

The Danger of Child Sexuality - an interview with Michel Foucault

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MICHEL FOUCAULT: All three of us agreed to take part in this broadcast (it was agreed in principle several months ago) for the following reason. Things had evolved on such a wide front, in such an overwhelming and at first sight apparently irreversible way, that many of us began to hope that the legal regime imposed on the sexual practices of our contemporaries would at last be relaxed and broken up. This regime is not as old as all that, since the penal code of 1810 (1) said very little about sexuality, as if sexuality was not the business of the law; and it was only during the 19th century and above all in the 20th, at the time of Pétain or of the Mirguet amendment (1960) (2), that legislation on sexuality increasingly became oppressive. But, over the last ten years or so, a movement in public opinion and sexual morals has been discernible in favor of reconsidering this legal regime. A Commission for the Reform of Penal Law was even set up, whose task it was to revise a number of fundamental articles in the penal code. And this commission has actually admitted, I must say with great seriousness, not only the possibility, but the need to change most of the articles in our present legislation concerning sexual behavior. This commission, which has now been sitting for several months, considered this reform of the sexual legislation last May and June. I believe that the proposals it expected to make were what may be called liberal.

However, it would seem that for several months now, a movement in the opposite direction has begun to emerge. It is a disturbing movement - firstly, because it is not only occurring in France. Take, for example, what is happening in the United States, with Anita Bryant's campaign against homosexuals, which has almost gone so far as to call for murder. It's a phenomenon observable in France. But in France we see it through a number of particular, specific facts, which we shall talk about later (Jean Danet and Guy Hocquenghem will certainly provide examples), but ones that seem to show that in both police and legal practice we are returning to tougher and stricter positions. And this movement, observable in police and legal practice, is unfortunately very often supported by press campaigns, or by a system of information carried out in the press. It is therefore in this situation, that of an overall movement tending to liberalism, followed by a phenomenon of reaction, of slowing down, perhaps even the beginning of a reverse process, that we are holding our discussion this evening.

GUY HOCQUENGHEM: Six months ago we launched a petition demanding the abrogation of a number of articles in the law, in particular those concerning relations between and decriminalization of relations between adults and minors below the age of fifteen. A lot of people signed it, people belonging to a wide range of political positions, from the Communist Party to Mme. Dolto (3). So it's a petition that has been signed

by a lot of people who are suspect neither of being particularly pedophiles themselves nor even of entertaining extravagant political views. We felt that a certain movement was beginning to emerge, and this movement was confirmed by the evidence submitted to the commission reforming the penal code. What we can now see, then, is not only that this kind of movement is something of a liberal illusion, but that in fact it does not amount to a profound transformation in the legal system, either in the way in which a case is investigated or in the way it is judged in court. Furthermore, at the level of public opinion, at the level of the mass media, the newspapers, radio, television, etc., it is rather the opposite that is beginning to take place, with new arguments being used. These new arguments are essentially about childhood, that is to say, about the exploitation of popular sentiment and its spontaneous horror of anything that links sex with the child. Thus in an article in the *Nouvel Observateur* begins with a few remarks to the effect that "pornography involving children is the ultimate American nightmare and no doubt the most terrible in a country fertile in scandals." When someone says that child pornography is the most terrible of present scandals, one cannot but be struck by the disproportion between this - child pornography, which is not even prostitution - and everything that is happening in the world today - what the black population has to put up with in the United States, for instance. This whole campaign about pornography, about prostitution, about all those social phenomena - which are in any case controversial - only leads to one fundamental presupposition: 'it's worse when children are consenting and worse still if it is neither pornographic nor paid for', etc. In other words, the entire criminalizing context serves only to bring out the kernel of the accusation: you want to make love with consenting children. It serves only to stress the traditional prohibition and to stress in a new way, with new arguments, the traditional prohibition against sexual relations without violence, without money, without any form of prostitution, that may take place between adults and minors.

