., and Joseph M. Adams. "Establishing rapport with deviant groups." *Social Problems* 18 (1970):102-17.
- Becker, Howard S. "Becoming a marijuana user." *American Journal of Sociology* 59 (1953):235-42; in DD&C(69) and Rus.
- . *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*. New York: Free Press, 1963; rev. ed., 1973; excerpts in D&M, F&S, and R&W.
- . "Deviance and deviates." *The Nation* 201 (September 20, 1965): 115-17.
- . "History, culture and subjective experience: An exploration of the social bases of drug-induced experiences." *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 8 (September 1967):163-76; in R&W (title changed).
- . "Whose side are we on?" *Social Problems* 14 (1967):239-47.
- . "Labelling theory reconsidered." Paper presented to the British Sociological Society, 1971; in Becker, *Outsiders* (1973 ed.) and R&M.
- , ed. *The Other Side: Perspectives on Deviance*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.
- Belknap, Ivan. *Human Problems of a State Mental Hospital*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956; excerpts in Rus.
- Bell, Daniel. "Crime as an American way of life." *Antioch Review* 13 (1953):131-54; in Rus.
- Bell, Robert R. *Social Deviance: A Substantive Analysis*. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1971.
- Bene, Eva. "On the genesis of male homosexuality: An attempt at clarifying the role of the parents." *British Journal of Psychiatry* 111 (1965): 803-13; in Rus.
- Bensman, Joseph, and Israel Gerver. "Crime and punishment in the factory: The function of deviancy in maintaining the social system." *American Sociological Review* 28 (1963):588-98; in Rus.
- Benson, Denzel E. "The interactionist perspective in the study of deviant behavior or 'Who says I'm a crook,'" in Ben.

- , ed. *Readings in Deviant Behavior*. New York: MSS Information Corp., 1973.
- Berger, Bennctt. "The new stage of American man—almost endless adolescence." *New York Times Magazine*, November 2, 1969, pp. 32–33 ff.; in Rai (title changed).
- Berk, Bernard B. "Organizational goals and inmate organization." *American Journal of Sociology* 71 (1966):522–45; in Rai.
- Bernstein, Walter. "The cherubs are rumbling." *New Yorker* 33 (September 21, 1957):129–59; in Dou(70a).
- Bingham, June. "The intelligent square's guide to hippieland." *New York Times Magazine*, September 24, 1967, pp. 25 ff.; in DD&C(69).
- Birenbaum, Arnold. "On managing a courtesy stigma." *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 11 (1970):196–206; in S&M.
- Birenbaum, Arnold, and Edward Sagarin. "The deviant actor maintains his right to be present: The case of the nondrinker," in Birenbaum and Sagarin, eds., *People in Places: The Sociology of the Familiar*. New York: Praeger, 1973.
- Bittner, Egon. "Police discretion in emergency apprehension of mentally ill persons." *Social Problems* 14 (1967):278–92; in Fil.
- . "The police on Skid-Row: A study of peace keeping." *American Sociological Review* 32 (1967):699–715; in Rai.
- Black, Donald J. "The social organization of arrest." *Stanford Law Review* 23 (1971):1087–1111; in R&W.
- Black, Donald J., and Albert J. Reiss, Jr. "Police control of juveniles." *American Sociological Review* 35 (1970):63–77; in S&D.
- Bloch, Herbert A., and Melvin Prince. *Social Crisis and Deviance: Theoretical Foundations*. New York: Random House, 1967.
- Block, Richard K., and Franklin E. Zimring. "Homicide in Chicago, 1965–70." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 10 (January 1973): 1–12; in Rai.
- Blum, Alan F. "The sociology of mental illness," in Dou(70b).
- . "Sociology, wrongdoing, and akrasia: An attempt to think Greek about the problem of theory and practice," in S&D.
- Blum, Richard H. "Mind-altering drugs and dangerous behavior," in President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: *Narcotics and Drug Abuse*; in DD&C(69).
- Blumenstiel, Alexander D. "An ethos of intimacy: Constructing and using a situational morality," in Dou(70b).
- Blumenthal, Monica D., Robert L. Kahn, Frank M. Andrews, and Kindra B. Heed. "American men's attitudes towards violence." Paper presented to the Fourth Annual Briefing on the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Council for the Advancement of Science Writing, New York, 1971; excerpt in Rai.
- Bordua, David J. "Delinquent subcultures: Sociological interpretations of gang delinquency." *The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science* 338 (1961):119–36; in Rus (title changed).
- . "Recent trends: Deviant behavior and social control." *Annals of*

- American Academy of Political and Social Science* 369 (1967):149-63.
- Box, Steven. *Deviance, Reality and Society*. London: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971.
- Boydell, C., et al., eds. *Deviant Behaviour and Societal Reaction in Canada*. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart & Winston of Canada, 1972.
- Brake, Mike, and Ken Plummer. "Bent boys and rent boys: Preliminary theoretical and conceptual comments on the social intercourse of the male homosexual prostitute." NDS, 1970.
- Breed, Warren. "Occupational mobility and suicide among white males." *American Sociological Review* 28 (1963):179-88; in Rus.
- Brown, Michael E. "The condemnation and persecution of hippies." *Transaction* 6 (September 1969): 33-46; in D&M and Sagarin (1971).
- Bryan, James H. "Apprenticeships in prostitution." *Social Problems* 12 (1965):287-97; in Ben, LS&M, R&W, and Rus.
- . "Occupational ideologies and individual attitudes of call girls." *Social Problems* 13 (1966):441-50; in Ben, R&W, and Rus.
- Bryant, Clifton D., ed. *Deviant Behavior: Occupational and Organizational Bases*. Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1974.
- Bryant, Clifton D., and J. Gipson Wells, eds. *Deviancy and the Family*. Philadelphia: F. A. Davis, 1973.
- Buckner, H. Taylor. *Deviance, Reality, and Change*. New York: Random House, 1971.
- Bultena, Louis. *Deviant Behavior in Sweden*. New York: Exposition Press, 1971.
- Burgess, Robert L., and Ronald L. Akers. "A differential association-reinforcement theory of criminal behavior," *Social Problems* 14 (1966): 128-47; in F&S.
- Bustamente, Jorge A. "The 'wetback' as deviant: An application of labeling theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 77 (1972): 706-18.
- Cahnman, Werner J. "The stigma of obesity." *Sociological Quarterly* 9 (1968):283-99; in S&M.
- Cain, Maureen. "On the beat: Interactions and relations in rural and urban police forces." NDS, 1968; in Coh.
- Cameron, Mary Owen. *The Booster and the Snitch*. New York: Free Press, 1964; excerpts in R&W.
- Campanis, Paul. "Normlessness in management," in Dou(70b).
- Campbell, Colin. "Religious deviancy and deviant religion: An exploration of some neglected areas." NDS, 1971.
- Carey, James T. *The College Drug Scene*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968; excerpt in Dou(70a).
- . "Problems of access and risk in observing drug scenes," in Dou (72).
- Carson, Kit. "White-collar crime and the enforcement of factory legislation." NDS, 1969.
- Carson, W.G. "The sociology of crime and the emergence of criminal laws: A review of some excursions into the sociology of law," in R&M.

- Cavan, Sherri. "The hippie ethic and the spirit of drug use," in Dou(70a).
 ———. *Liquor License: An Ethnography of Bar Behavior*. Chicago: Aldine, 1966; excerpt in Dou(70a).
- Chafetz, Morris E., and Harold W. Demone, Jr. "Alcoholics Anonymous" and "Al-Anon family groups," in Chafetz and Demone, *Alcoholism and Society*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962; excerpts in DD&C (69).
- Chambliss, William J. "A sociological analysis of the law of vagrancy." *Social Problems* 12 (1964):66–77; in D&M.
- Cicourel, Aaron V. "Delinquency and the attribution of responsibility," in S&D.
- Clark, John P., and Eugene P. Wenninger. "Goal orientation and illegal behavior among juveniles." *Social Forces* 42 (October 1963):49–59; in LS&M.
- Clinard, Marshall B. "Areas for research in deviant behavior." *Sociology and Social Research* 42 (1957):415–19.
 ———. *Sociology of Deviant Behavior*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1957, 1963, 1968, 1974 (4th ed.).
 ———. "The public drinking house and society," in David J. Pittman and Charles R. Snyder, eds., *Society, Culture and Drinking Patterns*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962; in DD&C(69) and DD&C(75).
 ———. "Contributions of sociology to understanding deviant behaviour." *British Journal of Criminology* 3 (October 1962):110–29.
 ———, ed. *Anomie and Deviant Behavior: A Discussion and Critique*. New York: Free Press, 1964.
- Cloward, Richard A. "Illegitimate means, anomie, and deviant behavior." *American Sociological Review* 24 (1959):164–76.
- Cloward, Richard A., and Lloyd E. Ohlin. *Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs*. New York: Free Press, 1960; excerpt in F&S.
- Cohen, Albert K. *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang*. New York: Free Press, 1955; excerpts in F&S and R&W.
 ———. "The study of social disorganization and deviant behavior," in Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom, and Leonard S. Cottrell, eds., *Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects*. New York: Basic Books, 1959; in F&S.
 ———. "The sociology of the deviant act: Anomie theory and beyond." *American Sociological Review* 30 (1965):5–14; in Rai.
 ———. *Deviance and Control*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966.
 ———. "Deviant behavior." *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* 4 (1968):148–55.
- Cohen, Albert K., and James F. Short, Jr. "Research in delinquent subcultures." *Journal of Social Issues* 14 (Summer 1958):20–37.
- Cohen, Phil. "Youth subcultures in Britain." NDS, 1970.
- Cohen, Stanley. "Middle-class violence." NDS, 1968.
 ———. "Criminology and the sociology of deviance in Britain: A recent history and a current report," in R&M.

- , ed. *Images of Deviance*. Middlesex, Eng., and Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971.
- Cohen, Stanley and Jock Young, cds. *The Manufacture of News: Deviance, Social Problems and the Mass Media*. Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 1974.
- Cole, Jonathan O. "Report on the treatment of drug addiction," in *Narcotics and Drug Abuse*, Task Force Report, The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967; in DD&C (69).
- Colvin, Eric. "Con-men." NDS, 1969.
- Commission on Obscenity and Pornography. *The Report*. New York: Random House, 1970; excerpts in DD&C(75) and in Rai.
- Comrade X. See X
- Connor, Walter D. *Deviance in Soviet Society: Crime, Delinquency, and Alcoholism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.
- Conrad, John P. "Corrections and simple justice." *Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology* 64 (1973):208-17; in DD&C(75).
- Cooley, Charles Horton. *Human Nature and the Social Order*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902; excerpt in F&S.
- Cooney, John, and Dana Spitzer. "Hell, no, we won't go!" *Transaction* 6 (September 1969):53-62; in S&M.
- Corrigan, Paul. "Interactionist theory and social work." NDS, 1970.
- Corrigan, Paul, and Bob Fryer. "The Industrial Relations Act: A suitable case for deviance?" NDS, 1972.
- Coser, Lewis A. "The termination of conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 5 (1961):347-53; in D&M.
- . "Some functions of deviant behavior and normative flexibility." *American Journal of Sociology* 68 (1962):172-81; in LS&M.
- Cothran, Tilman C. "The Negro protest against segregation in the South." *The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science* 357 (1965):65-72; in S&M.
- Coulter, Jeff. "A critique of bio-genetic theories in explaining cognitive disorders." NDS, 1971.
- Cressey, Donald R. "Culture conflict, differential association, and normative conflict," in Marvin E. Wolfgang, ed., *Crime and Culture: Essays in Honor of Thorsten Sellin*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968; in D&M.
- Cutright, Phillips. "Historical and contemporary trends in illegitimacy." *Archives of Sexual Behavior* 2 (1972):97-118; in Rai.
- Daniels, Arlene K. "Normal mental illness and understandable excuses: The philosophy of combat psychiatry." *American Behavioral Scientist* 14 (1970):167-84; in R&W.
- Daniels, Arlene K., and Richard R. Daniels. "The social function of the career fool." *Psychiatry* 27 (1964):219-29; in LS&M.
- Dank, Barry. "Coming out in the gay world." *Psychiatry* 34 (1971):180-97; in DD&C(75).

- Daventry, Richard. "Problems of participant observation in a gambling setting." NDS, 1972.
- David, Pedro. "The making of a burglar: Five life histories," in DD&C (75).
- Davidman, Howard, and Edward Preble. "Schizophrenia among adolescent gang leaders," in Paul H. Hoek and Joseph Zubin, eds., *Psychopathology of Schizophrenia*. New York: Grune and Stratton, 1966; in LS&M.
- Davis, Ann E., Simon Dinitz, and Benjamin Pasamanick. "The prevention of hospitalization in schizophrenia: Five years after an experimental program." *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 42 (1972):375-88; in DD&C(75).
- Davis, Fred. "Definitions of time and recovery in paralytic polio convalescence." *American Journal of Sociology* 61 (1956):582-87; in Fil.
- . "Deviance disavowal: The management of strained interaction by the visibly handicapped." *Social Problems* 9 (1961): 120-32; in Bee, Fil, and Rai.
- . "Focus on the flower children: Why all of us may be hippies someday." *Trans-action* 5 (December 1967):10-19; in Dou(70a).
- Davis, Fred, with Laura Munoz. "Heads and freaks: Patterns and meanings of drug use among hippies." *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 9 (1968):156-64; in Dou(70a) and Rai.
- Davis, Kingsley. "The sociology of prostitution." *American Sociological Review* 2 (1937):744-55; in DD&C(69) and DD&C(75).
- Davis, Nanette J. "Labeling theory in deviance research: A critique and reconsideration." *Sociological Quarterly* 13 (1972):447-74.
- Decker, John F. "Curbside deterrence? An analysis of the effect of a slug-rejector device, coin-view window, and warning labels on slug usage in New York City parking meters." *Criminology* 10 (1972):127-42; in DD&C(75).
- DeLamater, John. "On the nature of deviance." *Social Forces* 46 (1968): 445-55.
- Denisoff, R. Serge, and Charles H. McCaghy, eds. *Deviance, Conflict, and Criminality*. Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1973.
- Dentler, Robert A., and Kai T. Erikson. "The functions of deviance in groups." *Social Problems* 7 (1959):98-107; in F&S.
- Denzin, Norman K. "Rules of conduct and the study of deviant behavior: Some notes on the social relationship," in Dou(70b).
- Dickson, Donald T. "Bureaucracy and morality: An organizational perspective on a moral crusade." *Social Problems* 16 (1968):143-56; in ViV.
- Dinitz, Simon, Russell R. Dynes, and Alfred C. Clarke, eds. *Deviance: Studies in the Process of Stigmatization and Societal Reaction*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- , eds. *Deviance: Definition, Management, Treatment*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Dinitz, Simon, Harold Goldman, Lewis Lindner, Harry Allen, and Thomas Foster, "Drug treatment of the sociopathic offender: The 'juice model' approach," in DD&C(75).
- Douglas, Dorothy J. "Managing fronts in observing deviance," in Dou(72).

- Douglas, Jack D. "Deviance and respectability: The social construction of moral meanings," in Dou(70b).
- . *Youth in Turmoil: America's Changing Youth Cultures and Student Protest Movements*. National Institute of Mental Health, Center for Studies in Crime and Delinquency, 1970; excerpt in D&M.
- . "The experience of the absurd and the problem of social order," in S&D.
- . "Observing deviance," in Dou(72).
- , ed. *Observations of Deviance*. New York: Random House, 1970a.
- , ed. *Deviance & Respectability: The Social Construction of Moral Meanings*. New York: Basic Books, 1970b.
- , ed. *Research on Deviance*. New York: Random House, 1972.
- Downes, David. "Studying gambling." NDS, 1969.
- Downes, David, and Paul Roek. "Social reaction to deviance and its effect on crime and criminal careers." *British Journal of Sociology* 22 (1971):351-64.
- Driscoll, James P. "Identity and the transsexual adaptation." *Trans-action* 8 (March-April 1971):28-37 ff.; in Rai.
- Durkheim, Emile. *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1951; excerpt in F&S.
- Eddy, Nathan B. "Methadone maintenance for the management of persons with drug dependence of the morphine type," in DD&C(75).
- Edelhertz, Herbert. "The nature, impact and prosecution of white collar crime." Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1970; in DD&C(75).
- Edwards, George. "Due process of law in criminal cases." *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology & Police Science* 57 (1966):130-35; in DD&C(69).
- Einstadter, Werner J. "The social organization of armed robbery." *Social Problems* 17 (1969):64-83; in Rai.
- Emerson, Robert M. *Judging Delinquents*. Chicago: Aldine, 1969; excerpt in R&W.
- Empey, LaMar T., and Steven G. Lubeck. "Conformity and deviance in the 'situation of company.'" *American Sociological Review* 33 (1968): 760-74.
- Endore, Guy. "Synanon: The learning environment." Synanon Pamphlet Series 5. Santa Monica, Calif., Synanon Foundation, Inc.; in DD&C(75).
- Ennis, Philip H. "Criminal victimization in the United States," in *Narcotics and Drug Abuse*, Task Force Report, The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967; in Rai.
- Erikson, Kai T. "Patient role and social uncertainty—a dilemma of the mentally ill." *Psychiatry* 20 (1957): 263-74; in Ben and R&W.
- . "Notes on the sociology of deviance." *Social Problems* 9 (1962): 307-14; in Bee, Ben, Rai, and R&W (reprinted versions differ from original).

- . *Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966; excerpt in F&S.
- Fabrega, Horacio, Jr., and Peter K. Manning. "Disease, illness, and deviant careers," in S&D.
- Farrell, Ronald A., and Thomas J. Morrione. "Conforming to deviance." Paper presented to the Eastern Sociological Society, New York, 1973; in F&S.
- Farrell, Ronald A., and Victoria L. Swigert, eds. *Social Deviance*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975.
- Filstead, William J., ed. *An Introduction to Deviance: Readings in the Process of Making Deviants*. Chicago: Markham, 1972.
- Finestone, Harold. "Cats, kicks, and color." *Social Problems* 5 (1957): 3-13; in Bec and Rus.
- . "Reformation and recidivism among Italian and Polish criminal offenders." *American Journal of Sociology* 72 (1967):575-88; in Rai.
- Fisher, Charles S. "Observing a crowd: The structure and description of protest demonstrations," in Dou(72).
- Freedman, Jonathan L., and Anthony N. Doob. *Deviancy: The Psychology of Being Different*. New York: Academic Press, 1968.
- Freeman, Howard E., and Ozzie G. Simmons. "Feelings of stigma among relatives of former mental patients." *Social Problems* 8 (1961):312-21; in S&M.
- Freidson, Eliot. "Disability as social deviance," in Sussman (1966); in R&W.
- Gagnon, John H. "Every exit is an entrance somewhere: Some notes on Erving Goffman." NDS, 1973.
- Gagnon, John H., and William Simon. "Pornography—raging menace or paper tiger." *Trans-action* 4 (July-August 1967):41-48; in DD&C(69).
- Gannon, Thomas M. "Emergence of the 'defensive' gang." *Federal Probation* 30 (December 1966):44-47; in DD&C(69).
- Garfinkel, Harold. "Conditions of successful degradation ceremonies." *American Journal of Sociology* 61 (1956):420-24; in Fil, F&S, and R&W.
- Geis, Gilbert. "Identifying delinquents in the press." *Federal Probation* 29 (December 1965):44-49; in DD&C(69).
- . *Not the Law's Business: An Examination of Homosexuality, Abortion, Prostitution, Narcotics and Gambling in the United States*. Rockville, Md.: National Institute of Mental Health, Publication No. 72-9132, 1972; excerpts in DD&C(75).
- Gerrard, Nathan L. "The serpent-handling religions of West Virginia." *Trans-action* 5 (May 1968):22-28; in S&M.
- Gibbons, Don C., and Joseph F. Jones. "Some critical notes on current definitions of deviance." *Pacific Sociological Review* 14 (1971):20-37.
- Gibbs, Jack P. "Needed: Analytical typologies in criminology." *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly* 40 (1960):321-29; in Rus.

- . "Conceptions of deviant behavior: The old and the new." *Pacific Sociological Review* 9 (Spring 1966):9-14; in Ben, Fil, and LS&M.
- . "Issues in defining deviant behavior," in S&D.
- Gibbs, Jack P., and Walter T. Martin. "A theory of status integration and its relationship to suicide." *American Sociological Review* 23 (1958):140-47; in LS&M.
- Glaser, Barney G., and Anselm L. Strauss. "Awareness contexts and social interaction." *American Sociological Review* 29 (1964):669-79; in Fil.
- Glaser, Daniel. *Social Deviance*. Chicago: Markham, 1971.
- . "The sociological approach to crime and correction." *Law and Contemporary Problems* 23 (1958):683-702; in R&W (title changed).
- . "Criminality theories and behavioral images." *American Journal of Sociology* 61 (1956):433-44; in F&S.
- Glaser, Daniel, Bernard Lander, and William Abbott. "Opiate addicted and non-addicted siblings in a slum area." *Social Problems* 18 (1971): 510-21; in Rai.
- Glaser, Daniel, and Vincent O'Leary. *The Alcoholic Offender*. Washington, D.C.: National Parole Institutes, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1966; excerpt in DD&C(75).
- Goffman, Erving. "The moral career of the mental patient." *Psychiatry* 22 (1959):123-42; in Ben, Fil, R&W, and Rus (title changed).
- . *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963; excerpts in F&S, Rai, and R&W.
- . "Characteristics in total institutions," in *Symposium on Preventive and Social Psychiatry*. Washington, D.C.: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 1967; in DD&C(69) and DD&C(75).
- Gold, Martin. "Suicide, homicide, and the socialization of aggression." *American Journal of Sociology* 63 (1958):651-61; in Rus.
- Goode, Erich. "Marijuana and the politics of reality." *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 10 (1969):83-94; in S&M.
- Goode, William J. "The place of force in human society." *American Sociological Review* 37 (1972):507-19; in Rai.
- Gouldner, Alvin W. "The sociologist as partisan: Sociology and the welfare state." *American Sociologist* 3 (1968):103-16.
- Granfield, David. "Rethinking the abortion problem: Law and morals." *Criminologica* 4 (February 1967):11-19; in DD&C(69).
- Greene, Nancy B., and T. C. Esselstyn. "The beyond control girl." *Juvenile Justice* 23 (November 1972):13-19; in DD&C(75).
- Greenwald, Harold. *The Call Girl: A Social and Psychoanalytic Study*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1958; excerpts in DD&C(69) and Rus.
- Grimshaw, Allen D. "Lawlessness and violence in America and their special manifestations in changing Negro-white relationships." *Journal of Negro History* 44 (January 1959):52-72; in DD&C(69).
- Grost, Audrey. "Mike enters the world of normal people," in S&M.
- Gusfield, Joseph R. "Moral passage: The symbolic process in public

- designations of deviance." *Social Problems* 15 (1967):175-88; in Ben, Fil, Rai, and S&M.
- Gussow, Zachary, and George S. Tracy. "Status, ideology, and adaptation to stigmatized illness: A study of leprosy." *Human Organization* 27 (1968):316-25; in S&M and Sagarin (1971).
- Haas, Jack, and Bill Shaffir, eds. *Decency and Deviance: Studies in Deviant Behavior*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974.
- Hackler, James C. "A developmental theory of delinquency." *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 8 (1971): 61-75; in F&S.
- Hagan, John L. "Conceptual deficiencies of an interactionist perspective in 'deviance.'" *Criminology* 11 (1973):383-404.
- . "Labelling and deviance: A case study in the 'sociology of the interesting.'" *Social Problems* 20 (1973):447-58.
- Hall, Peter M. "Identification with the delinquent subculture and level of self-evaluation." *Sociometry* 29 (June 1966):146-58; in Ben and LS&M.
- Hall, Robert E. "The medico-legal aspects of abortion." *Criminologica* 4 (February 1967):7-10; in DD&C(69).
- Hall, Stuart. "The hippies—an American movement." NDS, 1970.
- . "The uses of structuralism." NDS, 1973.
- . "Deviance, politics, and the media," in R&M.
- Hedblom, Jack D., "The female homosexual: Social and attitudinal dimensions," in Joseph A. McCaffrey, ed., *The Homosexual Dialectic*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972; in DD&C(75).
- Henslin, James M. "Guilt and guilt neutralization: Response and adjustment to suicide," in Dou(70b).
- . "Studying deviance in four settings: Research experiences with cabbies, suicides, drug users, and abortionees," in Dou(72).
- Hepworth, Mike. "Deviants in disguise: Blackmail and social acceptance." NDS, 1969; in Coh.
- . "The deviance of privacy." NDS, 1972.
- Hepworth, Mike, and Mike Featherstone. "'Persons believed missing': A search for a sociological interpretation," in R&M.
- Hewitt, John P. *Social Stratification and Deviant Behavior*. New York: Random House, 1970.
- Hills, Stuart L. "Combating organized crime in America." *Federal Probation* 33 (March 1969):23-28; in DD&C(75).
- Hirschi, Travis. "The professional prostitute." *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 7 (1962):33-49; in Rus.
- . "Procedural rules and the study of deviant behavior." *Social Problems* 21 (1973):159-73.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. New York: Praeger, 1963; excerpt in D&M.
- Hollingshead, August B. "Factors associated with prevalence of mental illness," in Eleanor E. Maccoby, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene

- L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology*. 3d ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1958; in Rus.
- Homans, George C. "The Western Electric researches," in Schuyler Dean Hoslett, ed., *Human Factors in Management*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951; in Rus (title changed).
- Hooker, Evelyn. "The homosexual community," in James O. Palmer and Michael J. Goldstein, eds., *Perspectives in Psychopathology: Readings in Abnormal Psychology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966; in Dou(70a).
- Horowitz, Irving Louis, and Martin Liebowitz. "Social deviance and political marginality: Toward a redefinition of the relation between sociology and politics." *Social Problems* 15 (1968):280-96; in D&M.
- Horton, John. "Order and conflict theories of social problems as competing ideologies." *American Journal of Sociology* 71 (1966):701-13; in D&M.
- Huff, C. Ronald. "Unionization behind the walls." Paper presented to the American Society of Criminology, New York, 1973; in DD&C(75).
- Hughes, Everett C. "Good people and dirty work." *Social Problems* 10 (1962):3-11; in Bec and Rai.
- Humphreys, Laud. *Tearoom Trade: Impersonal Sex in Public Places*. Chicago: Aldine, 1970; excerpt in R&W.
- . "Impersonal sex and perceived satisfaction," in James M. Henslin, ed., *Studies in the Sociology of Sex*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971; in Rai (title changed).
- Ingraham, Barton L., and Gerald W. Smith. "The use of electronics in the observation and control of human behavior and its possible use in rehabilitation and parole." *Issues in Criminology* 7 (Fall 1972): 35-53; in DD&C(75).
- Irwin, John. "Participant-observation of criminals," in Dou(72).
- . *The Felon*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970; excerpt in R&W.
- Irwin, John, and Donald R. Cressey. "Thieves, convicts, and the inmate culture." *Social Problems* 10 (1962):142-55; in Bec and Rus.
- Jackman, Norman R., Richard O'Toole, and Gilbert Geis. "The self-image of the prostitute." *Sociological Quarterly* 4 (1963):150-61; in DD&C(69).
- Jackson, Bruce. "White-collar pill party." *Atlantic Monthly* 218 (August 1966):35-40; in Dou(70a).
- . "Exiles from the American dream: The junkie and the cop." *Atlantic Monthly* 219 (January 1967):44-51; in Dou(70a).
- Jackson, Joan K. "The adjustment of the family to the crisis of alcoholism." *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol* 15 (1954):562-86; in Fil, R&W, and ViV.
- . "The adjustment of the family to alcoholism." *Marriage and Family Living* 18 (1956):361-69; in Rus.

- Jacobs, Jerry. "A phenomenological study of suicide notes." *Social Problems* 15 (1967):60-72; in DD&C(69).
- . "The use of religion in constructing the moral justification of suicide," in Dou(70b).
- Jeffery, Clarence Ray. "Criminal behavior and learning theory." *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology & Police Science* 56 (1965):294-300; in F&S.
- Jellinek, E. M. "Phases of alcohol addiction." Second Report, Alcoholism Subcommittee of World Health Organization, WHO Technical Report Series No. 48, August 1952; excerpt in DD&C(69).
- Jenkins, Richard L. "Adaptive and maladaptive delinquency." *The Nervous Child* 11 (October 1955):9-11; in DD&C(69).
- Jessor, Richard. "Toward a social psychology of excessive alcohol use: A preliminary report from the Tri-Ethnic Project," in Charles R. Snyder and David R. Schweitzer, eds., *Proceedings, Research Sociologists' Conference on Alcohol Problems*. Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University, 1964; in LS&M.
- Jewell, Donald P. "A case of a 'psychotic' Navaho Indian male." *Human Organization* 11 (Spring 1952):32-36; in R&W.
- Johnson, Elmer. "Work release—a study of correctional reform." *Crime and Delinquency* 13 (1967):521-30; in DD&C(75).
- Johnson, John M. "The practical use of rules," in S&D.
- Johnson, Lyndon B. "The National Crime Commission Report," from President's Message to 90th Congress, 1st session, House of Representatives Document 53, January 1967; in DD&C(69).
- Johnson, Rita Volkman. See Volkman, Rita.
- Kamisar, Yale. "When wasn't there a 'crime crisis'?" Speech delivered at 28th conference of the Third Judicial Court of the United States, Atlantic City, N.J., September 9, 1965; in DD&C(69).
- Kantner, John F., and Melvin Zelnik. "Sexual experience of young unmarried women in the United States." *Family Planning Perspectives* 4 (October 1972):9-18; in Rai.
- Katz, Jack. "Deviance, charisma, and rule-defined behavior." *Social Problems* 20 (1972):186-202.
- Kelly, Robert J. "New political crimes and the emergence of revolutionary nationalist ideologies," in F. Adler and G. O. W. Mueller, eds., *Politics, Crime and the International Scene: An Interamerican Focus*. Ponce de Leon, P.R.: North-South Press, 1972; in D&M.
- Kemper, Theodore D. "Representative roles and the legitimation of deviance." *Social Problems* 13 (1966):288-98; in LS&M.
- Kennedy, John F. "Mental illness and mental retardation," in President's message to 88th Congress, 1st session, House of Representatives Document No. 58, February 5, 1963; in DD&C(69).
- Kitsuse, John I. "Societal reaction to deviant behavior: Problems of theory and method." *Social Problems* 9 (1962):247-56; in Bec, Ben, and R&W.

- . "Deviance, deviant behavior, and deviants: Some conceptual problems," in Fil.
- Kitsuse, John I., and Aaron V. Cicourel. "A note on the uses of official statistics." *Social Problems* 11 (1963):131-39; in Fil.
- Kitsuse, John I., and David C. Dietrick. "Delinquent Boys: A critique." *American Sociological Review* 24 (1959):208-15; in R&W (title changed).
- Kittric, Nicholas N. *The Right to Be Different: Deviance and Enforced Therapy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971.
- . "Will the XYY syndrome abolish guilt?" *Federal Probation* 35 (June 1971):26-31; in DD&C(75).
- Klapp, Orrin E. *Heroes, Villains, and Fools: The Changing American Character*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962; excerpts in R&W.
- Klemesrud, Judy. "The disciples of Sappho, updated." *New York Times Magazine*, March 28, 1971, pp. 38-39 ff.; in S&M.
- Kobler, Arthur L., and Ezra Stotland. *The End of Hope*. New York: Free Press, 1964; excerpt in Rus.
- Kohn, Melvin L., and John A. Clausen. "Social isolation and schizophrenia." *American Sociological Review* 20 (1955):265-73; in Rus.
- Koran, Lorrin M. "Heroin maintenance for heroin addicts: Issues and evidence." *New England Journal of Medicine* 288 (March 29, 1973): 654-60; in DD&C(75).
- Korn, Richard R., and Lloyd W. McCorkle. *Criminology and Penology*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1959; excerpts in R&W.
- Lambert, John. "Cops and colour." NDS, 1969.
- Lassman, Peter. "Aspects of the phenomenological approach to sociological theory." NDS, 1970.
- Lavine, Harold. "Twenty-one G.I.'s who chose tyranny: Why they left us for communism." *Commentary* 18 (1954):41-46; in DD&C(69).
- Lefton, Mark, Shirley S. Angrist, Simon Dinitz, and Benjamin Pasamanick. "Social class, expectations and performance of mental patients." *American Journal of Sociology* 68 (1962):79-87; in LS&M.
- Lefton, Mark, James K. Skipper, Jr., and Charles H. McCaghy, eds. *Approaches to Deviance: Theories, Concepts, and Research Findings*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968.
- Lemert, Edwin M. *Social Pathology: A Systematic Approach to the Theory of Sociopathic Behavior*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951; excerpt in F&S.
- . "An isolation and closure theory of naive check forgery." *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology & Police Science* 44 (1953):296-307; in LS&M.
- . "The behavior of the systematic check forger." *Social Problems* 6 (1958):141-48; in Bcc, DD&C(69), and DD&C(75).
- . "Paranoia and the dynamics of exclusion." *Sociometry* 25 (March 1962):2-20; in R&W.

- . *Human Deviance, Social Problems, and Social Control*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967.
- . "The check forger and his identity," in Lemert (1967); in R&W.
- . "Beyond Mead: The societal reaction to deviance." *Social Problems* 21 (1974):457-68.
- . "The juvenile court—quest and realities," in *Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime*, Task Force Report. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967; in Rai (title changed).
- Leonard, Peter, "Community action." NDS, 1973.
- Lewis, David, and Peter Hughman. "The prosecution process." NDS, 1973.
- Leznoff, Maurice, and William A. Westley. "The homosexual community." *Social Problems* 3 (1956):257-63; in DD&C(69) and Rus.
- Liazos, Alexander. "The poverty of the sociology of deviance: Nuts, sluts, and preverts." *Social Problems* 20 (1972):103-20.
- Lofland, John (with Lyn H. Lofland). *Deviance and Identity*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969; excerpt in D&M.
- Loney, Martin. "Social control in Cuba," in T&T.
- Long, Edward N. *The Intruders*. New York: Praeger, 1967; excerpt in DD&C(69).
- Lopata, Helena Znaniecki. "Loneliness: Forms and components." *Social Problems* 17 (1969):248-62; in Rai (title changed).
- Lorber, Judith. "Deviance as performance: The case of illness." *Social Problems* 14 (1967):302-10; in S&M.
- . "Deviance as conformity." Paper presented to the American Sociological Association, Denver, Colo., 1971.
- Ludwig, Arnold M., and Frank Farrelly. "The weapons of insanity." *American Journal of Psychotherapy* 21 (1967):737-49; in DD&C(75).
- MacNamara, Donal E. J., and John J. Sullivan. "Making the victim whole: Composition, restitution, compensation," in Terence P. Thornberry and Edward Sagarin, eds., *Images of Crime: Offenders and Victims*. New York: Praeger, 1974; in DD&C(75).
- Maddison, Simon. "Mindless militants? Psychiatry and the university." NDS, 1971; in T&T.
- Mankoff, Milton. "On alienation, structural strain, and deviancy." *Social Problems* 16 (1968):114-16.
- . "Societal reaction and career deviance: A critical analysis." *Sociological Quarterly* 12 (1971):204-18.
- Mann, W. E., ed. *Deviant Behaviour in Canada*. Toronto: Social Science Publishers, 1968.
- Manning, Peter K. "Observing the police: Deviants, respectables, and the law," in Dou(72).
- . "A dramaturgical perspective on social control." NDS, 1973.
- . "Survey essay on deviance." *Contemporary Sociology* 2 (1973):123-28.
- Manson, Iain. "Sociological aspects of pornography." NDS, 1972.

- Mars, Gerald. "Dock pilferage: A case study in occupational theft," in R&M.
- Martin, John M. *Toward a Political Definition of Juvenile Delinquency*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration, 1970; in D&M.
- Marwell, Gerald. "Adolescent powerlessness and delinquent behavior." *Social Problems* 14 (1966):35-47; in Rus.
- Mathiesen, Thomas. "Strategies of resistance within a total institution." NDS, 1972.
- Mattick, Hans W. "The prosaic sources of prison violence," in *Occasional Papers*, University of Chicago Law School, March 15, 1972; in Rai.
- Matto, Michele S. "The transsexual in society." *Criminology* 10 (1972): 85-109; in DD&C(75).
- Matza, David. *Becoming Deviant*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969.
- . *Delinquency and Drift*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964; excerpts in R&W.
- Maurer, David. *The Big Con*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1940; excerpt in Dou(70a).
- McCaghy, Charles H. "Drinking and deviance disavowal: The case of child molesters." *Social Problems* 16 (1968):43-49.
- McCaghy, Charles H., and R. Serge Denisoff. "Pirates and politics: An analysis of interest group conflict." Paper presented to the American Society of Criminology, Caracas, Venezuela, 1972; revised version in D&M.
- McCaghy, Charles H., and James K. Skipper, Jr. "Lesbian behavior as an adaptation to the occupation of stripping." *Social Problems* 17 (1969): 262-70; in Ben and R&W (title changed).
- McCaghy, Charles H., James K. Skipper, and Mark Lefton, eds. *In Their Own Behalf: Voices from the Margin*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1st ed., 1968; 2d ed., 1974.
- McCall, George J. "Symbiosis: The case of hoodoo and the numbers racket." *Social Problems* 10 (1963):361-71; in Bec.
- McHugh, Peter. "A common-sense conception of deviance," in Dou (70b).
- McIntosh, Mary. "Changes in the organization of thieving." NDS, 1969; in Coh.
- . "Gay liberation and gay ghetto." NDS, 1972.
- McKinlay, John. "The other side of the typificatory coin: Clients' perception of social work and other agencies." NDS, 1970.
- McPherson, James Alan. "Chicago's Blackstone Rangers." *Atlantic Monthly* 223 (May 1969):74-84 and (June 1969):92-102; in Dou(70a) (title changed).
- Mead, George Herbert. "The psychology of punitive justice." *American Journal of Sociology* 23 (1917-18):577-602; in F&S.
- Mercer, Jane R. "Social system perspective and clinical perspective: Frames of reference for understanding career patterns of persons labelled as