JEAN DANET: We already know that some psychiatrists consider that sexual relations between children and adults are always traumatizing. And that if a child doesn't remember them, it is because they remain in his subconscious, but in any case the child is marked forever, the child will become emotionally disturbed. So what takes place with the intervention of psychiatrists in court is a manipulation of the children's consent, a manipulation of their words. Then there is another use - a fairly recent one, I think - of repressive legislation, which should be noted because it may be used by the legal system as a temporary tactic to fill in the gaps. Indeed in the traditional disciplinary institutions - prisons, schools, and asylums - the nurses, teachers, and so on, followed a very strict regimen. Their superiors kept as close a watch on them as on the inmates. On the other hand, in the new agencies of social control, control through hierarchy is much more difficult. Indeed we may well wonder whether we are not witnessing a use of common-law legislation; incitement of a minor to commit an immoral act, for example, can be used against social workers and teachers. And I would point out in passing that Villerot is a teacher, that Gallien was a doctor even if the acts did not take place at a time when he was practicing his profession; that in 1976, in Nantes, a teacher was tried for inciting minors to immoral acts, when in fact what he had done was to supply contraceptives to the boys and girls in his charge. So the common-law appears to have been used this time to repress teachers and social workers who were not carrying out their task of social control as their respective hierarchies wished. Between 1830 and 1860, there already were laws directed specifically at teachers: certain judgements stated this explicitly. Article 334 of the Penal Code - which applied to certain persons, teachers, for example, and concerned the incitement of minors to

commit immoral acts - was invoked in a case that did not involve a teacher. So we can see the extent to which such legislation is ultimately looking for places where 'perverts likely to corrupt young people' might slip in. The judges were obsessed with this. They were unable to come up with a definition of the perversions. Medicine and psychiatry were to do it for them. In the mid-19th century they had one obsession: if the pervert was everywhere, then they must start tracking him down in the most dangerous institutions, the institutions at risk, among the populations at risk, though the term had not yet been invented. If it has been possible to believe for a time that there was to be a withdrawal of legislation, it was not because we thought that we were living in a liberal period but because we knew that more subtle forms of sexual supervision would be set up - and perhaps the apparent freedom that camouflaged these more subtle, more diffuse social controls was going to extend beyond the field of the juridical and the penal. This is not always necessarily the case, and it is quite possible to believe that traditional repressive laws will function side-by-side with much more subtle form of control, a hitherto unknown form of sexology that would invade all institutions, including educational ones.

MICHEL FOUCAULT: Indeed it seem to me that we have reached an important point. It is true that we are witnessing a real change: it is probably not true that this change will be favorable to any real alleviation of the legislation on sexuality. As Jean Danet has shown, a very large body of legislation was gradually promulgated, though not without difficulty, throughout the 19th century. But this legislation was characterized by the odd fact that it was never capable of saying exactly what it was punishing. Harassments were punished, but were never defined. Outrageous acts were punished; nobody ever said what an outrage was. The law was intended to defend decency (pudeur); nobody ever knew what pudeur was. In practice, whenever a legislative intervention into the sphere of sexuality had to be justified, the law on pudeur was always invoked. And it may be said that all the legislation on sexuality introduced since the 19th century in France is a set of laws on pudeur. It is certainly a fact that this legislative apparatus, aimed at an undefined object, was never used except in cases when it was considered to be tactically useful. Indeed, there has been a whole campaign against teachers. There was a time when it was used against the clergy. This legislation was used to regulate the phenomenon of child prostitution, so important throughout the 19th century between 1830 and 1880. We are now aware that this instrument, which possessed the advantage of flexibility, since its object was undefined, could no longer survive when these notions of pudeur, outrage, and harrassment were seen as belonging to a particular system of value, culture, and discourse; in the pornographic explosion and the profits that it involves, in this new atmosphere, it is no longer possible to use these words and to make the law function on this basis.

But what is emerging - and indeed why I believe it was important to speak about the problem of children - what is emerging is a new penal system, a new legislative system, whose function is not so much to punish offenses against these general laws concerning decency, as to protect populations and parts of populations regarded as particularly vulnerable. In other words, the legislator will not justify the measures that he is proposing by saying: the universal decency of mankind must be defended. What he will say is: there are people for whom others' sexuality may become a permanent danger. In this catagory, of course, are children, who may find themselves at the mercy of an adult sexuality that is alien to them and may well be harmful to them. Hence there is a legislation that appeals to this notion of a vulnerable population, a "high-risk population," as they say, and to a whole body of psychiatric and psychological knowledge imbibed from psychoanalysis - it doesn't really matter whether the psychoanalysis is