- mentally retarded." *Social Problems* 13 (1965):18-34; in R&W (title changed).
- . "Labels and reality: Diagnosing mental retardation." Paper presented to the American Psychological Association, 1971; in Rai.
- Merton, Robert K. "Social structure and anomie." *American Sociological Review* 3 (1938):672-82; in F&S, LS&M, Rus, and Merton (1957).
- . "Nonconforming and aberrant behavior," in Robert K. Merton and Robert Nisbet, eds., *Contemporary Social Problems*. New York: Harcourt Brace, Jovanovich, 1971; in D&M.
- . *Social Theory and Social Structure*. New York: Free Press, rev. ed., 1957; excerpt in F&S.
- Miller, Lloyd, and James K. Skipper, Jr. "Sounds of protest: Jazz and the militant avant garde," in LS&M.
- Miller, Walter B. "American youth gangs: Past and present," in Abraham Blumberg, ed., *Current Perspectives on Criminal Behavior*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974; in Rai (title changed).
- . "Lower class culture as a generating milieu of gang delinquency." *Journal of Social Issues* 14, No. 3 (1958):5-19; in DD&C(69), DD&C(75), and F&S.
- Mills, C. Wright. "The professional ideology of social pathologists." *American Journal of Sociology* 49 (1943):165-80; in LS&M.
- Mills, James. *The Drug Takers*. Time-Life Report, 1965; in Dou(70a).
- Mizruchi, Ephraim H., and Robert Perrucci. "Norm qualities and differential effects of deviant behavior." *American Sociological Review* 27 (1962):391-99; revised in LS&M (title changed).
- Molotch, Harvey. "Oil in Santa Barbara and power in America." *Sociological Inquiry* 40 (1970):131-44; in D&M.
- Mungham, Geoff, and Geoff Pearson. "Radical scholarship and radical action." NDS, 1972.
- Murdock, Graham. "Pop fans and pupils." NDS, 1971.
- Murphy, Fred J., Mary M. Shirley, and Helen L. Witmer. "The incidence of hidden delinquency." *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 16 (1946):686-96; in DD&C(69).
- Myerhoff, Howard L., and Barbara G. Myerhoff. "Field observations of middle class 'gangs.'" *Social Forces* 42 (1964):328-36; in DD&C(69).
- Myers, Jerome K., Lee L. Bean, and Max P. Pepper. "Social class and psychiatric disorders: A ten year follow-up." *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 6 (1965):74-79; in LS&M.
- National Commission on Causes and Prevention of Violence. "Violent crime; Homicide, assault, rape, robbery," in DD&C(75).
- National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse. *Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972; excerpt in Rai.
- National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. "The crime of robbery in the United States," in DD&C(75).

- Newman, Graeme. "Normality and criminality revisited: A view from the sociology of deviance." *British Journal of Criminology* 10 (1970):64-73.
- Newman, Oscar. "Defensible space as a crime preventive measure," in DD&C(75).
- Nuttall, Ken. "The ideology of psychiatry." NDS, 1971.
- O'Donnell, John A. "The Lexington program for narcotic addicts." *Federal Probation* 26 (March 1962):55-59; in DD&C(69).
- Palmer, Jerry. "Thrillers: The deviant behind the consensus." NDS, 1971; in T&T.
- Palmer, Stuart. *Deviance and Conformity: Roles, Situations and Reciprocity*. New Haven, Conn.: College & University Press, 1970.
- Palson, Charles, and Rebecca Palson. "Swinging in wedlock." *Society* 9 (February 1972):28-37; in S&M.
- Parsons, Talcott. "Deviant behavior and the mechanisms of social control," chapter 7 of Talcott Parsons, *The Social System*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1951; excerpt in F&S.
- Pasamanick, Benjamin, Frank R. Scarpitti, and Simon Dinitz. *Schizophrenics in the Community: An Experimental Study in the Prevention of Hospitalization*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967; excerpt in DD&C(69).
- Pearce, Frank. "Cicourel's contribution to deviancy theory." NDS, 1970.
- . "Crime, corporations and the American social order." NDS, 1972; in T&T.
- Pearson, Geoff. "Misfit sociology: A study of scholarship and action." NDS, 1972.
- Phillips, Derek L. "Rejection: A possible consequence of seeking help for mental disorders." *American Sociological Review* 28 (1963):963-72; in Rus.
- Phillipson, Michael. "Juvenile delinquency and the school." NDS, 1970.
- Phillipson, Michael, and Maurice Roche. "Phenomenology, sociology, and the study of deviance," in R&M.
- Piliavin, Irving, and Scott Briar. "Police encounters with juveniles." *American Journal of Sociology* 70 (1964):206-14; in Rai.
- Polsky, Ned. *Hustlers, Beats, and Others*. Chicago: Aldine, 1967; excerpt in Dou(70a).
- President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. Task Force Reports: *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*, excerpts in DD&C(69) and DD&C(75); *Crime and Its Impact—an Assessment*, excerpts in DD&C(69); *Drunkennes*, excerpts in DD&C(69) and DD&C(75); *Organized Crime*, excerpts in DD&C(69) and DD&C(75); all publications, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967.
- Quarantelli, E. L., and Russell R. Dynes. "Looting in recent civil dis-

- orders: An index of social change." *American Behavioral Scientist* 11 (March–April 1968):7–10; in DD&C(69).
- . "Property norms and looting: Their patterns in community crises." *Phylon* 31 (1970):168–82; in DD&C(75).
- Quarantelli, E. L., and Dennis Wenger. "A voice from the thirteenth century: The characteristics and conditions for the emergence of a ouija board cult." *Urban Life and Culture* 2 (1973):379–400; in S&M.
- Quinney, Richard. "Is criminal behaviour deviant behaviour?" *British Journal of Criminology* 5 (April 1965): 132–42.
- . *The Social Reality of Crime*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970; excerpts in D&M and F&S.
- . "From repression to liberation: Social theory in a radical age," in S&D.
- Raffalli, Henri Christian. "The battered child: An overview of a medical, legal, and social problem." *Crime and Delinquency* 16 (April 1970): 139–50; in S&M.
- Rainwater, Lee, ed. *Social Problems and Public Policy: Deviance and Liberty*. Chicago: Aldine, 1974.
- Rainwater, Lee, and David J. Pittman. "Ethical problems in studying a politically sensitive and deviant community." *Social Problems* 14 (1967): 357–66.
- Ray, Marsh B. "The cycle of abstinence and relapse among heroin addicts." *Social Problems* 9 (1961):132–40; in Bec, Rus, and R&W.
- Ray, Oakley. *Drugs, Society, and Human Behavior*. St. Louis: C. V. Mosby, 1972; excerpt in DD&C(75).
- Reichstein, Kenneth J. "Ambulance chasing: A case study of deviation and control within the legal profession." *Social Problems* 13 (1965):3–17; in ViV.
- Reiss, Albert J., Jr. "The social integration of queers and peers." *Social Problems* 9 (1961):102–20; in Bec, Ben, R&W, and ViV; with adaptations in Rus.
- . "The study of deviant behavior: Where the action is." *Ohio Valley Sociologist* 32 (Autumn 1966):1–12; in LS&M.
- . "Police brutality—answers to key questions." *Trans-action* 5 (July–August 1968):10–19; in Rai.
- Riddell, Carol. "Transvestism and the tyranny of gender." NDS, 1972.
- Riedel, Marc, and Terence P. Thornberry, eds. *Crime and Delinquency: Dimensions of Deviance*. New York: Praeger, 1975.
- Robertson, Roland, and Laurie Taylor. "Problems in the comparative analysis of deviance: A survey and a proposal," in R&M.
- . *Deviance, Crime and Socio-Legal Control: Comparative Perspectives*. London: Martin Robertson, 1973.
- Robins, Eli, Seymour Gassner, Jack Kayes, Robert H. Wilkinson, Jr., and George E. Murphy. "The communication of suicidal intent: A study of 134 consecutive cases of successful (completed) suicide." *American Journal of Psychiatry* 115 (1959):724–33; in Rus.

- Robins, Lee N. *Deviant Children Grown Up: A Sociological and Psychiatric Study of Sociopathic Personality*. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1966.
- Robins, Lee N., Harry Gyman, and Patricia O'Neal. "The interaction of social class and deviant behavior." *American Sociological Review* 27 (1962):480-92; in Rus.
- Roby, Pamela A. "Prostitution and criminal law: Revision of the New York State Penal Law on prostitution." *Social Problems* 17 (1969): 83-109; in Rai.
- Rock, Paul. "The police as agents of social control." NDS, 1968.
- . "Phenomenalism and essentialism in the sociology of deviance." NDS, 1972.
- . *Deviant Behaviour*. London: Hutchinson, 1973.
- Rock, Paul, and Mary McIntosh, eds. *Deviance and Social Control*. London: Tavistock (for British Sociological Association), 1974.
- Roebuck, Julian B. *Criminal Typology: The Legalistic, Physical-Constitutional-Hereditary, Psychological-Psychiatric and Sociological Approaches*. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1967; excerpt, "The numbers man," in DD&C(69) and DD&C(75).
- Roebuck, Julian, and D. Wood Harper, Jr. "The after-hours club: A study in organizational deviancy," in F. Adler and G. O. W. Mueller, eds., *Politics, Crime and the International Scene: An Interamerican Focus*. Ponce de Leon, P.R.: North-South Press, 1972; in DD&C(75).
- Roebuck, Julian B., and Robert Bruce Hunter. "Medical quackery as deviant behavior." *Criminology* 8 (1970):46-62; in S&M.
- Roebuck, Julian B., and Ronald Johnson. "The jack-of-all-trades offender: A comparative study." *Crime and Delinquency* 8 (1962): 172-81; in Rus.
- Rooney, James F. "Group processes among Skid Row winos: A reevaluation of the undersocialization hypothesis." *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol* 22 (1961):444-60; in Rus.
- Rosenhan, D. L. "On being sane in insane places." *Science* 179 (1973): 250-58; in DD&C(75).
- Rosenthal, Robert, and Lenore Jacobson. "Teachers' expectancies: Determinants of pupils' IQ gains." *Psychological Reports* 19 (1966):115-18; in S&M.
- Roshier, Bob. "Crime reporting and the press." NDS, 1971.
- Roth, Julius A. "Some contingencies of the moral evaluation and control of clientele: The case of the hospital emergency service." *American Journal of Sociology* 77 (1972): 839-56; in Ben and ViV.
- Rothman, David J. "Of prisons, asylums, and other decaying institutions." *The Public Interest* no. 26 (Winter 1972):3-17; in Rai (title changed).
- Rubington, Earl. "The bottle gang." *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol* 29 (1968):943-55; revised in R&W (title changed).
- Rubington, Earl, and Martin S. Weinberg, eds. *Deviance: The Interactionist Perspective: Text and Readings in the Sociology of Deviance*. New York: Macmillan, 1st ed., 1968; 2d ed., 1973.

- Rush, Gary B. "Status consistency and right-wing extremism." *American Sociological Review* 32 (1967):86-92; expanded in LS&M.
- Rushing, William A. "Role conflict and alcoholism," in Rus.
- . "Suicide as a possible consequence of alcoholism," in Rus.
- , ed. *Deviant Behavior and Social Process*. Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1969.
- Sagarin, Edward. "Voluntary associations among social deviants." *Criminologica* 5 (May 1967):8-22; in DD&C(75).
- . "Anonymity, Incorporated: The marginal world of organized deviants." *Salmagundi* 2 (Spring 1968): 27-42.
- . "Ideology as a factor in the consideration of deviance." *Journal of Sex Research* 4 (1968):84-94.
- . *Odd Man In: Societies of Deviants in America*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969; reprinted, New York: Franklin Watts—New Viewpoints; excerpt in DD&C(75).
- . "Behind the Gay Liberation Front." *The Realist* no. 87 (May-June 1970):1,17-23; in D&M (title changed).
- . "The research setting and the right not to be researched." *Social Problems* 21 (1973):52-64.
- , ed. *The Other Minorities: Nonethnic Collectivities Conceptualized as Minority Groups*. Waltham, Mass.: Xerox College Pubg., 1971.
- Sagarin, Edward, and Donal E. J. MacNamara. "The problem of entrapment." *Crime and Delinquency* 16 (1970):363-78.
- Sampson, Harold, Sheldon L. Messinger, and Robert D. Towne. "Family processes and becoming a mental patient." *American Journal of Sociology* 68 (1962):88-96; in R&W.
- Sampson, Harold, Sheldon L. Messinger, Robert D. Towne, David Ross, Florine Livson, Mary-Dee Bowers, Lester Cohen, and Kate S. Dorst. "The mental hospital and marital family ties." *Social Problems* 9 (1961): 141-55; in Bec.
- Scarpitti, Frank, and Paul T. McFarlane, eds. *Deviance: Action, Reaction, Interaction*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975.
- Scheff, Thomas J. "The role of the mentally ill and the dynamics of mental disorder: A research framework." *Sociometry* 26(1963):436-52; in DD&C(69), DD&C(75), Rai, and S&M.
- . "The societal reaction to deviance: Ascriptive elements in the psychiatric screening of mental patients in a Midwestern state." *Social Problems* 11 (1964):401-13; in Ben, R&W (title changed), and Rus.
- . *Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory*. Chicago: Aldine, 1966; excerpts in F&S.
- . "Typification in the diagnostic practices of rehabilitation agencies," in Sussman (1966); in R&W.
- Scheff, Thomas J., and Eric Sundstrom. "The stability of deviant behavior over time: A reassessment." *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 11 (1970):37-43.
- Schelling, Thomas C. "Economic analysis and organized crime," in Presi-

- dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: *Organized Crime*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967; excerpt in D&M (title changed).
- Schervish, Paul G. "The labeling perspective: Its bias and potential in the study of political deviance." *American Sociologist* 8 (1973):47-57.
- Schur, Edwin M. "Drug addiction under British policy." *Social Problems* 9 (1961):156-66; in Bcc.
- . *Crimes Without Victims: Deviant Behavior and Public Policy—Abortion, Homosexuality and Drug Addiction*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965; excerpts in DD&C(69) and DD&C(75).
- . "Reactions to deviance: A critical assessment." *American Journal of Sociology* 75 (1969):309-22.
- . *Labeling Deviant Behavior: Its Sociological Implications*. New York: Harper & Row, 1971; excerpts in F&S and Rai.
- Schwartz, Michael, and Sheldon Stryker. *Deviance, Selves and Others*. Arnold M. and Caroline Rose Monograph Series. Washington, D.C.: American Sociological Association, 1970.
- Schwartz, Richard D., and Jerome H. Skolnick. "Two studies of legal stigma." *Social Problems* 10 (1962):133-42; in Bec, Ben, R&W, Rus, and S&M.
- Schwitzgebel, Ralph K. *Development and Legal Regulations of Coercive Behavior Modification Techniques with Offenders*. United States Public Health Service Monograph 2067; excerpt in DD&C(75).
- Scott, Joseph E., and Pamela A. Bennett. "Background and development of the use of the ex-offender." Monograph, Program for the Study of Crime and Delinquency, Ohio State University, Columbus, 1973; in DD&C(75).
- Scott, Marvin B. *The Racing Game*. Chicago: Aldine, 1968; excerpt in Dou(70a).
- Scott, Marvin B., and Stanford M. Lyman. "Accounts." *American Sociological Review* 33 (1963):46-62; in Fil.
- . "Paranoia, homosexuality and game theory." *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 9 (1968):179-87; in F&S.
- . "Accounts, deviance, and social order," in Dou(70b).
- Scott, Marvin B., and Roy Turner. "Weber and the anomie theory of deviance." *Sociological Quarterly* 6 (1965):233-40.
- Scott, Robert A. "The selection of clients by social welfare agencies: The case of the blind." *Social Problems* 14 (1967):248-57; in Fil.
- . *The Making of Blind Men*. New York: Russell Sage, 1969.
- . "The construction of conceptions of stigma by professional experts," in Dou(70b).
- . "A proposed framework for analyzing deviance as a property of social order," in S&D.
- Scott, Robert A., and Jack D. Douglas, eds. *Theoretical Perspectives on Deviance*. New York: Basic Books, 1972.
- Seull, Andrew. "Social control and the amplification of deviance," in S&D.

- Sedgwick, Peter. "Mental illness is illness." NDS, 1972.
- Seibel, H. Dieter. "Social deviance in comparative perspective," in S&D.
- Seiden, Richard H. *Suicide Among Youth*. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Mental Health, 1969; excerpt in DD&C(75).
- Sellin, Thorsten. *Culture Conflict and Crime*. Bulletin 41. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1938; excerpt in F&S.
- Shaw, Clifford R., and Henry D. McKay. *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942; excerpt in F&S.
- Shellow, Robert, and Derek V. Roemer. "The riot that didn't happen." *Social Problems* 14 (1966):221-33; in Rai.
- Sheridan, William H. "Juveniles who commit noncriminal acts: Why treat in a correctional system?" *Federal Probation* 31 (March 1967):26-30; in DD&C(69).
- Shneidman, Edwin S. "Classifications of suicidal phenomena." *Bulletin of Suicidology* (July 1968):1-9; in DD&C(75).
- Shoham, Shlomo. *Crime and Social Deviation*. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966.
- . *The Mark of Cain: The Stigma Theory of Crime and Social Deviation*. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1970.
- Short, James F., Jr., and F. Ivan Nye. "Reported behavior as a criterion of deviant behavior." *Social Problems* 5 (1957-58):207-13.
- Short, James F., Jr., and Fred L. Strodbeck. "The response of gang leaders to status threats: An observation on group process and delinquent behavior." *American Journal of Sociology* 68 (1963):571-79; in Rus.
- Shover, Neal. "Structures and careers in burglary." *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology & Police Science* 63 (1972):540-49; in ViV.
- Silvers, Ronald J. "The modern artist's asociability: Constructing a situated moral revolution," in Dou(70b).
- Simmons, J. L. "On maintaining deviant belief systems: A case study." *Social Problems* 11 (1964):250-56; in Ben and R&W.
- . "Public stereotypes of deviants." *Social Problems* 13 (1965):223-32; in S&M.
- . *Deviants*. Berkeley, Calif.: Glendessary Press, 1969.
- Simon, William, and John H. Gagnon. "Homosexuality: The formulation of a sociological perspective." *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 8 (1967):177-85; in DD&C(69), DD&C(75), and LS&M.
- . "The lesbians: A preliminary overview," in Gagnon and Simon, eds., *Sexual Deviance*. New York: Harper & Row, 1967; excerpts in Dou(70a).
- Simons, Bernie, and Jeremy Smith. "Prospects for a radical legal profession." NDS, 1972.
- Skipper, James K., Jr., and Charles H. McCaghy. "Stripteasers: The anatomy and career contingencies of a deviant occupation." *Social Problems* 17 (1970):391-405; in ViV.
- Skolnick, Jerome H. *Justice Without Trial*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966; excerpt in R&W.

- . "Why cops behave the way they do." *New York World Journal Tribune*, October 23, 1966, pp. 12 ff.; in DD&C(69).
- Slocum, Kenneth. "Master swindlers." *Wall Street Journal*, May 23, 1962, pp. 12 ff.; in DD&C(75).
- Smith, Charles. "Mass education and deviance." NDS, 1972.
- Smith, Mike. "The sociology of mental illness: Ideology and research." NDS, 1970.
- Spiegel, Don, and Patricia Keith-Spiegel, eds. *Outsiders USA: Original Essays on 24 Outgroups in American Society*. San Francisco: Rinehart Press, 1973.
- Spradley, James P. "The moral career of a bum." *Trans-action* 7 (May 1970):16-29; in S&M.
- . *You Owe Yourself a Drunk*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970; excerpt in Fil.
- Stebbins, Robert A. *Commitment to Deviance: The Nonprofessional Criminal in the Community*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1971.
- Steffensmeier, Darrell J., and Robert M. Terry. "Deviance and respectability: An observational study of reactions to shoplifting." *Social Forces* 51 (1973):417-26.
- Stephenson, Richard M. "Involvement in deviance: An example and some theoretical implications." *Social Problems* 21 (1973):173-90.
- Stimson, Gerry. "Patterns of heroin addiction." NDS, 1972.
- Stoll, Clarice S. "Images of man and social control." *Social Forces* 47 (1968):119-27; in S&M.
- Strong, Phil. "Notes on the management of sexual interaction." NDS, 1969.
- Stubblefield, Keith A., and Larry L. Dyc. "Introduction to the offender as a correctional manpower resource." Joint Commission on Correctional Manpower and Training; in DD&C(75).
- Suchman, Edward A. "Accidents and social deviance." *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 11 (1970):4-15.
- Sudnow, David. "Normal crimes: Sociological features of the penal code in a Public Defender Office." *Social Problems* 12 (1965):255-76; in Rai, R&W, and S&M.
- Sussman, Marvin B., ed. *Sociology and Rehabilitation*. Washington, D.C.: American Sociological Association, 1966.
- Sutherland, Edwin H. *The Professional Thief*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937; excerpt in Rus.
- Sutherland, Edwin H., and Donald R. Cressey. *Principles of Criminology*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, various editions; excerpt in F&S.
- Svalastoga, Kaare. "Homicide and social contact in Denmark." *American Journal of Sociology* 62 (1956):37-41; in Rus.
- Sykes, Gresham M. "The corruption of authority and rehabilitation." *Social Forces* 34 (1956):257-62; in Rus.
- Sykes, Gresham M., and David Matza. "Techniques of neutralization: A theory of delinquency." *American Sociological Review* 22 (1957):664-70; in F&S, and R&W (title changed).

- Sykes, Gresham M., and Sheldon L. Messinger. "The inmate social system," in *Theoretical Studies in Social Organization of the Prison*, New York: Social Science Research Council, Pamphlet 15, 1960; in Rus.
- Szabo, Denis (with André Normandeau), eds. *Déviante et criminalité*. Paris: Armand Colin, 1970.
- Szasz, Thomas S. "The myth of mental illness." *American Psychologist* 15 (1960):113-18; in DD&C(69), DD&C(75), and LS&M.
- Tannenbaum, Frank. *Crime and the Community*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1938; excerpts in F&S and R&W.
- Tarde, Gabriel. *Penal Philosophy*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1912; reprinted, Montclair, N.J.: Patterson Smith, 1968; excerpt in F&S.
- Taylor, Ian R. "'Football mad'—a speculative sociology of football hooliganism." NDS, 1968; in Coh (title changed).
- . "Soccer in Mexico: Who gets the kickback?" NDS, 1970.
- . "Two new conflict theories of deviancy." NDS, 1972.
- Taylor, Ian R., and Laurie Taylor, eds. *Politics and Deviance*. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1973.
- Taylor, Ian R., and Paul Walton. "Values in deviancy theory and society." *British Journal of Sociology* 21 (1970):362-74.
- Taylor, Laurie. *Deviance and Society*. London: Michael Joseph, 1971.
- Taylor, Laurie, and Roland Robertson. *Deviance, Crime and Socio-Legal Control: A Comparative Approach*. London, 1973.
- Taylor, Laurie, and Ian Taylor. "We are all deviants now." *International Socialism* 34 (1968):28-32.
- Taylor, Laurie, and Paul Walton. "Industrial sabotage: Motives and meanings." NDS, 1969; in Coh.
- Teeters, Negley K. "State of prisons in the United States: 1870-1970." *Federal Probation* 33 (December 1969):18-23; in DD&C(75).
- Thio, Alex. "Class bias in the sociology of deviance." *American Sociologist* 8 (1973):1-12.
- Thomas, William I. *The Unadjusted Girl*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1923; excerpt in F&S.
- Thompson, Hunter S. *Hell's Angels*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1966, excerpt in Dou(70a).
- Thorsell, Bernard A., and Lloyd W. Klemke. "The labeling process: Reinforcement and deterrent?" *Law and Society Review* 6 (1972):393-403.
- Trice, Harrison M., and Paul Michael Roman. "Delabeling, relabeling, and Alcoholics Anonymous." *Social Problems* 17 (1970):538-46; in S&M.
- Truzzi, Marcello. "Lilliputians in Gulliver's land: The social role of the dwarf," in Truzzi, ed., *Sociology and Everyday Life*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968; in S&M and Sagarin (1971).
- Tudor, Andy. "Popular culture: Light fantasy—heavy baroque." NDS, 1972.
- Turk, Austin T. "Prospects for theories of criminal behavior." *Journal of*

- Criminal Law, Criminology & Police Science* 55 (1964):454-61; in Ben and LS&M.
- . "Conflict and criminality." *American Sociological Review* 31 (1966):338-52; in D&M.
- . *Criminality and Legal Order*. Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1969; excerpt in F&S.
- Turner, Ralph H. "Value-conflict in social disorganization." *Sociology and Social Research* 38 (1954):301-8; in LS&M.
- . "The public perception of protest." *American Sociological Review* 34 (1969):815-31; in S&M.
- . "Deviance avowal as neutralization of commitment." *Social Problems* 19 (1972):308-21; in Ben.
- U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee of the Judiciary. Report. "The diversion and abuse of methadone used to treat addicts," in DD&C(75).
- Vaughan, Diane. "The halfway house," in DD&C(75).
- Vaughan, Ted R., and Gidon Sjoberg. "The social construction of legal doctrine: The case of Adolf Eichmann," in Dou(70b).
- Vera Institute of Justice. "An alternative for the drunkenness offender: The Manhattan Bowery Project," in DD&C(75).
- ViVona, Charles M., ed. *The Meanings of Deviance*. New York: MSS Information Corp., 1973.
- Vold, George B. *Theoretical Criminology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958; excerpts in D&M and F&S.
- Volkman, Rita, and Donald R. Cressey. "Differential association and the rehabilitation of drug addicts." *American Journal of Sociology* 69 (1963): 129-42; in Ben and R&W.
- Voysey, Margaret. "Parents of the disabled." NDS, 1970.
- Wald, Patricia M. "Poverty and criminal justice," in President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: *The Courts*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967; in DD&C(69).
- Wallace, Samuel E. "Patterns of violence in San Juan," in Walter C. Reckless and Charles L. Newman, eds., *Interdisciplinary Problems in Criminology: Papers of the American Society of Criminology*, 1964. Columbus: Ohio State University College of Commerce and Administration, 1965; in DD&C(69).
- . *Skid Row as a Way of Life*. Totowa, N.J.: Bedminster Press, 1965; excerpts in DD&C(69) and R&W.
- Walsh, Dermont. "Deviant appearance and deviant action: Some hypotheses." NDS, 1969.
- Walton, Paul. "The case of the Weathermen: Social reaction and radical commitment." NDS, 1971; in T&T.
- Ward, David A., and Gene K. Kassbaum. "Homosexuality: A mode of