good or bad - and this will give the psychiatrists the right to intervene twice. Firstly, in general terms, to say: yes, of course, children do have a sexuality, we can't go back to those old notions about children being pure and not knowing what sexuality is. But we psychologists or psychoanalysts or psychiatrists, or teachers, we know perfectly well that children's sexuality is a specific sexuality, with its own forms, its own periods of maturation, its own highpoints, its specific drives, and its own latency periods, too. This sexuality of the child is a territory with its own geography that the adult must not enter. It is virgin territory, sexual territory, of course, but territory that must preserve its virginity. The adult will therefore intervene as guarantor of that specificity of child sexuality in order to protect it. And, on the other hand, in each particular case, he will say: this is an instance of an adult bringing his own sexuality into the child's sexuality. It could be that the child, with his own sexuality, may have desired that adult, he may even have consented, he may even have made the first moves. We may even agree that it was he who seduced the adult; but we specialists with our psychological knowledge know perfectly well that even the seducing child runs a risk, in every case, of being damaged and traumatized by the fact that he or she has had sexual dealings with an adult. Consequently, the child must be 'protected from his own desires', even when his desires turn him towards an adult. The psychiatrist is the one who will be able to say: I can predict that a trauma of this importance will occur as a result of this or that type of sexual relation. It is therefore within the new legislative framework - basically intended to protect certain vulnerable sections of the population with the establishment of a new medical power - that a conception of sexuality and above all of the relations between child and adult sexuality will be based; and it is one that is extremely questionable.

HOCQUENGHEM: There is a whole mixture of notions that makes it possible to fabricate this notion of crime or offence against decency, a highly complex mixture, which we do not have time here to discuss at length, but which comprises both the religious prohibitions concerning sodomy and the completely new notions, to which Michel Foucault has just referred, about what people think they know of the total difference between the world of the child and the world of the adult. But today's overall tendency is indisputably not only to fabricate a type of crime that is quite simply the erotic or sensual relationship between a child and an adult, but also, since this may be isolated in the form of a crime, to create a certain category of the population defined by the fact that it tends to indulge in those pleasures. There exists then a particular category of the pervert, in the strict sense, of monsters whose aim in life is to practice sex with children. Indeed they become perverts and intolerable monsters since the crime as such is recognized and constituted, and now strengthened by the whole psychoanalytical and sociological arsenal. What we are doing is constructing an entirely new type of criminal, a criminal so inconceivably horrible that his crime goes beyond any explanation, any victim. It is rather like that kind of legal monster, the term "attentat sans violence": an attack without violence that is unprovable in any case and leaves no trace, since even the anoscope is unable to find the slightest lesion that might legitimate in some way or other the notion of violence. Thus, in a way, public outrage to decency also realizes this, insofar as the offence in question does not require a public in order to be committed. In the case of "attentat sans violence", the offence in which the police have been unable to find anything, nothing at all, in that case, the criminal is simply a criminal because he is a criminal, because he has those tastes. It is what used to be called a crime of opinion. Take the case of Parajanov. When a delegation arrived in Paris to see the representative of the Soviet embassy to hand in a protest, the Soviet representative

replied: in fact you don't really know why he was condemned; he was condemned for raping a child. This representative read the press: he knew very well that this term inspired more fear than any other. The constitution of this type of criminal, the constitution of this individual perverse enough to do a thing that hitherto had always been done without anybody thinking it right to stick his nose into it, is an extremely grave step from a political point of view. Even if it has not reached the same dimensions as the campaigns against the terrorists, there are nevertheless several hundred cases going before the courts each year. And this campaign suggests that a certain section of the population must henceforth be regarded a priori as criminals, may be pursued in operations of the "help the police" type, and this is what happened in the case of Villerot. The police report noted with interest that the population took part in the search, that people used their cars to look for the pervert. In a way the movement feeds upon itself. The crime vanishes, nobody is concerned any longer to know whether in fact a crime was committed or not, whether someone has been hurt or not. No one is even concerned any more whether there actually was a victim. The crime feeds totally upon itself in a man-hunt, by the identification, the isolation of the category of individuals regarded as pedophiles. It culminates in that sort of call for a lynching sent out nowadays by the gutter press.

DANET: It is true that lawyers defending these cases have a lot of problems. But I should like to say something specifically about such problems. In cases like the Croissant affair, the terrorists' lawyers were regarded immediately as dangerous accomplices of the terrorists (4). Anyone who came into contact with the affair became implicated. Similarly, the defense of someone found guilty of an indecent act with a minor, especially in the provinces, has extremely serious problems, because many lawyers simply cannot take on such a defense, avoid doing so, and prefer being appointed by the court. For, in a way, anyone who defends a pedophile may be suspected of having some sympathy for that cause. Even judges think to themselves: if he defends them, it's because he isn't really as much against it himself. It's a serious matter, though it's almost laughable really, it's a fact known to anyone who has had to deal with such cases whether in the provinces or in Paris: it is extremely difficult both for the lawyer to defend such a case and even sometimes to find a lawyer willing to do so. A lawyer will be quite happy to defend someone accused of ten old ladies. That doesn't bother him in the least. But to defend someone who has touched some kid's cock for a second, that's a real problem. That is part of the whole set up around this new sort of criminal, the adult who has erotic relations with children.

I apologize for referring to history once again, but I think in this matter one can usefully refer to what happened in the 19th and early 20th centuries. When an open letter to the commission for the reform of the penal code was published and signatures placed at the bottom of this letter, it was remarked that a number of psychologists, sexologists, and psychiatrists had signed. What they were demanding, then, was the decriminalization of immoral acts with minors over the age of fifteen, a different regime for immoral acts with minors between fifteen and eighteen, abolition of the offense of public outrage etc., etc. The fact that psychiatrists and psychologists demanded that the law be brought up to date on this point did not mean that they were on the side of those who were subjected to such repression. What I mean is, just because one is involved in a struggle against some authority, in this instance, the legal authorities, this does not mean one is on the side of those who are subjected to it. This is proved by the example of Germany, where from the 19th century onwards, from 1870, a whole movement protested against a law that was aimed at homosexuals, paragraph 175 of the German penal code. It was not even a habitual crime. There was no need to be an acknowledged

homosexual; a single homosexual act was enough, whatever it may be. So a whole movement developed, made up of homosexuals, but also of doctors and psychiatrists, to demand the abolition of this law. But if one reads the literature published by these doctors and psychiatrists it becomes absolutely clear that they expected only one thing from the abolition of this law, namely, to be able to take over the perverts for themselves and to treat them with all the knowledge that they claimed to have acquired since around 1860. With Morel's "Treatise On Degeneracy" what we have is the setting up of a whole nosography of the perversions; and these psychiatrists were demanding in fact that the perverts be handed over to them, that the law should give up any dealings it may have with sexuality, which it speaks of so badly, in so unscientific a way, and that they should be able to treat cases in a perhaps less aggressive, less systematic, less blind way than the law; they alone could say in each case who was guilty, who was sick, and calmly decide what measures were to be taken (5). I'm not saying that things were reproduced in the same way, but it is interesting to see how the two authorities could be in competition to get hold of that 'population of perverts'.

MICHEL FOUCAULT: I'm certainly not going to sum up everything that has been said. I think Hocquenghem has shown very clearly what was developing in relation to the strata of the population that had to be "protected." On the other hand, there is childhood, which by its very nature is in danger and must be protected against every possible danger, and therefore any possible act or attack. Then, on the other hand, there are dangerous individuals, who are generally adults of course, so that sexuality, in the new system that is being set up, will take on quite a different appearance from the one it used to have. In the past, laws prohibited a number of acts, indeed acts so numerous one was never quite sure what they were, but, nevertheless, it was acts that the law concerned itself with. Certain forms of behavior were condemned. Now what we are defining and, therefore, what will be found by the intervention of the law, the judge, and the doctor, are dangerous individuals. We're going to have a society of dangers, with, on the one side, those who are in danger, and on the other, those who are dangerous. And sexuality will no longer be a kind of behavior hedged in by precise prohibitions, but a kind of roaming danger, a sort of omnipresent phantom, a phantom that will be played out between men and women, children and adults, and possibly between adults themselves, etc. Sexuality will become a threat in all social relations, in all relations between members of different age groups, in all relations between individuals. It is on this shadow, this phantom, this fear that the authorities would try to get a grip through an apparently generous and, at least general, legislation and through a series of particular interventions that would probably be made by the legal institutions, with the support of the medical institutions. And what we will have there is a new regime for the supervision of sexuality; in the second half of the 20th century it may well be decriminalized, but only to appear in the form of a danger, a universal danger, and this represents a considerable change. I would say that the danger lay there.