- adaptation in a prison for women." *Social Problems* 12 (1964):158-77; in ViV.
- . *Women's Prison: Sex and Social Structure*. Chicago: Aldine, 1965; excerpt in Dou(70a).
- Ward, Richard H. "The labeling theory: A critical analysis." *Criminology* 9 (1971):268-90.
- Warren, Carol A. B. "Observing the gay community," in Dou(72).
- Warren, Carol A. B., and John M. Johnson. "A critique of labeling theory from the phenomenological perspective," in S&D.
- Wattenberg, William W., ed. *Social Deviancy Among Youth*. Sixty-fifth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education. Part I. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966.
- Weinberg, Martin S. "Sexual modesty, social meanings, and the nudist camp." *Social Problems* 12 (1965):311-18; in Dou(70a) and LS&M.
- . "Becoming a nudist." *Psychiatry* 29 (1966):15-24; in Ben and R&W.
- . "The nudist management of respectability: Strategy for, and consequences of, the construction of a situated morality," in Dou(70b) and R&W.
- Weinberg, Martin S., and Colin J. Williams. "Fieldwork among deviants: Social relations with subjects and others," in Dou(72).
- Weinberg, S. Kirson. *Deviant Behavior and Social Control*. Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown, 1974.
- Weiner, Norman L. "The teen-age shoplifter: A microcosmic view of middle-class delinquency," in Dou(70a).
- Westley, William A. "Violence and the police." *American Journal of Sociology* 59 (1953):34-42; in Rus.
- Whalen, Thelma. "Wives of alcoholics." *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol* 14 (1953):632-41; in Rus.
- Wheeler, Stanton. "Socialization in correctional communities." *American Sociological Review* 26 (1961):697-711; in Rus.
- . "Deviant behavior," in Neil J. Smelser, ed., *Sociology: An Introduction*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967.
- Whiteley, Stuart, Dennie Briggs, and Merfyn Turner. *Dealing with Deviants*. London: Hogarth, 1972.
- Widgery, David. "The politics of the underground." NDS, 1972.
- Wiles, Paul. "Private security companies in the United Kingdom." NDS, 1970.
- Wilkins, Leslie T. *Social Deviance: Social Policy, Action, and Research*. London: Tavistock, 1964, and Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965; excerpt in F&S.
- Willis, Paul. "A motor-bike subculture." NDS, 1972.
- Wilson, James Q. "The police and the delinquent in two cities," in Stanton Wheeler, ed., *Controlling Delinquents*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968; in R&W (title changed).
- Winick, Charles. "The use of drugs by jazz musicians." *Social Problems* 7 (1959-60):240-53; with adaptations in Rus.

- . "Physician narcotic addicts." *Social Problems* 9 (1961):174-86; in Bec.
- Winslow, Robert W. *Society in Transition: A Social Approach to Deviancy*. New York: Free Press, 1970.
- , ed. *The Emergence of Deviant Minorities: Social Problems and Social Change*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, and San Ramon, Calif.: Consensus Publishers, 1972.
- Winslow, Robert W., and Virginia Winslow. *Deviant Reality: Alternative World Views*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1974.
- Wirth, Louis. "Culture conflict and misconduct." *Social Forces* 9 (June 1931):484-92; in F&S.
- Wiseman, Jacqueline P. *Stations of the Lost: The Treatment of Skid Row Alcoholics*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970; excerpts in R&W.
- Wolfenden, Sir John, et al. *The Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution*. London: Her Majesty's Printing Office, 1957; excerpt in DD&C(69).
- Wolfgang, Marvin E. "An analysis of homicide-suicide." *Journal of Clinical and Experimental Psychopathology* 19 (1958):208-18; in Rus.
- . "A sociological analysis of criminal homicide." *Federal Probation* 25 (March 1961):48-55; in Rus.
- Wolkon, George H., and Arden E. Melzer. "Disease or deviance: Effects on the treatment continuum," in LS&M.
- Wood, Arthur Lewis. *Deviant Behavior and Control Strategies*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974.
- Woodhill, David. "Ideology and responsibility in the juvenile court." NDS, 1972.
- Wootton, Barbara. "Social psychiatry and psychopathology: A layman's comments on contemporary development." Lecture delivered to the American Psychopathological Association, 1967; in DD&C(69).
- Wulbert, Roland. "Inmate pride in total institutions." *American Journal of Sociology* 71 (1965):1-9; in Rai.
- Wynn, Joan Ransohoff, and Clifford Goldman. "Gambling in New York City: The case for legalization," in Fund for the City of New York, *Legal Gambling in New York: A Discussion of Numbers and Sports Betting*; in Rai.
- X, Comrade. "The British campaign to stop immigration." NDS, 1973.
- Yablonsky, Lewis. "The delinquent gang as a near-group." *Social Problems* 7 (1959):108-17; in Ben, DD&C(69), R&W, and Rus.
- . "The anticriminal society: Synanon." *Federal Probation* 26 (September 1962):50-57; in DD&C(69).
- . "The problems of deviant research." *Criminologica* 6 (May 1968):10-13.
- Yarrow, Marian Radke, Charlotte Green Schwartz, Harriet S. Murphy, and Leila Calhoun Deasy. "The psychological meaning of mental ill-

- ness in the family." *Journal of Social Issues* 11, no. 4 (1955):12-24; in R&W.
- Yinger, J. Milton. "Contraculture and subculture." *American Sociological Review* 25 (1960):625-35; in D&M.
- Young, Jock. "The role of the police as amplifiers of deviancy, police as negotiators of reality and translators of phantasy." NDS, 1968; in Coh.
- . "The zookeepers of deviancy." *Catalyst* 5 (Summer 1970):38-46.
- . "The hippie solution: An essay in the politics of leisure," in T&T.
- . "Romantics, Keynesians and beyond." NDS, 1972.
- . "Mass media, drugs, and deviance," in R&M.
- Young, Jock, and Mary McIntosh. "Wide, camp and cool: A study of argot in three deviant groups." NDS, 1970.
- Young, Wayland. *Eros Denied: Sex in Western Society*. New York: Grove Press, 1964; excerpt in Dou(70a).
- Zimroth, Peter L. "101,000 defendants were convicted of misdemeanors last year: 98,000 of them had pleaded guilty to get reduced sentences." *New York Times Magazine*, May 28, 1972, pp. 14 ff.; in ViV.
- Zola, Irving Kenneth. "Observations on gambling in a lower-class setting." *Social Problems* 10 (1963):353-61; in Bec.
- Zurcher, Louis A., Jr., R. George Kirkpatrick, Robert G. Cushing, and Charles K. Bowman. "The anti-pornography campaign: A symbolic crusade." *Social Problems* 19 (1971):217-38; in ViV.

Index of Names

- Abrahamsen, D., 97
Agnew, S., 183
Aiehhorn, A., 99, 148
Akers, R. L., 136
Arnou, H., 161
Aubert, V., 199-200
- Baldwin, J. M., 315
Becker, H. S., 4, 7-8, 16, 34, 54,
122, 125, 130, 132-33, 135, 137,
140-41, 143, 225, 245, 299, 309,
341, 345, 350, 388
Beigel, H. C., 289
Benedict, L., 241-42
Benedict, R., 123, 215
Bensman, J., 375
Bentham, J., 377
Berger, P. L., 241, 247
Bergler, E., 142
Berrigan, P., 337, 386
Bettelheim, B., 101
Birenbaum, A., 201
Black, D. J., 7
Bloeh, H. A., 45
Blum, A. F., 195-96
Blumer, H., 258
Bonger, W. A., 155
Bordua, D. J., 133
Brophy, B., 170
Brown, J., 20, 100
Brown, N. O., 100
Brown, R., 127
Broyard, A., 325
Burke, K., 153
- Castro, F., 377
Cavan, R., 166
Cieourel, A. V., 224
Clarke, A. C., 333
Clinard, M. B., 7, 43, 103, 109,
215-16
Cloward, R. A., 104, 109, 171
Cohen, A. K., 4, 6, 76, 99, 297
Cohen, S., 5
Comstock, A., 376
Cooley, C. H., 315
Cosser, L., 328
Cressey, D. R., 112-15, 119, 242
- Dank, B., 149
Darwin, C., 78, 80
Datta, 75
Davis, F., 4, 17, 52, 130, 204, 211-
12, 240, 324
Davis, K., 161, 251
Denisoff, S., 127
Denzin, N. K., 239
Deutscher, I., 222
Devlin, P., 378
Dinitz, S., 333-37, 342
Donne, J., 396
Doob, A. N., 22
Douglas, J. D., 54, 103
Douglass, F., 242
Du Bois, W. E. B., 122, 235, 305
Durkheim, E., 27, 40, 46, 103-4,
136, 219, 371-72, 392
Duster, T., 27, 46, 367
Dynes, R. R., 333
- Eagleton, T., 183
- Cameron, M. O., 131, 142

- Edgerton, R. B., 283
 Eichmann, A., 27, 274
 Ellis, A., 88
 Ellis, H., 81
 Erikson, E., 100, 152
 Erikson, K. T., 130, 237, 399
 Esterson, A., 136, 143
- Farber, J., 244
 Faris, R. E. L., 44
 Ferracuti, F., 162
 Ferri, E., 81
 Finestone, H., 34
 Frank, L. K., 215
 Freedman, J. L., 22
 Freidson, E., 211
 Freud, S., 81-82, 88, 95-101, 148,
 151, 158, 215, 226
 Frias, S., 122
 Fromm, E., 100
- Gagnon, J., 150, 347
 Gandhi, M., 100, 323
 Garfinkel, H., 131, 323
 Gebhard, P. H., 150, 221-22
 Geis, G., 26
 Genet, J., 194
 Gerth, H., 271
 Gerver, I., 375
 Gibbons, D. C., 349
 Ginzburg, R., 387
 Glaser, B. G., 147
 Glover, E., 215
 Glueck, E., 75, 84, 86, 88, 92-94
 Glueck, S., 75, 84, 86, 88-89, 92-
 94, 117-19
 Goffman, E., 9, 14, 16, 47, 51-52,
 199, 205, 213, 222, 226, 232,
 240, 268, 283-84, 288-91, 294,
 302, 307-8, 315, 325, 334, 338,
 344, 355
 Goldberg, S., 102
 Goode, E., 139
 Goring, C., 81
 Gouldner, A. W., 4, 5, 35, 133,
 259
- Gusfield, J. R., 138, 330, 332, 337,
 342-43
- Hardman, D. G., 75, 84
 Hart, H. L. A., 378
 Hartjen, C. A., 129
 Hartl, E. M., 84
 Hartung, F., 75, 189, 215
 Hausner, G., 382
 Hawkins, G., 38
 Hawthorne, N., 294
 Healy, W., 93
 Hegel, G. W. F., 155
 Henslin, J. M., 5, 236
 Heywood, T., 20
 Hitler, A., 93, 100
 Hoffman, M., 139, 194, 366
 Homer, 20
 Hooker, E., 365
 Hooton, E. A., 82, 365
 Horney, K., 100
 Hughes, E. C., 18, 407
 Hughes, L., 224, 241
 Hughes, W. L., 235
 Humphreys, L., 150, 235, 241, 246
- Jacobs, J., 39
 Joyce, J., 20
- Kadish, S., 389
 Kafka, F., 321
 Kando, T., 348
 Kardiner, A., 143
 Karmen, A., 250, 256
 Katz, J., 42
 Keniston, K., 343
 Kennedy, J. F., 396
 Kenyatta, J., 235
 King, M. L., Jr., 93, 171, 323, 340,
 343, 396
 Kinsey, A. C., 150, 221-22, 224
 Kinsie, P. M., 222
 Kitsuse, J. I., 126-27, 130, 136-37,
 139, 141, 224, 290-91
 Kittrie, N. N., 140, 185, 362-63,
 381
 Klemke, L. W., 131, 142

- Kretschmer, E., 83
 Kriegel, L., 207, 213
- Lader, L., 231
 Laing, R. D., 126, 136, 143, 158,
 187-88, 285
 Lee, A. R., 285
 Lefton, M., 39
 Lemert, E. M., 5, 42, 110, 122-25,
 127, 129, 135, 138, 141-42, 158,
 188, 245, 337
 LeVine, R. A., 55
 Lewin, K., 401
 Liazos, A., 3, 406-7
 Lindesmith, A. R., 138, 367
 Lofland, J., 16, 126, 145, 158, 163
 Lombroso, C., 55, 80-81, 88, 122
 Lombroso-Ferrero, G., 55
 López-Rey, M., 221
 Lorber, J., 353
 Lorenz, K., 87
 Lorot, J., 124
 Luckmann, T., 247
 Luther, M., 100
 Lyman, S. M., 276
- Maccoby, H., 303
 MacNamara, D. E. J., 338
 Mankoff, M., 130-31, 142
 Mannheim, K., 247
 Manning, P. K., 44, 127
 Marcuse, H., 100
 Martin, C. E., 221-22
 Marx, K., 155, 157, 167, 226, 247,
 370
 Matza, D., 76, 118, 130, 138, 163,
 252, 273, 296, 301, 341
 McCallister, E., 386
 McCaghy, C. H., 39, 127
 McDermott, E., 84
 McGee, R., 45
 McHugh, P., 199
 McIntosh, J., 39
 Mead, G. H., 222, 226, 307, 315
 Means, R. L., 135
 Mcnninger, K., 214-15
- Merton, R. K., 8, 32, 62, 104-10,
 117, 122-23, 169, 295, 342
 Messinger, S. L., 199-200
 Michels, R., 312
 Mills, C. W., 154, 271
 Mitford, J., 252
 Montanino, F., 313
 Morris, A., 166
 Myrdal, G., 36, 346-47, 349
- Napoleon, 186-87
 Neill, A. S., 108
 Niederhoffer, A., 120
 Nietzsche, F., 95
 Nixon, R. M., 100
- Ohlin, L. E., 104, 109, 171
 Orwell, G., 53
 Ovesey, L., 143
- Packard, V., 167, 400
 Park, R. E., 35-37
 Parsons, T., 7, 54, 198-99
 Phillipson, H., 285
 Phillipson, M., 372
 Pittman, D. J., 254
 Polsky, N., 35, 122, 236
 Pomeroy, W. B., 221-22
 Pound, E., 181
 Proust, M., 194
- Quetelet, A., 219
 Quinney, R., 126, 129
- Rainwater, L., 254
 Reckless, W., 46, 170
 Redl, F., 272-73
 Reiss, A. J., Jr., 7, 233
 Reiss, I. L., 6-7, 54
 Rheinstein, M., 243
 Rieff, P., 100
 Riesman, D., 37
 Rogers, C., 75, 88
 Rokcach, M., 147
 Rooney, E. A., 349
 Rose, A. M., 45, 241
 Rosc, C., 241

- Rosenhan, D. L., 189
 Ross, H. L., 25
 Roszak, T., 295
 Ryan, W., 276
- Sagarin, E., 52, 150, 250, 256, 303, 338
 Sahlins, M., 258
 Salzman, L., 148
 Sartre, J.-P., 194, 241
 Schaff, A., 226
 Scheff, T. J., 56-57, 126, 130, 140-41, 144, 180-81, 183, 189, 191, 347
 Scheler, M., 327-28
 Schopenhauer, W., 95
 Schur, E. M., 8-9, 52, 126, 130, 139, 145, 293, 367, 380-81, 388, 403
 Schutz, A., 37-38
 Schwartz, R. D., 58, 128
 Scott, M. B., 276
 Scott, R. A., 126, 130, 211, 225, 403
 Sedgwick, P., 194
 Sellin, T., 28, 61, 159-61, 167-68, 286
 Sheldon, W. H., 83-84
 Shoham, S., 162, 286, 337, 340-41
 Simmel, G., 37, 157-58, 226
 Simmons, J. L., 341, 344, 350
 Simon, W., 150, 347
 Skinner, B. F., 88
 Skipper, J. K., Jr., 39
 Skolnick, J. H., 58, 128
 Sophocles, 96
 Srole, L., 188-89
 Stalin, J., 93, 100
 Stejneger, G., 68, 73
 Stevens, S. S., 83-84
 Stevenson, R. L., 270
 Stonequist, E. V., 35-37, 39
 Strauss, A. L., 147, 153-54, 247
 Sulcov, M., 301
 Sumner, W. G., 376, 378
 Sutherland, E. H., 26, 112-20, 138, 225, 378-79, 407
- Sykes, G. M., 252, 273
 Szasz, T. S., 126, 130, 136-37, 139, 180-81, 185-87, 214-16, 249, 337, 381
- Tannenbaum, F., 123, 129, 145, 158, 337
 Tappan, P. W., 138, 140
 Tarde, G., 112-13, 118
 Taylor, I. R., 87, 112, 339
 Thio, A., 406
 Thomas, W. I., 122
 Thoreau, H. D., 340
 Thornberry, T. P., 134, 142
 Thorsell, B. A., 131, 142
 Tillich, P., 152
 Toffler, A., 161
 Turk, A. T., 78
 Turner, N., 20
 Turner, R. H., 204, 292
- Ullerstam, L., 192
- Vesey, D., 20
 Vold, G., 75
- Walker, E. A., 181
 Walton, P., 87
 Washington, B. T., 205
 Weber, M., 235, 243, 271
 Weinberg, M. S., 122
 Wilde, O., 318
 Wilkins, L. T., 20-22
 Williams, C. J., 122
 Williams, R., 323
 Wilson, W., 100
 Wineman, D., 272-73
 Winick, C., 58, 128, 222
 Wirth, L., 158-59, 166, 241
 Wolfgang, M. E., 28, 61
 Wolpc, J., 88
 Woolf, V., 194
- Yinger, J. M., 295
 Young, J., 87
- Zimring, F., 38

General Index

- Aberrant-in-being, 334, 336
Abnormality, 40-43
Abolitionists, 139
Abortion, 50-51, 231, 382, 384, 387
Abortionees, 5, 50-51, 231, 239
Accidental deviance, 340-41
Accounts, 276
Addicts. *See* Drug users
Adultery, 317-18, 385, 389
Agencies of social control, 321
Agents provocateurs, 337-38
Aggression, inborn, 87
Albinos, 230-31, 239
Alcoholics Anonymous, 50, 229, 307-9, 311-12
Alcoholism, 50, 97, 99-100, 156, 228, 301-2
Alienation, 103
Aliens, 37-38
Alleviating stigma, 307
Alternate culture, 295-96
American Medical Association, 223
American Social Hygiene Association, 138
Anal types, 97
Anomic, 102-11, 121, 123, 144
Anonymity, 303, 305
Anti-Saloon League, 138
Anti-Semitism, 242
Anticipatory socialization, 306
Antisexual crusaders, 376
Apostates, 335
Appeal to higher loyalties, 273-74, 282
Army deserters, 250-59
Arrested development, 145
Associations. *See* Involuntary associations; Voluntary associations
Attitudinal studies, 223
Avoidance, 324, 354
Awkwardness, 354
Bad faith, 241-42
"Bad seed," 78
Bangladesh, rape in, 55
Bay of Pigs action, 396
Being and doing, 146-47
Bias of researcher, 246, 251
Biological theories, 78-89
Black Panthers, 312
Black protest, 306
Blackmail, 388-89
Blaming the victim, 252
Blindness, 225
Blue laws, 386
Body types, 83-86
Bolshevik Revolution, 155
Born criminal, 78, 81-82, 88
Born losers, 366
Boston Tea Party, 338
Bribery, 382
"Bringing out," 208
Camelot project, 258
Career deviance, 131
Careers in deviance, 137-38
Catharsis, 291
Children, attitudes of, toward deviants, 323-24
China, 156

- Chromosomal disorders, 86–87
 Civil disobedience, 340
 Civil rights, 394–95, 411
 Civil War, 411
 Class conflict, 155–65
 Coalitions of deviants, 312
 Collective deviance, 338–40
 Collective discrimination, 241–42
 Colonialism, 60
 Colostomy patients, 279
 “Coming out,” 280, 292
 Communes, 296
 Communism, 156
 Conceptualization, 62–63
 Condemnation of the condemners, 273–74
 Conduct norms, conflict of, 158–65
 Confederacy, 411
 Confidentiality and research, 252
 Conflict, 254–56, 392
 Conflict theory, 123, 155–65
 Conforming deviants, 353
 Conformity, 106, 169, 370–73
 “Congenital liars,” 153
 Consciousness-of-kind, 295
 Consensus in society, 54
 Constitutional theories, 78–89
 Containment, inner and outer, 170
 Contempt, 319
 Contexts, of awareness, 147; of deviant acts, 59
 Control moves, 283
 Counter-uncovering moves, 290
 Courtesy stigma, 52, 289–90, 322, 356
 Crime, and deviance, 24–33; functions of, 369–70; measurement of, 53–54, 61; quality of, 392–93; statistics on, 224
 Crimes without victims, 335
 Criminality and sickness, 199–200
 Criminalization, 24, 379
 Cultural heterogeneity, 400
 Cultural homogeneity, 398–99
 Cultural pluralism, 372
 Cultural relativism, 59–61, 78–79, 134, 382
 Cultural transmission, 112–21, 144, 208
 Culture conflict, 155–65, 274, 286
 Daughters of Bilitis, 311
 “Decadents,” 90
 Decriminalization, 277, 336, 367, 375–91
 Degradation ceremony, 131, 323
 Dehumanization, 319
 Denial of injury, 273
 Denial of responsibility, 273
 Denial of the victim, 273–74
 Depersonalization, 319
 Deprivatization, 280
 Deserters, 250–59, 335
 Destigmatization, 277, 362, 364, 366
 Deviance, avowal, 204, 210, 292; concept of, 3; as conflict, 338; definitions of, 6–9; dimensions of, 53–62; disavowal, 204; discouragement of, 364–65; as distinct from deviants, 46–53; explanations of, 67–171; functions of, 368–75; as immorality, 342; manufacture of, 136–37, 154, 337–38, 372; as martyrdom, 340; measurement of, 61; occasional, 340; as rebellion, 342–43; as rejection, 343; renunciation of. *See* Renunciation of deviance; sociology of, 405–12; tolerable levels of, 391–98
 Deviant, as alienated, 336–37; as criminal, 335–36; definition of, 9; deviants, 354; as freak, 333–34; as “sick,” 179–218, 336; as “sinful,” 334–35; as social creation. *See* Deviance, manufacture of; subcultures, 170, 294–302; as term of reproach, 16
 Deviants, counting of, 221–25; cynical, 330–31; deviating, 352–53; lists of, 3–5; methods of studying, 225–39; as minorities, 212–14, 239–44

- Deviation and deviance, 7
 Differential association, 112-21
 Differential opportunities, 171
 Disability, 365, 403-4; as deviance, 177-216
 Discreditability, 9
 Disguised observation, 233-39, 246, 252
 Disidentification, 152-54
 Disorganization, personal and social, 44-46
 Dissembling, 278-94
 Dissensus, 398-405
 Diversity, 363-64, 398-405
 Divorce, 364-65
 "Double failures," 107
 "Double outcasts," 354
 Drift, 341
 Drug addiction, 301-2, 335, 349
 Drug users, 5, 198-99, 364, 366-67, 389
 Drunkenness, 374, 390
 Dying patients, 147

 Eccentricity, 40-43
 Eclecticism, 74-76
 Economic crimes, 155-56
 Ectomorphs, 83-86
 Ego, 96
 Ego reinforcement, 300, 309
 Eichmann case, 274
 Embarrassment, 320
 Endomorphs, 83-86
 Enemy deviant, 330, 332-33
 Enforced therapy, 140, 185, 362-63, 381
 England, deviance in, 31
 Entrapment, 337-38
 Ethics of research, 246, 250-59
 Ethnic conflict, 164
 Ethnic groups, 239-44
 Ethnic marginals, 36
 Ethnic slurs, 316
 Ethnocentrism, 274, 409
 Ethology, 87-88

 Etiology, 139
 Evolution, 80
 Ex-convicts, 311
 Ex-patients. *See* Mental patients
 Exclusion, social, 316-17, 321, 329
 Excuses, 276
 Exhibitionism, 404
 Expressions of contempt, 316
 Expressive groups, 307

 False accusations of deviance, 285-86, 293
 False answers, 222-23
 Family, 168-69
 Feeble-mindedness, 91-92
 Feminism, 97
 Fixation, 145
 Folk crime, 25, 335
 Forgers, 299-300
 Formal organizations, 302-14
 Formal sociology, 157-65
 Freaks, 333-34
 Free will, 81
 Freudian left, 100
 Freudian vocabulary, 271
 Freudianism, 95-102, 121, 144