DISCUSSION

PIERRE HAHN: I simply would like to mention a work that appeared about ten years ago, but which seems to me to be rather important in the present context. It is a work on the personality of exhibitionists. On the one hand, then, there is this classification that leads to excluding a certain type of exhibitionist from what I would call the system of psychoanalytic reeducation and, on the other hand, it actually consists in returning, but in rather different ways, apparently to the notion of the born criminal. I just would like to quote this sentence from the book, because it seems to me significant and then I shall say why: "The exhibitionist perversion is a category of exhibitionistic perverts - exhibitionistic perversion

corresponds here to a phenomenon of radical amputation from part of the instincts, and this amputation takes place at a stage that is neither genital nor non-genital in sexual development, but in that still mysterious area where personality and instinct seem to me to be potential." Yes, we are back to Lombroso's notion of the born criminal, which the author himself had just quoted (6). It really is something present before birth, something that appears to be in the embryo; and if I mention the embryo it is because at the present time we are seeing a strong return of old methods, though perhaps wrapped up in new forms: methods such as psycho-surgery, in which, for example, homosexuals, pedophiles, and rapists might be operated on in the brain. On the other hand, certain genetic manipulations are being carried out: we had proof of this quite recently, especially in East Germany. All this seems to me very disturbing. Of course, it is pure repression. But, on the other hand, it is also evidence of a certain use of the critique of psychoanalysis that is in a sense quite reactionary, I would say, in inverted commas.

The expert referred to in the text I have quoted is called Jacques Stephani, a psychiatrist in Bordeaux who has contributed to the study of the exhibitionist personality. The expert actually says that the judge must act as one element in a process of therapeutic reeducation, except in the extreme case where the subject is regarded as beyond rehabilitation. This is the moral madman, Lombroso's born criminal. Indeed this idea that legislation, the legal system, the penal system, even medicine must concern themselves essentially with dangers, with dangerous individuals rather than acts, dates more or less from Lombroso and so it is not at all surprising if one finds Lombroso's ideas coming back into fashion. Society has to defend itself against dangerous individuals. There are dangerous individuals by nature, by heredity, by genetic code, etc.

Q: I would just like to ask Guy Hocquenghem, who gave us an outline of some examples of the repression associated today with this type of act, how can we create strategic alliances to fight in that area? The natural allies of this type of movement - which are, let's say, the progressive groups - are somewhat reticent about getting mixed up in this sort of business. Movements such as the women's movement are focusing their activities on such problems as rape and are succeeding in increasing the penalization of such acts.

HOCQUENGHEM: We were very careful in the text of the Open Letter to the Penal Code. We took great care to speak exclusively of an indecent act not involving violence and incitement of a minor to commit an indecent act. We were extremely careful not to touch, in any way, on the problem of rape, which is totally different. Now I agree with you on one thing, and that is that we have all seen the television program on rape and were all shocked by the reactions it aroused in France, some of which even went so far as telephone calls requesting the chemical castration of the rapists. There are two problems here. There is the problem of rape in the strict sense, on which the women's movement and women in general have expressed themselves perfectly clearly, but there is the other problem of the reactions at the level of public opinion. One triggers off secondary effects of man-hunting, lynching, or moral mobilization.

DANET: I should like to add something in reply to the same question. When we say that the problem of consent is quite central in matters concerned with pedophilia, we are not, of course, saying that consent is always there. But - and this is where one may separate the attitude of the law with regard to rape and with regard to pedophilia - in the case of rape, judges consider that there is a presumption of consent on the part of the woman and that the opposite has to be demonstrated. Whereas where pedophilia is concerned, it's the opposite. It's considered that there is a presumption of non-consent, a presumption of violence, even in a case where no charge of an indecent act with violence has been made, that is,

in a case in which the charge used is that of indecent act without violence, that is, with consenting pleasure - because it has to be said that this act without violence is the repressive, legal translation of consenting pleasure. It's pretty clear how the system of proof is manipulated in opposite ways in the case of rape of women and in the case of indecent assault on a minor. Q: Public opinion, including enlightened opinion such as that of the doctors of the Institute of Sexology, asked at what age there can be said to be definite consent. It's a big problem.