 Gamblers, 164, 309, 383
 Genius, as deviant, 22
 Genocide, 60, 134-35, 274, 319
 Geographic mobility, 167, 399-400
 Germany, Nazi. *See* Nazi Germany
 Getting caught, 280
 Goals of society, 102-11
 Going public, 280-81
 Goldbricking, 282
 Gossip, 58, 318, 324-25
 Group therapy, 305, 310
 Guilt, 315, 322
 Gusii, rape in, 55
 Gypsies, as marginals, 36

 Hallucinations, 147, 186-87
 Harc Krishna, 275
 Health, Education, and Welfare, Department of, 210

- Heretics, 335
 Heroic deviants, 341
 Heroin. *See* Drug users
 Heterogeneity, 165-71
 Hippies, 328, 363
 "Hitting bottom," 131
 Homecomers, 37-38
 Homosexuality, 146, 149-51, 192, 232, 292, 301-4, 332, 335, 347-50, 364-67, 377, 384, 387-89; pretended, 283-84; recognition of, 290-91
 Homosexuals, organizations of, 303, 311-12
 Humiliation, 316
 Humor, against deviants, 316, 325; for deviants, 325
 Hustling, 233

 Id, 96
 Identity, 144-54, 366
 Ideological bias, 262
 Ideological distortion, 132
 Ideology, 247-49
 Illegitimacy, 164
 Imitation, theory of, 112-13
 Immorality, 334
 Imperialism, 60
 Impotence, 287
 Impression management, 222, 232, 268, 278-94, 312
 Imputations of deviance, 282-83, 285-86
 Inborn factors, 80
 Incest taboo, 370
 Indifference, 224
 Informal controls, 141-42, 321-23, 326-27
 Informal sanctions, 56, 315-29
 Informers, 281-82
 Injustice collectors, 142
 Innovation, 106-7
 Insanity defense, 184
 Institute for Sex Research, 231
 Institutionalization, 277, 307
 Instrumental groups, 307
 Integration, 409

 Interaction, 136, 143; with disabled, 202; and labeling, 122
 Intergenerational conflict, 161
 Intergroup relations, 394-95
 Intermarriage, 260-64, 365
 Internalization of norms, 169-70
 Interracial marriage, 260-64
 Involuntary associations, 313-14
 Involuntary cliques, 313-14
 Involuntary deviants, 201-14, 303, 313-14, 322, 328-29
 Irrationality, inborn, 88
 Isness, 144-54, 269, 335

 Jazz musicians, 125, 137
 Jekyll-Hyde complex, 270
 Jews as marginals, 36
 Juvenile delinquents, 296-98, 301, 340-41

 Kent State, 407
 Kerner Commission, 394
 Kleptomania, 41, 183

 Labeling, 71, 121-44, 158, 194, 199, 201, 225, 245, 293-94, 321, 351, 366, 381-82
 Language, and deviance, 144-54, 270-76; of hostility, 316
 Latency, 96, 99, 147-49, 151
 Law and morality, 375-91
 Learned behavior, 366
 Learning theory, 112-21, 123
 Left-handedness, 22-23, 367, 401-2
 Legalization of deviant actions, 375-91
 Legions of Decency, 138
 Legislation of morality, 375-91
 Leprosy, 404
 Lesbians, 223
 Loners, 295
 Lynching, 17, 275-76, 326

Mala in se, 27, 32, 407
Mala prohibita, 27, 32

- Malingering, 282
 Management of deviance, 267-356
 Marginality, 34-40, 125
 Marihuana use, 137, 299, 349, 364-65, 388
 Marxism, 82, 104, 121, 126, 155-65, 369-70
 Marxist terminology, 271
 Masquerade as pleasure, 284-85
 Mass media, 118-19
 Master status, 341
 Mattachine Society, 303, 311-12
 Means and ends, 102-11
 Medical errors, types of, 191
 Medical model of deviance, 177-216
 Mental illness, 143, 177-216, 234-35, 249, 282, 332, 342; labeling of, 126; reality of, 190-201; simulation of, 189-90, 282
 Mental incompetence, 92
 Mental patients, 235, 310-11, 347
 Mental retardates, 232
 Mentality and deviance, 89-94
 Mesomorphs, 83-86
 Migration, 158
 Militancy of deviants, 312
 Minorities, deviants as, 239-44
 Minstrelization, 325-26
 Miscegenation, 388
 Misprision, 238
 Monetary success goal, 109
 Moral commitment, 396
 Moral crusade, 397
 Moral entrepreneurs, 137, 388
 "Moral imbecility," 89
 "Moral insanity," 89
 Morality, legislation of, 375-91
 Mores, strength of, 378-79
 Mothers for a Clean America, 138
 Motives. *See* Vocabularies of motives
 Multicausality, 76-77, 166
 Murder-and-suicide pact, 381
 My Lai, 409
 Narcotics. *See* Drug users
 Nazi Germany, 82, 135, 407
 Necrophilia, 192
 Neurotics Anonymous, 310
 Newcomers, 37
 Nonmarital sexuality, 23, 363-64
 Normalization, 205, 210, 277, 355-56
 Normals, burdens of, 354-56
 Normification, 355-56
 Normlessness, 105
 Norms, 12-14; conflict of, 158-65; determination of, 221-25; of deviants, 353; of everyday life, 56-58; neutralizing, 170, 272-76
 Numerical minorities, 18-24
 Nuremberg trials, 407-8
 "Nuts, sluts, and preverts," 3, 405
 Obesity, 53, 279, 309
 Obsolete laws, 386
 Occam's razor, 68
 Oedipal stage, 96
 Oedipus complex, 96-97, 101-2
 Office of Economic Opportunity, 210
 Oppression of mentally ill, 182-90
 Oral types, 97, 99
 Organizations, of deviants, 302-14; of disabled, 209-11
 Ostracism. *See* Exclusion, social
 Outsiders, 34, 125
 Outward-directed behavior, 337
 Overconformity, 208-9
 Overcriminalization, 389-91
 Paranoia, 142, 188
 Participant observation, 233-39
 Passing, 288-89
 Pathology, 40-43
 Patronization, 316
 Patterned evasion, 323
 Perjurors, 232
 Persecution fantasy, 187
 Personal disorganization. *See* Disorganization
 Personality and deviance, 89-94
 Perspectives on deviance, 67-171

- Phrenology, 92-93
 Physical disability, 126, 201-14, 222
 Physical types, 83-86
 Pluralism, 110, 171
 Political crime, 396-97
 Political deviance, 280, 373
 Political use of "sick" label, 181-82
 Pornography, 364, 377
 Positive deviance, 42
 Power relations, 304, 307, 332-33
 Power to condemn, 57-59
 Prejudice, 345
 Pretended deviance, 281-85
 Pretended illness, 282
 Pride of self, 300
 Prison riot, 339-40
 Privacy, 254
 Privacy and research, 251-59
 Private morality, 376
 Privileged communication, 237-38
 Prohibition, 376
 Projective tests, 91
 Prostitutes, 301-2
 Prostitution, 222, 377, 383; male, 233
 Protest movements, 305, 312
 Psychiatric injustice, 180, 381
 Psychiatric label, 182
 Psychoanalytic theory, 95-102
 Psychohistory, 100
 Psychological theories, 89-94
 Psychopaths, 90
 Psychotherapy, 193
 Public opinion pollsters, 223
 Punishment, 184
- Quality of life, 225, 391-95
Quecues, 12
- Race relations, 396, 409-10
 Racism, 82, 88, 93, 242, 316
 Radical nonintervention, 403
 Rape, 54-55, 378
 Rarity and deviance, 18-24
 Reaction formation, 96
 Rebellion, 107, 306
 Rebuke, 317
 Rehabilitation, 79, 139-40, 211, 277, 305, 356, 362
 Reification, 149
 Rejection of rejectors, 276
 Religious institutions, 168
 Renegades, 335
 Renunciation of deviance, 152-54, 277-78, 305-6, 356
 Repentant deviants, 330-31
 Research methods, 233-39
 Researchers, problems of, 226
 Respondents, credibility of, 232-33
 Responsibility, 135; and punishment, 184; of researcher, 259
Ressentiment, 327-28
 Retrcatism, 107
 Rhodesia, 23
 Ridicule, by deviant, 352; of deviant, 56, 323, 325
 Right not to be researched, 251-59
 Ritual, organizational, 302
 Ritualism, 107
 Role distance, 47
 Role encapsulation, 145
 Role engulfment, 145
 Role impairment, 201
 Role imprisonment, 145
 Rules, flexibility of, 11-14
 Rumor of deviance, 291
 Russian Revolution, 156
- Safety valve, deviance as, 374-75
 Salience of deviance, 60-61
 Samples, representativeness of, 231-33
 Sampling, bias of, 90-91
 Sanctions, informal, 315-29
 Scapegoating, 399
 Schizophrenia, 180
 Secondary crime, 381, 384-85, 388-89
 Secondary deviance, 132, 385
 Secondary deviation, 124
 Secrecy, 202, 268-69, 276, 278-94, 303; organizational, 302
 Secret deviance, 140-42

- Secret deviants, 287-91
 Secularism, 392
 Self-condemnation, 270
 Self-fulfilling prophecies, 122
 Self-image, 322
 Self-justifications, 270-76, 291
 Self-labeling, 144-54, 308-9
 Self-mockery, 326
 Self-presentation, 292
 Self-revelation, 291
 Seriousness of deviance, 60-61
 Sex deviance, 88, 145, 156, 185, 367, 374
 Sexism, 88
 Sexual conduct, 221-22
 Sexual crimes, 25
 Sexual relations, adult-child, 364
 Shame, 315, 322
 Shoplifting, 15
 Sick deviant, 330-32
 Sick role, 198
 Sickness, 179-216, 232, 342
 Skeleton in the closet, 289-90
 Skid Row, 35, 44, 300
 Skills of deviants, 116
 Slavery, 60
 Snowball effect, 263
 Soccer hooliganism, 5
 Social agencies for handicapped, 211
 Social change, 305-6, 373
 Social cohesion, 372, 398
 Social control, 370-73, 395
 Social Darwinism, 88, 378
 Social differentiation, 171
 Social disorganization, 43-46
 Social policy, 362-68
 Social problems and deviance, 43-46
 Social status of deviant, 58
 Societal reaction, unofficial, 315-29
 Societal reaction to deviance, 121-44
 Society for the Suppression of Vice, 138
 Somatotypes, 83-86
 South Africa, 23
 Soviet Union, 156
 Statistics on deviance, 221-25
 Status offenses, 335-36
 Stereotypes, 326, 343-54
 Stigma, 143, 198, 212-14, 240; alleviation of, 304; fallout, 52, 289-90; management, 344; of mental illness, 182-90; of physical disability, 204
 Stigmata, 81
 Strangers, 37-38
 Strategies of survival, 267-356
 Subcultures, 170, 193, 195, 294-302
 Subjects for study, 227-28; location of, 230-31
 Supercgo, 96
 Surveys, 223-24
 Survival patterns, 267-356
 Suspicions of deviance, 285-86
 Sweden, deserters in, 250-59
 Synanon, 308

 Tagging. *See* Labeling
 Temperament and deviance, 89-94
 Temporal changes in norms, 59-61
 Terrorists as deviants, 3
 Theories of deviance, 67-71; aims of, 68-77; self-validating, 72
 Therapy, 278; types of, 100
Today's Health, 223
 Tolerance, 403
 Total institution, 308
 Traffic violators, 58
 Traitors, 335
 Transsexualism, 292, 301, 348
 Transvestism, 289
 Triangulation, 239
 Tribal stigma, 239-44, 305, 334
 Types of deviants, 329-43
 Typologies of deviants, 329-43

 Ultraconformity, 306
 Unaware deviant, 286-87
 Unconscious motivations, 95
 Unconventionality, 43

- Underdog ideology, 132, 135, 247–49
Uniform Crime Reports, 221, 390
Upper-class deviants, 58
Upperworld crime, 396–97
Urbanization, 167, 392
Utilitarians, 377
- Value consensus, 54–55, 107, 110, 158
Value dissensus, 110
Value judgments, 15–18
Values, 254–56; of researcher, 249, 259
Venereal diseases, 404
Verstehen, 235
Victimless crimes, 371, 380–84
Victims, 133–34
Vietnam war, 181, 250–59, 283, 285, 331, 374, 396, 399, 407–9, 411
- Violence, 326; at sports events, 339
Visibility, 141, 279–81, 292, 305
Vocabularies of motives, 270–76
Voluntarism, 199
Voluntary associations, 302–14
Voluntary cliques, 313–14
Voluntary deviance, 270, 303, 365
- Wanderers, 37
War, rape in, 55. *See also* Vietnam war
Watergate, 109, 139, 273, 280, 331, 337, 395
Welfare recipients, 328
White-collar crimes, 407
White-collar criminals, 331
White House scandals, 407
Women's Liberation movement, 4, 88
- XYY chromosomal disorder, 86–87







9780275503307
2015-03-17 8:5

22