MICHEL FOUCAULT: Yes, it is difficult to lay down barriers. Consent is one thing; it is a quite different thing when we are dealing with the likelihood of a child being believed when, speaking of his sexual relations, his affections, his tender feelings, or his contacts (the sexual adjective is often an embarrassment here, because it does not correspond to reality), a child's ability to explain what his feelings are, what actually happened, how far he is believed, these are quite different things. Now, where children are concerned, they are supposed to have a sexuality that can never be directed towards an adult, and that's that. Secondly, it is supposed that they are not capable of talking about themselves, of being sufficiently lucid about themselves. They are unable to express their feelings about the whole thing. Therefore they are not believed. They are thought to be incapable of sexuality and they are not thought to be capable of speaking about it. But, after all, listening to a child, hearing him speak, hearing him explain what his relations actually were with someone, adult or not, provided one listens with enough sympathy, must allow one to establish more or less what degree of violence if any was used or what degree of consent was given. And to assume that a child is incapable of explaining what happened and was incapable of giving his consent are two abuses that are intolerable, quite unacceptable.

Q: If you were a legislator, you would fix no limit and you would leave it to the judges to decide whether or not an indecent act was committed with or without consent? Is that your position?

MICHEL FOUCAULT: In any case, an age barrier laid down by law does not have much sense. Again, the child may be trusted to say whether or not he was subjected to violence. An examining magistrate, a liberal, told me once when we were discussing this question: after all, there are eighteen-year-old girls who are practically forced to make love with their fathers or their stepfathers; they may be eighteen, but it's an intolerable system of constraint. And one, moreover, that they feel is intolerable, if only people are willing to listen to them and put them in conditions which they can say what they feel.

HOCQUENGHEM: On the one hand, we didn't put any age limit in our text. In any case, we don't regard ourselves as legislators, but simply as a movement of opinion that demands the abolition of certain pieces of legislation. Our role isn't to make up new ones. As far as this question of consent is concerned, I prefer the terms used by Michel Foucault: listen to what the child says and give it a certain credence. This notion of consent is a trap, in any case. What is sure is that the legal form of an intersexual consent is nonsense. No one signs a contract before making love.

MICHEL FOUCAULT: Consent is a contractual notion.

HOCQUENGHEM: It's a purely contractual notion. When we say that children are "consenting" in these cases, all we intend to say is this: in any case, there was no violence, or organized manipulation in order to wrench out of them affective or erotic relations. It's an important point, all the more important for the children because it's an ambiguous victory in that to get a judge to organize a ceremony in which the children come and say that they were actually consenting is an ambiguous victory. The public affirmation of consent to such acts is extremely difficult, as we know. Everybody - judges, doctors, the defendant - knows that the child was

consenting - but nobody says anything, because, apart from anything else, there's no way it can be introduced. It's not simply the effect of a prohibition by law: it's really impossible to express a very complete relationship between a child and an adult - a relation that is progressive, long, goes through all kinds of stages, which are not all exclusively sexual, through all kinds of affective contacts. To express this in terms of legal consent is an absurdity. In any case, if one listens to what a child says and if he says "I didn't mind," that doesn't have the legal value of "I consent." But I'm also very mistrustful of that formal recognition of consent on the part of a minor, because I know it will never be obtained and is meaningless in any case.

Translated by Alan Sheridan

Notes:

(1) Penal Code of 1810: Part of the Napoleonic Code. This group of 485 articles defines crimes, offenses, and misdemeanors as well as the resulting punishments. Promulgated February 12, 1810.

(2) Mirguet amendment: Promulgated July 18, 1960 as amendment to article 38 of the 1958 French constitution (October 4, 1958). It declared the necessity to fight against all threats to public hygiene and specifically names tuberculosis, cancer, alcoholism, prostitution, and homosexuality as objects of attack.

(3) Françoise Dolto. French clinical psychoanalyst whose research on children focuses particularly on the theoretical aspects of early maladjustment [Lawrence D. Kritzman].

(4) Klaus Croissant. The lawyer of the Red Army Fraction. He sought asylum in France but was the victim of extradition to Germany in 1978. Foucault took on the cause of Croissant and wrote many articles on his behalf in the NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR.

(5) Benedict-Auguste Morel (1809-1873). He studied the institution of the insane asylum in Europe and reformulated the coercive procedures used against the mentally ill.

(6) Cesar Lombroso (1836-1909). Italian founder of the science of criminology. Postulated a theory that distinguishes "normal" individuals from criminal types.